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PSYCHOLOGY 

AND 

NATURAL  THEOLOGY 


BY 

OWEN  A.  HILL 


Ethics,  General  amd 
Special 


PSYCHOLOGY    "' ''""n 

AND  ^^<iOlDi)iri^i^' 

NATURAL  THEOLOGY 


BY 
OWEN  A.  HILL,   S.J.,  Ph.D. 

Lecturer  on  Psychology 
Natural  Theology  and  Ethics  at  Fordham  University 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

1921 

All  rights  reserved 


COPTEIGHT,    1921, 

By  the  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 


Set  up  and  dectrotjped.     Published,  February,  1921 


3!m|iruni  pattBt. 

JOSEPHUS  H.   ROCKWELL,   S.J.. 

PraeposUus  Prov.  Mwrylandiae  Neo-Eboracenais. 


53'il|a  nbatat 

ARTHURUS  J.  SCANLAN,  D.D.. 

Censor  Librorum. 


^mptimntwc, 

PATRITIUS  J.  HAYES,  D.D.. 

Archiepiscopus  Neo-Eboracensis, 


Nbo-Ebokaci,  die  25  Novembris.  1920. 


PEEFACE 

This  volume  on  Psychology  and  Natural  Theology  is  the  re- 
sult of  years  of  experience  in  the  class-room.  It  has  at  least 
the  merit  of  being  thoroughly  tried  out  and  tested,  and  that  in 
itself  means  some  commendation.  With  help  from  his  teacher 
the  average  student  can  readily  grasp  its  contents,  and  raaturer 
minds  can  without  any  extraneous  aid  master  its  statements, 
and  champion  their  validity  against  all  opponents.  It  has  been 
the  author's  aim  to  combine  as  far  as  possible  the  conciseness 
of  the  text-book  with  the  fuller  flow  of  the  essay;  and  he  in- 
dulges the  hope  that,  while  consulting  the  needs  of  the  pupil 
in  class,  he  has  not  entirely  neglected  the  predilections  of  the 
general  reader.  Philosophy  and  rhetoric  are  no  enemies;  and 
the  thought  somewhat  accounts  for  the  extended  notice  Inger- 
soll  and  Verworm  get,  and  for  the  separate  article  on  Hypno- 
tism. Theology  contains  no  more  important  truth  than  the 
existence  of  God;  and  Ingersoll,  with  the  help  of  empty  argu- 
ments and  glittering  language,  is  responsible  for  not  a  few  of 
the  atheists  in  our  own  country.  In  all  Psychology  immortality 
and  free-will  are  the  dogmas  of  most  practical  worth ;  and  their 
opponents  appeal  for  support  to  the  reputed  learning  of  men 
like  Verworm.  Hypnotism  and  kindred  practices  of  devil- 
worship  will  continue  to  work  harm  till  stripped  of  their  mys- 
tery ;  and  right  psychology  is  the  single  remedy. 

While  deriving  no  argument  from  Church  or  Scripture  in 
matters  purely  philosophical,  the  author  never  hesitates,  when 
opportunity  offers,  to  mention  a  dogma  of  faith,  or  explain  some 
truth  contained  in  the  catechism.  When  constrained  to  trans- 
fer a  technical  term  of  Scholastic  Philosophy  from  Latin  to 
English,  he  selects  the  best  equivalent  at  his  disposal.  On  oc- 
casions he  multiplies  proofs,  not  because  they  are  individually 
weak,  but  because  truth  gathers  strength  and  force  when  viewed 
from  different  sides. 

When  reading  a  book  one  wants  to  know  primarily  what  the 

vii 


viii  PREFACE 

writer  himself  has  to  say,  not  what  others  have  to  say ;  and  this 
is  the  author's  excuse  for  the  meagre  disphiy  of  foot-notes,  and 
references,  and  quotations  in  his  work.  As  between  men,  the 
prestige  of  an  opponent  lends  no  intrinsic  value  whatever  to 
his  argument.  In  the  field  of  philosophy  every  individual's 
authority  is  worth  only  as  much  as  his  arguments.  xVrgumcnts 
from  authority  are,  perhaps,  the  weakest  in  all  philosophy,  wholly 
subsidiary  and  corroborative,  of  no  weight  with  the  wise,  with- 
out prior  and  independent  arguments  based  on  the  very  nature 
of  things;  and  the  common  consent  of  mankind  is  only  a  seem- 
ing exception  to  this  rule. 

Psychology  and  Natural  Theology,  all  the  Metaphysics  of 
Senior  Year  in  Jesuit  Colleges,  are  combined  in  the  one  vol- 
ume; and  this  makes  for  economy  as  well  as  for  convenience. 
Questions  are  thoroughly  explained,  without  sending  the  pupil 
to  other  sources  of  information.  The  discussion  of  diflBculties 
is  unusually  complete;  and  experience  quite  satisfies  the  au- 
thor that  nothing  in  all  philosophy  is  more  important  than  this 
solution  of  difficulties.  It  is  virtually  an  application  of  the 
Case  System  to  philosophy.  The  highest  kind  of  knowledge, 
the  only  kind  of  knowledge  really  worth  while,  is  certainty; 
and  certainty  is  incompatible  with  concrete  possibility  of  the 
opposite.  Certainty  is  out  of  the  question  as  long  as  any  single 
opposing  argument  remains  unanswered,  no  matter  how  many 
favorable  arguments  are  urged  in  defense  of  a  thesis  or  state- 
ment. Hence  the  supreme  need  of  being  able  first  to  compre- 
hend, and  then  to  answer  the  arguments  of  opponents. 

All  the  matter  is  done  into  set  and  concise  theses,  and  the 
Scholastic  method  of  presentment  is  strictly  adhered  to.  In 
religion  a  good  Catholic  can  be  nothing  but  a  devoted  son  of 
the  Church,  and  in  philosophy  he  can  be  nothing  but  a  thorough 
Scholastic,  an  enthusiastic  follower  of  St.  Thomas.  Pope  Leo 
XIII  forever  settled  that.  Eeligion  was  not  improved  by  the  so- 
called  Eeformation,  and  Luther  himself  on  no  few  occasions 
adverts  to  the  fact.  Luther  and  the  Eeformers  worked  no 
more  harm  to  faith  and  morality  than  Kant,  with  his  fore- 
runners and  followers,  worked  to  reason  and  philosophy.  Prot- 
estantism is  a  wilderness  of  religious  confusion,  and  modern 
philosophy  is  a  conglomeration  of  falsehoods,  beneath  the  con- 


PKEFACE  ix 

tempt  of  honest  and  healthy  minds.  AYe  have  small  respect  for 
modern  systems  in  philosophy,  with  their  pitiful  mistakes  and 
empty  rant,  culminating  in  mental  obliquity  and  religious  de- 
spair. Kant  was  a  disciple  of  Luther,  and  all  his  philosophy 
is  in  substance  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  disciple  to  give 
an  air  of  respectability  to  the  master's  principle  about  the  right 
to  private  judgment.  Kant's  autonomy  of  reason  is  but  a  de- 
velopment of  Luther's  individual  right  to  interpret  Scripture. 
One  is  key  to  Protestant  Ethics,  the  other  is  key  to  Protestant 
theology;  and  both  are  the  crown  and  consummation  of  Sub- 
jectivism. Translated  into  plain  English,  Kant's  categorical 
imperative  runs  this  way,  "  Act  as  you  think,  and  think  as  you 
like."  With  him  speculative  or  pure  reason  is  the  faculty 
which  thinks  things  in  themselves,  things  as  they  are;  and  it 
has  nothing  to  do  with  the  categorical  imperative,  or  with  any 
other  question  bearing  on  conduct,  God  or  the  Soul.  Kant 
writes  it  down  the  fruitful  cause  of  all  the  aberration,  confu- 
sion and  superstition  conspicuously  abundant,  he  thinks,  in 
Catholic  philosophy  and  theology.  With  him  practical  reason 
is  the  faculty  which  thinks  things  not  in  themselves,  not  as 
they  are,  but  as  they  are  in  us,  as  we  want  them  to  be;  and 
it  furnishes  him  with  his  categorical  imperative,  and  with  all 
his  certainty  about  the  existence  of  God,  the  reality  and  the 
immortality  of  the  soul.  His  practical  reason  subjects  think- 
ing to  wishing,  and,  because  it  partakes  more  of  the  nature  of 
an  appetitive  than  of  a  cognoscitive  faculty,  can  with  more 
propriety  be  called  the  will  than  the  reason.  And  when  a  man 
makes  his  will  the  standard  of  his  conduct,  his  descent  into  the 
abyss  of  wickedness  is  imminent  and  swift;  when  he  makes  his 
will  the  criterion  of  truth,  whatever  is  desirable  becomes  true, 
whatever  is  undesirable  becomes  false,  and  the  multiplication- 
table  needs  to  be  readjusted. 


CONTENTS 

PART  I  — PSYCHOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION: 

PAGE 

Philosophy  —  Definition  and  Division 1-4 

Psychology  —  Definition  and  Division 4-5 

Thesis  I.  Life  is  that  perfection  in  a  being  which  makes 
self-motion  or  immanent  action  possible  with  it.  We 
must  recognize  in  plants  a  life-giving  principle  essentially 
different  from  inert  matter  and  its  forces,  physical  and 
chemical.  Brute  animals  are  not  mere  automatic  ma- 
chines, but  they  possess  the  faculty  of  sense.  They  are 
nevertheless  without  intellect.  Universal  evolution  or 
Darwinism  is  therefore  absurd 6-33 

Thesis  II.  Sensation  is  an  immanent  and  cognoscitive  act. 
There  can  be  no  sensation  without  a  faculty  and  object, 
and  union  between  the  two  in  the  faculty.  Sensation  per- 
ceives the  outside  object,  not  its  species  or  image,  not  the 
organ  impression 34-45 

Thesis  III.  There  exists  in  man  a  spiritual  cognoscitive  fac- 
ulty or  intellect,  essentially  different  from  sense;  and  this 
faculty  has  truly  universal  ideas 46-54 

Thesis  IV.    Monism,  of  whatever  shape,  cannot  explain  the 

soul 55-62 

Thesis  V.  The  rational  soul  of  man  is  an  immaterial  sub- 
stance, in  its  existence  and  in  its  operations  intrinsically 
independent  of  matter.  The  rational  soul  of  man  is  a 
substance  physically  simple,  in  point  of  essence  and  in 
point  of  extension.  In  man  there  is  but  one  soul,  the 
life-giving  principle  of  his  intellectual,  and  his  sensible 
perceptions,  and  his  growth.  In  man  the  rational  soul 
and  the  human  body  are  so  united  among  themselves  that 
from    the    union    a    single    nature,    a    single    substance 

arises 63-82 

xi 


xii  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Thesis  VI.  The  soul  of  man,  even  when  separated  from  the 
body,  is  of  its  nature  capable  of  existence  and  life; 
neither  can  it  possibly  be  deprived  of  them.  The  soul  of 
man  will,  therefore,  live  forever 83-114 

Thesis  VII.  The  intellect,  to  understand,  has  need  of  the 
imprinted  intelligible  image  as  a  determining  principle. 
This  imprinted  intelligible  image  is  the  joint  product  of 
a  phantasm  and  the  working  intellect,  acting  as  partial, 
efficient,  subordinate  causes.  The  receiving  intellect  and 
this  imprinted  image  so  combine  as  efficient  causes  to  put 
the  act  or  idea,  that  the  idea  in  its  entirety  proceeds  from 
both  as  from  subordinate  causes 115-142 

Thesis  VIII.  There  exists  in  man  a  rational  appetite  or 
will,  which  can  desire  every  good  proposed  by  the  intel- 
lect, and  nothing  but  good.  All  the  objects  of  its  actual 
desires  must  in  some  measure  assume  a  relation  of  fitness 
with  the  subject 143-149 

Thesis  IX.  Man's  will  enjoys  freedom  of  choice,  and  no 
previous  judgment  holds  it  to  a  set  decision.  Fatalism, 
therefore,  and  Determinism  are  absurd     ....   150-182 

Thesis  X.     The  Truth  about  Hypnotism 183-195 


PAET  II  —  NATUKAL  THEOLOGY 

INTRODUCTION 197-199 

Thesis  I.  From  the  created  things  of  earth,  from  the  order 
apparent  in  the  physical  universe,  from  the  moral  order 
naturally  known  to  us,  finally,  from  the  common  consent 
of  mankind,  we  prove  a  posteriori  that  there  is  a  God  200-241 

Thesis  II.    God  is  infinite,  altogether  simple,  and  essentially 

one 242-262 

Thesis  III.  God  is  unchangeable,  as  well  physically  as  mor- 
ally.    He  is  besides  eternal  and  immense  ....  2G3-270 

Thesis  IV.  God  knows  all  past,  present,  future,  possible  and 
futurible  things 271-286 

Thesis  V.    God  has  a  will,  necessary  with  regard  to  Himself, 

free  with  regard  to  creatures 287-293 


CONTENTS  xiii 

PAGE 

Thesis  VI.  Creatures,  to  continue  in  being,  need  positive 
and  direct  conservation  on  the  part  of  God.  Creatures, 
to  act,  need  physical  and  immediate  cooperation  on  the 
part  of  God 294:-301 

Thesis  VII.  God's  cooperation  with  man's  free  will  is  no 
physical  predetermination 302-305 

Thesis  VIII.    God  and  evil 306-310 

Thesis  IX.  God's  cooperation,  viewed  as  something  outside 
of  God,  is  the  creature's  act,  proceeding  at  one  and  the 
same  time  from  the  creature  as  from  second  or  particular 
cause,  and  from  God  as  from  first  and  universal  cause  311-312 

Thesis  X.  Physical  predetermination  is  a,  useless  in  neces- 
sary agents;  &,  useless  in  free  agents  and  destructive  of 
free  will.     Simultaneous  cooperation  is  right  .      .     .  313-328 

Thesis  XI.    Providence  belongs  to  God 329-331 

Thesis  XII.  God's  providence  a,  extends  to  everything  cre- 
ated, and  h,  touches  man  in  a  very  special  way     .      .  332-335 

Thesis  XIII.  X,  God's  providence  over  all  is  immediate  and 
particular;  Y,  God's  a,  government  of  the  world  is  h,  in 
part  immediate*  in  part  mediate 336-338 

Index 339 


PSYCHOLOGY 
AND  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

PART  I— PSYCHOLOGY 

INTRODUCTION 

DEFINITION  AND  DIVISION  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

A  definition  is  a  collection  of  words  briefly  setting  forth  a 
thing's  yiature.  Division  is  the  breaking  up  of  a  whole  into  its 
parts.  Philosophy,  in  virtue  of  its  Greek  parentage,  means 
love  of  wisdom,  and  this  is  called  its  nominal  or  name  definition. 
Wisdom  itself  is  a  superior  sort  of  knowledge,  a  knowledge  that 
sticks  not  at  the  outward  surface  or  external  appearance  of 
things,  but  burrows  deeper,  and  in  such  sort  sifts  the  very  es- 
sence of  the  object  known,  that  human  effort  can  proceed  no 
farther  with  the  examination.  Philosophy,  then,  with  us  is 
knowledge  of  things  in  their  last  and  most  universal  causes, 
so  far  as  such  knowledge  is  attainable  by  the  light  of  7iatural 
reason;  and  this  is  called  its  real  definition.  With  the  old 
Romans  we  distinguish  three  ways  of  knowing,  set  forth  in  the 
Latin  terms  cognitio,  scientia,  sapientia.  The  English  equiva- 
lents are  Knowledge,  Science,  and  Wisdom.  We  cannot  better 
illustrate  their  differences  than  by  alleging  an  example.  A  man 
walks  along  a  public  thoroughfare.  The  common,  unsophisti- 
cated citizen,  viewing  him  from  a  distance,  has  knowledge  to 
the  effect  that  the  being  in  motion  is  what  we  usually  style  a 
man ;  but  he  can  give  hardly  any  reasons  for  the  knowledge  within 
him.  At  most  he  can  offer  but  very  imperfect  and  superficial 
reasons,  qualities,  for  instance,  that  might  equally  well  exist 
in  some  certain  animal  as  far  removed  from  man  as  day  from 
night.     This  common,  unsophisticated  citizen   is  possessed  of 

knowledge  in  its  rudest  and  simplest  state,  namely  experiment 

1 


2  PSYCHOLOGY 

and  authority.  Suppose  a  physiologist  near,  a  man  thoroughly 
acquainted  with  all  the  various  muscles,  bones,  sinews,  and  the 
whole  organism  of  the  human  frame.  He  is  of  opinion,  too, 
that  the  object  in  front  is  what  in  every-day  parlance  we  call 
a  man.  But  he  can  substantiate  his  opinion  with  solid  reasons. 
He  walks  upright,  not  on  all  fours.  He  has  arms  and  legs,  not 
fore-legs  and  hind-legs.  He  has  fingers  on  his  hands  and  toes 
on  his  feet,  that  preserve  due  proportions.  These,  indeed,  are 
good  reasons;  but  not  final,  not  what  our  definition  styles  the 
last  and  most  universal  causes.  They  are  not  the  last,  because 
there  is  one  farther  removed,  so  far  removed  in  fact,  that,  unless 
philosophy  suggested  it,  the  physiologist  would  be  in  continual 
danger  of  confounding  men  with  beasts.  They  are  not  the 
most  universal,  because  a  large  proportion  of  men  are  without 
one  or  other  characteristic.  Some  men  have  no  arms,  others 
have  no  legs.  Some  men  possess  more  than  the  requisite  num- 
ber of  fingers  and  toes,  others  are  wholly  without  them.  The 
physiologist's  knowledge  is,  of  course,  more  perfect  than  that 
of  the  unsophisticated  citizen.  It  is  called  scientific  knowl- 
edge, or  science.  A  philosopher  now  appears  on  the  scene.  He 
accosts  the  stranger,  holds  a  short  conversation  and  remarks, 
"  Here  in  good  sooth  is  a  man,  because  he  is  a  rational  animal." 
His  reasons  are  the  last  and  most  universal.  It  is  quite  im- 
possible to  hit  on  any  reasons  beyond.  They  are  besides  applic- 
able to  whatever  man  walks,  has  walked  or  will  walk  the  earth. 
The  intrinsic  absolutely  last  cause  of  a  thing  is  its  essence;  the 
extrinsic  absolutely  last  cause  of  things  is  God.  Things  in  our 
definition  comprise  whatever  exists  or  can  be  conceived  to  exist. 
It  is  perhaps  the  most  indefinite  noun  in  our  language.  It  in- 
cludes God,  the  angels,  man  and  the  material  world  or  universe, 
from  the  hugest  brute  in  the  jungles  of  Africa  to  the  minutest 
grain  of  sand  on  the  seashore.  The  word  cause  is  taken  to 
mean  whatever  by  way  of  answer  satisfies  the  question,  "  Why 
is  this  thing  such  or  such?"  Kant  makes  philosophy  a  fixed 
knowledge  of  the  laws  and  causes  of  reason's  spontaneity;  and 
with  him  everything  is  merely  subjective.  Wisdom  embraces 
all  that  God  knows.  It  is  an  abyss  that  man  can  never  hope  to 
fathom.  God  knows  everything  capable  of  passage  into  an  in- 
finite mind.  He  knows  things  not  only  in  their  proximate  or 
most  palpable  and  apparent  causes;  but  also  in  their  last  and 


INTRODUCTION  3 

most  universal  causes,  and  in  all  the  intermediate  causes  ranking 
between  the  proximate  and  most  universal  causes.  Our  knowl- 
edge, of  course,  is  less  wide.  Our  imperfect  philosophy  must 
rest  satisfied  with  knowing  some  few  or  many  things  in  their 
universal  and  last  causes,  without  attempting  to  trace  these  last 
and  universal  causes  through  such  as  are  proximate  and  inter- 
mediate. Pythagoras  on  this  account  refuses  to  denominate 
men  wise.  He  vindicates  this  attribute  to  God  alone.  He 
writes  himself  down  not  a  wise  man,  but  a  philosopher,  a  man 
in  eager  pursuit  of  wisdom. 

Division  is  the  separation  of  a  whole  into  its  parts. 

Plato  divides  philosophy  into  -real,  rational  and  moral ;  the 
philosophy  of  things,  of  mind,  and  of  will;  and  they  are  called 
Metaphysics,  Logic,  Ethics.     Hence  our  division: 


Philosophy 


.      [  Minor,  Dialectics 
J^ogic  I  Major,  First  Principles 

'  General  —  Ontology 
Metaphysics  i  r  Cosmology 

I  Special    -  Psychology 
Theology 


Ethics  ^ 


r  General 


[  Special 


Sir  Francis  or  Lord  Bacon  penned  a  wholesome  truth,  when 
he  wrote,  "  Leves  gustus  in  philosophia  movere  fortasse  possunt 
ad  atheismum,  sed  pleniores  haustus  ad  Deum  reducunt." 
"  Sips  of  philosophy  can  perhaps  lead  a  man  to  think  there  is 
no  God,  but  fuller  draughts  tend  ever  to  belief  in  His  exist- 
ence." We  fancy  with  reason  that  the  world  of  to-day  is  flooded 
with  atheists,  infidels,  and  empty  theorists,  only  because  the 
world  of  to-day,  while  spurring  on  its  votaries  to  unparalleled 
diligence  in  things  material,  encourages  them  to  skim  lightly 
over  facts  that  bear  on  the  mind,  the  spiritual  and  nobler  part 
of  man.  And  the  world  will  continue  dark  to  life  eternal,  until 
it  changes  its  method  of  studying  philosophy.  As  long  as  men 
rest  content  with  mere  dabbling  in  this  most  sacred  and  most 
sublime  of  the  natural  sciences,  so  long  will  there  be  presump- 
tuous scatter-brains,  ready  to  scoff  at  truths  too  hidden  and  too 
abstruse  to  be  taken  in  by  a  casual  glance.     This  is  all  true 


4  PSYCHOLOGY 

even  of  the  philosophy  that  Socrates,  Plato,  and  Aristotle,  long 
before  Christ's  coming,  taught  in  the  groves  and  the  highways 
of  Greece;  but  the  remark  gathers  additional  strength,  when 
applied  to  what  we  style  Catholic  Philosophy.  This  latter  is 
grounded  in  the  natural  resources  of  man's  intellect,  as  was  that 
of  the  pagans.  Divine  revelation,  though  it  forms  in  Catholic 
Philosophy  no  real  foundation  or  reason  for  the  acceptance  of 
truths,  has  nevertheless  suggested  to  later  times  sublime  ideas 
and  sublime  principles,  that  never  entered  into  the  mind  of 
Socrates,  Plato,  or  Aristotle.  This  fact  led  an  English  Jesuit, 
Father  Clarke,  to  say :  "  Catholic  Philosophy  is  not  a  system 
which  can  be  explained  in  half  an  hour  to  the  chance  inquirer. 
Its  principles  are  so  intimately  bound  up  with  the  Catholic 
Faith  that  it  is  to  the  non-Catholic  a  sealed  book,  an  unin- 
telligible mystery,  which  has  for  him  no  more  meaning  than 
an  utterly  unknown  language." 

DEFINITION  AND  DIVISION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

Maher,  pp.  1-26 

Psychology  is  the  second  branch  of  Special  Metaphysics ;  and, 
though  less  comprehensive  than  Cosmology,  is  far  more  impor- 
tant in  its  application.  Like  kindred  expressions  in  philosophy, 
it  is  a  Greek  term,  and  means  discourse  or  reasoning  about  the 
soul,  or  the  'principle  of  life  in  living  beings.  It  is  easy  to 
falsely  suppose  that  human  beings  alone  possess  souls.  They 
alone  possess  rational  souls,  but  the  tree,  as  well,  and  the  horse 
have  within  them  a  life-giving  principle,  that  truly  deserves 
the  name  soul.  Psychology,  however,  pays  small  attention  to 
beings  other  than  human,  and  examines  more  in  detail  that 
most  splendid  of  God's  works,  the  soul  of  man,  fathoming  as 
far  as  possible  its  hidden  secrets  and  veiled  mysteries.  It  dis- 
cusses the  peculiarities  of  life  in  plants  and  brutes.  It  sets 
down  and  elucidates  the  properties  and  characteristics  of  life 
in  man,  describes  the  union  prevailing  between  body  and  soul, 
strengthens  beyond  danger  of  loss  our  belief  in  immortality, 
offers  a  straightforward  and  satisfactory  solution  of  what  must 
forever  remain  a  partial  mystery,  the  joint  operations  of  in- 
tellect and  sense,  and  finally  furnishes  us  with  a  clear  insight 
into  the  workings  of  the  will  and  its  dread  power  of  liberty. 


INTRODUCTION  5 

The  Greek  word  for  soul  means  breath,  the  most  attenuated 
substance  within  experience,  and  is  another  tribute  to  early 
philosophy's  right  appreciation  of  the  soul's  spirituality,  and 
open  condemnation  of  modern  Materialism. 

Psychology  is  twofold,  empirical  or  phenomenal,  and  ra- 
tional. The  former  proceeds  by  way  of  experiment,  deals  chiefly 
with  results,  and  can  well  be  called  effect-psychology.  The 
latter  proceeds  by  way  of  reasoning  and  argument,  deals  chiefly 
with  the  faculties  themselves,  and  can  well  be  called  cause- 
psychology.  Two  methods  are  in  vogue  for  the  solution  of 
problems  in  empirical  psychology,  one  subjective,  the  other 
objective.  The  flrst  named  is  the  more  reliable  of  the  two  as 
well  as  the  more  immediate.  It  is  wholly  introspective,  based 
on  personal  consciousness  of  individual  mental  phenomena,  and 
borrows  its  information  from  inside  sources.  The  other  method, 
even  if  less  reliable,  and  more  mediate,  is,  when  employed  as 
an  aid  to  introspection,  quick  and  quite  satisfactory.  In  this 
second  method  the  student  ranges  beyond  the  fleld  of  his  own 
personal  consciousness,  and,  appealing  to  the  consciousness  of 
others,  borrows  information  from  outside  sources.  It  finds 
material  in  other  men's  minds,  in  language,  in  history,  in  ani- 
mal psychology,  in  physiology,  psychiatry  and  psychometry. 
Psychology  is  likewise  divided  into  Inferior  and  Superior.  In- 
ferior deals  with  characteristics  common  to  all  three  kinds  of 
life,  and  with  characteristics  peculiar  and  proper  to  plant  and 
brute  life.  Superior  deals  with  characteristics  exclusively  proper 
to  man. 


THESIS  I 

Life  is  that  perfection  in  a  being  which  makes  self-motion  or 
immanent  action  possible  with  it.  We  must  recognize  in  plants 
a  life-giving  principle,  essentially  different  from  inert  matter 
and  its  forces,  physical  and  chemical.  Brute  animals  are  not 
mere  automatic  machines,  but  they  possess  the  faculty  of  sense. 
They  are,  however,  without  intellect. 

Maher,  pp.  579-594;  Jouin,  pp.  151-161. 

QUESTION" 

In  this  first  thesis,  which  embraces  all  Inferior  Psychology, 
we  dispose  of  every  living  creature  but  man ;  and  so  make  ready 
for  the  large  work  before  us,  by  clearing  from  our  field  of 
view  a  multitude  of  beings  that  would  otherwise  darken  our 
vision.  Plants  of  whatever  description,  from  the  humblest 
mosses  to  the  fern-like  branches  that  seem  to  fold  their  leaves 
at  the  touch  of  a  hand,  fill  the  lowest  department  in  the  king- 
dom of  life.  Beneath  them  in  creation  are  ranged  anorganic 
or  lifeless  beings,  such  as  stones  and  minerals,  all  far  enough 
removed  from  them  by  manifest  and  specific  differences  to  make 
the  line  of  separation  always  possible  to  the  master  mind. 
Above  them  in  creation  are  ranged  beings  endowed  with  a  more 
perfect  life,  brute  animals;  while  at  the  top  and  head  of  visible 
creation  stands  man,  whom  God,  as  Scriptural  simplicity  puts 
it,  "  made  just  a  little  inferior  to  the  angels."  The  deep  im- 
portance of  this  thesis  may  not  at  first  sight  be  evident,  but  a 
moment's  reflection  about  what  Materialism  proposes  to  itself 
to  compass,  can  satisfy  the  most  incredulous  that  it  has  a  force 
of  its  own,  which  fully  entitles  it  to  the  conspicuous  place  it 
fills  in  psychology.  Materialism  would  persuade  itself  and  us 
that  spirit  is  a  myth  of  fairyland,  and  that  matter,  physical 
and  chemical  agents,  are  quite  equal  to  the  task  of  producing 
thoughts  or  ideas,  attributed  by  ordinary  mortals  to  a  spiritual 

6 


THESIS  I  7 

agency,  the  soul,  that  cannot  be  weighed,  or  measured,  or  an- 
alyzed in  the  laboratory.  If  Materialism  were  true,  regarding 
the  highest  kind  of  life  falling  under  our  immediate  expe- 
rience, we  should  scarcely  hesitate  to  affirm  that  these  same 
physical  and  chemical  forces  can  produce  whatever  phenomena 
in  the  life  of  plants  and  animals  elicit  our  wonder,  and  compel 
us  to  adopt  the  theory  set  down  in  our  thesis.  On  the  con- 
trary, we  base  all  psychology  on  the  indisputable  fact  that  even 
plants,  the  most  imperfect  sort  of  life  known  to  us,  contain 
within  themselves  a  principle  essentially  different  from  inert 
matter  and  its  forces.  Of  a  surety,  if  plants  call  for  such  a 
principle,  animals  and  men,  endowed  with  a  kind  of  life  far 
superior  to  theirs,  stand  in  still  greater  need  of  something  such ; 
and  so  Materialism  in  its  attempt  to  level  all  distinction  be- 
tween mind  and  matter  is  absurd.  Materialists  take  the  high- 
est order  of  life,  man,  and  pretend  to  explain  it  by  matter.  We 
take  the  lowest  order  in  life,  plant,  and  show  that  mere  matter 
is  no  adequate  explanation. 

TERMS 

Life.  The  word  life  admits  of  as  many  and  as  various  mean- 
ings as  the  word  nature.  At  one  time  it  means  conduct,  at  an- 
other it  is  applied  to  creatures  separated  by  an  immense  chasm 
from  all  notion  of  conduct.  This  much,  however,  may  be  said 
by  way  of  reducing  the  expression  to  something  like  oneness  of 
meaning.  Life,  as  we  use  it  here,  is  what  lies  at  the  base  of 
all  the  conceivable  notions  suggested  by  the  word.  For  it  is 
quite  plain  that  there  is  some  peculiar  feature  common  to  all 
the  beings  known  as  living.  Motion  is  this  feature,  and  we  are 
conscious  within  ourselves  of  acquaintance  with  this  peculiar 
feature  as  often  as  the  word  life  or  living  presents  itself.  An 
animal  is  alive  when  it  moves;  dead,  when  it  is  still,  as  St. 
Thomas  says.  Life  is  a  substantial  form,  and,  therefore,  an  in- 
complete substance,  which,  together  with  the  matter,  tree  or 
body  in  brute  and  man,  constitutes  a  single  living  substance. 
Life  taken  in  a  wider  sense,  and  with  a  marked  shade  of  differ- 
ence in  meaning,  may  be  considered  an  accidental  form;  inas- 
much as  it  gives  essence  and  specific  being  to  every  concrete 
and   individual   act   of   a   living   creature.     Accidental   life   is 


8  PSYCHOLOGY 

actual  self-motion  or  immanent  action;  substantial  life,  the 
basis  and  support  of  accidental,  is  mere  capability  or  possi- 
bility of  self-motion.  The  former  is  a  mere  accident  because 
it  simply  modifies  or  limits  an  accident,  such  as  are  all  the 
actions  of  plants,  brutes  and  men.  Substantial  life  is  for 
things  alive  being  or  essence;  accidental  life  is  superadded  to 
the  same,  and  is  resident  in  every  act  put  or  placed  by  the  liv- 
ing subject.  Substantial  life  is,  therefore,  capahility  of  self- 
motion  or  immanent  action;  accidental  life  is  the  manifesta- 
tion of  this  same  capahility  in  action. 

Life  in  actu  primo  is  a  substance;  life  in  actu  secundo  is  an 
accident. 

Life  in  actu  primo  physically  taken,  is  the  soul ;  in  actu  primo 
metaphysically  taken,  it  is  capacity.  Parallels  are,  rational 
animal  and  rational  animality. 

Defective  definitions  of  life: 

Bichat  describes  life  as  a  sum  of  the  functions  which  resist 
death;  Beclard,  as  a  sum  of  the  phenomena  peculiar  to  organ- 
ized beings;  Owen,  as  the  center  of  intussusceptive  assimilative 
force,  capable  of  reproduction  by  spontaneous  fission;  Comte,  as 
a  twofold  internal  movement,  composition  and  decomposition, 
at  once  general  and  continuous ;  and  Spencer,  as  the  continuous 
adjustment  of  internal  relations  to  external  relations.  All 
these  descriptions  are  defective  and  wrong,  because  they  halt 
at  effects  and  touch  only  accidental  life.  Philosophy  is  the 
science  of  things  in  their  last  causes,  not  in  their  effects;  and 
we  want  a  description  of  substantial  life. 

Self-motion.  Motion  is  of  so  many  different  kinds  that  the 
epithet  self  is  absolutely  necessary  for  the  full  conveyance  of 
what  we  mean  by  life.  There  are  a  motion  in  place,  a  motion 
in  time;  self-motion  and  motion  received  from  another;  mo- 
tion of  mind,  motion  of  body,  and  others  too  numerous  to  men- 
tion. But  the  idea  common  to,  and  invariably  found  at  the 
bottom  of,  these  several  notions,  is  that  of  change  or  passage 
from  one  state  to  another.  We  must  recognize  here  the  difft- 
culty,  that  God  possesses  life  without  experiencing  change.  Life 
is  not  univocal  in  God  and  creatures.  Hence,  two  definitions 
are  needed.  We  are  now  describing  life  as  it  exists  in  crea- 
tures. Created  life  is  in  God  in  an  eminent  way, —  with  all 
its  perfections,  without  its  imperfections.     Immanent  action  is 


THESIS  I  9 

characteristic  of  life  in  God,  too:  and,  though  it  produces  no 
change  in  God  Himself,  since  He  is  always  in  act,  it  fosters 
and  promotes  changes  in  others,  outside  of  God;  so  including 
within  itself  the  notion  claimed  above  to  be  common  to  life  in 
general.  Creatures  in  even  their  vital  or  immanent  acts  are 
moved  or  influenced  by  object  and  end;  God  moves  Himself 
altogether,  and  therefore,  God's  life  is  the  most  perfect  con- 
ceivable. Agent  in  immanent  act  determines  itself;  sight  is 
from  eye;  sight  of  this  or  that  is  from  object.  The  Scholastics 
thus  graphically  put  the  thing.  In  Deo  movens  et  motum  sunt 
perfecte  unum.  Dei  intellectus  est  Dei  substantia.  Deus  est 
sua  vita  in  actu  secundo.  And  they  mean  that  God  in  all  His 
acts  is  agent,  action,  object  and  end;  that  God's  intellect  is 
God  Himself  in  substance;  that  in  God  there  is  no  distinction 
between  substantial  life  and  accidental;  He  is  actus  purissimus, 
an  utter  stranger  to  mere  potency  or  capability.  Life  can  be 
viewed  in  a  threefold  way,  as  continuous  improvement,  as  self- 
motion,  and  as  immanent  action.  Its  conspicuous  feature  in 
plants  is  continuous  improvement;  in  brutes,  self-motion;  in 
man,  immanent  action.  All  three  are  manifestations  of  life, 
and  therefore  immanent  action.  Immanent  action  betrays  it- 
self in  plants  as  continuous  improvement,  and  so  of  the  rest. 

Immanent  action.  Immanent  is  only  a  Latin  expression  for 
indwelling  or  abiding  within,  and  has  for  opposite  the  term 
transient,  an  exact  equivalent  for  passing  from  one  thing  to 
another,  or  changing  position.  An  act  therefore  is  imman&nt 
when  it  stays  in  or  perfects  the  agent  from  which  it  proceeds, 
when  the  principle  or  originating  cause  of  the  act  and  its  term 
are  in  the  agent  to  which  it  is  ascribed.  All  really  vital  acts 
are  immanent,  and  from  this  very  fact  contribute  to  their  doer's 
perfection.  The  acts  of  inert  or  lifeless  causes,  like  molecules 
in  minerals,  are  transient,  contribute  nothing  to  their  improve- 
ment, and  either  proceed  from  a  principle  outside  the  agent  or 
have  their  finish  or  term  in  an  outside  object.  Light  proceed- 
ing from  the  sun  is  no  vital  act,  and  the  sun  is  not  a  living 
body,  because,  though  the  light  proceeds  from  the  sun  itself,  the 
term  of  the  act  or  illumination  is  in  other  bodies  distinct  from 
the  sun,  A  flow  of  water  is  no  vital  or  immanent  act,  because, 
though  the  term  of  the  act  is  resident  in  the  water,  its  prin- 
ciple is  in  gravity,  or  pressure,  or  some  such  external  force. 


10  PSYCHOLOGY 

Again,  in  this  matter  of  life  or  immanence  we  recognize  three 
different  principles,  the  principium  quod,  the  principium  quo 
remotum,  and  the  principium  quo  proximum;  and  immanence 
is  secured,  if  the  act  proceeds  from  and  terminates  in  any  of 
these  three  principles.  The  first  of  the  three  is  called  the  sup- 
positum,  or  the  whole  being;  the  second,  the  principle  of  life 
or  the  soul;  tlie  third,  the  faculty  employed.  These  three  fix 
the  varying  degrees  of  immanence.  An  act  terminating,  like 
a  thought  or  idea,  in  some  faculty  intrinsically  independent  of 
the  being's  material  element,  is  more  immanent  than  an  act 
terminating  in  a  faculty  intrinsically  dependent  on  such  an 
element,  or  in  the  whole  being.  Vegetation  terminates  in  the 
whole  plant;  sensation,  in  some  organic  faculty,  like  the  eye; 
thought,  in  an  inorganic  or  wholly  spiritual  faculty,  the  intel- 
lect. A  blow  is  a  transient  act  that  begins  in  the  agent  and 
finishes  in  outside  object;  it  is  immanent,  when  viewed  apart 
from  outside  object.  A  piece  of  stretched  rubber,  seeking  its 
normal  position,  is  not  alive;  because,  though  the  term  of  the 
act  is  in  the  rubber,  the  force  compelling  it  is  in  some  external 
agency,  namely  in  the  pull  that  previously  stretched  it.  Mo- 
tion in  the  rubber  is  exerted  to  attain  its  connatural  condition, 
no  ulterior  perfection.  It  is  a  case  of  flowing  water  and  grav- 
ity. Immanence  makes  life,  and  three  grades  of  immanence 
make  three  grades  of  life.  With  regard  to  the  principle,  mere 
execution  makes  plant  life;  execution  according  to  a  form  sen- 
sibly known  makes  brute  life;  and  execution  according  to  a 
form  intellectually  known,  with  a  view  to  some  end  not  deter- 
mined by  the  Creator,  but  fixed  by  the  agent,  makes  human 
life.  With  regard  to  the  term,  its  reception  or  residence  in  the 
whole  subject  or  agent  makes  plant  life;  its  reception  or  resi- 
dence in  a  part  or  organ  of  the  agent  makes  brute  life;  and 
its  reception  or  residence  in  a  faculty  altogether  independent 
of  the  agent's  organism  makes  human  life.  Again,  with  term 
for  viewpoint,  living  beings  take  to  themselves  something  from 
without.  Plants  take  elements  of  matter;  brutes  take  material 
images  or  sensations,  men  take  immaterial  images  or  ideas. 

Plants  : 

The  order  in  life  is,  plants,  brutes,  men.     St.  Thomas  says, 
the  more  self-motion,  the  more  life.     The  three  things  in  self- 


THESIS  1  11 

motion  are,  end,  sensible  knowledge,  intellectual  knowledge, 
with  choice  of  means.  Hence  we  have  plants,  brutes,  men. 
There  is  no  knowledge  in  plants,  only  execution;  in  their  case 
end  and  form  are  from  nature  and  from  without.  Knowledge 
is  had  in  brutes,  but  at  the  highest  mere  instinct;  they  have 
no  knowledge  about  the  relation  of  means  to  end.  Choice  of 
means  and  knowledge  of  end  as  such,  or  universal  knowledge, 
belong  to  men. 

With  the  philosopher-,  plants  are  beings  endowed  ivith  veg- 
etable life;  beings  capable  of  that  self-motion  or  immanent  ac- 
tion, which  manifests  itself  in  growth  by  the  peculiar  process 
styled  intussusception;  beings  able  to  nourish  themselves,  and 
produce  other  individuals  of  the  same  specific  complexion.  A 
snowball  grows  in  size  by  successive  additions  from  without, 
by  juxtaposition,  by  aggregation.  But  it  would  be  silly  to  ex- 
pect the  snowball  to  reach  out  for  neighboring  substances,  like 
soil  and  moisture,  put  them  through  a  series  of  transforma- 
tions and  change  them  into  snow. 

Plants  are  organic  bodies  without  sensation ;  but  distinguished 
from  inorganic  by  evolution,  propagation  and  structure. 

Our  adversaries  are  the  Cartesians  and  modern  physiologists. 

It  is  a  delicate  matter  to  determine  just  where  the  world  of 
vegetation  leaves  off,  and  where  the  world  of  inanimate  or  dead 
nature  begins.  Even  the  most  learned  quarrel  among  them- 
selves and  puzzle  over  the  question  whether  certain  beings,  to 
all  appearances  dead,  deserve  the  name  of  plant  or  not.  The 
philosopher  enters  no  such  controversy.  He  is  content  to  know 
that  whatever  tallies  with  the  above  description  is  a  plant,  and 
that  whatever  falls  away  from  it  belongs  to  some  higher  order 
of  life,  or  is  dead.  There  are  three  processes  in  plant  life, 
nutrition,  growth  and  reproduction  or  generation;  and  there 
are  three  corresponding  faculties  or  powers.  Nutrition  is  that 
process  by  which  an  organic  substance  changes  food  into  its 
own  substance,  to  preserve  itself  in  being.  It  differs  from 
growth  and  reproduction.  This  nutrition  constitutes  the  vital 
stream,  and  mends  the  wear  and  tear  entailed  by  life  on  the 
body  and  its  organs.  By  virtue  of  waste  and  repair  living 
bodies  within  certain  definite  periods  undergo  a  complete  change. 
Experiments  show  that  the  principle  of  life  affects  even  the 
bones  and  such  portions  of  the  animal  structure  as  seem  least 


12  PSYCHOLOGY 

vital.  Instances  are  poultry  and  pigeons  from  whose  food  cal- 
careous salts  were  extracted.  Nutrition  includes  absorption  of 
food  by  root  and  leaf  from  soil  and  air,  circulation  of  food- 
product,  breathing  and  exhalation.  By  day  the  leaves  absorb 
carbonic  acid  gas  in  the  atmosphere,  decompose  it,  and  retain 
the  carbon  to  exhale  the  oxygen.  By  night  oxygen  is  absorbed 
and  carbonic  acid  gas  exhaled.  Thus  equilibrium  is  preserved 
in  the  vegetable  and  animal  kingdoms.  The  waste  product 
of  plants  or  oxygen  is  food  supply  for  animals,  and  the  waste 
product  of  animals,  or  carbonic  acid  gas,  becomes  the  food- 
supply  of  plants.  Secretion  and  assimilation  are  other  func- 
tions of  nutrition.  Growth  is  that  vital  process  by  which  or- 
ganic substances  attain  to  their  due  size  by  assimilation  of  food. 
Reproduction  or  generation  is  that  vital  process  by  which  one 
living  being  derives  its  life  from  another  living  and  conjoined 
being,  with  specific  likeness  in  nature  for  result;  or,  as  St. 
Thomas  puts  it,  "  origo  viventis  a  vivente  principio,  conjuncto 
in  similitudinem  naturae."  1.  Q.  27.  a  2.  Explanation :  Life 
alone  can  produce  life,  to  exclude  abiogenesis  or  spontaneous 
generation.  The  term  must  be  alive,  to  separate  generation 
from  the  production  of  sweat  and  tears.  To  be  immanent  ac- 
tion, the  new  birth  must  be  conjoined  with  the  parent  during 
the  process  of  generation.  As  soon  as  separation  ensues,  gen- 
eration is  over.  The  hen  that  hatches  another's  egg  is  not  the 
chick's  mother.  Adam  did  not  generate  Eve,  because  the  mere 
removal  of  a  rib  has  no  natural  bearing  on  the  production  of 
a  specifically  similar  being.  Of  the  three  functions,  nutrition 
is  first  in  point  of  time,  last  in  point  of  dignity;  generation  is 
last  in  point  of  time,  first  in  point  of  dignity.  Generation  is 
effected  in  three  ways,  by  fission,  by  germination,  and  by  ovula- 
tion; by  multiplication,  by  bud,  by  Qgg.  Some  plants  and 
lower  animals  are  produced  the  first  two  ways.  The  third  way, 
uncommon  in  lower  orders  of  life  and  limited  to  their  more 
perfect  species,  is  proper  to  brutes  and  men.  In  fission,  orig- 
inal cell  breaks  into  several;  in  gemmation,  buds  arise  on  out- 
side of  living  body.  Two  principles  conspire  to  the  third  proc- 
ess, the  seed-cell  or  egg,  and  the  fecundating  principle.  The 
result  is  the  fecundated  egg.  Here  arises  the  old  difficulty 
about  the  precise  time  of  the  soul's  appearance  in  the  embryo. 
Old  writers  were  of  opinion  that  a  long  or  short  delay  had 


THESIS  I  13 

place.  It  is  to-day  a  common  opinion  with  theologians,  phi- 
losophers and  physiologists  that  the  soul  is  present  from  the 
first  moment  of  fecundation.  Spontaneous  generation,  or  the 
derivation  of  life  from  dead  matter,  is  a  theory  long  since  ex- 
ploded. Materialists  and  Evolutionists  greedily  swallowed  the 
theory,  to  escape  the  admission  of  God  and  a  soul.  But  sci- 
entists like  Pasteur  have  proved  conclusively  that  life  always 
has  its  origin  in  antecedent  life.  Worms  in  putrified  meat 
are  due  to  eggs  laid  hy  flies,  and  the  worms  are  the  larvae  of 
future  flies.  Worms  in  apples  and  pears  are  larvae  of  noc- 
turnal butterflies.  Pasteur  showed  by  experiment  that  no  life 
develops  in  a  liquid,  when  germs  are  completely  shut  out.  All 
appearances  of  spontaneous  generation  are  due  to  germ-deposits 
from  the  air.  Haeckel  and  Darwin  admit  that  spontaneous 
generation  is  a  postulate  of  Evolution.  There  is  a  wide  differ- 
ence between  modern  Materialism  and  the  old  Scholastics  in 
this  matter.  Scholastics  ascribed  everything  to  God  and  the 
planets.  Spontaneous  generation  is  opposed  to  experience  and 
reason.  No  instance  of  the  thing  can  be  adduced,  and  its  advo- 
cates appeal  to  earlier  times,  ages  back,  when  nature  was  younger 
and  its  forces  fresher;  as  though  the  specific  nature  of  these 
forces  had  undergone  a  change.  Eeason  cries  out  against  the 
theory,  because  no  effect  can  be  superior  to  its  total  cause. 

About  the  first  origin  of  life,  it  is  then  certain  that  living 
beings  are  not  sprung  from  minerals  or  dead  matter.  God  pro- 
duced first  life  with  the  cooperation  of  matter.  He  made  mat- 
ter fit  to  receive  life,  and  produced  life  in  this  prepared  matter, 
not  by  creation,  but  by  educing  vital  forms  from  it.  These 
first  organisms  could  have  been  seeds  or  perfect  plants  and  ani- 
mals of  full  growth.  He  could  have  made  all  the  different 
species  of  plants  and  animals  now  extinct  and  as  we  have  them, 
or  He  could  have  made  a  few  inferior  species  in  the  plant  and 
animal  kingdoms  from  which  the  others  were  successively 
evolved.  This  much  is  certain,  that  man's  soul  is  immediately 
created  in  every  individual  instance.  Adam's  body  in  the  ob- 
vious sense  of  Scripture  came  immediately  from  the  hands  of 
God,  without  any  process  of  evolution  from  lower  life.  Theolo- 
gians commonly  agree  that  at  least  the  lower  species  of  plant 
and  animal  life  came  immediately  from  God,  and  not  from 
natural  evolution.     The  souls  of  plants  and  brutes  are  substan- 


14  PSYCHOLOGY 

tial,  but  material  and  non-subsistent.  They  do  not  consist  of 
matter,  but  are  educed  from  matter,  and  are  intrinsically  de- 
pendent on  matter  for  their  being  and  activity.  They  cannot 
exist  apart  from  matter.  A  thing's  highest  operation  or  activ- 
ity settles  the  quality  of  its  being,  and  the  highest  operations 
of  plants  and  brutes  are  intrinsically  dependent  on  matter. 
Nutrition,  growth,  generation,  sensation,  cannot  be  exerted 
without  organs.  Man's  soul  is  intrinsically  dependent  on  or- 
gans for  vegetative  and  sensitive  life.  In  intellectual  opera- 
tions it  is  extrinsically  dependent  on  the  senses  or  matter,  and 
this  dependence  is  due  to  union  with  the  body.  Separated  from 
the  body,  it  can  thinlc  without  dependence  on  organs;  and  this 
constitutes  intrinsic  independence  of  matter.  Souls  of  plants 
and  brutes  are  not  created,  but  generated;  because  creation  has 
for  term  either  a  complete  substance,  like  an  angel,  or  a  sub- 
sistent  if  not  complete  substance,  like  the  human  soul.  The 
souls  of  plants  and  animals  are  not  immortal,  because  they 
perish  with  the  body's  organism. 

Life-giving  principle.  Soul  is  another  name  for  the  same 
thing.  The  eyes  cannot  see  this  life-giving  principle  in  plants, 
or  brutes,  or  men.  A  plant  cannot  be  boiled  down  to  secure 
it  by  evaporation  or  any  known  process  of  chemistry.  But  our 
knowledge  is  not  limited  to  the  visible  universe.  It  reaches 
beyond,  to  a  world  of  beings  too  closely  allied  with  the  intel- 
lect to  be  grasped  by  the  gross  senses.  Organism  is  not  this 
principle  of  life,  though  it  invariably  accompanies  the  same; 
because  organism  perseveres  after  life's  disappearance  from  the 
body.  It  is  a  substantial  form,  an  incomplete  substance,  which 
escapes  in  its  details  our  present  imperfect  vision. 

This  life-giving  principle  is  a  substance,  because  no  accident 
can  give  species  to  living  body. 

It  is  a  form,  because  it  is  not  prime  matter,  which  is  po- 
tency and  no  act. 

It  is  a  soul,  because  the  vital  principle  in  living  bodies. 

It  is  a  principle,  or  that  from  which  another  proceeds.  Such 
a  principle  must  be  admitted;  otherwise  we  have  an  effect  with- 
out a  cause,  or  we  make  God  second  cause  of  everything. 

Adversaries :  Materialists  deny  in  all  three  kingdoms  — 
Tongiorgi  denies  in  plants  —  Cartesians  deny  in  plants  and  ani- 
mals —  Materialists  explain  life  mechanically,  by  local  motion ; 


THESIS  I  15 

physically  and  chemically,  by  forces.  We  recognize  this  prin- 
ciple in  a  general  way  as  the  reality  which  restricts  or  limits 
living  beings  to  their  place  or  class  in  the  universe  of  exist- 
ences. St.  Thomas  with  Aristotle  describes  this  soul  as  "Actus 
primus  corporis  pliysici,  organici,  potentia  vitani  hahentis." 
Explanation:  Actus  is  an  imperfect  translation  of  Aristotle's 
word  which  means  finish  or  completion,  entelechy.  First  act 
or  finish,  because  it  is  a  form  which  determines  to  species; 
matter  without  form  is  undetermined.  The  body  in  man  is 
not  a  form,  because  it  actuates  no  subject.  First  form,  be- 
cause it  is  a  substantial  form;  because  there  is  no  form  prior 
to  it.  Physical  means  natural,  not  artificial  or  mathematical. 
Scotus  posits  a  forma  corporeitatis.  This  is  the  question  with 
Scotus,  is  the  body  prime  matter  or  second  matter?  We  main- 
tain that  one  and  the  same  soul  constitutes  prime  matter  a 
body  and  a  living  body,  as  substantial  form  and  vital  principle. 
The  life  mentioned  in  our  definition  of  Soul  is  accidental  life, 
not  substantial. 

This  principle  of  life  is  not  the  body,  because  one  perseveres 
in  the  other's  absence,  and  in  that  event  every  body  would  be 
a  living  body.  It  is  material  in  the  sense  of  intrinsic  depend- 
ence, not  in  the  sense  of  three  dimensions.  A  word  about  its 
faculties  or  powers.  Vital  acts  are  ascribed  to  three  princi- 
ples. The  principium  quod  is  the  suppositum  or  whole  agent, 
body  and  soul;  the  principium  quo  remotum  is  the  soul;  the 
principium  quo  proximum  is  some  particular  faculty  of  the 
soul.  Faculties  are  organic  and  inorganic.  Organic  are  in 
whole  composite,  and  they  are  vegetative  and  sensitive.  In- 
organic are  in  soul  alone,  and  they  are  intellectual.  Faculties 
are  active  and  passive.  Active  need  no  outside  object  as  de- 
terminant, and  they  are  vegetative.  Passive  need  such  an  ob- 
ject, and  they  are  sensitive.  The  intellect  is  both  active  and 
passive;  passive,  inasmuch  as  it  needs  a  phantasm  for  the  im- 
printed intelligible  image;  active,  inasmuch  as  with  this  image 
it  elicits  the  developed  intelligible  image  or  idea.  From  this 
point  of  view  agens  is  passive,  possibilis  is  active.  All  facul- 
ties are  active  inasmuch  as  they  actively  operate;  for  this  reason 
the  agens  is  active  as  well  as  passive,  and  the  same  is  true  of  the 
senses.  Act  and  formal  object  give  name  to  faculty.  Vital  acts 
are  six,  vegetative,  sensitive,  intellectual,  appetite,  will,  loco- 


16  PSYCHOLOGY 

motion.  Soul  and  faculties  are  really  distinct  with  inadequate 
distinction,  because  soul  is  designed  to  inform  body,  facul- 
ties are  designed  to  work;  soul  is  faculties  and  something 
besides. 

Essentially  different.  The  physical  and  chemical  forces  of 
nature,  blended  with  organism,  differ  indeed  accidentally  from 
the  same  forces,  considered  in  themselves  and  apart  from  all 
organism;  and  Tongiorgi  thinks  these  forces,  thus  accidentally 
modified,  a  sufficient  explanation  of  life  in  plants.  We  con- 
tend for  a  still  greater,  an  essential  difference  between  the  prin- 
ciple of  life  and  these  forces.  The  former,  instead  of  being 
the  latter,  exercises  the  authority  of  a  sovereign  over  them, 
and  compels  them  to  elicit,  when  under  its  potent  influence, 
effects  wholly  different  from  ordinary  results.  Of  course,  the 
principle  of  life  and  material  forces  are  in  substantial  union; 
not  in  accidental  union,  as  Plato  and  others  teach.  Thus, 
oxygen  in  contact  with  anorganic  bodies  works  havoc  and  de- 
struction. It  rusts  iron,  consumes  wood,  decomposes  lifeless 
flesh.  But  oxygen  is  inhaled  in  thick  volumes  by  ailing  pa- 
tients. Indeed,  for  diseases  like  pneumonia,  repeated  draughts 
of  pure  oxygen  are  most  healthful  medicine.  We  enumerate 
nine  conspicuous  differences  between  plants  and  minerals. 

(1)  Make-up  and  constitution.  Plants  are  heterogeneous; 
minerals,  homogeneous.  Plants  are  made  up  of  wood,  bark, 
leaves,  roots,  cells,  fibers.     Minerals  are  the  same  throughout. 

(2)  Origin.  Plants  result  from  seed  or  generation;  min- 
erals, from  chemical  composition. 

(3)  Reproduction.  By  fission,  gemmation,  ovulation;  min- 
erals are  multiplied  by  outside  agency,  by  breaking  asunder. 

(4)  Growth.  Plants  grow  by  intussusception,  and  are  never 
born  with  their  full  size;  minerals  grow  by  successive  additions 
from  without  and  are  of  any  size. 

(5)  Size.  Each  species  of  plant  has  its  own  fixed  size;  min- 
erals attain  to  any  size. 

(6)  Duration.  Every  plant  has  its  own  limited  duration; 
minerals  are  of  unlimited  duration.  Plants  destroy  them- 
selves; minerals  are  destroyed  by  outside  agencies. 

(7)  Shape.  Every  plant  has  its  own  fixed  shape,  and  curves 
predominate;  minerals  assume  any  shape,  and  straight  lines 
predominate.     Most  minerals  are  shapeless,  some  occur  as  crys- 


THESIS  I  17 

tals  or  geometrical   figures,   and   can   always  be   broken   into 
crystals  of  smaller  dimensions. 

(8)  Chemical  composition.  In  plants  the  chemical  elements 
are  complex;  in  minerals,  simple.  Protoplasm  or  life-stuff  is 
made  up  of  carbon,  hydrogen,  oxygen,  nitrogen.  Sulphur  and 
phosphorus  frequently  occur.  Iron  enters  the  blood.  Calcium 
and  magnesium  in  the  form  of  phosphates  enter  the  bones.  Po- 
tassium is  required  for  muscular  tissue;  sodium  and  chlorine 
for  the  secretions.  Minerals  are  made  up  of  one  or  two  ele- 
ments, and  their  composition  is  stable. 

(9)  The  activity  of  plants  is  immanent;  that  of  minerals, 
transient. 

X.B.  If  life  were  the  product  of  physical  and  chemical 
forces,  it  would  be  possible  to  form  a  living  body  by  suitable 
combinations.  And  yet  no  plant,  not  even  the  lowest  moss, 
can  be  produced  from  the  crucible.  The  chemical  constituents 
of  the  animal  body  are  well  known,  their  proportions  and  affini- 
ties can  be  expressed  in  arithmetical  formulae;  but  no  scientist 
has  ever  yet  produced  an  organism.  We  know  exactly  the  ele- 
ments of  an  egg,  how  much  oxygen,  how  much  hydrogen,  how 
much  nitrogen;  we  can  blend  them  in  accurate  proportions; 
but  science  cannot  make  an  egg  able  to  hatch  a  tadpole.  No 
laboratory  will  ever  create  a  cell,  a  muscle,  a  nerve.  In  life 
there  is  a  something  present  that  science  cannot  detect,  and 
this  something  is  the  principle  of  life,  the  soul.  The  substan- 
tial changes  manifest  in  life-action  are  Scholasticism's  chiefest 
argument  for  the  existence  of  matter  and  form.  Without  mat- 
ter and  form  these  changes  would  be  a  series  of  annihilations 
and  creations,  processes  beyond  the  reach  of  mere  creatures  or 
natural  agents.  Hydrogen  and  oxygen  are  transformed  by  the 
electric  spark  into  water;  and  water  is  transformed  by  the 
same  agency  back  again  to  hydrogen  and  oxygen.  The  matter 
of  a  living  being  is  changed  by  retrograde  metamorphosis  into 
inorganic  substances  to  become  the  food  of  a  plant,  and  the 
plant  becomes  the  food  of  an  animal.  That  animal  may  be 
the  very  one  from  which  this  traveling  matter  originally  came. 
Carbonic  acid  in  the  air  is  decomposed  by  plants.  These  plants 
give  back  the  oxygen,  to  retain  the  carbon.  This  carbon  in  the 
plant  finds  its  way  back  to  an  animal  in  the  form  of  vegetable 
food,  and,  brought  into  contact  with  the  oxygen  supplied  by 


18  PSYCHOLOGY 

the  lungs,  is  given  forth  in  respiration  in  the  form  of  carbonic 
acid.  And  the  process  begins  all  over  again.  All  change  pos- 
tulates a  subject  common  to  each  term  of  the  change,  unless 
we  want  to  admit  annihilation  and  creation;  and  this  common 
subject  is  prime  matter,  materia  prima. 

Inert.  Inert  is  here  opposed  to  alive  or  living.  Inert  can 
mean  inactive ;  but  absolute  inactivity  is  unknown  among  God's 
creatures.  Every  being,  even  the  most  insignificant  in  the  uni- 
verse of  existences,  a  grain  of  sand,  exerts  a  power  proper  and 
peculiar  to  itself.  Inert  therefore  means  lifeless,  incapable  of 
self-motion  or  immanent  action. 

Physical  and  chemical  forces.  Cohesion,  attraction,  repul- 
sion, gra\dty,  chemical  union,  affinity,  proportions,  and  others 
of  the  same  nature  too  numerous  to  mention,  and  discussed  at 
great  length  in  Physics  and  Chemistry. 

Brute  animals.  As  soon  as  a  living  being  gives  conclusive 
evidence  of  a  sense,  external  or  internal,  with  no  pretensions  to 
any  superior  faculty,  we  assign  it  to  the  category  of  brute  ani- 
mals. 

Three  operations  in  man  and  brute  absent  from  plants: 
They  apprehend  bodies  according  to  qualities,  having  external 
and  internal  senses  with  sensorial  organs.  They  seek  or  shun 
bodies  thus  apprehended,  having  appetite.  They  move  locally 
towards  or  away  from  bodies  thus  apprehended,  having  loco- 
motion. 

The  recognition  of  objects  manifest  in  brutes,  is  sufficient 
foundation  for  attributing  to  them  the  possession  of  senses; 
while  absence  of  speech  and  of  all  mechanical  progress  induces 
us  to  deny  them  the  possession  of  intellects.  Transmigration 
makes  brutes  as  intellectual  as  man.  Pythagoras,  Empedocles, 
Democritus,  Anaxagoras,  Epicureans  deny  man's  superiority. 
Sensists,  Physiologists  and  Materialists  make  all  knowledge  a 
physical  and  chemical  process.  Darwinists  give  inferior  minds 
to  brutes.  Some  animals  are  more  perfect  than  others.  They 
are  commonly  graded  in  our  estimation  by  the  fineness  and 
number  of  their  senses.  Thus,  while  not  a  few  are  limited  to 
the  use  of  one  single  sense,  others  rejoice  in  the  full  exercise 
of  all  the  external  and  internal  senses  we  ascribe  to  man.  But 
the  most  perfect  never  evince  signs  calculated  to  persuade  the 
unprejudiced  mind  that  they  understand.     They  hear,  they  see, 


THESIS  I  19 

they  remember,  they  dream ;  but  they  never  elicit  an  idea,  never 
utter  a  judgment,  never  give  expression  to  a  syllogism.  Some 
brutes  surpass  men  in  the  possession  of  a  certain  single  sense, 
usually  the  sense  employed  for  purposes  of  self-preservation. 
But  no  brute  has  all  nine  senses  of  the  same  uniform  fineness 
as  man's.  Their  soul,  or  principle  of  life,  is  material;  not  in 
the  sense  that  it  has  quantity,  can  be  weighed,  or  measured, 
or  handled;  but  in  the  sense  that  for  all  its  being  and  all  its 
operations  it  is  dependent  on  the  body,  or  matter.  It  is  derived 
from  the  parents  in  its  entirety,  because  it  possesses  no  specific 
property  transcending  the  nature  of  material  faculties,  like  the 
senses.  It  perishes  with  the  body.  Such  dependence  is  reck- 
oned intrinsic  and  extrinsic.  Man's  soul  essentially  connotes 
extrinsic  dependence  on  body  or  matter.  In  its  first  opera- 
tions it  presupposes  and  demands  as  a  necessary  requisite  some 
previous  work  of  the  senses.  It  is  not  the  gift  of  parent  to 
child,  but  is  the  result  of  a  new  act  of  creation  in  each  indi- 
vidual instance.  In  itself  it  can  exist,  and  after  death  it  does 
exist,  without  any  dependence  whatever  on  the  body,  that  crum- 
bles to  dust.  Sensitive  life  presupposes  vegetative.  We  note 
these  several  differences  between  the  two. 

1.  Chemical  elements  in  the  animal  combine  in  fours  to 
form  albumen;  and  these  elements  are  carbon,  hydrogen,  oxy- 
gen and  nitrogen;  in  plants,  they  combine  in  threes  to  form 
cellulose;  and  they  are  carbon,  hydrogen  and  oxygen. 

2.  In  brutes  vegetative  life  is  made  more  perfect  by  union 
with  sensitive,  and  changes  food  into  flesh,  bones  and  nerves. 

3.  Animals  feed  on  plants  and  other  animals;  plants  feed 
on  minerals.     Organic  food  supports  animals;  inorganic,  plants. 

4.  Sensation  is  specific  difference  between  plants  and  brutes; 
and  sensation  is  the  perception  of  bodily  substances  in  the  con- 
crete. 

Automatic  machines.  No  machine  is  strictly  automatic,  but 
only  such  in  appearance.  The  word  is  of  Greek  origin,  and 
signifies  a  thing  gifted  with  self-will  or  self-motion.  And  yet 
there  are  machines,  which  from  the  nice  perfection  of  their 
mechanism  lead  the  superficial  observer  to  conclude  that  they 
derive  their  motion  from  nothing  external  to  themselves.  Thus, 
the  watch  and  locomotive  to  all  appearances  depend  on  no  out- 
side agency  for  their  motion.     But  the  watch  will  run  down 


20 


PSYCHOLOGY 


and  stop,  unless  its  owner  at  stated  intervals  applies  the  phys- 
ical force  needed  to  wind  it  up;  the  locomotive  will  come  to  a 
standstill,  unless  its  cylinder  is  kept  well  supplied  with  steam. 
Brute  animals  differ  from  locomotives  and  watches  in  this,  that, 
once  in  existence,  they  are  capable  of  passing  from  one  place 
to  another  and  of  eliciting  various  acts  without  any  absolute 
dependence  on  beings  or  forces  external  to  themselves.  It  was 
an  opinion  of  Descartes  that  brutes  are  machines  set  in  motion 
and  kept  in  motion  by  the  immediate  influence  of  God. 

Sense  and  Intellect.  The  intellect  is  a  spiritual  cognoscitive 
faculty,  able  to  know  immaterial  objects  and  material  objects 
in  an  immaterial,  universal,  abstract  way;  able  to  know  the 
causes  and  essences  of  things;  able  to  reflect  on  itself  and  its 
acts,  to  pronounce  formal  judgments,  and  to  formally  reason. 
A  formal  judgment  unites  or  separates  ideas;  it  affirms  or  de- 
nies; a  virtual  is  matter  for  a  formal,  it  comprehends  without 
uniting  or  separating.  Sensations  are  virtual  judgments,  and 
they  deal  with  concrete  qualities  of  individual  things ;  e.  g. 
color  and  shape  of  bread.  Such  a  virtual  judgment  moves 
sensitive  appetite. 

Sense  is  a  material  cognoscitive  faculty;  knows  material  ob- 
jects in  a  material  way. 


Cognoscitive 

Faculties, 

Instruments  - 

of 
Knowledge 


N.B. 


DIAGRAM 

Sight 
Hearing 
External  -!  Touch 
Taste 
Senses    J  [Smell 

'Sensile  Discrimination 
Imagination 
Sensile  Consciousness 
Sensile  Memory 

'Intelligence 
Judgment 
Intellect^  "  uin.iiig  ^  jjeggon 

Consciousness 
Memory 

For  explanation  see  Thesis  II. 


.Internal 


THESIS  I  21 

Division  —  Four  Parts  and  a  corollary  — 

I.     Life  is  capacity  for  self-motion. 
II.     Soul  of  plant,  essentially  different  from  physical  and 
chemical  forces  of  plant. 

III.  Brute  animals  have  senses. 

IV.  Brute  animals  have  no  intellect. 
CoroUary  —  Evolution  is  absurd. 

PEOOPS,  I,  II,  III,  IV 

/.  N.B.  This  first  part  is  a  definition,  and  definitions  need 
not  be  proved,  but  explained.  A  definition  is  a  principle,  by 
supposition  the  subject  contains  the  predicate.  We  need  only 
show  that  our  definition  is  correct,  that  it  applies  to  living 
beings  and  none  else. 

It  is  the  common  opinion  of  mankind  that  things  gifted  with 
the  capability  of  self-motion  or  immanent  action  are  alive,  and 
that  things  without  the  same  capability  are  dead. 

But  what  renders  a  thing  alive  is  life,  and  in  certain  circum- 
stances, here  fulfilled,  the  common  opinion  of  mankind  is  in- 
fallible. 

Ergo  life  is  capability  of  self-motion  or  immanent  action; 
life  is  that  perfection  in  a  being  which  makes  self-motion  or 
immanent  action  possible. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  To  the  average  mind  motion  al- 
ways suggests  life;  stillness,  death.  And  the  thing  is  clear  in 
the  case  of  a  live  or  dead  animal.  With  motion  in  evidence 
minds  always  satisfy  themselves  regarding  the  presence  or  ab- 
sence of  life  by  determining  motion's  origin.  Flowing  water 
is  an  instance. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  The  judgment  partakes  of  the 
nature  of  a  moral  judgment. 

II.  N.B.  Eecall  notions  regarding  plants.  Their  princi- 
ple of  life  is  a  substantial  form  called  soul.  They  have  three 
operations.  They  have  no  sensation.  Their  soul  is  non-sub- 
sistent.  Their  soul  is  indivisible  in  itself;  divisible  because  of 
matter.  Plants  live  because  a  one  suppositum,  in  which  activ- 
ity begins  and  ends.  One  suppositum,  because  one  activity, 
and  everything  concurs  to  produce  seed  and  evolve  organism. 
Activity  begins  and  ends  in  plant,  because  organism  takes  up 


22  PSYCHOLOGY 

nutriment,  assimilates  it  to  own  substance,  and  distributes  it  — 

Plants  possess  a,  energies,  and  b,  qualities,  essentially  differ- 
ent from  those  of  minerals  or  dead  matter.  But  no  effect  exists 
in  nature  without  its  proper  cause. 

Ergo  there  is  in  plants  some  cause  of  these  energies  and 
qualities  essentially  different  from  those  of  minerals,  namely, 
physical  and  chemical  forces.  In  one  word  there  must  reside 
in  plants  a  principle  of  life,  designed  to  order  aright  and  watch 
over  these  physical  and  chemical  forces. 

With  regard  to  the  Major,  (a)  The  origin,  growth  and  re- 
production of  plants  are  quite  different  from  those  of  minerals. 
A  plant  begins  as  a  minute  cell,  feeds  on  surrounding  matter, 
grows,  multiplies  itself  into  other  cells,  which  in  turn  combine 
to  form  the  embryo.  From  the  embryo  a  perfect  organism 
arises.  Besides,  the  plant  mends  whatever  parts  suffer  loss, 
and  keeps  itself  alive.  Minerals  betray  no  such  energy.  Their 
every  act  is  transient,  and  they  grow  only  from  without. 

(b)  Plants  are  organic  beings.  Witness  the  cells  in  a  tree, 
the  roots,  stalk,  leaves,  petals  and  intricate  details  of  the  flower 
in  a  rosebush.  The  chemical  composition  of  plants  is  another 
feature  distinguishing  them  from  minerals.  The  shape  of  a 
plant  is  uniform  and  constant  for  the  same  species;  minerals 
are  indifferent  to  all  shapes.  Crystallization  induces  set  and 
regular  forms  in  minerals;  but  each  crystal  admits  of  division 
into  others  of  the  same  character.  Besides,  the  lines  in  a  crys- 
tal are  invariably  straight,  while  in  plants  they  are  at  one  time 
straight,  at  another  time  curved. 

III.  1.  It  is  the  common  opinion  of  mankind,  strengthened 
by  most  evident  signs  on  the  part  of  brute  creation  and  by  the 
wonderful  structure  of  brute  bodies,  that  animals  possess  the 
faculty  of  sense,  a)  external  and  (b)  internal.  They  have  or- 
gans, operations,  effects,  phenomena,  like  our  own.  But  the 
common  opinion  of  mankind  thus  strengthened  is  an  infallible 
guide.  Ergo  animals  possess  the  faculty  of  sense,  and  are  not 
mere  automatic  machines. 

With  regard  to  the  Major,  (a)  About  external  senses  there 
can  be  no  difficulty. 

(b)  Signs  of  internal  senses  follow.  Sensile  consciousness 
or  central  sense  is  evinced  from  the  fact,  that  to  hear,  a  dog 
uses  his  ears,  not  his  eyes  or  tail;  imagination  from  the  fact. 


THESIS  I  23 

that  a  dog  barks  in  his  sleep  and  goes  through  all  the  motions 
of  a  street-fight.  Sensile  memory  enables  a  dog  to  seek  home, 
and  to  find  his  master  in  a  crowd.  With  the  help  of  sensile 
discrimination  or  instinct  birds  gather  straw  for  their  nest,  and 
a  young  sheep  dreads  the  wolf. 

2.  Brutes  have  sense-organs.     Ergo  they  have  sense. 

3.  Brutes  have  sensitive  appetite,  as  their  movements  make 
evident.  But  appetite  supposes  knowledge.  Ergo  they  have 
sense. 

IV.  Brutes  give  unmistakable  evidence  that  they  are  pos- 
sessed of  (a)  neither  universal  ideas,  (b)  nor  psychological  re- 
flection. But  beings  without  universal  ideas  and  psychological 
reflection  are  without  intellect.  Ergo  brute  animals  are  with- 
out intellect. 

With  regard  to  the  Major,  (a,  b.)  (a)  The  fact  that  we 
have  universal  ideas  is  betokened  by  our  use  of  arbitrary  and 
conventional  signs  for  language.  But  the  use  of  such  signs  is 
unknown  among  brute  animals.     Ergo. 

Brutes  make  themselves  understood  by  natural  signs,  and 
are  utter  strangers  to  speech.  Parrots  can  be  taught  by  com- 
binations of  images  in  the  fancy  to  emit  a  limited  number  of 
sounds,  but  these  sounds  do  not  constitute  language. 

(b)  Psychological  reflection,  turning  wholly  on  ourselves  and 
our  acts,  leads  us  to  change  our  methods,  to  indefinitely  improve 
on  our  own  works  and  those  of  others,  and  to  make  progress 
generally.  But  no  such  change  of  methods,  no  such  improve- 
ment or  progress  appears  in  the  lives  of  brute  animals.     Ergo. 

Corollary  —  Universal  Evolution  or  Darwinism  is  therefore 
absurd. 

Evolution  derives  all  the  different  species  of  plants  and  ani- 
mals from  one  or  a  few  primitive  species.  In  his  early  work 
Darwin  admits  that  the  beginning  of  things  is  an  insoluble 
problem,  and  declares  himself  an  agnostic.  When  younger  he 
acknowledged  a  Creator,  to  account  for  primitive  species.  Later 
in  life  he  abandoned  God  altogether.  This  change  was  due  to 
the  logical  development  of  his  theory  by  men  like  Haeckel. 
Natural  selection  was  the  factor  introduced  by  Darwin  to  ex- 
plain the  multiplication  of  species.  The  industry  of  man  by 
breeding  and  crossing  can  effect  changes  in  plants  and  animals. 
Nature,  according  to  Darwin,  can  rival  man  in  this  process; 


24  PSYCHOLOGY 

and  nature's  activity  is  displayed  in  natural  selection.  Vari- 
ability, natural  selection,  heredity,  struggle  for  existence  and 
survival  of  the  fittest  are  the  magic  terms  occurring  everywhere 
in  Darwin's  work.  With  him,  natural  selection  is  the  prime 
cause  of  specific  evolution;  and  natural  selection  is  the  preser- 
vation of  favorable  individual  differences  and  variations,  and 
the  destruction  of  such  as  are  injurious.  All  the  young  of  plants 
and  animals  cannot  reach  maturity.  A  codfish  lays  9,000,000 
eggs  in  a  season.  In  750  years  the  elephants  descended  from  a 
single  pair  would  be  19,000,000.  Our  chief  objections  to  nat- 
ural selection  are  two.  It  is  in  itself  insufficient,  classes  are  not 
species;  and  it  contradicts  facts.  Besides,  it  eliminates  formal, 
final  and  efficient  causality,  to  leave  only  material.  It  pro- 
fesses to  get  man  from  monkey.  The  form  or  essence  of  man 
is  not  latent  in  monkey  as  that  of  oxygen  is  in  water,  and  such 
a  man  would  be  without  a  formal  cause.  No  monkey  can  essay 
becoming  a  man,  because  that  would  mean  self-destruction,  and 
purpose  would  be  wanting.  No  monkey  can  make  himself  a 
man,  because  effect  would  be  superior  to  cause.  Haeckel  in 
Germany  pushed  Darwin's  theory  to  its  logical  limit  when, 
applying  it  to  the  world  at  large,  he  essayed  to  explain  the 
origin  of  the  universe,  man  included,  from  primordial  matter; 
and  Darwin  was  not  long  catching  up  with  Haeckel.  In  this 
way,  the  theory  of  natural  selection  degenerated  to  the  system 
of  Eealistic  Monism.  Monism,  as  the  name  implies,  derives 
everything  from  one  principle,  matter.  It  is  opposed  to  Dual- 
ism which  recognizes  spirit  as  well  as  matter.  Monism  is  a 
gross  mistake,  because  it  denies  God  and  immortality;  because 
it  advocates  the  fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms,  laughed  to  scorn 
by  Cicero;  and  because  it  destroys  all  moral  order.  Haeckel 
himself  was  a  mammoth  fraud,  and  his  open  dishonesty  robbed 
his  old  age  of  whatever  prestige  his  early  years  enjoyed.  Dar- 
winists, with  Haeckel,  maintain  that  man  is  descended,  body 
and  soul,  from  the  ape.  One  Friedenthal  remarks  that  not  only 
are  we  descended  from  monkeys,  but  we  are  monkeys  ourselves. 
Advocates  of  the  wild  theory  see  an  argument  in  the  circum- 
stance, that  the  differences  between  men  of  two  races  are  greater 
and  more  striking  than  the  differences  between  a  man  and  an 
ape.  They  close  their  eyes  to  the  fact  that  the  difference  be- 
tween souls  of  men  is  one  of  degree,  not  of  kind;  while  the 


THESIS  I  25 

difference  between  the  souls  of  men  and  souls  of  apes  is  one  of 
kind,  not  merely  of  degree.  The  soul  of  man  is  not  descended 
from  the  soul  of  an  ape.  Keasou  and  revelation  bear  loud  wit- 
ness that  the  soul  of  man  is  spiritual  and  created.  Neither  is 
man's  body  descended  from  the  body  of  an  ape.  Arguments  to 
the  contrary  are  nothing  worth.  They  are  mainly  two,  resem- 
blances and  paleontology,  or  ancient  remains.  In  their  zeal  to 
discover  resemblances  our  opponents  neglect  differences.  The 
differences  between  the  body  of  a  man  and  the  body  of  an  ape 
are  too  wide  to  countenance  one's  origin  from  the  other.  The 
skull-cap,  the  brain,  and  the  bones  are  worth  study.  Mucker- 
mann,  S.J.,  has  tables  to  prove  that  the  skull-cap  of  man  is 
about  three  times  as  large  as  that  of  an  ape.  The  circumfer- 
ence of  a  man's  skull  is  twice  that  of  an  ape's.  The  human 
brain  is  three  times  heavier  than  that  of  the  ape.  In  man  it 
is  the  37th  part  of  his  body's  weight;  in  an  ape,  the  100th 
part.  Speaking  of  bones,  Virchow  says,  "  The  differences  are 
so  wide,  that  almost  any  fragment  is  sufficient  to  diagnose 
them." 

Besides,  no  intermediate  form  occurs  to  bridge  the  chasm 
between  man  and  ape.  The  missing  link  is  still  missing.  The 
wisdom  of  the  Creator  is  sufficient  explanation  for  all  the  dis- 
covered resemblances.  Man  is  the  king  of  creation,  and  ought 
to  embrace  all  kingdoms.  Infimi  supremum  debet  attingere 
infimum  supremi.  Natura  odit  saltus.  The  argument  from 
paleontology  is  of  as  little  weight.  The  Pithecanthropus  erectus 
and  the  Neanderthal  skull-cap  prove  nothing.  The  bones  of  the 
first  were  found  in  different  places  and  put  together,  a  farcical 
imposition.  No  ape  ever  yet  regularly  walked  erect.  Dancing 
bears  are  trained  to  walk  on  their  hind-legs,  but  the  attitude 
is  unnatural  and  violent.  The  Neanderthal  skull-cap  might 
belong  to  anything,  a  Hollander,  a  German,  an  Icelander  or  a 
Celt.  All  paleontological  finds  prove  man  possessed  of  intel- 
lect. Hence  the  various  implements  of  the  Stone,  Iron  and 
Brass  Ages. 

N.B.  Not  all  Evolution  is  Darwinism.  Evolution  itself  is 
opposed  to  constancy  or  fixity  of  species;  and  Evolution  is  of 
two  kinds.  Universal  or  Sweeping  and  Particular  or  Eestricted. 
Constancy  holds  that  all  species  of  plants  and  animals,  as  they 
now  exist,  were  created.     Sweeping  Evolution  holds  that  a  few 


26  PSYCHOLOGY 

elementary  organic  bodies  took  their  rise  in  matter  from  chance 
grouping  of  atoms.  Eestricted  Evolution  teaches  that  a  few 
species  of  plants  and  animals  were  created,  the  others  developed ; 
God  created  first  organisms  and  gave  them  special  power  to 
develop  higher.  Man  and  his  soul  are  excepted.  Man  was 
created,  body  and  soul.  Mivart  derives  man's  body  from  the 
ape.  Of  these  theories,  constancy  or  fixity  of  species  is  most 
in  harmony  with  simple  faith,  and  most  in  disfavor  with  mod- 
ern science.  Sweeping  Evolution  is  Realistic  Monism  and 
downright  ignorance.  Eestricted  Evolution  is  semi-scientific, 
not  opposed  to  so-called  educated  faith,  and  is  held  by  Catholic 
scientists,  like  Wassmann,  S.J.  Hence  our  thesis:  (a)  Uni- 
versal Evolution  or  Darwinism  is  opposed  to  right  reason;  Par- 
ticular or  Restricted  Evolution  is  (&)  without  foundation,  and 
(c)  contradicts  facts. 

With  regard  to  the  terms.  Species  in  Evolution  means  a 
collection  of  individuals  more  or  less  alike,  capable  of  progeny 
without  limit.  The  two  requisite  elements  are,  like  shape  and 
fertility.  Members  of  the  same  species  can  have  accidental 
differences.  A  variety  is  such  a  collection  of  the  same  species 
as  have  the  same  accidental  differences.  The  variety  is  called 
a  race  if  these  accidental  differences  are  handed  down  by  gen- 
eration and  become  fixed.  By  law  of  reversion,  varieties  re- 
turn to  primitive  type,  unless  pairs  of  the  same  variety  gen- 
erate. 

Fixity  or  constancy  of  species  means  that  one  species  never 
becomes  another.  All  the  species  of  plants  and  animals,  as 
they  now  exist,  were  in  existence  from  the  beginning. 

Evolution  means  that  all  the  species  now  extinct  and  now  in 
existence  are  sprung  from  one  or  a  few  primitive  species. 

The  language  our  opponents  employ  is  about  as  follows: 
Variation  in  species  is  inherited  by  offspring.  Nature  by 
means  of  natural  selection  fosters  some  characteristics,  and  lets 
others  disappear.  The  struggle  for  existence  is  nature's  abettor 
in  this  task.  As  a  result  of  the  struggle,  only  the  fittest  sur- 
vive. These  survivors  with  the  lapse  of  ages  originate  entirely 
new  species  of  plants  and  animals,  the  series  ending  in  man 
himself.  Darwin  has  no  explanation  for  the  origin  of  life. 
Heredity,  natural  selection,  struggle  for  existence  are  the  factors 
he  employs  to  explain  the  origin  of  species. 


THESIS  I  27 

Proofs,  (a)  Universal  Evolution  or  Darwinism  denies  God 
and  immortality;  postulates  fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms,  and 
spontaneous  generation;  and  destroys  the  moral  order. 

(6)  Heredity  is  no  explanation,  because  only  specific  char- 
acteristics are  transmitted  naturally.  Accidental  characteristics 
are  transmitted  only  by  the  interference  of  an  intellectual  cause 
like  man,  and  such  varieties  naturally  revert  to  original  type. 
Eventually  the  progeny  of  mulattoes  is  coal  black.  A  donkey, 
as  St.  Thomas  says,  never  essays  becoming  a  horse,  because 
that  would  mean  self-destruction.  Natural  selection  is  no  ex- 
planation, because  in  this  ease  a  blind  agent  would  be  able  to 
accomplish  what  man  has  not  yet  been  able  to  do,  develop  a 
new  species.  The  struggle  for  existence  would  account  for  the 
disappearance  of  lower,  not  for  the  evolution  of  higher  species. 

(c)  It  contradicts  present  as  well  as  past  experience.  Evo- 
lutionists admit  that  at  present  like  generates  like,  and  by  no 
process  can  new  species  be  gotten  from  old.  They  appeal  to 
the  past  with  as  little  success.  Within  history.  Job  and  Aris- 
totle describe  animals  and  plants  of  the  same  complexion  as  our 
own.  Plants,  dogs,  cats,  birds  and  cows  found  in  Egyptian 
tombs,  and  five  thousand  years  old,  are  like  our  own.  Fossils 
come  down  from  prehistoric  times  are  like  present-day  animals, 
unless  they  happen  to  be  extinct;  and  there  is  no  trace  of  in- 
tervening types,  which  ought  to  be  numerous  in  the  hypothesis 
of  evolution. 

Principles.  Rudimentary  organs  can  have  ornament  for  pur- 
pose as  well  as  utility.  Sweeping  Evolution  is  against  faith. 
Some,  like  Lamy  and  Urraburu,  think  Eestricted  Evolution, 
even  when  not  extended  to  men,  against  the  faith;  others  see 
no  opposition.  Nearly  all  Catholic  theologians  vote  it  highly 
wrong  to  ascribe  the  origin  of  man's  body  to  evolution  from  a 
monkey.     It  was  immediately  produced  from  slime  of  the  earth. 


PRINCIPLES 

A.  1.  The  chemical  elements  in  a  molecule  perfect  them- 
selves.    Ergo  immanent  action. 

2.  The  flame  in  a  candle  feeds  on  the  wax.  Ergo  immanent 
action. 


28  PSYCHOLOGY 

3.  Sensation  is  determined  by  object,  an  extrinsic  principle. 
Ergo  no  immanent  action. 

4.  Motion  is  always  from  another.     Ergo  no  self-motion. 
Answers.     (1)  Each    atom    perfects    another    atom,    or   the 

atoms   together   make   a  new   substance.     Ergo   no   immanent 
act. 

(2)  The  flame  is  not  one  substance,  but  an  aggregate;  and 
it  does  not  feed  on  the  wax  by  intussusception. 

(3)  The  object  determines  sensation  objectively,  not  subjec- 
tively. Sight  is  from  the  eye;  the  sight  of  this  or  that  thing 
is  from  the  object. 

(4)  Motion  is  from  another,  but  that  other  can  be  united 
with  the  thing  moved.  The  mind  is  not  the  man,  but  is  united 
with  him. 

B.  1.  Immanence  is  of  only  one  kind.  Ergo  only  one  kind 
of  life. 

2.  In  brutes  vegetative  life  produces  sensitive  substance;  sen- 
sitive life,  only  accidents.  Ergo  vegetative  is  superior  to  sensi- 
tive. 

3.  Mere  execution  of  motion  is  life  for  plants.  Minerals 
execute  motion.     Ergo  they  have  life. 

4.  Sensation  is  superior  to  vegetation  because  of  forms  as- 
sumed. But  vegetation  assumes  forms,  leaves  and  the  like. 
Ergo  no  superiority. 

5.  Plants  assume  material  substances;  senses  material  acci- 
dents.    Ergo  senses  not  superior. 

Answers.  (1)  Immanence  itself  is  of  only  one  kind;  but 
acts  vested  with  immanence  are  of  three  kinds,  vegetation,  sen- 
sation, thought. 

(2)  Vegetative  life  in  brutes  produces  sensitive  substance  not 
by  itself,  but  in  conjunction  with  sensitive  life.  The  accidents 
produced  by  sensation  are  in  the  order  of  knowledge,  and  there- 
fore higher  than  mere  vegetation. 

(3)  The  motion  of  minerals  passes  to  outside  objects,  it  is 
not  received  in  the  minerals  themselves.  Principle  outside. 
One  molecule  perfects  another,  it  never  perfects  itself. 

(4)  The  forms  vegetation  assumes  are  determined  by  nature, 
and  in  the  material  order ;  those  of  sensation  are  determined  by 
the  agent,  and  in  the  cognoscitive  order. 

(5)  The  material  accidents  assumed  in  sensation  are  of  a 


THESIS  I  29 

higher  order  than  the  material  substances  assumed  in  vegeta- 
tion. 

C.  1.  Difference  of  origin  proves  no  essential  difference. 
An  apple  can  be  created  or  grown. 

2.  Difference  in  duration  proves  no  essential  difference. 
Men  die  at  different  ages. 

3.  Living  beings  tend  towards  quiet  as  well  as  minerals. 
Everything  dies.     Ergo  tendency  to  motion  is  no  sign  of  life. 

4.  Difference  in  activity  proves  no  essential  difference  in  be- 
ing.    Moderate  heat  cures,  excessive  heat  kills. 

Answers.  (1)  Difference  in  natural  origin  proves  essential 
difference.  Creation  is  supernatural  in  sense  that  it  transcends 
the  power  of  created  natures.     God  alone  can  create. 

(3)  Duration  constitutes  essential  difference  between  plants 
and  minerals,  not  because  long  and  short,  but  because  deter- 
mined and  undetermined. 

(3)  Life  when  born  never  tends  to  quiet;  when  developed, 
it  tends  not  to  the  quiet  of  death,  but  to  cessation  from  vital 
changes. 

(4)  To  cure  or  kill  is  not  the  formal  effect  of  heat,  but  of 
a  greater  or  less  degree  of  heat.  We  argue  from  formal  ef- 
fects of  plants  and  minerals. 

D.  1.  Difference  in  the  combination  of  atoms  can  explain 
life,  without  any  principle  of  life  or  soul.  Letters  and  arrange- 
ment, meaning  and  no  meaning. 

2.  Chemical  analysis  can  detect  no  principle  of  life.  Ergo 
none  exists. 

3.  The  soul  is  that  at  the  disappearance  of  which  life  ceases. 
Life  in  the  plant  ceases  when  its  parts  are  sundered  and  dis- 
turbed.    Ergo. 

4.  The  principle  of  life  is  neither  a  substance  nor  an  acci- 
dent, neither  a  body  nor  a  spirit. 

5.  A  plant  is  no  more  one  substance  than  a  machine. 
Answers.     (1)   Difference    in    combination    cannot    explain 

generation,  tendency  to  motion,  necessity  of  union  among  parts, 
determined  duration.  Letters  get  meaning  not  from  them- 
selves, but  from  relation  to  men's  ideas. 

(2)  Reason  can  detect  what  escapes  the  notice  of  chemical 
analysis.  It  is  not  the  business  of  chemical  analysis  to  detect 
souls. 


30  PSYCHOLOGY 

(3)  Cohesion  and  arrangement  of  parts  are  conditions  of 
life,  not  its  formal  cause. 

(4)  The  principle  of  life  is  an  incomplete  substance,  it  is 
neither  a  body  nor  a  spirit;  but  it  is  something  material  or 
something  spiritual. 

(5)  Unity  in  the  machine  comes  from  without;  unity  in 
the  plant  comes  from  within. 

E.  Some  points  of  difference  between  the  intellect  and  the 
senses.  The  senses  acquire  knowledge  of  only  individual  ma- 
terial objects  without  any  generalization.  They  attain  to  the 
composite  substance,  inasmuch  as  it  is  a  jumble  of  essence, 
properties  and  accidents;  and  are  primarily  affected  by  the 
properties  and  accidents  in  things.  They  are  never  capable  of 
an  explicit  judgment;  but  only  apprehend,  without  any  union 
or  separation  of  ideas.  The  intellect  takes  up  sensible  percep- 
tion, and,  separating  the  essence  and  substance  from  their  prop- 
erties and  accidents,  views  them  alone,  and  so  acquires  uni- 
versal ideas.  It  compares  one  idea  with  another,  and,  when 
satisfied  that  a  resemblance  exists,  units  the  two  by  affirmation, 
or  elicits  a  judgment.  The  appetites  follow  the  natures  of 
their  prime  movers.  Thus,  the  sensible  appetite,  wholly  de- 
pendent on  the  senses  for  its  every  movement,  never  looks  be- 
yond material  goods.  The  intellectual  appetite,  because  in- 
tellect is  the  mainspring  of  its  actions,  soars  beyond  matter. 

F.  Mr.  Broderip's  story  of  a  dog  at  crossroads  seems  to 
prove  syllogism  and  reason.  The  dog  tries  in  vain  for  scent 
of  his  master  along  two  branches.  Keturning,  he  trots  along 
third  branch,  with  nose  in  the  air.  The  dog  would  seem  to 
argue  thus:  My  master  is  somewhere  along  one  of  these  three 
roads.     He  is  not  along  two  of  them.     Ergo  he  walks  the  third. 

Answer.  The  phenomenon  admits  of  a  dozen  different  ex- 
planations. The  dog  may  have  detected  ground  or  air  traces 
of  his  master  only  after  completing  examination  of  first  two 
roads.  A  dog  can  scent  his  master  without  keeping  his  nose 
to  the  ground. 

G.  The  artistic  effects  of  brute  animals  are  due  to  the  in- 
stinct they  receive  from  God,  and  are  wrought  after  so  mechan- 
ical and  unvarying  a  way  that  the  animals  themselves  are 
rather  passive  than  active  with  regard  to  the  artistic  element 
inherent  in  them. 


THESIS  I  31 

H.  Absolutely  sjDeakiiig,  God  could  have  created  animals 
mere  automatons;  but  at  present  such  creation  is  an  utter  im- 
possibility, unless  we  want  to  accuse  God  of  wilfully  and  ef- 
fectively deceiving  us  at  every  step. 

(/)  Identity  of  vegetative  and  sensitive  souls.  In  a  brute 
animal  there  is  but  one  soul,  the  principle  of  vegetation  and 
sensation.  One  and  the  same  soul  is  the  remote  principle  of 
growth  and  sensation;  the  faculties  or  proximate  principles  are 
several  and  distinct.  The  animal  has  but  one  being  and  one 
activity.  It  gets  both  from  the  principle  of  life  or  the  soul. 
Ergo  the  soul  is  one.  It  has  but  one  being,  because  it  is  one 
individual.  It  has  but  one  activity,  and  tlierefore  but  one  prin- 
ciple, because  its  activity  is  immanent,  and  this  would  be  impos- 
sible in  the  event  of  several  principles.  Other  reasons:  Wlien 
growth  ceases,  sensation  is  at  an  end;  and  vice- versa.  Growth 
ministers  to  the  organs  of  sense,  and  sensation  is  impaired  when 
growth  is  disturbed  by  disease  or  drink.  Growth  and  sensation 
are  of  uniform  perfection  in  the  different  species. 

{J)  The  souls  of  brutes  are  non-subsistent.  They  are  not 
accidents,  but  incomplete  substances  and  non-subsistent;  that 
is,  they  have  no  being  or  activity  independent  of  matter  or  the 
body's  organs.  Eeasons:  Growth  and  sensation  are  a  brute's 
highest  activity,  and  both  are  intrinsically  dependent  on  or- 
gans. When  an  organ  of  sense  is  injured  or  diseased,  the  cor- 
responding sensation  is  impossible.  The  senses  are  tired  by 
frequent  and  intense  application,  they  are  disturbed  by  violent 
excitation,  and  these  are  signs  of  intrinsic  dependence  on  or- 
gans. 

Corollaries.  1.  The  brute  soul  is  not  created.  Supernatur- 
ally,  it  can  be  created;  but  naturally,  it  calls  for  production 
from  something  of  subject;  and  creation  is  production  from 
nothing  of  self  and  subject.  Naturally  speaking,  what  cannot 
continue  in  existence  without  matter,  cannot  begin  its  existence 
without  matter.  In  first  production,  the  whole  brute,  body  and 
soul,  was  created. 

2.  The  souls  of  brutes  are  generated  by  their  parents,  be- 
cause the  whole  suppositum  is  generated,  and  creation  is  out  of 
the  question. 

3.  Souls  of  brutes  die  with  the  body.  They  are  corrupted 
by  accident,  not  in  themselves. 


32  PSYCHOLOGY 

(K)     About  the  divisibility  of  souls.     X.  Y.  Z. 

X.  The  soul  of  man  is  alone  indivisible  per  se  and  per  ac- 
cidens. 

Y.    All  other  souls  are  divisible  per  accidens. 

Z.  The  souls  of  more  perfect  brutes  die  in  part  when  di- 
vided. X.  The  human  soul  is  indivisible.  Eeasons:  The 
part  in  an  amputated  limb  vrould  corrupt  or  remain;  and 
neither  supposition  is  tenable.  The  same  soul  thinks,  wishes, 
sees,  hears,  and  the  like;  and  consciousness  vouches  for  this. 
All  the  parts  would  think  or  only  one  part;  and  both  supposi- 
tions are  impossible.  All  the  parts  would  be  free  or  only  one 
part;  and  the  two  suppositions  are  impossible.  Simple  acts  call 
for  simple  principles ;  and  thoughts  are  simple  acts.  Simplicity 
goes  with  spirituality,  not  vice-versa. 

PKINCIPLES 

{1)  Man's  soul  has  quantity,  because  it  is  received  in  body 
and  is  spread  over  body. 

Answer.  It  is  received  and  spread  in  such  a  way  that  the 
whole  soul  is  in  the  whole  body  and  in  each  part  of  the  body. 

{2)   The  soul  is  affected  by  bodies. 

Answer.     Not  in  itself,  but  because  of  union  with  the  body. 

(5)   That  would  be  multilocation. 

Answer.  Multilocation  calls  for  several  adequate  places. 
The  soul  is  in  one  adequate  place,  the  whole  body. 

(-^)   The  soul  would  move  and  be  quiet  at  the  same  time. 

Answer.     Under  different  respects. 

(5)  The  soul  would  have  to  withdraw  from  an  amputated 
limb.  \ 

Answer.     Soul  simply  loses  one  of  its  presences. 

{6)   The  soul  reappears  in  an  affixed  limb. 

Answer.  The  affixed  limb  is  all  right  for  vegetative  powers 
of  soul  in  rest  of  body. 

Y.  In  plants  and  imperfect  brutes  the  soul  is  divisible. 
Eeasons:  Experience  with  worms  and  snakes;  shoots  and 
grafts.  If  parts  of  the  soul  animate  cut  portions  of  the  plant 
or  animal,  the  soul  must  have  had  parts  in  potency  before  the 
cutting.  These  parts  because  of  union  were  actually  one  soul, 
potentially  many  souls.     Actual  simplicity  is  compatible  with 


THESIS  I  33 

composition  in  }X)tency,  or  indivisibility  per  se  is  compatible 
with  divisibility  per  accidens.  If  the  severed  portion  of  the 
body  is  without  the  requisite  organism  for  life,  the  soul  in  it 
ceases  to  exist,  because  intrinsically  dependent  on  matter.  Im- 
perfect animals  are  such  as  have  few  senses  and  a  ruder  or- 
ganism, like  earth-worms.  Even  plants  and  worms,  when  cut 
into  small  pieces,  die;  because  the  organism  is  defective  in 
minute  portions.  Plants  and  animals  cannot  be  divided  longi- 
tudinally but  transversely,  because  of  organism.  Z.  In  per- 
fect brutes  the  soul  is  divisible,  but  it  dies  in  part.  It  has  no 
parts  per  se,  it  has  parts  per  accidens;  and  it  dies  in  part  be- 
cause of  intrinsic  dependence  on  organism.  Eeasons:  Souls 
in  perfect  brutes  are  as  material  as  souls  in  imperfect  brutes, 
and  therefore  divisible  per  accidens.  After  division  parts  die, 
because  of  more  intricate  organism.  A  part  of  the  soul  dis- 
appears from  the  severed  portion.  Not  the  whole  soul.  Ergo 
a  part  only.  The  whole  soul  would  either  corrupt,  or  subsist 
in  itself,  or  retire  to  the  live  portion.  Not  corrupt,  because 
whole  soul  exists  in  live  portion.  Not  subsist  in  itself,  be- 
cause it  is  material.  Not  retire  to  live  portion,  because  that 
portion  already  has  a  soul.  Part  of  the  soul  corrupts,  because 
corruptible  by  accident.  iV.  B.  Different  in  man,  because  his 
soul  is  spiritual  and  exists  independent  of  matter.  In  an  am- 
putated limb  man's  soul  neither  corrupts,  nor  subsists  in  itself, 
nor  retires  to  live  portion  of  body.  Man's  soul  admits  of  no 
composition  in  potency,  or  by  reason  of  matter.  It  simply 
ceases  to  inform  or  actuate  the  amputated  limb.  In  material 
souls,  to  exist  and  to  actuate  are  the  same;  in  a  spiritual  soul, 
to  exist  and  to  actuate  are  not  the  same.  The  human  soul  can 
cease  to  actuate  without  ceasing  to  exist. 

P.  8.  When  the  organism  in  plant  or  animal  is  divided, 
the  soul  is  by  accident  divided,  because  it  intrinsically  depends 
on  matter  and  shares  in  matter's  imperfection.  The  form  or 
any  quality  of  gold  is  divided  in  the  same  way.  The  soul,  as 
form  of  plant  or  animal,  is  as  dependent  on  matter  for  its  be- 
ing as  the  form  or  any  quality  of  gold.  The  soul  in  a  separated 
branch  is  no  proof  that  there  were  actually  several  souls  in  the 
tree,  but  only  potentially. 


THESIS  II 

Sensation  is  an  immanent  and  cognoscitive  act.  There  can 
he  no  sensation  without  a  faculty,  an  object,  and  union  between 
the  two  in  the  faculty.  Sensation  perceives  the  object,  not  its 
species  or  image,  not  the  organ  impression. 

Maher,  pp.  63-208 ;  26-54.    Jouin,  pp.  161-171. 

QUESTION 

Division. — 'Three  parts. 

I.  What  is  sensation?  It  is  an  immanent  and  cognoscitive 
act. 

II.  How  is  sensation  accomplished?  By  union  of  faculty 
and  object  in  faculty. 

III.  What  does  it  perceive?     The  outside  object. 
Adversaries.     1,  II,  III. 

I.  Materialists  deny  soul,  and  maJce  sensation  a  purely  me- 
chanical and  transient  act.  With  them,  sensation  is  motion 
transmitted  to  the  brain  and  provoking  modifications  and  re- 
actions of  a  purely  mechanical  nature.  In  other  words,  sen- 
sation is  molecular  motion  of  the  brain,  whether  phosphor- 
escence, or  electrical  tension,  or  what  not. 

II.  With  Descartes,  the  soul  is  always  thinking.  With  Leib- 
nitz, every  thought  has  its  sufficient  reason  in  some  prior 
thought.  Scholastics,  whether  in  sensation  or  thought,  demand 
union  between  faculty  and  object.  Object  cannot  be  united 
with  faculty.  Hence  a  substitute  is  needed,  and  this  is  the 
species  impressa.  Act  must  be  immanent.  Hence  species  ex- 
pressa. 

III.  Loclce   and   Cartesians   deny   objectivity   of   sensations. 

Species  and  organ-changes  are  that  which  is  known,  and  in 

which  objects  are  known. 

34 


THESIS  II  35 


TEEMS 

Faculties.  Aristotle  attributes  five  powers  or  faculties  to  the 
soul  of  man,  vegetative,  locomotive,  appetite,  sense,  reason. 
The  first  four  are  common  to  man  and  brute.  The  fifth  is 
proper  and  peculiar  to  man.  The  first  two  have  no  bearing  on 
knowledge,  and  can  for  the  present  be  neglected.  St.  Thomas 
emphasizes  the  difference  between  sensitive  appetite  and  ra- 
tional appetite.  As  sense  and  reason  are  two  phases  of  knowl- 
edge, appetite  and  will  are  two  phases  of  desire.  Therefore, 
all  question  of  growth  and  locomotion  aside,  the  soul  of  man 
embraces  these  four  faculties  or  powers,  sense  and  reason  in  the 
cognitive  order,  appetite  and  will  in  the  appetitive  order.  And 
with  these  four  topics  we  are  especially  concerned  in  Psychology. 

Senses  and  Sensation.  The  senses  are  the  first  of  man's 
cognitive  faculties  to  halt  our  attention.  We  met  them  in 
Major  Logic,  and  we  can  best  begin  by  recalling  some  of  the 
notions  there  set  down.  We  then  described  the  senses  as  ma- 
terial, organic,  cognoscitive  faculties,  common  to  man  and  brute. 
They  are  instruments  employed  by  man  in  his  acquisition  of 
sensations.  Sensations  in  man  are  modifications  of  a  living 
organ  of  sense,  presenting  to  its  owner  some  object  affected 
with  extension  and  resistance.  An  organ  is  any  part  of  a  living 
body  possessed  of  a  structure  adapted  to  the  performance  of 
some  function  closely  allied  with  life.  The  sense  is  called  sight; 
the  sensation,  vision;  the  organ,  the  eye.  Intellect  is  that  spir- 
itual, inorganic,  cognoscitive  faculty  in  man,  separating  him 
from  brute  creation;  or  the  faculty  attaining  to  all  the  knowl- 
edge peculiar  to  the  senses,  and  furnishing  man  with  a  uni- 
versal and  abstract  knowledge,  to  which  the  senses  cannot  as- 
pire.    Eeturning  to  the  senses,  they  are  external  and  internal. 

External,  when  organ  is  on  surface  of  agent,  and  object  is 
outside  of  agent;  internal,  when  organ  is  in  brain  and  object 
is  inside  the  agent.  The  external  senses  are  five,  sight,  hearing, 
touch,  taste  and  smell,  because  there  are  five  organs.  There  is 
no  sixth  sense,  because  there  is  no  sixth  organ.  The  internal 
senses  are  four,  1,  sensus  communis,  sensile  consciousness,  or 
central  sense;  2,  vis  gestimativa,  sensile  discrimination  or  in- 
stinct; 3,  sensile  memory;  and  4,  imagination.     The  one  in- 


36  PSYCHOLOGY 

tellect  exercises  three  different  functions,  called  simple  appre- 
hension, judgment  and  reasoning.  The  resultants  of  these 
several  functions,  expressed  in  language,  are  the  word,  the 
proposition  and  the  syllogism.  In  the  production  of  an  idea 
the  intellect  acts  in  a  twofold  capacity.  Under  one  aspect  it  is 
called  intellectus  agens,  or  the  working  intellect;  under  the 
other,  intellectus  possibilis,  or  the  receiving  intellect.  As  work- 
ing intellect,  it  conspires  with  the  phantasm  to  effect  what  we 
call  the  imprinted  intelligible  image.  As  receiving  intellect  it 
cooperates  with  the  imprinted  intelligible  image  to  produce  the 
developed  intelligible  image,  or  idea  proper. 

Without  wishing  to  lose  ourselves  in  a  labyrinth  of  ques- 
tions, and  with  no  desire  to  encroach  on  the  domain  of  physi- 
ology, it  will  be  enough  for  the  present  to  merely  note  the  or- 
gans and  the  objects  of  the  several  senses,  external  and  in- 
ternal. The  organ  of  sight  is  the  eye,  its  formal  object  is  col- 
ored surface,  or  color.  The  organ  of  hearing  is  the  ear,  its 
formal  object  is  sound.  The  organ  of  touch  is  the  whole  outer 
surface  of  the  body,  its  formal  object  is  manifold;  roughness 
and  smoothness,  temperature,  organic  disturbance,  pressure, 
resistance.  The  organ  of  smell  is  the  inner  surface  of  the  nose, 
its  formal  object  is  odor.  The  organ  of  taste  is  the  surface  of 
tongue  and  palate,  its  formal  object  is  sweetness,  bitterness  and 
the  like. 

Of  the  internal  senses  it  may  be  said  in  general  that  their 
organs  are  the  nervous  system  and  special  compartments  of 
the  brain.  The  formal  object  or  purpose  of  sensile  conscious- 
ness is  to  discriminate  between  and  differentiate  the  operations 
of  the  external  senses,  while  they  are  present.  The  formal  ob- 
ject or  purpose  of  instinct  is  to  apprehend  objects  as  fit  or  use- 
ful to  satisfy  the  needs  of  animal  nature,  which  qualities  es- 
cape the  knowledge  of  the  external  senses.  Sensile  memory  re- 
tains and  excites  past  sensations.  It  adds  to  imagination  the 
recognition  of  old  sensations  as  past.  Imagination  retains  and 
combines  past  sensations  without  knowing  them  for  past  sen- 
sations. 

In  every  sensation  we  recognize  three  distinct  stages,  the  ac- 
tion of  some  outward  body  on  the  organ,  disturbance  in  nerves 
forwarded  to  the  brain,  and  the  conscious  sensation.  The  out- 
ward body  falls  within  the  domain  of  Physics.     Physiology  has 


THESIS  II  37 

to  do  with  the  nerve-disturbance,  and  Psychology  is  busy  with 
the  sensation  proper,  the  finished  product.  Physiologists  tell 
us  that  our  nervous  apparatus  is  twofold,  the  sympathetic  sys- 
tem for  purposes  of  veggtation  or  growth,  and  the  cerebro- 
spinal system  for  purposes  of  knowledge.  We  remark  in  pass- 
ing that,  while  these  nerves  with  the  body's  organs  are  joint 
factors  in  the  production  of  sensations,  they  are  no  adequate 
explanation  of  the  same.  Even  sense  knowledge,  whether  in 
brutes  or  men,  postulates  in  addition  to  nerves,  organs,  physical 
and  chemical  forces,  a  principle  of  life,  a  soul,  too  subtle  to  be 
detected  by  eye  or  microscope,  simple  per  se,  divisible  per  ac- 
cidens  and  material,  not  in  the  sense  that  it  is  measurable,  but 
in  the  sense  that  it  is  intrinsically  dependent  on  matter  for  its 
existence  and  activity. 

Materialism  is,  therefore,  wrong,  when  it  professes  to  ex- 
plain even  sense-knowledge  with  the  single  help  of  nerves,  or- 
gans, and  physical  or  chemical  forces.  It  is  wronger  still, 
when  it  ascribes  the  same  origin  to  thought  or  intellectual 
knowledge.  Nerve  action  and  molecular  movement  are  condi- 
tions, not  the  cause  of  thought,  and  non  causa  pro  causa  is  a 
sophism.  Sensation  is  the  work  of  neither  the  body  nor  the 
soul  alone,  but  of  the  composite  being  resulting  from  the  union 
of  both,  the  animal.  There  is  no  sensation  in  a  soul  separated 
from  the  body.  In  hell  God  supplies  for  sensation.  Our  ideas 
are  dependent  on  our  senses  up  to  the  formation  of  the  phan- 
tasm. Beyond  that  stage  they  are  entirely  spiritual;  organs 
and  nerves  play  no  part  whatever  in  their  final  production,  and 
a  wholly  immaterial  faculty,  the  intellect,  is  their  single  ex- 
planation. Apart,  therefore,  from  the  body  and  its  organs,  the 
intellect  can  exist  and  operate;  and  its  dependence  on  the  body 
is  merely  extrinsic,  due  entirely  to  our  present  condition,  and 
open  to  complete  reversal  after  death,  or  separation  from  the 
body. 

Omitting  the  sympathetic  system  of  nerves,  the  cerebro- 
spinal system  can  be  best  described  as  a  central  mass,  con- 
nected with  all  the  different  parts  of  the  body  by  wires.  This 
central  mass  is  made  up  of  brain  and  spinal  cord,  the  wires  are 
the  nerves.  The  spinal  cord  is  a  column  of  white  fibrous  mat- 
ter, enclosing  a  core  of  gray  cellular  substance  called  the  mar- 
row.    The   nerves   are   strings   proceeding   in   pairs   from   the 


38  PSYCHOLOGY 

back  and  front  of  the  spinal  column.  The  front,  anterior,  ef- 
ferent or  motor  nerves  transmit  impulses  outward,  and  are  the 
instruments  of  muscular  movement.  The  back,  posterior,  af- 
ferent or  sensory  nerves  transmit  impulses  inward,  and  give 
rise  to  sensations.  These  nerves  branch  to  all  parts  of  the 
body  in  such  profusion  that  the  finest  needle,  applied  to  any 
portion  of  the  body's  surface,  will  come  in  contact  with  a 
nerve.  The  brain  contains  four  compartments,  the  medulla 
oblongata,  a  prolongation  of  the  spinal  cord,  with  nerves  for 
the  face,  heart  and  lungs;  the  cerebellum,  above  and  back  of 
the  medulla,  with  nerves  for  locomotion ;  the  pons  Varolii,  above 
and  in  front  of  the  medulla;  and  the  cerebrum,  or  large  brain, 
above  all,  with  its  two  hemispheres  and  its  two  fissures,  the 
Sylvian  and  that  of  Eolando.  The  nerves  with  ends  in  the 
head  would  seem  to  be  located  in  the  four  different  compart- 
ments of  the  brain;  those  with  ends  in  the  rest  of  the  body,  in 
the  spinal  column.  The  nerves  are  in  pairs,  efferent  and  af- 
ferent, like  the  wires  in  an  electric  circuit;  and  this  would  seem 
to  be  the  process  of  sensation.  An  impression  wrought  on  the 
end-organ  of  an  afferent  nerve  is  transmitted  to  a  center  in  the 
brain.  At  its  arrival  in  the  brain  a  sensation  is  awakened. 
Conscious  sensation  produces  an  impulse,  which  flowing  back 
along  a  motor  nerve  causes  movement.  Treading  on  the  foot 
is  an  example. 

Sensation  is  not  in  the  brain,  but  in  the  organ  proper  to  the 
sensation  in  question.  Scholastics  are  against  physiologists  in 
this  matter.  The  outward  organ  receives  the  impression,  and 
sends  it  on  to  the  brain;  reaction  follows  in  the  brain,  to  in- 
form central  sense,  and  go  back  to  the  outward  organ.  This 
reaction  is  responsible  for  the  two  species,  imprinted  and  de- 
veloped. Reasons:  1.  Experience  and  common  sense;  2.  A 
hurt  in  the  brain  is  not  felt  elsewhere;  3.  The  brain  can  be 
removed  and  sensation  continue;  4.  Peculiar  construction  is  in 
organ,  not  in  brain;  5.  The  brain  finishes  its  work  with  the 
internal  senses. 

The  motion  is  too  slow  to  be  electrical.  It  is  no  faster  than 
80  or  200  feet  a  second. 

Physiologists  have  mapped  the  different  nerve-centers  in  the 
brain,  and  located  with  more  or  less  accuracy  the  positions  of 
the  several  sense-centers.     Thus,  while   the  upper  portion  of 


THESIS  II  39 

the  brain  is  reserved  for  memory  and  imagination,  the  origin 
of  the  olfactory  nerves  is  in  the  center  of  the  base  of  the  brain; 
that  of  the  optic  nerves,  a  little  back  of  the  first  pair.  The 
other  nerves  start  in  the  medulla,  and  they  control  the  skin  of 
the  face,  and  the  muscles  of  the  tongue  and  jaws.  The  audi- 
tory and  gustatory  nerves  are  rooted  here.  The  tactual  and 
motor  nerves  arise  lower  down  in  the  spinal  cord.  St.  Thomas, 
in  his  treatise  on  the  internal  senses,  assigns  each  its  own 
definite  compartment  of  the  brain,  and  in  his  own  crude  way 
foreshadows  the  work  of  modern  physiologists.  The  ends  of 
the  gustatory  nerves  are  on  the  surface  of  the  tongue  and  palate, 
and  the  body  to  be  tasted  must  be  in  a  state  of  solution.  The 
ends  of  the  olfactory  nerves  are  in  the  membrane  lining  the 
inner  surface  of  the  nose,  and  the  stimulating  particles  must 
be  drawn  over  the  sensitive  surface  by  inhalation.  The  ends 
of  the  tactual  nerves  are  in  the  dermis,  immediately  under  the 
cuticle  or  outer  skin.  These  papillae  are  stimulated  by  pres- 
sure on  the  outer  skin.  The  ends  of  the  auditory  nerves  are 
in" the  liquid  distributed  throughout  the  labyrinth  or  inner  ear. 
The  ends  of  the  optic  nerves  are  in  the  inner  strata  of  the 
retina,  and  are  a  layer  of  rods  and  cones,  conveying  the  image 
on  the  retina  as  a  neural  tremor  to  the  brain.  The  ear  and  the 
eye  are  the  most  complicated  of  our  sense-organs.  Obviously 
we  cannot  enter  into  a  detailed  explanation  of  each.  That 
would  be  to  trespass  on  physiology.  We  therefore  dismiss  the 
subject  with  these  few  remarks.  The  ear  is  made  up  of  three 
parts,  the  pinna  or  sail  and  meatus;  the  tympanum,  drum  or 
middle  ear;  and  the  labyrinth,  or  inner  ear.  The  eye  contains 
the  sclerotic,  the  cornea  or  pupil,  the  choroid  coat,  the  retina, 
the  yellow  spot  and  the  blind  spot. 

We  recognize  in  sensation  two  values,  the  emotional,  or 
pleasure  and  pain;  and  the  cognitive,  or  knowledge.  In  the 
order  of  emotion  the  senses  are  thus  rated,  systemic,  taste, 
smell,  hearing,  touch,  and  sight.  In  the  order  of  cognition 
this  rating  is  reversed  to  sight,  touch,  hearing,  smell,  taste,  sys- 
temic. This  order  stands  only  when  the  senses  are  viewed  di- 
rectly, without  taking  into  account  appropriation  by  means  of 
association  and  inference. 

Idealism  questions  the  validity  of  our  sensations  as  instru- 
ments of  knowledge,  contending  that  they  can  furnish  us  with 


40  PSYCHOLOGY 

no  solid  certainty  regarding  the  objective  reality  of  tilings. 
But  this  wrong  system,  evolved  by  Berkeley  and  others  from 
false  prineiples  advanced  by  Descartes  and  Locke,  was  abun- 
dantly refuted  in  Cosmolog)^;  and  we  refer  readers  to  that 
treatise. 

Many  im])ortant  discoveries  with  a  bearing  on  the  growth 
and  development  of  sense  perception  are  due  to  physiological  re- 
search, and  they  are  being  daily  multiplied.  Thus,  the  weight 
of  the  brain  at  birth  is  about  one-sixth  that  of  the  whole  body. 
During  the  child's  first  year  it  almost  doubles  its  size,  and 
after-growth  is  much  less  rapid.  It  is  full  sized  at  the  end 
of  the  seventh  year.  In  normal  European  adults  it  weighs 
from  46  to  52  ounces.  The  child  is  born  deaf,  and  in  the  mat- 
ter* of  sight  is  able  merely  to  distinguish  light  from  darkness, 
without  the  ability  to  discriminate  colors.  Infancy  covers  the 
first  two  years,  when  the  senses  reach  maturity,  and  locomotion 
and  speech  are  imperfectly  acquired.  Childhood  reaches  to  the 
seventh  year.  During  this  period  memory  and  imagination 
grow,  play-impulse  appears,  knowledge  of  personality,  self-con- 
sciousness and  use  of  reason.  Boyhood  runs  from  seven  to 
fourteen.  This  is  the  plastic  period.  Habits  and  passions  are 
hard  to  dislodge  at  fifteen.  Youth  ranges  from  fourteen  to 
twenty-one.  Character  becomes  set  and  fixed;  the  passions  are 
prominent,  and  these  years  are  the  season  of  ideals.  This  pe- 
riod colors  the  man's  whole  future  life. 

The  primary  and  secondary  qualities  of  matter  are  only  the 
formal  and  material,  or  proper  and  common  objects  of  the 
senses.  Thus,  color,  sound  and  the  like  are  primary  qualities; 
while  extension,  figure,  motion,  rest,  number  and  the  like  are 
secondary. 

In  every  operation  of  the  senses  we  must  distinguish  two 
phases  or  elements,  one  in  the  subject,  the  other  in  the  object. 
Odor  in  me  and  odor  in  the  rose,  are  a  familiar  example.  The 
object  must  somehow  get  into  the  subject,  and  the  two  must 
come  into  close  contact.  Sensation  perhaps  best  expresses  the 
act  from  a  subjective;  perception,  from  an  objective  point  of 
view.  The  Scholastics  explain  everything  with  their  species 
intentionales,  knowledge-likenesses  or  images.  They  are  called 
intentionales  because  with  their  help  the  faculty  tends  towards 
or  goes  out  to  the  object.     A  species  witli  them  was  no  ma- 


THESIS  II  41 

terial  efflux  from  the  object.  Objects,  according  to  them,  al- 
ways act  on  the  organ  through  intervening  media.  A  species 
was  a  modification  of  the  faculty,  helping  to  knowledge  of  out- 
side objects.  It  was  a  transference  of  the  object  to  the  faculty. 
With  them,  outside  objects  were  the  things  known,  not  their 
species.  Sense  and  intellect  never  know  species,  they  know  the 
corresponding  outside  objects,  trees,  horses,  and  the  like.  They 
never  pass  from  a  knowledge  of  species  to  a  knowledge  of  outside 
objects.  And  all  this  was  pithily  and  accurately  expressed  in 
the  formula:  "Species  est  id  quo  res  intelligitur,  non  id  quod 
intelligitur ,  neque  id  ex  quo  vel  in  quo  res  intelligitur."  Locke 
and  idealists  in  general  make  the  mistake  of  limiting  our 
knowledge  or  certainty  to  these  species,  declaring  the  species, 
id  quod  intelligitur.  The  Scholastics  were  wiser,  and  based 
their  position  on  the  following  argument,  contained  in  St. 
Thomas,  1,  q.  85,  A.  2.  "  Every  such  purely  subjective  view 
of  knowledge  is  wrong,  because  what  we  know  is  ultimately 
the  subject  matter  of  science,  and  science  deals  with  outside 
objects,  like  the  stars,  the  elements,  trees  and  such,  not  with 
modifications  of  the  agent,  like  the  species.  Besides,  this  false 
theory  renews  the  error  of  whatever  ancient  philosophers  main- 
tained that  everything  is  exactly  what  it  is  perceived  to  be ;  that 
honey  is  in  reality  sweet  and  bitter,  with  entire  dependence  on 
the  normal  or  abnormal  taste  of  the  tasting  agent." 

These  species  are  intentionales  inasmuch  as  they  are  psychi- 
cal expressions  of  material  things.  They  are  sensiles  and  in- 
telligibiles,  in  accordance  with  the  faculty  employed.  Impressae, 
or  imprinted,  are  resultants  from  action  of  the  object;  ex- 
pressae,  or  developed,  are  resultants  from  reaction  of  the  faculty. 
Memory  and  its  readiness  argue  the  existence  of  impressae. 
Both  kinds  are  affections  of  the  faculty,  not  the  object  on  the 
retina  of  the  eye,  not  nervous  disturbance.  Hence  the  epithet, 
intentionales.  If  we  want  to  escape  the  absurdity  of  innate 
ideas,  we  must  maintain  that  material  objects  act  on  our  facul- 
ties, and  base  our  knowledge.  The  deaf  cannot  hear  a  sound 
or  think  it;  the  blind  cannot  see  a  color  or  think  it.  Ergo 
mind  and  sense  do  not  altogether  determine  their  own  modifi- 
cations. Furthermore,  knowledge  represents  realities,  unless  we 
want  to  be  skeptics ;  and  sensation  and  thought  are  the  psychical 
expression  of  things. 


42  PSYCHOLOGY 

Imagination  and  sensile  memory  are  important  enough  to 
deserve  our  special  attention.  The  imagination  is  that  in- 
ternal sense  which  stores  away  old  sensations,  preserves  them, 
presents  them  luhen  called  for,  and  combines  them  to  form  new 
images.  It  forms  representations  of  material  objects  apart 
from  their  presence.  Its  energy  results  in  what  we  call  a 
phantasm.  As  compared  with  that  of  the  other  senses,  the 
work  of  the  imagination  is  faint  in  intensity,  obscure  in  out- 
line, transitory  in  character,  normally  subject  to  our  control 
and  without  bearing  on  objective  reality.  Ordinarily  the 
imagination  is  reproductive;  when  productive,  constructive,  cre- 
ative, it  assumes  the  name  of  fancy.  Memory  is  not  reproduc- 
tion, but  recognition.  Illusions,  dreams  and  reveries  are  due 
to  the  imagination.  Illusion  differs  from  fallacy  and  delusion. 
It  is  a  spurious  act  of  apprehension.  Its  causes  are  subjective 
or  objective.  Thus,  strong  anticipation  of  an  event  leads  one 
to  perceive  the  occurrence  before  it  happens;  as  in  the  case  of 
the  butcher,  who  thought  his  arm  torn  by  a  meat-hook.  De- 
sire and  fear  can  work  kindred  results  in  the  case  of  a  timid 
traveler  and  a  child  treated  to  ghost-stories.  Ill  health  and 
disordered  organs,  along  with  irregularities  in  medium,  are 
instances  of  objective  influences.  Hallucinations  are  illusions 
of  an  extreme  and  permanent  kind.  Dreams  and  reveries  are 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  imagination  usurps  the  functions  of 
the  external  senses,  which  in  sleep  and  drowsiness  are  inactive 
along  with  will,  reflection,  and  the  power  to  compare.  Dreams 
seem  real,  because  we  are  completely  at  the  mercy  of  the  imag- 
ination. They  are  incoherent  and  extravagant,  with  a  tinge 
of  consistency,  and  they  regularly  exaggerate  actual  impressions. 
The  mind  accepts  as  real  the  representations  of  the  imagination, 
unless  some  faculty  checks  them;  and  in  sleep  no  checking 
faculty  is  at  hand. 

Memory  is  tJie  faculty  that  retains,  recalls  and  recognizes 
past  cognition  or  knowledge.  If  this  past  knowledge  is  sensa- 
tion, the  memory  concerned  is  sensile ;  if  it  is  thought,  the  mem- 
ory is  intellectual.  We  are  at  present  dealing  with  memory 
taken  as  an  internal  sense;  but  what  is  true  of  sensile  is 
easily  applicable  to  intellectual  memory.  Aristotle  distin- 
guishes between  memory,  mneme,  and  reminiscence  or  recol- 


THESIS  II  43 

lection,  anamnesis;  between  retention  and  recall  or  recognition. 
Modern  writers  call  the  first  spontaneous,  or  automatic;  the 
other,  voluntary  memory  or  recollection.  St.  Thomas  restricts 
reminiscence  to  man,  because  it  involves  will  and  reason.  If 
brutes  have  sense  and  appetite,  we  fail  to  see  why  they  must 
be  denied  an  inferior  kind  of  reminiscence. 

Logically,  the  first  question  demanding  attention  is  the  re- 
tention of  past  sensations.  The  Schoolmen  were  far  clearer, 
simpler  and  wiser  on  this  subject  than  moderns,  who,  because  of 
their  materialistic  tendencies,  render  a  plain  and  easy  problem 
a  tangled  mass  of  confusion.  The  Scholastics  meet  the  diffi- 
culty by  supposing  the  memory  a  thesaurus  specierum,  a  treas- 
ury of  past  experiences.  When  sensations  disappear  from  con- 
sciousness, the  soul  with  the  help  of  the  organism  retains  these 
modifications,  images,  species,  as  faint  dispositions  or  habits. 
Eeproduction  and  recognition  are  based  on  laws  of  association. 
They  are  three,  the  Law  of  similarity,  the  law  of  contrast,  and 
the  law  of  contiguity  in  space  and  time.  They  mean  that  men- 
tal states  suggest  like,  or  different,  or  connected  states  in  past 
experience;  and  our  doctrine  of  species  or  psychical  expressions 
of  objects  is  ample  explanation.  Memory  is  likewise  helped 
by  the  strength  of  the  original  impression,  by  frequent  repeti- 
tion, and  by  freshness  of  the  experience.  A  good  memory  mani- 
fests itself  in  facility  of  acquisition,  tenacity,  and  readiness  of 
reproduction.  Ben  Jonson,  Scaliger,  Pascal,  Macaulay,  Mez- 
zofanti,  were  remarkable  in  this  particular.  Children  ought  to 
be  trained  to  judicious,  not  mere  mechanical,  memory. 

Immanent  act  is  opposed  to  transient.  In  a  transient  act, 
the  effect  is  received  in  a  suppositum  really  different  and  dis- 
tinct from  the  agent.  In  an  immanent  act  the  effect  is  re- 
ceived in  the  agent  itself.  An  act  is  immanent  in  broad  sense 
when  the  effect  is  not  a  perfection  of  the  faculty  from  which  it 
proceeds,  e.  g.  nutrition  and  locomotion ;  it  is  immanent  in 
strict  sense  when  the  effect  is  a  perfection  of  the  faculty,  e.  g. 
to  feel,  to  think,  to  wish. 

Cognoscitive  act  means  knowledge;  it  means  to  know;  it 
means  to  become  the  thing  known,  e.  g.  I  hold  this  in  my 
memory.  "We  become  the  thing  known,  not  according  to  its 
material  being,  but  according  to  its  ideal  or  intentional  being. 


44  PSYCHOLOGY 

This  intentional  representation,  its  substitute  in  the  faculty, 
is  called  a  species,  whether  intelligibilis  or  sensibilis.  Hence 
Jcnowledge  is  the  vital  expression  of  an  object  in  the  faculty. 

PROOFS  I,  II,  III 

I.  Sensation  is  an  immanent  and  cognoscitive  act. 
Immanent,   from   experience.     Common   or   central  sense   is 

witness  that  sensation  proceeds  from  me,  and  is  received  within 
me. 

Cognoscitive,  because  it  is  a  vital  expression  of  the  object,  as 
in  vision  or  imagination. 

II.  a.  A  faculty  and  object  are  needed;  t.  There  must  be 
union  between  the  two.     c,  This  union  must  be  in  the  faculty. 

"  There  can  be  no  act  without  a  principle  and  a  term.  Some- 
thing must  perceive,  and  something  must  be  perceived.  The 
faculty  is  the  principle;  the  object  is  the  terminating  term;  its 
substitute,  the  species,  is  the  determining  term. 

*  The  faculty  is  indifferent,  and  must  be  determined  by  the 
object.  This  determination  is  impossible  without  union  be- 
tween the  two,  because  action  from  a  distance  is  repugnant; 
non  datur  actio  in  distans;  the  effect  cannot  be  altogether  sepa- 
rate from  its  cause;  where  a  thing  does  not  exist  it  cannot  act; 
esse  is  prior  to  agere. 

"  Union  must  be  in  faculty,  because  otherwise  sensation 
would  not  be  an  immanent  act. 

III.  Sensation  perceives  the  object,  not  its  species  or  image, 
not  the  organ  impression.  We  perceive  objects  not  as  they 
are  in  us,  but  as  they  are  outside  of  us,  e.  g.  trees.  When  we 
touch  a  sphere,  tlie  sensation  is  of  a  convex  thing,  not  of  a 
concave  thing. 

PRINCIPLES 

7.  A.  Knowledge  means  a  judgment.  Sensation  is  no 
judgment.  Ergo  sensation  is  no  knowledge.  Answer.  Per- 
fect knowledge  means  a  judgment,  I  grant;  imperfect,  I  again 
distinguish.  It  means  a  formal  judgment,  I  deny;  a  virtual, 
I  grant; 

B.     Sense  must  know  that  the  object  exists.     Impossible  to 


THESIS  II  45 

sense.  Ergo.  Answer.  Must  know  in  the  concrete,  I  grant; 
in  the  abstract,  I  deny, 

C.  The  ultimate  principle  of  knowledge  ought  to  be  im- 
material. Answer.  Immaterial,  in  sense  of  not  matter,  I 
grant;  immaterial,  in  sense  of  independent  of  matter,  I  again 
distinguish.  In  intellectual  knowledge,  I  grant;  in  sensation, 
I  deny.  Sensation  is  organic,  or  material,  in  sense  that  it  pro- 
ceeds not  from  the  soul  alone,  but  from  the  composite  or  organ 
informed  by  the  soul.     Thought  is  inorganic,  wholly  immaterial. 

//.  D.  The  physical  change  induced  in  the  organ  explains 
sensation,  without  any  union  between  faculty  and  object.  An- 
swer. It  involves  adaptation  to  sensitive  cognition,  I  grant; 
otherwise,  I  deny. 

E.  Sense  is  no  voucher  for  species  impressa.  Ergo  species 
is  not  needed.  Answer.  The  species  impressa  is  demanded  by 
reflection  and  reasoning  combined. 

F.  Species  impressa  is  enough.  Ergo,  there  is  no  need  of 
species  expressa.  Answer.  It  is  not  enough,  because  it  is  a 
virtual  image,  and  transient,  passing  from  object  to  faculty; 
the  expressa  is  a  formal  image,  and  immanent. 

///.  G.  It  is  not  the  work  of  the  senses  to  judge  about  the 
nature  of  things.  That  belongs  to  the  intellect.  Answer. 
About  inner  essence,  I  grant;  about  outer  accidents,  I  deny. 

H.  Light,  heat,  electricity  are  all  explained  by  vibrations. 
Ergo,  there  are  no  sensible  qualities,  but  vibrations.  Answer. 
Sensible  qualities  are  vibrations,  I  deny;  are  accompanied  by 
them,  I  grant.  Sensibles  are  proper,  common  and  per  acci- 
dens,  e.  g.  color,  shape,  substance  or  man.  Proper  Sensibles 
are  active  forms  and  energies  inhering  in  bodies.  Vibrations 
and  undulations  are  not  these  qualitates  sensibiles,  but  accom- 
pany them  . 

/,  Bodies  are  felt  and  perceived  through  vibrations.  Ergo, 
there  are  no  qualities.  Answer.  Sensibles  are  vibrations  only, 
I  deny;  joined  with  vibrations,  I  grant. 

J.  Color  blind  see  wrong.  Ergo,  there  are  no  sensible  quali- 
ties. Answer.  In  vitiated  condition,  I  grant;  in  normal,  I 
deny.     They  see  only  in  part. 

K.  Senses  reach  bodies  through  species  impressa.  Ergo, 
they  reach  not  bodies.  Answer.  As  medium  quod,  or  in  quo, 
I  deny;  as  medium  quo,  I  grant. 


THESIS  III 

There  exists  in  man  a  cognoscitive  faculty,  essentially  dif- 
ferent from  sense;  and  this  faculty  has  truly  universal  ideas. 

Maher,  pp.  239-253;  Jouin,  pp.  210-215. 

QUESTION 

Division.     Two  parts:     I.  Intellect;  II.  Universals. 

The  soul  is  ultimate  and  radical  principle  of  all  man's  life. 
It  needs  accidental  principles  or  natural  faculties  to  elicit  vital 
acts.  Faculty  can  be  whole  eye  or  soul-power  in  the  eye. 
Whole  eye,  compounded  of  organ  and  power,  is  certainly  dis- 
tinct from  soul  by  inadequate  distinction.  St.  Thomas  makes 
faculties  real  and  distinct  properties  flowing  from  essence  of 
soul.     They  are  not  the  soul's  substance. 

Faculty  is  a  proximate  and  connatural  principle  of  vital 
operations;  not  remote  like  soul;  not  accidental  like  habit  and 
species.  Number  of  faculties  is  the  same  as  number  of  apti- 
tudes for  vital  operations.  Faculties  are  denominated  by  acts 
and  formal  objects.  According  to  Aristotle  the  soul's  facul- 
ties are  five,  vegetative,  sensitive,  intellectual,  appetitive,  loco- 
motive. 

Question:     Is  the  formal  object  of  intellect  different  from 

formal  object  of  sense? 

TEEMS 

I.  Intellect  is  a  higher  faculty  than  sense,  because  its  knowl- 
edge is  of  a  higher  order;  and  causes  are  graded  by  their  ef- 
fects. Man  is  superior  to  brute,  primarily  because  of  what 
he  can  do,  when  he  exerts  his  highest  energy.  All  knowledge 
is  not  ultimately  reducible  to  sensation,  in  spite  of  the  popu- 
larity the  opposite  doctrine  to-day  enjoys.  The  materialistic 
tendencies  of  our  age  are  altogether  responsible  for  the  sad 
mistake,   and  the   penny-wise  philosophers,  who   cater  to   the 

46 


THESIS  III  47 

public  taste,  are  variously  known  as  Sensationalists,  Associa- 
tionists,  Materialists,  Phenomenists,  Positivists,  Empiricists 
and  Evolutionists.  Sensationists  reduce  all  knowledge  to  sen- 
sation. Associationists  make  all  knowledge  a  grouping  of  sen- 
sations by  similarity,  contrast,  and  by  contiguity  in  time  or 
space.  Materialists  hold  that  all  knowledge  turns  on  matter, 
and  that  the  mind  is  a  function  of  organism.  Phenomenists 
restrict  all  knowledge  to  phenomena  or  appearances  open  to  the 
eye,  the  ear,  and  the  other  senses.  Positivists  limit  knowledge 
to  positive  science,  to  laws  observable  in  phenomena  or  sense- 
occurrences,  with  no  concern  for  metaphysics  or  ultimate  re- 
alities. With  Empiricists  knowledge  is  bounded  by  what  falls 
under  the  experience  or  notice  of  the  senses.  According  to  Evo- 
lutionists mind  is  evolved  from  matter,  and  therefore  different 
from  sense  in  degree  only,  not  in  kind.  Adversaries.  Material- 
ists make  intelligence  motion  in  matter  like  sensation,  with  no 
essential  difference.  Cartesians  make  intellect  and  sense  differ 
essentially  from  matter,  accidentally  among  themselves.  If 
brutes  had  sense,  they  would  have  intellect.  They  raise  sense 
to  intellect,  sensation  to  intelligence.  Sensists  reduce  intellect 
to  sense,  intelligence  to  sensation;  making  concept,  judgment, 
reasoning,  reflection  sensations,  associated  or  transformed; 
making  intellect  Just  as  organic  as  sense,  with  no  essential  dif- 
ference. So  Locke  and  Condillac.  With  Locke,  judgments  are 
composite  sensations;  with  Condillac,  judgments  are  sensations 
transformed  from  imperfect  to  perfect. 

We  are  capable  of  several  acts  that  clearly  prove  intellect's 
essential  superiority  over  sense.  These  acts  are  intellectual 
attention,  comparison,  and  judgment,  especially  in  the  case  of 
necessary  judgments;  universal  and  abstract  concepts,  reflec- 
tion and  self-consciousness.  With  regard  to  attention,  we  re- 
mark that  active  attention  is  a  secondary  act,  an  interior  reac- 
tion of  a  higher  kind,  superadded  to  primitive  sense-impres- 
sions, which  induce  a  condition  of  mere  passivity.  An  orange 
on  a  table  can  furnish  forth  a  fair  example.  Comparison  and 
judgment  postulate  intellect.  These  acts  are  impossible  with- 
out a  force  holding  the  compared  ideas  together  in  the  con- 
sciousness, and  discerning  the  relation  of  similarity  between 
them.  Coexistence  or  successive  occurrence  of  impressions  is 
not  enough.     A  third  and  distinct  activity  must  be  present. 


48  PSYCHOLOGY 

able  to  apprehend  the  common  feature.  And  all  this  becomes 
clearer  in  the  casef  of  necessary  judgments,  as  contrasted  with 
empirical  or  a  posteriori  judgments,  about  the  antipodes,  a 
man's  photograph,  fire  and  heat,  white  snow,  glass  as  a  food. 
Sense  tells  us  that  a  particular  fact  exists;  intellect  tells  us 
that  a  universal  truth  holds.  Universal  and  abstract  concepts 
likewise  prove  intellect.  Science  without  universal  ideas  is 
impossible.  Imagination  cannot  form  them.  Berkeley  log- 
ically admits  this,  and  concludes  that  we  have  no  universal 
ideas  because  we  have  no  faculty  for  their  formation.  His 
catalogue  of  faculties  is  incomplete.  The  concept  represents  a 
thing's  nature  or  essence  without  accidental  conditions;  the 
image  sets  forth  concrete  conditions.  The  concept  is  one  ap- 
plicable to  many;  the  image  is  applicable  to  but  one.  The 
concept  is  immutable  and  necessary;  the  image,  changeable, 
different  in  each  individual  of  the  same  class.  When  we  say 
that  the  whale  is  a  mammal,  we  mean  no  particular  whale,  but 
every  whale.  Eeflection  and  self-consciousness  demand  intel- 
lect. We  can  recognize  ourselves  as  something  more  than  our 
transient  states.  Something  goes  over  from  primitive  condi- 
tion to  present  condition  of  consciousness.  That  something  is 
not  sense.     Ergo  it  is  intellect. 

The  intellect  is  a  spiritual,  non-organic  faculty;  sense  is  an 
organic,  corporeal,  material  faculty.  Objects  of  sense  are  ma- 
terial phenomena,  and  sense  employs  bodily  organs.  The  eye 
sees,  the  ear  hears,  or  better  still,  the  soul  sees  and  hears  by 
means  of  the  eye  and  ear.  The  soul  thinks  by  means  of  the 
intellect.  It  thinks  by  means  of  the  phantasm  only  acci- 
dentally, or  because  of  the  present  union  in  force  between  body 
and  soul.  Unity  of  consciousness  is  possible  to  only  a  spiritual 
agent,  because  matter  cannot  be  turned  back  upon  itself.  In- 
dividual, concrete  objects  appeal  to  an  organic  faculty,  like 
sense;  universal  ideas,  necessary  judgments  appeal  to  only  a 
spiritual  faculty,  an  intellect.  Extrinsic  dependence  of  intel- 
lect on  brain  is  far  from  making  it  material.  Stimulation  of 
sense  is  a  conditio  sine  qua  non  in  this  life  for  intellectual  ac- 
tivity, not  a  cause. 

Balmes  and  Lotze  refute  the  Sensism  of  Condillac.  Con- 
dillac  says,  "  a  statue  of  gold  with  but  one  sensation  has  but 
one  attention  and  no  judgment.     Two  sensations  would  form 


THESIS  III  49 

two  attentions,  and  would  make  comparison  and  judgment  pos- 
sible." In  this  theory  all  sensation  would  be  attention,  and 
all  attention  would  be  sensation.  But  attention  is  application 
of  the  mind  to  something.  The  perception  of  the  difference 
between  a  pink  rose  and  a  red  rose,  is  the  effect  of  an  activity 
of  a  different  order  from  sensation,  and  that  is  intellect.  Dif- 
ference is  an  abstraction,  and  no  proper  object  of  sense.  As 
Lotze  says,  attention  has  for  purpose  the  discovery  of  relations, 
a  work  beyond  the  reach  of  sense. 

11.  Universals  —  Systems :  Nominalism,  Conceptualism,  Ex- 
aggerated Realism,  Moderate  Realism.  Universal  is  derived 
from  the  Latin  phrase,  unum  versus  alia,  and  means  one  with 
a  relation  to  many,  e.  g.  man,  all  essences  are  universals.  Five 
different  ways  of  being  universal,  in  causando,  God  as  cause 
of  all  things;  in  significando,  words,  James  as  standing  for 
all  of  that  name;  in  repraesentando,  circle  on  blackboard  as 
standing  for  all  circles;  in  essendo,  one  existing  of  its  nature 
in  many,  man  taken  as  an  essence;  in  praedicando,  one  of  its 
nature  predicated  of  many,  man  taken  as  an  essence.  Our 
present  question  is  about  last  two;  and  they  mean,  one  thing 
suitable  to  exist  in  many  according  to  its  whole  being. 

Essences  are  formal  object  of  the  intellect,  without  saying 
a  word  about  their  existence  in  many.  We  now  discuss  whether 
and  how  the  mind  conceives  a  universal,  one  existing  in  many. 
NominaUsm  teaches  that  universals  are  mere  words.  This 
system  admits  universals  in  significando,  denies  universals  in 
repraesentando  and  in  essendo,  employing  this  argument:  No 
universal  idea  is  possible  without  a  universal  object.  But  there 
are  no  universal  objects.  Ergo  there  are  no  universal  ideas, 
and  universals  are  mere  words.  Conceptualism  teaches  that 
universals  are  mere  ideas,  without  any  corresponding  reality; 
they  are  mere  figments  or  creations  of  the  mind.  This  system 
admits  universals  in  repraesentando,  denies  universals  in  es- 
sendo, employing  this  argument :  Universal  words  call  for  uni- 
versal ideas,  with  no  universal  object.  Ergo  universals  are 
mere  ideas  or  concepts,  with  no  corresponding  reality  a  parte 
rei,  circle  on  board.  Exaggerated  Realism  teaches  that  uni- 
versal objects  exist  apart  from  and  outside  of  us;  that  some- 
where a  universal  man  is  just  as  much  a  concrete  reality  as  an 
individual  man  among  us;  employing  this  argument :     Univer- 


50  PSYCHOLOGY 

sal  words  call  for  universal  ideas,  universal  ideas  call  for  uni- 
versal objects.  Ergo  universal  objects  exist  apart  from  and 
outside  of  us.  There  are  three  schools  of  Exaggerated  Real- 
ism. Plato  taught  that  in  another  sphere  man,  horse,  tree 
without  individuating  notes  exist,  like  individuals  here.  On- 
tologists,  Malebranche  and  the  rest,  held  that  universals  are 
divine  ideas  immediately  perceived  by  the  mind.  William  of 
Champeaux  maintained  that  individuals  of  the  same  species 
have  numerically  as  well  as  specifically  the  one  nature. 

Moderate  Realism  teaches  that  universals  are  formally  in  the 
mind,  fundamentally  in  things,  employing  this  argument :  We 
certainly  have  universal  ideas,  otherwise  all  science  is  out  of 
the  question.  There  can  be  no  idea  without  its  corresponding 
object,  otherwise  all  our  knowledge  deteriorates  to  subjectivism 
and  idealism.  On  the  other  hand  there  can  be  no  physical  uni- 
versal a  parte  rei,  as  that  would  be  a  contradiction  in  terms, 
one  and  at  the  same  time  many  under  the  same  aspect.  Hence 
universals  are  formally  in  the  mind,  fundamentally  in  things. 
Formally  in  the  mind,  because  universality  is  not  real  but 
logical.  Fundamentally  in  things,  because  the  similarity  of 
essences  specifically  the  same,  is  foundation  for  conceiving 
many  as  one. 

Universals  are  of  two  kinds,  direct  and  reflex.  The  names 
explain  themselves.  A  direct  universal  is  the  abstract  essence, 
or  the  essence  separated  from  its  individuating  notes,  with 
never  a  word  about  its  presence  in  one  or  many.  A  reflex  uni- 
versal is  gotten  from  the  direct  by  that  operation  of  the  mind 
called  reflection.  The  mind  reflects  on  the  direct  and  discovers 
that  it  says  a  relation  to  many,  that  it  is  actually  multiplied 
or  capable  of  multiplication  in  many.  Indeterminate  would  be 
the  more  proper  name  for  direct.  The  reflex  is  the  universal 
properly  and  strictly  so  called.  The  direct  is  in  the  individual, 
but  with  notes.  The  reflex  is  formally  in  the  mind  alone,  it  is 
an  ens  rationis,  it  is  in  the  individual  only  in  potency.  The 
real  universal  is  many  actually,  one  in  potency;. the  logical  is 
many  in  potency,  one  actually.  The  real  universal  is  the  direct 
universal,  as  explained  above;  the  logical  universal  is  the  reflex 
universal,  it  is  the  direct,  considered  apart  from  accompanying 
individuating  notes.  The  essence  of  man  is  one,  human,  capa- 
ble of  lodgment  in  every  individual  of  the  race. 


THESIS  III  51 


PROOFS 


I.  Intellect  differs  essentially  from  sense.  Faculties  are 
essentially  different,  when  their  formal  objects  are  essentially 
different.  But  tlie  formal  objects  of  intellect  and  sense  are 
essentially  different.     Ergo. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  An  orange,  as  reached  by  the  dif- 
ferent senses,  is  example. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  Intellect  perceives  unextended 
objects,  and  extended  objects  in  an  unextended  way.  Sense 
perceives  extended  objects  in  an  extended  way.  Unextended 
objects  are  being,  essence,  existence,  possibility,  substance,  right, 
duty,  virtue.  Extended  objects  in  an  unextended  way  are  man 
as  universal,  all  universals.  Sense  is  an  organic  faculty,  rooted 
in  whole  composite,  and  necessarily  knows  only  extended  ob- 
jects in  an  extended  way,  e.g.  Man  as  object  of  vision. 

PEINCIPLES 

A.  Only  material  things  are  known.  Ansiver.  By  act  of 
phantasm,  I  grant;  by  intellect,  I  deny. 

B.  Intellect  is  intimately  united  with  body.  Answer.  In 
unextended  way,  I  grant;  in  extended  way,  I  deny. 

PEOOFS 

II.  The  mind  has  truly  universal  ideas. 

Three  things  to  prove.  A.  We  have  truly  universal  ideas, 
against  Nominalism  and  Conceptualism. 

B.  There  are  no  universals  a  parte  rei,  against  Exagger- 
ated Realism. 

C.  Universals  are  fundamentally  in  things;  formally,  in  the 
mind.  A.  1°,  The  common  nouns  in  our  language  prove  truly 
universal  ideas.  They  stand  for  something.  Otherwise  most 
of  our  language  is  vain.  They  stand  for  nothing  individual, 
like  a  man;  they  stand  for  no  collection  of  individuals  like  an 
army.  Every  individual  has  its  own  particular  name;  and  the 
name  of  a  collection  cannot  be  attributed  to  its  component 
parts.     An  individual  man  is  John  Smith  or  something  such. 


52  PSYCHOLOGY 

no  single  soldier  is  called  the  army.  Ergo  common  nouns 
stand  for  something  common  to  many,  or  for  universals,  and 
we  have  truly  universal  ideas. 

2°.  The  collective  nouns  in  our  language,  like  army,  prove 
truly  universal  ideas.  No  idea  of  a  collection  can  be  had  with- 
out some  enumeration  of  individuals,  and  this  enumeration  of 
individuals  is  impossible  without  universal  ideas.  A  stone  and 
a  plant  cannot  be  united  in  a  collection,  or  enumerated  as  two 
in  their  capacity  of  stone  and  plant;  but  only  in  their  capacity 
of  corporeal  substances  or  bodies,  the  note  common  to  both. 
John  Smith  and  James  Brown  cannot  be  united  in  the  collec- 
tion called  army,  or  counted  as  two  in  their  capacity  of  indi- 
vidual men;  but  only  in  their  capacity  of  soldiers,  the  note 
common  to  both.  Arithmetic  can  do  nothing  with  a  barrel  of 
molasses  and  a  ton  of  hay  taken  individually;  but  it  can  find 
their  value  in  money  or  in  weight,  the  notes  common  to  both. 

B.  Exaggerated  Eealism  is  a  contradiction,  because  it  as- 
cribes unity  and  plurality  to  the  same  thing  under  the  same 
respect.  Moderate  Eealism  escapes  blame,  because  it  makes 
the  object  of  a  universal  idea  plural  really  and  one  logically; 
plural,  inasmuch  as  it  exists  fundamentally  in  things;  one,  in- 
asmuch as  it  exists  formally  in  the  mind. 

C.  1°.  Universals  are  fundamentally  in  things,  formally 
in  the  mind.  Things  and  mind  cooperate  to  form  universals. 
Things  contribute  the  matter,  mind  contributes:  the  form. 
Ergo  universals  are  fundamentally  in  things,  formally  in  the 
mind. 

2°.  The  similarity  of  essences  specifically  the  same  and  nu- 
merically different  is  in  things,  and  this  similarity  is  foundation 
for  conceiving  many  as  one.  Ergo  universals  are  funda- 
mentally in  things. 

3°.  Unity  and  communicability  constitute  the  formality  or 
essence  of  a  universal.  Both  are  due  to  work  of  the  mind, 
and  are  not  in  things. 

Ergo  universals  are  formally  in  the  mind. 

With  regard  to  Minor.  Before  work  of  the  mind,  essences 
specifically  the  same  are  numerically  many,  not  one.  They  are 
as  many  as  the  individuals  possessing  them. 

Before  work  of  the  mind,  essences  are  not  communicable,  but 
individual;  each  essence  is  restricted  or  limited  to  the  indi- 


THESIS  III  53 

vidual  possessing  it;  the  essence  man  in  John  Smith,  belongs 
exclusively  to  John  Smith,  and  to  no  other. 

N.B.  The  whole  universal,  direct  as  well  as  reflex,  is  an 
ens  rationis.  John  Smith  is  an  ens  reale.  When  we  say, 
John  Smith  is  a  man,  we  mean  that  he  is  an  ens  rationis  and 
something  more,  he  is  a  direct  universal  along  with  individuat- 
ing notes.  The  direct  universal,  on  which  reflection  works  to 
produce  the  reflex  universal,  though  it  is  an  individual  essence, 
is  not  an  ens  reale.  An  individual  essence  is  an  ens  reale,  when 
taken  as  it  exists  in  nature,  with  individuating  notes.  The  di- 
rect universal  is  indeed  an  individual  essence,  but  stripped  of  its 
individuating  notes,  and  taken  as  it  exists  in  the  mind,  not  as 
it  exists  in  nature.  Ergo  the  whole  universal  is  an  ens  ra- 
tionis. 

Corollaries.     A.     How  we  know  our  own  body  and  singulars. 

B.  How  we  know  our  soul. 

C.  How  we  know  God. 

A.  We  know  our  own  body  and  singulars  by  reflection.  Re- 
flection is  twofold;  strict  and  less  strict.  Strict  turns  on 
faculty's  own  acts;  less  strict  turns  on  acts  of  another  faculty. 
"We  know  individuals  as  individuals  by  reflection  on  phantasms 
of  them.  Ergo  we  know  singulars  directly  through  the  senses, 
indirectly  through  the  intellect,  reflecting  on  sensations.  All 
this  is  plain  from'  the  circumstance  that  we  define  or  cogni- 
tively  grasp  individuals  with  the  help  of  notes  falling  under 
the  senses,  like  time,  place,  shape,  color. 

Ergo  intellect  has  knowledge  of  singulars  from  the  senses. 
But  the  senses  never  lead  into  the  intellect.  Ergo  the  intellect 
reflects  on  the  senses. 

B.  We  know  our  soul  through  its  acts,  not  through  its 
essence.  Otherwise  we  should  always  know  our  soul,  and  this 
knowledge  at  times  escapes  us. 

C.  We  know  God  by  negation,  affirmation,  and  analogy. 
Our  concepts  of  God  are  analogical  and  negative-positive. 

PEINCIPLES 

A.  'No  concept,  unless  object  is  real.  Universal  is  not  real. 
Ergo  no  universal  idea. 


54  PSYCHOLOGY 

Answer.  Unless  real  with  regard  to  wliat  is  conceived,  I 
grant;  with  regard  to  manner  in  which  it  is  conceived,  I  again 
distinguish;  unless  real  fundamentally,  I  grant;  unless  real 
formally,  1  deny. 

B.  Manner  of  ohject's  existence  precedes  act  of  faculty. 
Ergo  universals  a  parte  rei. 

Answer.     Fundamentally  at  least,  I  grant;  formally,  I  deny. 

C.  One  and  many,  of  same  tiling,  a  contradiction.  Ergo  no 
universal. 

Answer.  Under  same  respect,  I  grant;  under  different  re- 
spects, I  deny.     Entitatively  and  representatively. 

D.  Essence  is  one  in  many  individuals  before  work  of  the 
mind.     Ergo. 

Answer.  Specifically,  I  grant;  numerically,  I  deny.  Log- 
ical unity,  and  real  unity. 


The  Soul  —  What  It  Is  Not 
THESIS  IV 

Monism  in  whatever  shape  is  no  adequate  explanation  of  the 
soul. 

Maher,  pp.  474-524;  Jouin,  pp.  186,  187. 

QUESTION 

Our  opponents  are  Kant,  Hume,  Mill,  James,  Monists 

According  to  Kant  our  knowledge  or  certainty  is  limited  to 
phenomena,  or  appearances,  or  experiences,  whether  they  he 
sensible  or  intellectual.  IFe  have  no  certain  knowledge  about 
noumena,  or  things  in  themselves.  In  this  question  of  the  soul, 
or  the  Ego,  as  he  prefers  to  call  it,  he  distinguishes  between 
phenomena  and  noumena  by  recognizing  an  empirical  Ego  and 
a  transcendental  Ego.  In  plain  language,  the  first  is  the  soul 
apj)ealing  to  our  notice  in  its  several  activities  of  thinking, 
willing,  remembering,  believing,  loving,  reflecting,  hoping  and 
the  like.  In  this  phase  tlie  Ego  belongs  to  the  class  of  phenom- 
ena, it  can  be  studied  with  profit,  and  in  its  discussion  we  can 
compass  knowledge  or  certainty.  The  second  or  transcendental 
Ego  is  the  soul  in  itself,  and  apart  from  its  activities.  Thus 
considered,  the  soul  belongs  to  noumena,  it  is  beyond  our  mental 
reach,  and  time  spent  in  its  study  is  time  wasted,  and  the  whole 
thing  ends  in  uncertainty,  confusion  and  superstition.  We 
contend  that  noumena  are  as  much  the  object  of  knowledge  as 
phenomena,  that  we  have  minds  as  well  as  senses,  and  that  the 
mind's  eye  sees  farther  and  better  than  the  body's.  We  have 
immediate  knowledge  of  the  soul,  and  that  is  a  distinct  gain 
over  our  knowledge  of  outside  phenomena.  We  have  no  intui- 
tion of  a  naked  pure  Ego,  stripped  of  all  particular  forms  of 
behavior,  and  we  have  need  of  no  such  intuition.  It  is  quite 
impossible  in  our  present  condition  of  dependence  on  sense  for 
knowledge.     But,  with  the  help  of  internal  observation,  com- 

55 


56  PSYCHOLOGY 

bined  with  rational  deduction  from  evident  principles,  we  can 
prove  to  certainty  that  the  soul  is  a  real,  abiding,  simple,  spir- 
itual and  immortal  being;  and  that  is  what  we  purpose  doing 
in  the  next  thesis. 

The  Empiricists,  witJi  Hume  for  leader,  make  mind  a  suc- 
cession of  transitory  feelings,  because  forsooth  senses  vouch 
for  no  permanent  self  or  abiding  basis  of  these  changes,  and 
knowledge  vouched  for  by  the  senses  is  alone  valid  knowledge. 
At  any  rate,  the  senses  vouch  for  these  transitory  feelings;  and 
the  mind,  beginning  work  where  the  senses  leave  oil',  unequivo- 
cally informs  us  that  judgment,  reasoning,  reflection,  memory, 
with  a  bearing  on  these  evanescent  states,  vouclied  for  by  the 
senses,  would  be  absolutely  impossible  without  the  existence  of 
a  real,  abiding  subject,  which  puts  together  and  holds  together 
the  terms  of  the  judgment,  which  combines  the  premisses  of 
the  syllogism,  which  compares  past  with  present  states  in  re- 
flection and  memory.  As  well  have  a  separate  dynamo  for 
each  electric  light  in  the  city,  for  each  car  in  the  Subway,  or 
Tube.  Mill  makes  the  mind  a  series  of  feelings  aware  of  itself 
as  a  series,  and  talks  of  a  thread  of  consciousness,  to  secure  the 
needed  unity  of  mind  in  its  different  activities.  But  a  series 
always  remains  a  series,  and  the  Ego  is  with  Mill  just  as  much 
a  mere  succession  of  states  as  it  is  with  Hume.  In  our  theory 
the  Ego  is  not,  as  Mill  thinks,  something  diiferent,  in  the  sense 
of  separate,  from  any  series  of  feelings.  The  true  Ego  is  the 
mind  plus  its  states.  It  is  an  abiding  existence,  with  a  series 
of  feelings.  Its  states  are  but  modifications  of  the  Ego. 
Hume  flatly  denies  the  need  of  a  permanent  subject  for  thought- 
activity.  Mill  sees  permanency  in  a  series  aware  of  itself  as  a 
series. 

James  of  Harvard,  rejecting  Hume  and  Mill,  secures  perma- 
nency of  subject  by  conceiving  the  Ego  as  a  stream  of  con- 
sciousness, in  which  each  section  knows  the  previous  section  and 
in  it  all  that  went  before.  And  he  illustrates  ownership  by  ap- 
pealing to  the  example  of  a  long  succession  of  herdsmen,  com- 
ing rapidly  into  possession  of  the  same  cattle  by  bequest.  Each 
thought  is  thus  born  an  owner,  and  dies  owned,  transmitting 
whatever  it  realized  as  its  self  to  its  later  proprietor.  Tlie 
chief  features  in  James'  theory  are,  stream,  cognition  of  pre- 
ceding states,  and  inheritance.     The  expression,  series  of  states. 


THESIS  IV  57 

is  certainly  more  accurate  than  stream,  because  of  interruptions 
by  sleep  and  the  like.  Present  thought's  ownership  of  all 
former  learning  is  a  mystery,  without  the  permanency  of  some 
subject  that  appropriated  and  retains  all  previous  learning. 
My  present  thought  was  not  in  existence  years  ago  to  be  vested 
with  ownership  in  anything.  In  the  case  of  the  cattle  the  title 
was  always  in  existence.  It  would  be  interesting  to  know  what 
happens  to  the  stream  during  six  or  seven  hours  of  sleep  and 
unconsciousness,  unless  some  permanent,  abiding  subject  bridges 
the  gap.  A  man's  ownership  of  cows  is  different  from  his  own- 
ership of  past  existence.  It  must  forever  remain  hard  to  un- 
derstand how  each  pulse  of  cognitive  consciousness  possesses  the 
life  history  of  the  individual;  and  that  is  James'  theory.  It  is 
a  paroxysmal  unintelligibility.  The  common  sense  theory  is 
much  less  open  to  objection.  The  soul,  the  subject  of  past  ex- 
periences, abides  within  me,  and  possesses  the  power  to  repro- 
duce and  recognize  many  of  these  past  experiences,  forever  alive 
to  its  own  identity  in  successive  thoughts. 

Arguments  of  James. 

(1)  No  soul  is  needed.  Answer.  Persevering  identity  of 
conscious  subject,  judgments,  reasoning,  memory  are  impos- 
sible without  it. 

(2)  The  soul  is  worthless  to  explain  thought.  Answer. 
Conscious  succession  of  thought  is  impossible  without  it.  The 
notion  of  thoughts  and  feelings  inhering  in  nothing  is  absurd 
and  unthinkable.  Were  such  thoughts  and  feelings  possible, 
they  would  never  constitute  an  enduring  Ego. 

(5)  The  argument  from  free  will  is  nothing  worth.  An- 
swer. It  is  worth  much  when  deliberation,  reflection,  resist- 
ance, responsibility,  remorse  are  taken  into  account. 

(^)  James  stands  for   an  anima  mundi,   a  universal  soul. 

Answer,  (a)  There  is  no  evidence  in  favor  of  its  existence. 
We  argue  from  our  own  soul  to  that  of  others  because  of  organ- 
ism. 

(6)  It  is  an  incoherent  notion  and  in  conflict  with  facts, 
(c)   It  leads  to  pantheism. 

Double  consciousness  doubles  the  difficulty  for  Mr.  James. 
In  the  case  of  Felida  I,  and  Eelida  II,  the  phenomenon  is  no 


58  PSYCHOLOGY 

doubt  due  to  faintly  conscious  activities,  or  to  reflex  and  auto- 
matic processes  of  the  animated  organism. 

TERMS 


Dualism  and  Monism. 

r  Ultra  —  Plato  and  Descartes. 

(_  Moderate  —  Aristotle,  St.  Thomas,  and  Scholastics. 

Idealism  —  Berkeley. 

Materialism  —  Cabanis,   Vogt,    Molcschott,   Huxley, 

Buchner,  Locke,  Bain,  Hodgson. 
Iicalistic  —  Clifford,  A.  Bain,  Spencer,  Huxley,  Hoff- 


Dualism  -l 


Monism 


ling. 


Monism  makes  mind  and  body  one.  Dualism  makes  mind 
and  body  two.  Ultra  Dualism  makes  mind  and  body  too  sep- 
arate, with  Plato  and  Descartes  for  advocates.  Moderate  Dual- 
ism puts  mind  and  body  in  substantial  uniori,  ivith  Ari^otle 
and  Scholastics  for  advocates.  Monism  is  of  three  kinds,  Ideal- 
ism, Materialism,  Realistic  Monism.  Idealism-  teaches  that 
there  is  no  matter,  that  everything  is  mind.  In  Idealism  the 
material  world  is  an  illusory  creation  of  the  mind;  all  minds 
are  one,  all  are  wavelets  on  the  ocean  of  universal  conscious- 
ness. Materialism  teaches  that  there  is  no  mind,  that  every- 
thing is  matter.     Arguments : 

(1)  Experience  vouches  for  brain,  not  for  mind. 
Answer.     Reason  vouches  for  mind. 

(2)  Thought  is  dependent  on  neural  functions. 
Answer.     Extrinsically ;  a  condition  is  no  cause. 

(3)  We  cannot  imagine  how  matter  acts  on  mind  and  vice- 
versa. 

Answer.     We  can  understand. 

(4)  Conservation  of  energy  and  law  of  inertia  are  opposed 
to  interaction. 

Answer.     These  laws  are  meant  for  matter. 

(5)  According  to  Cabanis  thought  is  a  secretion  of  the  brain ; 
according  to  Vogt,  the  relation  between  thought  and  the  brain 
is  the  same  as  between  bile  and  liver;  according  to  Moleschott 
thought  is  motion  in  matter,  phosphorescence  of  the  brain. 

Answer.     Thought  is  unextended;  secretion  is  movement,  a 


THESIS  IV  59 

material  product,  occupies  space,  result  possesses  weight  and 
resistance,  external  senses  can  perceive  process,  results  continue 
when  unperceived.  Conscious  states  are  just  the  reverse,  their 
esse  is  their  percipi. 

(6)  Huxley  makes  thought  a  function  of  nervous  matter. 

Answer.  The  one  function  of  matter  is  to  experience  move- 
ments or  changes  in  matter.  The  brain  functions  or  expends 
energy  when  we  think,  but  this  functioning  or  expenditure  of 
energy  is  not  thought. 

(7)  With  Buchner,  mind  is  a  sort  of  steam  engine,  magnet- 
ism, electricity. 

Answer.  These  things  cause  movement  like  the  organism  of 
the  body;  but  consciousness  is  different;  it  is  life  centered  in 
one  single  being,  in  a  peculiarly  indivisible  unit. 

(8)  Locke  teaches  that  matter  has  many  unknown  qualities, 
and  that  thought  may  be  one  of  them. 

Answer.  Matter  has  no  quality  directly  contrary  to  its  own 
nature,  God  cannot  effect  a  metaphysical  impossibility. 

(9)  Bain  argues  that  dependence  on  matter  disproves  spirit- 
uality. Mind  varies  with  weight  of  brain,  its  convolutions,  its 
phosphorescent  activity;  mentality  increases  and  deteriorates 
with  growth  of  brain. 

Answer.  Scholastics  never  conceived  the  soul  an  independent 
entity  isolated  from  the  body.  The  soul  is  the  substantial  form 
of  the  body,  implying  most  intimate  union  and  mutual  inter- 
dependence. Therefore,  bodily  conditions  influence  mental 
operations.  The  intellect  requires  as  an  essential  condition 
operations  of  sense  and  imagination,  and  whatever  affects  them 
affects  the  operations  of  the  intellect.  The  intellect  is,  there- 
fore, extrinsically  dependent  on  organs  for  its  material.  Its 
activity,  manifest  in  thoughts,  judgments,  reasoning,  psycho- 
logical reflection,  consciousness,  proclaims  it  spiritual  and  in- 
trinsically independent  of  matter.  We  never  find  mind  apart 
from  the  body,  but  we  often  find  the  body  apart  from  mind. 

N.B.  About  the  size  and  weight  of  brain.  Taken  absolutely, 
the  brain  of  an  elephant  or  whale  weighs  more  than  a  man's. 
Taken  relatively,  that  of  a  titmouse  or  child  weighs  more  than 
an  adult's.  Considering  convolutions,  the  brain  of  an  ox  is  su- 
perior to  man's.  In  point  of  phosphorus,  the  brain  of  a  sheep 
or  goose  is  richer  than  a  man's.     The  measurement  of  an  aver- 


60  PSYCHOLOGY 

age  Parisian's  skull  is  1.5 ;  that  of  a  Cave-man  1.6.  Gambetta's 
brain  weighed  only  two  and  a  half  pounds.  Four  pounds  are 
ordinary. 

(10)  AVith  Dr.  Shadworth  Hodgson,  conscious  states  never  con- 
dition, modify  or  determine  each  other.  All  Materialists  main- 
tain that  there  is  no  reaction  of  consciousness  on  nerves. 
Neural  or  cerebral  action  conditions  consciousness.  He  alleges 
as  an  example  a  man  turning  aside  from  a  wheelbarrow.  The 
image  on  the  retina  determines  nerve-action,  and  nerve-action 
results  in  the  appropriate  movement.  The  mental  state  is  a 
mere  epiphenomenon.  The  only  alternative  is  the  admission  of 
an  immaterial  agent,  and  we  have  no  experience  of  that. 

Answer.  Take  other  examples  besides  wheelbarrow;  novelist 
writing  a  novel,  a  detective  gathering  clews,  a  man  seeking  re- 
venge in  murder,  premisses  in  syllogism  and  conclusion. 

Real  Monism  teaches  that  mind  and  body  are  not  two  dis- 
tinct realities,  hut  merely  two  aspects,  sides,  phases  of  one  be- 
ing; and  that  there  is  no  real  interaction  between  mental  and 
bodily  states.  In  other  words,  mind  and  body  are  one;  mind 
is  body,  and  body  is  mind. 

W.  Clifford,  A.  Bain,  H.  Spencer,  Huxley  and  H  off  ding  up- 
hold Real  Monism. 

Clifford  invented  the  word  mind-stuff.  Every  particle  of 
matter  has  a  bit  of  rudimentary  intelligence.  The  molecules 
of  matter  and  appended  morsels  of  mind  have  no  mutual  influ- 
ence or  interaction.  Each  goes  it  own  way,  and  hence  Parallel- 
ism. Arguments:  (1)  Parallelism  is  plain  from  Physiology. 
(2)  Mutual  interaction  is  impossible  from  Physics.  {3)  Ori- 
gin of  life  in  dead  matter  is  plain  from  Evolution.  In  the 
jelly-fish  mind-stuff  rises  to  sentience.  Elements  of  mind-stuff 
are  enclosed  in  a  film  on  under  side  of  fish.  In  vertebrates 
mind-stuff  rises  to  consciousness;  in  the  human  brain,  to  in- 
telligence. 

Bain  restricts  Parallelism  to  man.  With  him,  mental  life  is 
a  phase  or  aspect  of  neural  changes.  Mental  and  physical  pro- 
ceed together  as  undivided  twins.  There  is  no  interaction  be- 
tween mind  and  body,  nothing  but  unbroken  material  succes- 
sion. Neural  antecedents  alone  determine  neural  changes,  men- 
tal sequence  goes  with  material  sequence,  but  never  modifies  it. 

Spencer  sees  and  acknowledges  the  impossibility  of  identify- 


THESIS  IV  61 

ing  mental  states  with  neural  processes,  or  mind  with  body.  A 
unit  of  feeling,  he  says,  has  nothing  in  common  with  a  unit 
of  motion.  And  yet  he  concludes  with  Clifford  and  Bain  that 
mind  and  nervous  action  are  subjective  and  objective  faces  of 
the  same  thing,  which  is  itself  unknowable. 

Answer.  Clifford  makes  too  large  a  call  on  our  faith.  Sci- 
ence never  yet  discovered  a  trace  of  feeling  or  intelligence  in 
minerals  or  dead  matter.  Bain  has  to  explain  why  bodies  in 
conscious  beings  have  this  subjective  aspect,  while  other  bodies 
are  without  it.  Consciousness  cannot  be  a  new  form  of  ma- 
terial energy,  unless  he  admits  that  material  energy  can  issue 
forth  from  consciousness.  Conservation  of  energy  demands  this 
mutual  interchange  according  to  physicists.  The  mind-stuff  in 
molecules  is  either  conscious  or  unconscious.  If  unconscious, 
no  multitude  of  unconscious  acts  can  constitute  conscious  in- 
telligence. If  conscious,  all  material  things  ought  to  own  a 
mental  existence.  Plants  and  leaves  ought  to  have  minds,  steam- 
tugs  ought  to  rejoice,  an  abandoned  coal-mine  ought  to  enter- 
tain emotions  of  sadness.  Besides,  mental  states  are  not  com- 
posite; they  are  indivisible,  as  is  evident  in  thought,  judgment, 
reasoning,  memory,  self-consciousness;  and  their  principle  is 
not  made  up  of  separate  minute  intelligences. 

Monism  is  absurd  in  its  denial  of  mind's  influence  on  body. 
In  Evolution,  its  own  pet  theory,  natural  selection  and  struggle 
for  existence  suppose  that  pleasurable  feelings,  awakened  by 
songs  and  colors  in  birds,  determine  and  modify  their  bodily 
activity.  If  thought  never  influences  action,  we  cannot  argue 
to  the  existence  of  other  minds  besides  our  own.  Mind  and 
will,  love  and  hate,  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  wonder- 
ful changes  in  history.  J^eural  groupings  would  be  their  sole 
cause.  All  mental  activity  would  be  only  an  aspect  or  phase 
of  body,  with  no  efficient  bearing  on  events  beyond  mere  se- 
quence and  succession.  The  terms  employed  by  Monists  are 
ludicrous,  crutches  for  halting  theories,  childish  attempts  to 
deceive  with  half-understood  words,  metaphorical  phrasings  ex- 
pressive of  the  talker's  ignorance.  For  instance,  a  two-sided 
cause  is  about  as  intelligible  as  a  blue  sound  or  a  three-sided 
motion. 

Hoffding  appeals  to  two  laws.  Conservation  of  Energy  and 
Inertia. 


62  PSYCHOLOGY 

Conservation  of  Energy  makes  the  sum  total  of  energy  in  the 
nniver.'ie  remain  always  the  same. 

Inertia  makes  rest  or  uniform  motion  in  a  straight  line  con- 
tinue, unless  impressed  forces  change  it. 

Ansircr.  ]'hysical  movement  is  modified  not  only  by  phys- 
ical forces,  but  also  by  ideas.  Witness  the  part  ideas  of  justice, 
fair  treatment  and  tiie  like  play  in  strikes  and  other  economic 
upheavals.  The  first  law  is  verified  only  in  case  of  inanimate 
matter,  and  cannot  be  demonstrated  for  living  organisms. 
Even  in  the  case  of  inanimate  matter  it  would  not  seem  to  be 
universal.  Witness  a  cap  setting  off  a  ton  of  dynamite.  The 
soul  must  not  be  considered  a  foreign  agent  acting  on  the  body; 
it  is  the  body's  substantial  form,  most  intimately  united  with  it. 
It  modifies  not  the  quantity  of  the  body's  energy,  but  its  qual- 
ity; and  the  liberation  and  control  of  a  man's  physical  activity 
by  his  mind,  in  the  shape  of  thoughts  and  wishes,  need  not  con- 
flict with  the  law  of  conservation  of  energy.  About  the  law 
of  inertia,  Hoffding  changes  Newton's  formula  to  read  thus, 
the  state  of  a  material  point  can  be  altered  only  through  the 
influence  of  another  material  point;  and  thus  worded  the  law 
is  abundantly  refuted  by  reference  to  natural  selection  in  Evolu- 
tion, to  our  knowledge  of  minds  in  other  men,  and  to  history's 
dependence  on  thoughts,  ideas,  principles  and  feelings.  New- 
ton was  too  wise  a  philosopher  to  make  any  such  mistake.  Lu- 
ther, to  suit  his  vile  purposes,  changed  the  wording  of  the  Bible ; 
small  wonder  if  Hoffding  changes  the  wording  of  Newton's 
formula.  Finally,  Monism  rests  not  on  reason,  but  on  faith, 
with  ignorant  men  like  Hoff'ding  for  sole  authority;  and  it  fin- 
ishes in  Agnosticism. 


The  Soul  —  What  It  Is 
THESIS  V 

TTie  rational  soul  of  man  is  an  immaterial  or  spiritual  sub- 
stance, that  V?,  in  its  existence  and  in  its  operations  it  is  intririr- 
sically  independent  of  matter.  The  rational  soul  of  man  is  a 
substance  physicalh/  simple  in  point  of  essence  and  in  point  of 
extension.  In  man  there  is  but  one  soul,  the  life-giving  prin- 
ciple of  his  understanding,  JlIs  sensible  perception,  and  his 
growth.  In  man  the  rational  soul  and  the  human  body  are 
so  united  among  themselves  that  from  the  union  a  single  na- 
ture, or  a  single  substance  arises. 

Maher,  pp.  459-47-i;  54i-579.     Jouin,  pp.  180-193. 

QUESTION 

This  and  the  succeeding  thesis  are  most  important.  They 
constitute  the  body  of  what  we  term  Eational  Psychology  as 
opposed  to  Empirical ;  cause-Ps3'chology  as  opposed  to  effect- 
Psycholog}\  In  them  we  determine  what  reason  teaches  re- 
garding the  nature,  origin  and  destiny  of  the  human  soul. 
And  the  method  we  follow  is  at  the  same  time  inductive  and 
deductive.     From  what  the  soul  does  we  gather  what  the  soul  is. 

In  the  preceding  thesis  we  mentioned  Materialism.  Its  de- 
fenders, if  logical,  are  ultimately  forced  to  the  deplorable  and 
unlovely  expedient  of  denying  first  and  foremost  the  existence 
of  God,  then  the  immateriality  of  the  soul  and  its  immortality. 
In  Materialism  man  is  only  a  more  delicately  elaborated  brute, 
with  organs  favorable  to  nicer  combinations  of  chemical  ele- 
ments, and  an  arrangement  of  parts  conducive  to  a  fuller  appli- 
cation of  the  physical  forces  of  dead  nature.  This  is  Material- 
ism reduced  to  its  barest  simplicity.  Some  ^laterialists  may 
repudiate  this  analysis  of  their  system,  and  indignantly  pro- 
test that  no  such  tenets  are  theirs.     They  are  at  least  unwilling 

63 


64  PSYCHOLOGY 

witnesses  to  the  repugnance  ever  evinced  by  reason  to  false  and 
unsound  theories;  and,  to  the  detriment  of  their  reputation  as 
logicians,  they  halt  before  a  difficulty,  that  can  be  neither 
climbed  over,  nor  gone  around,  nor  removed.  With  us,  matter 
is  in  the  present  imperfect  condition  of  things  an  indispensable 
requisite  for  work  of  the  mind.  Man's  soul  is  so  wedded  to  his 
body,  his  intellect  to  his  senses,  that  thought  depends  on  sen- 
sible perception,  and  therefore  mind  on  matter,  in  much  the 
same  way  as  the  sculptor  depends  on  his  block  of  marble.  But 
matter  of  itself  is  as  incapable  of  thinking  as  the  unshapen 
rock  is  of  transforming  itself  into  a  Venus  of  Phidias  or  a  Moses 
of  Michael  Angelo.  Organs  are  not  the  cause  of  thought,  they 
are  a  mere  condition.  Brain  is  to  thought  what  light  is  to  vision. 
Vision  is  impossible  without  light,  but  nobody  ever  thought 
light  the  cause  of  vision.  Only  a  fool  could  be  guilty  of  think- 
ing or  saying  that  light  sees.  Pain  and  sunshine  are  necessarj' 
for  vegetation,  without  being  its  cause.  If  mind  and  will  were 
organic,  they  ought  to  be  for  the  organism.  They  are  not  for 
the  organism,  but  for  higher  and  spiritual  good.  Intellect  and 
will  cannot  add  an  inch  to  a  man's  stature.  They  cannot  im- 
prove his  digestion  or  cure  the  body's  ills. 

Materialism,  if  true,  would  of  course  put  outside  of  all  ques- 
tion the  other  properties  attributed  by  us  to  the  soul.  Its  sim- 
plicity, its  oneness,  and  the  part  it  plays  in  the  composition  of 
man,  would  be  foolish  fancies,  since  it  would  be  itself  only  the 
offspring  of  a  dream.  Plato,  that  master  mind  of  antiquity, 
trusting  to  sensible  emotions  that  arise  within  us  when  affected 
by  one  movement  of  the  soul  or  another,  recognized  in  man  the 
presence  of  three  more  or  less  separate  souls;  the  principle  of 
Jinowledge  situated  in  the  brain,  the  principle  of  anger  or  im- 
petuous desire  situated  in  the  heart,  and  the  principle  of  milder 
desire  and  growth  situated  in  the  liver.  The  followers  of  Apol- 
linaris  and  the  Manicheans  were  content  with  two ;  the  former, 
with  principles  of  sensible  perception  and  intellectual  knowl- 
edge; the  latter,  with  principles  of  good  and  evil.  In  this 
matter  Pope  Pius  IX  saw  fit  to  condemn  the  teachings  of  a 
certain  Gunther,  who  described  man  as  a  happy  union  of  spirit 
and  matter,  resulting,  however,  from  a  process  of  evolution, 
by  which  matter  in  man,  pushed  to  its  utmost  perfection,  put 
on  the  nature  of  a  spirit,  and  assumed  the  dignity  of  a  human 


THESIS  V  ^5 

soul.  Our  doctrine,  the  only  admissible  doctrine  on  this  point, 
is  that  man's  parents  make  ready  his  body.  On  its  completion, 
God  by  a  separate  and  individual  creative  act  breathes  into  the 
body  a  soul,  the  image  of  Himself,  destined  never  to  die. 

The  combined  action  of  soul  and  body,  and  the  influence 
they  exert  on  one  another,  are  full  of  difficulty.  The  one  safe 
way  of  explaining  these  partial  mysteries  is  that,  which  at  the 
same  time  answers  all  reasonable  questions,  and  avoids  the  rocks 
on  which  great  minds  split.  Such  an  explanation  we  adopt. 
Plato,  following  his  theory  of  the  soul's  imprisonment  for  some 
past  offense,  attributed  to  the  rational  soul  of  man  about  the 
same  influence  over  his  body  as  the  sailor  exerts  on  his  ship, 
the  rider  on  his  horse.  With  him,  therefore,  soul  and  body 
were  hardly  more  a  unit  than  are  the  sailor  and  his  ship. 
Malebranche  applied  Occasionalism  to  the  intercommunication 
between  soul  and  body.  This  theory  makes  God  constantly 
work  miracles,  and  is  altogether  opposed  to  our  consciousness 
of  the  influence  exerted  by  outside  objects  on  our  thoughts,  and 
of  the  mutual  interaction  in  force  between  body  and  soul.  It 
makes  phases  of  mind  occasions  provoking  God  to  produce  cor- 
responding changes  of  body,  and  vice-versa.  Leibnitz  refers 
everything  to  the  preestablished  harmony  mentioned  in  Ontol- 
ogy. He  solves  the  problem  with  one  miracle,  accomplished 
from  the  start,  when  soul  and  body  are  arranged  to  keep  to- 
gether like  two  clocks.  All  three,  Plato,  Malebranche,  and  Leib- 
nitz, destroy  the  intimate  physical  union  of  soul  and  body,  and 
the  mutual  interchange  of  influences  between  them,  which  we 
recognize,  and  for  which  in  this  thesis  we  contend. 

TEEMS 

Rational  Soul.  The  soul  of  man  can  be  well  and  briefly  de- 
scribed as  the  root  and  principle  of  his  whole  life.  His  life 
partakes  of  all  three  kingdoms,  vegetable,  brute  and  human; 
and  its  principle  is  therefore  at  one  and  the  same  time  a  vege- 
table soul,  an  animal  soul,  and  a  rational  soul.  Here  we  desig- 
nate it  by  the  last  epithet,  because  it  expresses  his  true  dignity, 
and  implicitly  predicates  of  him  the  lower  perfections,  vegeta- 
tion and  animality  or  sensation. 

Immaterial.     Immateriality  and  simplicity  are  quite  differ- 


66  PSYCHOLOGY 

eut  notion?.  SimpUcily,  formally  and  strictly  iahen,  is  the 
denial  of  conipodtion,  or  uf  parts;  itmnateiiality  is  the  denial 
of  intimate,  intrinsic  dependence  on  matter,  he  it  primal  or 
second  matter.  Extrinsic  dependence  on  matter,  such  as  is  nat- 
ural to  man's  soul  during  its  sojourn  on  earth,  or  that  necessity 
it  lies  under  of  deriving  all  its  knowledge  and  exerting  all  its 
faculties  through  the  agency  of  the  body's  organs,  nohow  lessens 
or  interferes  with  its  intrinsic  independence  of  matter,  or  that 
natural  right  it  possesses  to  existence  or  being  with  absolute 
freedom  from  matter.  The  brute's  soul  is  both  intrinsically 
and  extrinsically  dependent  on  matter;  that  is  to  say,  it  derives 
its  original  being  from  matter,  and  depends  as  well  on  matter 
for  its  every  act.  However,  it  is  not  matter,  but  something 
quite  distinct  from  it.  Neither  is  it  necessary  to  know  just 
what  it  is;  since  there  are  in  the  universe  things  innumerable, 
of  whose  essences  we  are  wholly  or  partially  ignorant;  and  this 
principle  of  life  is  one  of  them.  To  exact  such  knowledge  of 
us  would  be  as  absurd  as  to  demand  of  the  scientist  what  is  the 
precise  nature  of  that  mysterious  force,  which,  generated  by  the 
rapid  revolution  of  metallic  plates,  lights  up  a  city  and  carries 
commuters  home. 

Substance.  Man's  soul  is  a  substance.  All  beings  are  di- 
vided into  substances  and  accidents.  We  are  better  acquainted 
with  accidents  than  with  substances,  because  they  appeal  to  our 
senses.  But  we  are  more  certain  about  the  reality  of  substances, 
than  we  are  about  the  reality  of  accidents,  because  our  informa- 
tion regarding  them  is  based  on  reason,  a  more  reliable  instru- 
ment of  knowledge  than  the  senses.  Naturally  speaking,  there 
can  be  no  accident  witliout  its  corresponding  substance.  Acci- 
dents of  their  very  nature  inhere  or  subsist  in  another,  and  that 
other  is  substance.  Y^ou  can  have  no  shape,  no  color,  no  pain, 
no  thought  without  a  something  to  base  them.  Sfotion  is  un- 
thinkable without  something  that  is  moved.  Thoughts  cannot 
inhere  in  nothing,  desires  cannot  proceed  from  nothing.  Inner 
experience  is  testimony  conclusive  that  there  is  within  me  an 
Ego  or  self,  which  is  the  center  and  source  of  my  ever  changing 
acts  and  states.  Thoughts  and  wishes  appear  and  disappear, 
the  thinker  or  wisher  goes  on  forever.  What  thought  within 
me  a  year  ago,  thinks  witliin  me  to-day.  Substance  is  not  a 
mere  noumenon,  which  never  reveals  itself  to  knowledge.     It 


THESIS  V  67 

is  not  a  secret  substratum,  like  the  core  of  an  onion ;  its  pri- 
mary element  is  not  permanence  without  change,  but  existence 
in  itself  and  not  in  another.  It  can  be  produced  by  another, 
but  after  its  production  it  stands  in  itself  without  exigence  of 
inhesion  in  another  as  in  a  subject.  Permanence  amid  changes 
is  a  property  flowing  from  its  nature.  In  the  case  of  an  in- 
complete substance  it  can  unite  with  another  to  form  one  com- 
plete substance;  but  this  union  is  of  a  peculiar  kind,  not  at  all 
like  the  inhesion  proper  to  accidents.  The  soul  is  an  incom- 
plete, not  a  complete  substance.  It  is  a  substance,  because  it 
exists  in  itself;  it  is  incomplete,  because  it  is  designed  by  na- 
ture to  inform  and  enliven  the  human  body,  and  so  help  to 
the  finish  of  the  complete  substance,  man.  It  is  a  spiritual  in- 
complete substance  or  form,  and  differs  from  pure  spirits  or 
angelic  forms  only  in  this  point,  that  nature  intended  it  to  be 
bound  up  with  the  human  body,  while  angels  are  ordained  to 
nothing  such.  In  other  words,  angels  are  completely  subsistent 
forms,  the  human  soul  is  an  incompletely  subsistent  one. 

That  the  soul  is  a  real  unitary  being,  which  abides  the  same 
during  all  the  varying  modes  of  consciousness,  is  plain  in  re- 
flection on  past  experiences,  and  in  that  process  of  memory  we 
call  recollection.  Judgments  and  the  syllogism  are  impossible 
without  the  permanence  of  a  being  during  the  interval  it  takes 
to  pass  from  subject  to  predicate,  from  premisses  to  conclusion. 
Our  assurance  about  past  events  is  as  live  and  vivid  as  our 
assurance  about  the  present.  Material  organism  completely 
changes  in  a  comparatively  short  time.  It  is  therefore  no  en- 
during basis  for  reflection  or  recollection.  Fleeting  acts  in  the 
same  way  are  no  permanent  foundation  for  linking  the  years. 
Apart  from  memory,  self-consciousness  discloses  only  the  pres- 
ent existence  of  the  Ego;  but  memory  adds  to  consciousness 
persistent  identity  of  the  mind  as  a  real  being.  The  Ego  al- 
ways sails  into  view  as  the  combining  center  of  past  and  present 
experiences. 

Physically  simple.  Simplicity  is  the  denial  of  composition, 
and  a  good  idea  of  physical  simplicity  as  opposed  to  metaphys- 
ical simplicity,  and  of  what  constitutes  the  various  kinds  of 
simplicity  and  composition,  can  be  gathered  from  an  inspection 
of  the  diagram  of  wholes,  set  down  under  Division  in  Minor 
Logic.     The  soul  is  composed  of  metaphysical   parts,  essence 


68  PSYCHOLOGY 

and  existence;  it  is  composed,  too,  of  various  faculties  which 
make  it  what  was  there  described  as  a  virtual  whole.  But  these 
degrees  of  composition  do  not  in  the  least  interfere  with  its 
physical  simplicity  in  point  of  essence  and  in  point  of  exten- 
sion. In  other  words,  the  soul  is  neither  a  physical  essential 
whole,  nor  a  physical  integral  wliole.  A  physical  essential 
whole  is  composed  of  matter  and  form;  and  the  human  soul  is 
a  pure  form  without  any  admixture  of  matter.  A  physical  in- 
tegral whole  contains  parts  of  a  fixed  quantity,  size,  magnitude ; 
and  no  such  division  touches  the  human  soul.  Some  are  of 
opinion  that  the  soul  of  a  brute  is  thus  composed  of  parts,  and 
that  in  its  entirety  it  exists  spread  over  the  whole  body,  with- 
out existing  in  any  part  of  the  body  whole  and  entire.  Scholas- 
tics in  general,  with  St.  Thomas,  hold  the  contrary  opinion; 
and  we  stand  with  them.  According  to  them  the  brute  soul 
is  simple  per  se;  and,  because  completely  immersed  in  matter, 
divisible  per  accidens.  All  are  agreed  that  the  human  soul 
enjoys  definitive  existence,  existing  at  the  same  time  whole  and 
entire  throughout  the  body,  and  whole  and  entire  in  each  part 
of  the  same. 

Location  of  the  soul.  The  soul's  simplicity  settles  its  loca- 
tion. Because  it  is  simple,  the  soul  exists  whole  and  entire  in 
the  whole  body,  whole  and  entire  in  each  part  of  the  body. 
This  kind  of  existence,  peculiar  to  spirits,  is  called  definitive 
as  opposed  to  circumscriptive,  the  kind  peculiar  to  bodies.  A 
body,  because  of  its  quantitative  extension,  fills  its  place  in  such 
a  way  that  the  whole  body  is  in  its  whole  space  and  only  a  part 
of  it  is  in  each  part  of  its  space.  Eeason  is  entirely  responsible 
for  our  notion  of  definitive  existence.  The  imagination  helps 
only  fundamentally,  not  formally;  because  imagination  has  to 
do  with  only  extended  bodies  and  their  qualities.  It  would  be 
vain,  therefore,  to  strive  to  imagine  definitive  existence.  The 
soul,  therefore,  exists  whole  and  entire  in  the  whole  body,  whole 
and  entire  in  each  part  of  the  body. 

The  soul,  we  have  already  seen,  is  not  a  physical  essential  or 
a  physical  integral  whole.  It  is,  however,  a  metaphysical  whole, 
composed  of  the  three  faculties,  vegetative,  sensitive  and  intel- 
lectual, which  are  functions  of  one  and  the  same  soul.  Though 
the  whole  soul  is  present  in  each  part  of  the  body,  it  is  not 
everywliere  present  in  all  its  activity  or  force.     Its  vegetative 


THESIS  V  69 

and  sensitive  activities  are  intrinsically  dependent  on  set  and 
special  organs;  its  intellectual  activity  is  extrinsically  depend- 
ent on  the  imagination  and  sensile  consciousness,  and  they  are 
situated  in  the  brain.  Though  present  whole  and  entire  in  all 
three  organs,  the  soul  sees  only  in  the  eye,  hears  only  in  the 
ear,  and  thinks  only  in  the  brain.  This  fact  led  some  phi- 
losophers, who  denied  the  substantial  union  of  soul  and  body, 
to  restrict  the  soul  to  definite  locations  in  the  body.  Plato  and 
Descartes  made  the  brain  its  residence;  others,  the  heart,  the 
blood,  the  cerebellum,  the  spinal  marrow  and  so  on  and  so 
forth. 

We  prove  in  the  fourth  part  of  our  thesis  that  body  and 
Goul  in  man  coalesce  as  matter  and  form  to  make  one  complete 
substance,  one  complete  nature.  In  other  words,  the  soul  ani- 
mates the  body,  the  whole  body;  and  as  this  animation  is  a  vital 
or  immanent  act,  the  soul  must  be  present  wherever  it  has 
place;  in  every  part  of  the  body,  in  even  the  hair,  the  nails 
and  the  teeth.  The  whole  soul  is  in  each  part  of  the  body,  be- 
cause, as  a  simple  substance,  wherever  it  exists  it  exists  whole; 
and  it  animates  every  solid  portion  of  the  body  at  least  by 
way  of  vegetative  principle.  Different  faculties  can  be  con- 
sidered metaphysical  parts  of  the  soul,  calling  for  organs  of 
definite  shape  and  efficacy;  and  the  metaphysical  parts  have 
fixed  locations  in  the  body,  determined  by  the  seats  of  the  sev- 
eral organs.  Thus,  the  soul,  as  far  as  its  power  of  seeing  or 
hearing  is  concerned,  is  in  the  eye  or  ear  respectively;  and  so 
of  the  rest.  Were  the  reverse  true,  the  body  would  be  as  ca- 
pable of  understanding  as  it  is  of  growth.  The  intellect  is  in 
the  brain,  inasmuch  as  it  is  the  seat  of  the  imagination,  on 
which  the  intellect  extrinsically  depends.  It  is  in  the  foot,  in- 
asmuch as  it  is  in  the  soul,  which  communicates  life  to  the 
foot  and  actuates  it.  Man  is  what  results  from  union  of  soul 
and  whole  body,  not  what  results  from  union  of  soul  and  part 
of  the  body.  The  soul  fills  the  body  in  much  the  same  way 
as  God  fills  Heaven  and  earth,  not  as  air  fills  the  room.  When 
an  arm  or  limb  is  removed,  the  substance  of  the  soul  is  not 
diminished,  because  it  is  without  quantity.  It  merely  loses  a 
presence,  and  its  activity  is  limited  in  extent. 

Phrenology  attempted  to  locate  in  the  brain  the  precise  posi- 
tions of  various  mental  powers.     Bumps  may  indicate  sensa- 


70  PSYCHOLOGY 

tion-development,  they  can  never  measure  intellectual  or  emo- 
tional development,  because  intellectual  faculties  are  not  lo- 
cated in  organs  or  intrinsically  dependent  on  them.  Cerebral 
functions  can  be  located,  and  of  late  years  motor-centers  and 
sensation-centers  have  been  settled  with  some  definiteness.  Stim- 
ulation by  electricity  in  certain  areas  of  the  brain  produces 
movement  in  certain  limbs;  and  definite  portions  of  the  brain 
seem  to  be  connected  with  the  work  of  the  eye,  the  ear  and  the 
other  senses.  Much  of  the  brain,  especially  in  the  frontal  re- 
gion, is  silent  or  not  responsive,  and  this  unoccujjied  territory 
may  belong  to  memory,  imagination,  and  the  other  internal 
senses  already  described  and  explained.  St.  Thomas  centuries 
ago  hinted  as  much,  when  he  assigned  each  its  own  particular 
portion  of  the  brain.  The  motor-center  is  usually  found  on  tho 
side  of  the  head  opposite  to  the  correlated  member. 

One  kSoul.  The  unity  proper  to  the  soul  is  that  of  indivisi- 
bility. The  human  soul,  besides  being  undivided  or  one,  is  in- 
divisible per  se  and  per  accidens. 

Substance  and  Nature.  A  substance  is  a  being  existing  in  it- 
self. A  nature  is  a  substance,  viewed  as  a  being  possessed  of 
activity.  Since,  therefore,  every  substance,  as  soon  as  it  begins 
to  exist,  contains  within  itself  an  activity  peculiar  and  proper 
to  its  own  species,  every  substance  is  a  nature.  The  distinc- 
tion between  the  two  is  only  a  distinction  of  reason. 

Division  —  Four  parts. 

I.  The  soul  of  man  is  a  spiritual  substance. 

II.  The  soul  of  man  is  a  simple  substance. 

III.  The  soul  of  man  is  one. 

IV.  Body  and  soul  unite  to  form  one  substance,  one  nature. 

PROOFS  I,  II,  III,  IV 

/.  A  thing's  liighest  effort  indicates  the  order  and  degree  of 
its  being.  But  the  highest  effort  of  the  soul,  the  exercise  of 
the  intellect  and  will,  is  immaterial.  Ergo  the  being  of  the 
soul,  the  soul  itself,  is  immaterial. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  That  work  or  operation  is  im- 
material, which  is  consummated  without  any  intrinsic  concur- 


THESIS  V  71 

rence  of  a  bodily  or  material  organ.  But  the  work  of  the  mind 
and  will  is  without  any  such  concurrence.  Ergo  it  is  imma- 
terial. 

With  regard  to  this  Minor.  The  mind  attains  to  notions  ex- 
pressive of  things,  to  which  the  senses  can  never  attain,  possi- 
bility, necessity,  decency,  duty  and  the  like.  It  recognizes  sen- 
sible objects  that  have  not  fallen,  and  may  perhaps  never  fall, 
under  the  observation  of  the  senses;  when,  for  instance,  it  per- 
ceives in  a  cause  the  effect  it  is  capable  of  producing,  and  in 
an  effect  the  cause  which  gave  it  being.  The  mind,  too,  fre- 
quently corrects  and  checks  the  work  of  the  senses.  A  faculty 
intrinsically  dependent  on  a  bodily  organ  can  react  only  in  re- 
sponse to  a  physical  impression,  and  can  form  only  images  of 
a  concrete  character,  of  a  purely  here-and-now  existence.  In 
psychological  reflection  the  Ego  reflecting  and  the  Ego  reflected 
upon  are  the  same.  The  Ego  is  at  once  subject  and  object.  A 
sheet  of  paper  cannot  be  turned  back  upon  itself.  A  part  can 
be  folded  back  upon  a  part,  but  the  whole  sheet  cannot  be  folded 
back  upon  the  whole  sheet.  The  will  never  confines  itself  to 
such  material  goods  as  influence  the  senses,  but  specially  longs 
for  goods  that  far  transcend  all  mere  bodily  gratification. 
Hence  truth,  knowledge,  virtue,  honor,  which  make  no  impres- 
sion whatever  on  a  material  organ,  are  prizes  highest  in  favor 
with  man's  inclinations  and  desires.  If  our  volitions  were 
merely  subjective  phases  or  mental  states  inseparably  bound  up 
with  organic  processes,  their  moral  freedom  would  be  impos- 
sible, and  man  would  be  incapable  of  responsibility  and  mor- 
ality. 

//.  (a)  Physically  simple  in  point  of  essence.  (&)  Phys- 
ically simple  in  point  of  extension. 

(a)  The  two  parts  would  be  either  matter  and  form,  or  prin- 
ciple of  thoughts  and  principle  of  wishes.  But  neither  suppo- 
sition can  be  admitted.     Ergo. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  The  first  supposition  is  too  ab- 
surd to  need  further  attention.  We  just  proved  the  soul  a 
spiritual  substance.  If  one  of  its  constituents  is  prime  matter, 
it  must  be  at  one  and  the  same  time  spirit  and  matter,  or  spir- 
itual matter,  which  is  a  contradiction  in  terms.  Common  sense 
and  personal  experience  are  loud  in  their  denial  of  the  exist- 
ence within  us  of  two  separate  principles  or  souls,  one  the  in- 


72  PSYCHOLOGY 

strument  of  our  thoughts,  the  other  that  of  our  wishes;  while 
the  assertion  of  such  duality  is  entirely  without  foundation, 
and  rests  on  no  solid  proof  whatever. 

N.B.  This  whole  argiiment  is  based  on  unity  of  conscious- 
ness. The  mind  cannot  be  an  extended  agent  like  the  brain, 
and  at  the  same  time  think,  judge  and  reason.  In  the  matter 
of  thought  three  impossible  alternatives  present  themselves. 
Different  parts  of  the  idea  must  belong  to  different  parts  of  the 
brain  or  soul;  each  part  of  the  brain  or  soul  must  contain  the 
whole  idea;  the  whole  idea  must  belong  to  a  single  part  of  the 
brain  or  soul.  First  and  second  cases  are  evidently  impossible. 
In  the  third  case  the  part  of  the  brain  or  soul  in  question  would 
be  either  extended  or  simple.  If  extended,  the  whole  question 
recurs  again.  Any  judgment,  any  syllogism  can  as  readily 
prove  the  brain  an  impossible  subject  or  agent. 

(h)  The  soul  is  capable  of  acts  representative  of  things  ut- 
terly simple  in  point  of  extension ;  as,  for  instance,  that  simplest 
of  all  notions,  being,  and  the  thought  pondered  in  psycholog- 
ical reflection.  These  acts,  to  be  truly  representative  of  such 
objects,  must  be  themselves  simple  in  point  of  extension.  If 
an  agent  quantitatively  extended  produced  an  effect  simple  and 
without  all  quantitative  extension,  the  effect  would  be  superior 
to  the  cause ;  and  that  axiom,  at  the  root  and  basis  of  all  phi- 
losophy, would  be  rudely  torn  away  and  demolished. 

///.  (a)  Identity  of  the  principle  of  sensible  perception  and 
understanding,  meaning  the  remote  principle  or  soul,  not  the 
proximate  principle  or  faculty.  (&)  Identity  of  the  principle 
of  sensible  perception  and  growth  as  above. 

(a)  Consciousness  is  witness  that  it  psychologically  reflects 
on  sensible  perceptions  and  on  concepts  or  acts  of  the  under- 
standing. But  this  could  not  be  the  case,  unless  the  principle 
of  sensible  perception  and  understanding  were  one  and  the 
same.     Ergo. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  Sensation  and  understanding  are 
immanent  acts,  and  as  such  dwell  in  their  entirety  within  their 
principle  or  subject.  It  would,  therefore,  be  impossible  for 
consciousness  to  psychologically  reflect  on  sensations  and  con- 
cepts or  mental  acts,  if  one  and  the  other  sprang  from  different 
and  distinct  principles.  In  that  case,  either  the  sensation  or 
the  concept  would  cease  to  be  immanent,  and,  passing  from  its 


THESIS  V  73 

own  principle,  would  be  received  in  another  principle,  and  would 
so  become  a  transient  act.  Furthermore,  when  the  senses  are 
very  intensely  employed,  the  intellect  as  a  rule  remains  in  pro- 
found quiet,  and  vice-versa.  Dante  in  his  Commedia  adverts 
to  this  fact.  All  our  intellectual  knowledge  takes  its  rise  in 
sensible  perception.  Work  of  the  outer  senses  and  of  the  imagi- 
nation is  a  necessary  prerequisite  and  a  tremendous  aid  to  the 
acquisition  of  mind-lore.  The  inner  struggle  between  sensible 
appetite  and  spiritual  desire  is  another  sign  that  the  principles 
of  sense  and  intellect  are  one.  Like  doubt,  the  state  of  sus- 
pense between  two  views,  such  a  war  supposes  the  battle-field 
to  be  one  and  the  same  principle  or  mind. 

(b)  Identity  of  the  vegetative  and  sensitive  principle  in  man 
is  proved,  if  between  growth  and  sensation  there  exists  the 
closest  kind  of  relationship  in  point  of  graded  perfection,  dura- 
tion, subserviency  and  influence.  But  such  a  relationship  exists. 
Ergo. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  Unless  the  principles  were  iden- 
tical, sensation  and  growth  would  now  and  then  fail  of  one  or 
other  of  the  relationships  just  enumerated. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  These  are  recognized  facts,  that 
the  more  perfect  the  power  of  sensible  perception  in  a  man, 
the  more  perfect  are  his  powers  of  nutrition ;  that  man  ceases  to 
grow  or  to  nourish  himself  when  he  ceases  to  use  his  senses; 
that  in  fact  all  three  lives  go  out  at  once;  that  the  faculties 
of  growth  are  ordained  by  nature  to  repair  and  strengthen  the 
organs  of  sense;  that  close  application  of  the  senses,  as  well 
as  too  absorbing  study,  ruins  digestion  and  impairs  all  the 
organs  of  nutrition. 

IV.  Man,  or  what  results  from  the  union  of  body  and  soul, 
is  capable  of  actions,  which,  possible  to  neither  component  taken 
separately,  can  belong  only  to  the  whole  compound,  as  to  a 
complete  principle,  one  and  undivided.  But  such  a  compound 
is  a  single  nature  and  a  single  substance.     Ergo. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  Man  is  conscious  of  the  fact  that 
he  is  a  being  of  a  certain  quantity  or  extension.  The  body  alone 
cannot  be  the  principle  of  this  consciousness,  since  left  to  its 
own  resources  it  is  absolutely  incapable  of  all  consciousness. 
Neither  can  the  soul  alone  compass  this  cognition,  since  left  to 
itself  it  is  just  as  incapable  of  conceiving  itself  made  up  of  a 


74  PSYCHOLOGY 

certain  quantity,  and  possessed  of  a  certain  extension.  This 
act  of  perception,  too,  is  one  and  undivided;  nut  the  resultant 
of  two  or  more  acts,  derived  from  two  or  more  principles.  Man 
also  has  knowledge  of  large  and  small  beings  outside  of  him- 
self. But  knowledge  of  such  beings  requires  an  agent  or  prin- 
ciple, itself  possessed  of  formal  extension  or  quantitative  parts. 
Such  an  agent  the  soul  alone  can  never  be  considered,  because 
of  the  simplicity,  already  proved  its  natural  birthright.  Neither 
can  the  body  alone  acquit  itself  of  this  operation,  because  its 
own  unaided  powers  can  never  attain  to  knowledge  of  any  kind 
whatever.  Therefore,  the  only  principle  capable  of  acquiring 
this  knowledge  is  the  whole  man  taken  as  a  unit,  or  that  being 
compounded  of  body  and  soul. 

PEINCIPLES  —  sriEiTUALiTY 

A.  In  spite  of  what  Locke  says  to  the  contrary,  matter  is 
utterly  incapable  of  understanding.  Intelligent  matter  is  as 
much  an  impossibility  as  a  square  circle;  because  it  contains 
notes  necessarily  destructive  of  one  another.  Intelligent  mat- 
ter would  be  spirit  and  matter,  and  therefore  an  intrinsic  impos- 
sibility. Voltaire  thought  Locke's  theory  solid,  because  matter 
can  contain  within  itself  such  simple  properties  as  gravity,  and 
the  various  forces  of  nature.  These  properties  are  indeed  sim- 
ple, but  they  are  not  on  that  account  spiritual.  Spirituality  and 
simplicity  are  quite  different  notions,  and  the  forces  adduced 
by  Voltaire  are  intrinsically  dependent  on  matter. 

B.  The  soul's  extrinsic  dependence  on  matter,  or  bodily  or- 
ganism, makes  it  possible  for  a  diseased  brain,  as  in  the  insane, 
to  disturb  the  course  of  its  operations.  But  this  is  only  an  ex- 
trinsic and  indirect  effect,  not  directly  or  intrinsically  affecting 
the  soul,  or  that  faculty  of  the  soul  known  as  the  intellect.  The 
action  of  the  brain  is  not  thought  itself  or  its  cause,  but  only 
a  prerequisite  condition  for  thouglit  in  present  circumstances. 
The  phantasm  contributes  only  to  thought's  beginning,  it  plays 
no  part  in  thought's  finish.  The  species  impressa  and  intel- 
lectus  possibilis  finish  the  thought.  And  this  is  what  we  mean 
by  extrinsic  dependence  and  intrinsic  independence.  Matter 
enters  the  constitution  of  a  man's  essence;  and  from  this  cir- 
cumstance it  follows  that  the  natural  exercise  of  his  highest 


THESIS  V  75 

faculty  must  depend  at  least  extrinsically,  not  intrinsically,  on 
matter. 

C.  All  our  notions,  coming  as  they  must  through  the  senses, 
are  originally  of  things  more  or  less  material.  Hence,  when 
discussing  and  proving  the  spirituality  of  the  soul,  our  argu- 
ments may  appear  weak  from  the  fact,  that  we  seem  to  substi- 
tute analogical  for  imivocal  notions.  In  other  words,  we  prove 
the  soul  spiritual,  though  possessed  of  nothing  but  figurative 
notions  of  what  spirituality  is.  Our  concept  of  a  spiritual  sub- 
stance, like  the  soul,  is  not  intuitive  and  purely  positive,  as  it 
is  when  a  body  or  material  substance  is  in  question.  It  is  what 
we  call  an  abstractive  and  negativo-positive  concept.  In  other 
words  it  strips  bodies  of  triple  dimension  or  quantity,  to  ex- 
press spirit's  substantial  being;  and  at  the  same  time  keeps 
apart  from  spirit  the  imperfection  attaching  to  quantity.  And 
this  arises  from  the  need  we  lie  under  of  beginning  intellectual 
work  with  the  senses. 

D.  Man  understands,  and  man  is  a  material  and  organic 
principle.     Ergo  the  soul  is  not  spiritual. 

Answer.  Man  is  the  principium  quod,  not  the  principium 
quo.  The  soul  is  the  principium  quo  remotum;  the  intellect, 
the  principium  quo  proximum.  Man  is  said  to  understand,  be- 
cause acts  are  attributed  to  the  whole  suppositum  or  person. 
Actiones  sunt  suppositorum.  A  man's  thoughts  belong  to  him, 
but  his  soul  and  its  faculty  of  understanding  are  their  principle 
or  cause. 

E.  The  soul  is  the  form  of  the  body  in  such  a  way  that  it  is 
not  totally  buried  or  sunk  in  bodily  matter,  like  the  soul  of 
brutes  or  plants;  but  in  such  a  way,  that,  as  root  and  principle 
of  intellectual  acts,  it  is  intrinsically  independent  of  matter. 

F.  The  soul  is  the  body's  form  in  such  a  way  that  it  has  acts 
distinct  from  its  informative  activity.  Its  informare  is  not  its 
esse,  as  happens  in  brutes  and  plants.  It  is  the  root  of  spiritual 
energies  like  understanding,  in  addition  to  being  the  body's 
form. 

G.  The  soul  sickens  and  grows  old  with  the  body.  Ergo  it 
is  material. 

Answer.  Not  with  regard  to  its  substance,  but  with  regard 
to  its  faculties ;  intrinsicall}^,  with  regard  to  vegetation  and  sen- 
sation; extrinsically,  with  regard  to  use  in  the  case  of  intellect. 


76  PSYCHOLOGY 

Vaughan  illustrates  with  the  exainj)le  of  a  broken-down  har- 
monium and  a  sonata.  The  player  must  use  the  defective  in- 
strument, because  no  otlier  is  at  hand.  It  would  be  a  mistake 
to  think  that  the  power  of  musical  execution  or  the  merit  of 
the  piece  is  in  the  instrument. 

H.  Children  resemble  parents  in  mind  and  will.  Ergo  soul 
is  derived  from  parents,  and  material. 

Answer.  Children  get  organs  from  parents;  mind  and  will 
extrinsically  depend  on  organs.     Hence  resemblance. 

/.  Even  rational  appetite  in  man  inclines  more  to  material 
goods  than  to  spiritual.     Ergo  soul  is  material. 

Answer.  Men  without  reason  make  this  mistake.  ]\Ien  with 
reason  sometimes  go  wrong  in  the  matter,  but  always  with  full 
knowledge  that  they  are  insulting  their  true  dignity. 

J.  There  is  no  contradiction  in  intrinsic  dependence  for  vege- 
tation and  sensation,  and  intrinsic  independence  for  under- 
standing, because  not  affirmed  under  the  same  respect. 

K.  The  body  receives  the  soul,  not  according  to  the  soul's 
whole  capacity,  but  according  to  its  own  capacity,  vegetative 
and  sensitive. 

Simplicity 

A.  The  soul  moves  the  body,  not  by  the  kind  of  contact  or 
touch  most  familiar  to  us,  and  styled  that  of  quantity  or  mass; 
but  by  a  kind  peculiar  to  spirits,  and  styled  that  of  power,  in- 
fluence, virtue.  Only  the  first  kind  supposes  quantity  and  ex- 
tension in  the  agent  or  mover.  The  soul  moves  the  body  inas- 
much as  it  is  the  body's  form,  not  inasmuch  as  it  is  the  principle 
of  intellectual  life  and  activity. 

B.  A  spirit  freed  from  all  connection  with  matter,  or  a  sep- 
arate spiritual  substance,  should  perhaps  have  force  sufficient 
to  move  any  mass  or  weight  whatever.  The  doctors  disagree 
in  this  matter;  St.  Thomas  and  Suarez  deny  angels  the  power, 
Scotus  is  against  them.  But  our  soul  is  not  such  a  spirit.  It 
is  bound  up  with  the  body  as  its  form.  No  wonder  then  that 
it  encounters  bodies  offering  resistance  too  great  for  any  effort 
it  can  elicit.  In  the  execution  of  movements  the  soul  intrin- 
sically depends  on  nerves  and  muscles.  In  ordering  movement 
it  is  free  from  this  intrinsic  dependence. 

C.  St.  Thomas  remarks  in  one  of  his  treatises  that  matter 


THESIS  V  11 

and  form  can  be  said  to  have  two  meanings.  Matter  can  some^ 
times  be  confounded  with  possibility  or  essence,  and  form  with 
actuality  or  existence  outside  tlie  mind.  In  this  acceptation, 
matter  and  form  can  be  attributed  to  the  soul.  But  the  com- 
position thence  resulting  is  only  metaphysical,  and  that  we  agree 
to  recognize  in  the  human  soul.  The  proper  and  strict  mean- 
ings of  the  terms  matter  and  form  are  not  essence  and  exist- 
ence; but  essence  itself  is  the  result  of  their  combination. 
Hence  in  this  latter  sense  the  soul  cannot  be  said  to  consist  of 
matter  and  form,  since  it  is  pure  form,  uniting  not  with  any- 
thing in  itself,  but  with  the  human  body,  to  form  the  essence 
and  existence  called  man. 

D.  The  soul  animates  the  body,  the  whole  body;  and,  as  this 
animation  is  a  vital  or  immanent  act,  the  soul  must  be  present 
wherever  it  has  place,  in  every  part  of  the  body,  in  even  the 
hair,  the  nails  and  the  teeth.  There  is  some  difficulty  about 
the  soul's  presence  in  the  blood.  Cajetan  is  of  opinion  that  the 
soul  animates  the  blood.  Others,  like  Bonaventure,  Albertus 
Magnus,  Suarez,  DeLugo,  Lessius,  a  Lapide,  maintain  the  con- 
trary. As  usual,  both  sides  appeal  to  Aristotle  and  St.  Thomas. 
If  the  blood  be  actually  part  of  the  body,  if  it  possesses  organ- 
ism and  enjoys  even  vegetative  life,  it  must  be  said  to  be  ani- 
mated by  the  soul.  The  Thomists,  with  the  approval  of  some 
modern  physiologists,  ascribe  all  three  qualities  to  the  blood. 
Their  opponents  advance  arguments  to  show  that  the  blood 
is  actually  no  part  of  the  body,  that  it  is  without  organs,  and 
that  it  evinces  no  sign  of  growth.  Quite  the  contrary,  St. 
Thomas  safeguards  the  integrity  of  the  Blessed  Virgin's  body 
in  the  Incarnation,  by  urging  that  the  body  of  Christ  was  made, 
not  from  the  flesh  or  bones  of  His  Mother,  but  from  her  blood, 
which  is  not  an  actual  part  of  the  body,  but  a  part  only  in 
potency,  and  as  such  removable  without  detriment  to  the  body. 
Physiologists  are  not  agreed  among  themselves  that  the  blood 
contains  organs  and  betrays  symptoms  of  growth.  A  few  at 
most  contend  that  the  red  globules,  a  small  percentage  of  the 
whole  supply,  fulfill  these  conditions.  Even  the  red  globules 
are  disjoined  from  the  rest  of  the  body,  and  on  this  score  in- 
capable of  animation  by  the  soul. 

The  chief  arguments  advanced  by  upholders  of  the  negative 
are  these  three.     The  blood  acquits  itself  of  no  vital  act  in  even 


78  PSYCHOLOGY 

the  vegetative  order.  The  blood  is  nourishment  for  the  body; 
and,  therefore,  has  its  own  form  before  conversion  into  the  body's 
substance.  The  blood  is  disjoined  from  the  solid  parts  of  the 
body.  Transfusion  of  blood  proves  it  possessed  of  its  own  form. 
(N.B.  Grafting  of  skin  would  rel'utc  this  last  argument.)  St. 
Thomas  teaches  that,  like  the  different  body-humors,  the  blood 
is  not  yet  part  of  the  body,  but  on  its  way  to  this  dignity. 
Finally,  there  are  weighty  arguments  for  both  sides;  and,  till 
the  Church  settles  the  matter,  by  an  explicit  definition,  the 
two  opinions  must  be  voted  probable. 

To  meet  the  theological  argument,  derived  from  the  divinity's 
union  with  the  blood  in  Christ,  and  its  consequent  assumption 
by  Christ  as  part  of  the  human  body,  defenders  of  the  nega- 
tive opinion  distinguish  between  primary  and  secondary  parts 
of  the  body.  Primary  parts  have  organic  structure,  and  are 
animated  by  the  soul ;  secondary  parts,  like  the  blood  and  hu- 
mors, have  no  organic  structure,  are  not  animated  by  the  soul, 
and  still  contribute  to  the  wholeness  or  entirety  of  the  human 
body.  To  be  united  with  the  divinity,  the  blood  need  only  be 
part  of  the  body  in  Christ,  whether  primary  or  secondary.  In 
much  the  same  way,  the  body  of  Christ  in  the  Holy  Eucharist 
postulates,  in  virtue  of  natural  connection,  the  presence  of  His 
sacred  blood  in  the  Host,  whether  the  blood  be  a  primary  or 
secondary  part  of  the  body.  Though  not  animated  or  vivified 
by  the  soul,  the  blood  gets  its  form,  or  is  denominated  human, 
from  the  soul.  Hence,  body  and  soul  are  not  like  a  house  and 
its  form.  The  house  is  an  artificial  whole,  and  its  form  is  an 
artificial  form.  Man  is  a  natural  whole,  and  his  soul  is  a 
natural  or  substantial  form.  The  parts  of  a  house  have  their 
own  form  before  union,  the  parts  of  the  body  are  without  form 
before  the  soul's  approach.  Or  as  St.  Thomas  puts  it,  a  sub- 
stantial form  gives  finish  and  perfection  not  only  to  the  whole, 
but  also  to  its  parts. 

E.  The  soul  is  in  potency  to  accidental  acts,  not  to  substan- 
tial acts.  It  cannot  change  to  another  form.  Hence  it  is  phys- 
ically simple  in  point  of  essence.  It  is  its  own  formal  cause, 
and  has  no  other;  though  it  has  an  efficient  cause,  God.  As  a 
simple  form,  it  is  simple  act,  but  finite;  unlike  God,  whose 
actuality  is  His  essence.     The  soul's  actuality  is  not  its  essence. 

F.  The  soul  is  coextensive  with  the  body.     Ergo  compound. 


THESIS  V  79 

Answer.     Definitively,  not  circumscriptively. 

G.  The  soul  has  extended  or  quantitative  faculties  for  vege- 
tation and  sensation.     Ergo  compound. 

Answer.  As  root  or  principle,  not  as  subject  in  which  they 
inhere.     The  whole  man  is  the  subject  in  which  they  inhere. 

H.  Growth  and  amputation  prove  parts  and  quantity.  Ergo 
compound. 

Answer.  New  presences,  not  new  substance.  Amputation  af- 
fects presence,  not  substance.  Amputation  is  not  to  be  under- 
stood as  the  soul's  withdrawal  irom  severed  portion,  but  as  sun's 
disappearance  from  room,  when  window  is  closed. 

Unity 

A.  The  word  formally  plays  an  important  part  in  this  branch 
of  philosophy.  Admitting  many  nice  distinctions,  and  various 
interpretations,  the  word  can  easily  lead  a  beginner  astray.  It 
has  two  senses,  inasmuch  as  it  sometimes  prescinds  from  other 
perfections  inherent  in  a  being,  and  sometimes  excludes  from  a 
being  all  perfections  higher  than  that  said  to  belong  formally 
to  it.  Thus,  the  human  soul  is  said  to  be  in  the  first  sense 
formally  vegetative,  sensitive  and  intellectual.  In  the  second 
sense  it  is  formally  intellectual  only.  Souls  formally  vegeta- 
tive and  sensitive  in  the  second  sense,  such  for  instance  as 
those  of  plants  and  brutes,  are  perishable  and  subject  to  death. 
But  man's  soul,  because  not  formally  vegetative  and  sensitive 
in  the  second  sense,  but  only  such  in  the  first  sense,  is  not 
necessarily  perishable  and  subject  to  death. 

B.  Some  see  in  the  war  between  man's  passions  and  desires 
an  argument  for  plurality  of  souls;  because,  forsooth,  opposi- 
tion demands  at  least  two  agents,  and  one  soul  cannot  be  at 
odds  with  itself.  But  they  forget  that  the  strife  is  not  neces- 
sarily between  souls,  but  between  the  different  powers  or  facul- 
ties of  the  one  soul.  Man's  soul,  though  in  reality  one,  is  vir- 
tually or  in  its  forces  and  faculties  many.  There  would  be  no 
quarrel,  were  there  two  souls.     Each  would  go  its  own  way. 

C.  The  soul  of  man  is  wholly  incorruptible.  Its  vegetative 
and  sense-principles  are  not  corrupted  after  separation  from  the 
body,  but  simply  hindered  from  activity. 

D.  The  notion  of  a  vegetative  or  sensitive  soul  contains  in 
itself  no  notion  of  corruptibility  or  incorruptibility,  in  much 


80  PSYCHOLOGY 

the  same  way  as  animality  conveys  no  notion  of  rationality  or 
its  absence.  Animality  in  man  is  rational,  in  brutes  it  is  ir- 
rational. Even  so  vegetative  and  sensitive  souls  in  plants  and 
brutes  are  corruptible,  in  man  they  are  incorruptible.  Souls 
in  plants  and  brutes  acquit  themselves  of  no  higher  life  than 
vegetation  and  sensation,  and  they  are  on  this  account  intrin- 
sically dependent  on  organs,  and  corruptible  by  accident.  The 
soul  in  man,  which  is  at  the  same  time  vegetative,  sensitive  and 
intellectual,  acquits  itself  of  intellectual  life,  and  is  therefore 
intrinsically  independent  of  matter  and  incorruptible. 

E.  Animal  is  said  univocally  of  man  and  brute;  because  the 
soul  of  man,  though  generically  different  from  the  soul  of 
brute,  when  viewed  as  merely  intellectual,  is  similar  and  re- 
ducible to  the  soul  of  brute,  when  viewed  as  the  root  and  prin- 
ciple of  sensation.  Man  the  compound  is  as  corruptible  as 
brutes,  and  therefore  in  the  same  genus.  His  soul  is  a  spirit- 
ual substance,  is  in  the  genus  of  spirits,  and  therefore  incor- 
ruptible. Genus  is  said  of  the  whole  compound,  not  of  its 
form. 

F.  Man's  soul  is  not  a  species  of  the  genus  spirit,  a  species 
of  the  genus  animal,  and  a  sjjecies  of  the  genus  plant.  But 
it  is  a  species  of  the  genus  spirit  alone,  and  at  the  same  time 
the  root  and  principle  of  properties  that  belong  to  the  lower 
genera,  animals  and  plants. 

G.  Man  is  not  an  animal  in  virtue  of  one  soul,  rational  in 
virtue  of  another.  He  is  a  rational  animal  in  virtue  of  one 
Boul,  substantially  spiritual,  in  root  or  principle  vegetative  and 
sensitive.  Genus  and  specific  difference  are  concept-beings,  and 
a  distinction  of  reason  between  souls  is  sufficient. 

Composition  of  Man 

A.  We  Catholics,  relying  on  the  promise  made  in  person  by 
Christ  to  St.  Peter  and  his  successors,  that  truth  should  be  the 
Church's  everlasting  legacy,  bow  our  heads  and  our  hearts  to 
her  divinely  secure  guidance  in  matters  as  well  philosophical 
as  theological.  In  her  representatives,  the  Popes  and  the  Coun- 
cils, she  has  at  times  seen  fit  to  promulgate  lier  tenets  with  re- 
gard to  the  composition  of  man,  and  we  quote  these  few.  Un- 
der Clement  V,  in  1311,  an  Oecumenical  Council  inscribed  this 
definition  among  its  decrees.     "  "We  condemn  as  false  and  di- 


THESIS  V  81 

rectly  opposed  to  the  Catholic  faith  whatever  system  maintains 
that  the  rational  soul  of  man  is  not  truly  and  of  itself  the  form 
(or  actuating,  determining  principle)  of  man's  body.  If  any 
man  boldly  presumes  to  contend  that  the  rational  soul  is  not  of 
itself  and  essentially  the  form  of  the  human  body,  let  him  be 
counted  a  heretic."  In  the  5th  Lateran  Council  Leo  X  thus 
decreed,  "  We  severely  condemn  all  who  assert  that  man's  ra- 
tional soul  is  subject  to  death,  or  that  it  is  numerically  one  and 
the  same  in  all  men.  Not  only  is  it  truly,  of  itself  and  essen- 
tially the  form  of  the  human  body,  but  it  is  also  immortal,  and, 
in  exact  proportion  with  the  number  of  bodies  into  which  it 
is  breathed,  individually  multiplied  and  necessarily  so  multi- 
plied." 

B.  Soul  and  body,  though  a  simple  substance  and  a  com- 
pound, thougli  spirit  and  matter,  though  indivisible  and  di- 
visible, can  unite  to  form  one  complete  and  compound  sub- 
stance in  the  capacity  of  matter  and  form  or  incomplete  sub- 
stances.    They  could  never  unite  to  form  a  simple  substance. 

C.  Substantial  union  is  impossible,  unless  the  soul  somehow 
partakes  of  the  body's  material  being,  while  the  body  somehow 
partakes  of  the  soul's  spiritual  being.  And,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
the  body  does  partake  of  the  soul's  being;  not  inasmuch  as  the 
soul  is  precisely  spiritual,  but  inasmuch  as  it  is  the  root  and 
principle  of  vegetative  and  sensitive  life.  In  the  same  way  the 
soul  partakes  of  the  body's  material  being  not  inasmuch  as  it 
is  the  root  and  principle  of  thought,  but  inasmuch  as  it  is  the 
root  and  principle  of  growth  and  sensation. 

D.  The  body  before  union  with  the  soul  would  seem  to  be 
matter  with  form,  and  therefore  the  soul  is  not  the  single  form 
of  the  human  body.  Before  union  with  the  soul  the  body  is  not 
a  complete,  but  an  incomplete  substance,  under  the  aspect  of  a 
human  body.  It  is  an  actual  being  only  in  a  wide  sense,  not 
in  a  strict  sense;  and  only  an  actual  being  in  strict  sense  is 
constituted  such  by  form.  The  dispositions,  induced  in  the 
body  by  generation  before  union,  are  not  accidents;  but  requi- 
sites for  primal  matter,  adapted  to  the  form  called  soul.  The 
body's  chemical  elements  before  union  are  not  complete  sub- 
stances, fixed  in  determined  species;  but  a  total  subject,  fit  to 
be  informed  and  given  a  fixed  species,  or  made  a  himian  body 
by  the  soul. 


82  PSYCHOLOGY 

E.  It  is  impossible  for  a  pure  spirit  to  be  a  constituent  part 
of  a  body.  The  same  is  not  true  of  a  spirit  like  the  soul,  which 
is  a  spirit  naturally  ordained  to  be  at  the  same  time  root  and 
principle  of  vegetative  and  sensitive  life. 

F.  The  body  before  union  is  not  complete  as  a  human  body. 
It  gets  that  completeness  from  the  soul.  It  is  complete,  as  a 
collection  of  elementary  bodies,  each  with  its  own  form,  in  such 
a  way  that  the  collection  is  an  incomplete  subject  ready  to  be 
informed  by  the  soul.  These  forms  are  latent  during  union, 
and  are  educed  from  the  potency  of  matter  after  separation. 

G.  Body  and  soul  are  not  two  species  under  one  genus,  but 
they  are  two  principles  constituting  one  species  of  a  genus. 
Therefore,  body  and  soul  are  not  of  the  same  genus. 

H.  JSTo  corpse-form  need  be  admitted,  because  after  death  the 
body  ceases  to  be  a  body,  and  becomes  rather  a  collection  of 
bodies. 

I.  When  faith  teaches  that  the  soul  of  Christ  is  in  the 
Sacred  Host  not  vi  verborum,  but  per  concomitantiam,  it  is 
talking  of  the  soul  of  Christ,  not  inasmuch  as  it  is  the  form 
of  His  body;  but  inasmuch  as  it  is  spiritual,  or  root  and  prin- 
ciple of  intellectual  operations.  This  is  one  of  many  probable 
explanations. 

J.  The  dead  body  of  Christ  was  truly  one  with  the  living 
body  of  Christ  materially,  not  formally;  because  of  union  with 
the  divine  personality  of  Christ,  not  because  of  the  form  or  soul. 

K.  When  the  soul  actually  informs  the  body,  it  informs  it 
by  virtue  of  its  essence.  It  is,  however,  of  the  soul's  essence 
to  inform  the  body  not  actually  but  aptitudinally.  Therefore, 
subsistence  after  separation  is  quite  possible  to  the  soul. 

L.  The  body  in  union  would  seem  to  be  an  accident,  because 
it  accrues  to  the  soul  already  created  by  God.  But  the  soul,  as 
the  body's  form,  is  not  a  complete  substance;  and  accidents  in- 
here in  only  complete  substances. 

M.  Soul  and  body  combine  as  matter  and  form,  not  as  chem- 
ical elements.  They  do  not  perish  like  chemical  elements  to 
produce  a  third  reality,  the  man ;  because  the  process  of  union 
is  not  mutual  conversion  or  change,  but  mutual  communication 
of  their  realities. 


THESIS  VI 

The  rational  soul  of  man,  even  when  separated  from  the  hody, 
is  of  its  nature  capable  of  existence  and  life,  neither  can  it  pos- 
sibly be  depiived  of  them.  The  soul  of  man  will  therefore  live 
forever. 

Maher,  pp.  524-544;  Jouin,  pp.  193-200. 

QUESTION 

This  thesis  contains  four  parts,  and  is  most  important.  It 
bears  directly  on  man's  moral  life;  and  must,  when  carefully 
studied  and  thoroughly  understood,  produce  a  lasting  impres- 
sion for  good.  If  our  career  is  to  begin  and  end  with  this 
shifting  life,  this  round  of  joys  and  sorrows;  if  our  thoughts, 
words  and  deeds  are  not  to  follow  us  beyond  our  deathbed;  if 
no  grim  spectres  in  the  shape  of  deeds  ill  done,  of  duties  un- 
fulfilled, are  to  confront  us  before  the  judgment  seat,  my  pres- 
ent mode  of  life  and  yours  are  a  hallucination  and  cruel  self- 
deceit.  Wliy  deny  ourselves,  why  restrain  our  passions,  why 
say  nay  so  many  times  a  day  to  appealing  self-indulgence,  if 
we  are  candidates  for  the  same  blank  fate  as  the  dumb  herd 
of  dull  sensualists,  who  pamper  self,  who  give  unbridled  rein 
to  their  passions,  whose  self  indulgence  knows  not  what  refusal 
or  disappointment  means? 

It  is  an  article  of  faith  that  these  our  bodies,  after  hiding 
away  a  space  in  the  ground,  will  arise  at  the  last  day,  be  re- 
united with  the  soul,  and  with  some  few  modifications,  called 
for  by  their  new  sphere  of  existence,  will  last  forever,  the  eter- 
nal companions  of  the  spirits  within  us.  But  the  immortality 
of  the  soul  is  a  dogma  of  reason,  and  was  recognized  and  con- 
tended for  as  such  by  ignorant  and  learned  alike,  long  ages  be- 
fore the  advent  of  Christ  and  the  establishment  of  His  Church. 
Pagans,  who  lived  before  tbe  full  light  of  divine  revelation 
dawned  on  the  world,  to  clear  up  mysteries  and  brighten  up  old 
truths,  could  without  fault  profess  ignorance  of  the  astounding 

83 


84  PSYCHOLOGY 

favor  gratuitously  done  human  nature,  the  immortality  of  the 
body.  The  body,  the  soul's  companion,  is  of  itself  heir  to  cor- 
ruption ;  and  had  not  our  gracious  Master,  wishing  to  signalize 
His  wondrous  goodness,  decreed  to  the  contrary,  it  would  for- 
ever tenant  the  cold  grave.  Small  wonder  that  this  consoling 
dogma,  now  so  familiar  to  mankind,  entirely  escaped  even  the 
noblest  geniuses  of  paganism.  Guided  by  unaided  reason,  we 
can  readily  enough  compass  the  notions  of  absolute  and  natural 
immortality.  The  first  is  peculiar  to  the  infinite  being  known 
as  God,  the  second  is  the  birthright  of  such  spiritual  substances 
as  angels  and  the  souls  of  men.  We,  who  hear  God  speak  in  the 
Scriptures,  distinguish  a  third  species  of  immortality,  that  of 
grace,  accruing  to  an  otherwise  corruptible  body  only  because 
God's  free  and  limitless  will  was  pleased  to  so  dower  it.  Omit- 
ting for  the  present  all  discussion  of  the  body's  immortality  and 
of  God's  immortality  or  eternit}^,  we  mean  to  weigh  and  prove 
the  immortality  of  the  soul. 

Whether  pagans  or  Christians,  men  with  a  claim  to  reason 
and  its  sober  use  have  been  a  unit  on  the  fact  in  question.  A 
wide  variety  rules  when  the  fact  comes  to  be  explained;  and 
the  crude  notions  of  some  ancient  philosophers  are  scarcely  more 
puerile  than  the  theories  advanced  by  not  a  few  of  the  enlight- 
ened minds  of  our  own  time.  These  ancients  at  least  recog- 
nized the  utter  impossibility  of  confounding  thought  with  the 
products  of  matter,  and  thus  soared  worlds  beyond  the  teachers, 
who  to-day  contend  that  dead  matter  can  elicit  concepts.  The 
origin  of  this  half  mysterious  principle  they  could  not  satis- 
factoril}^  determine.  Their  attempts  to  surmount  this  first  dif- 
ficulty were  many  and  curious. 

One  school,  with  the  great  Plato  and  Pythagoras,  thought 
that  human  souls  were  beings  from  another  sphere,  that  of  the 
stars,  who  because  of  some  unknown  wickedness  had  been  con- 
demned by  an  ofl^ended  Creator  to  drag  out  a  miserable  exist- 
ence in  this  body,  or  prison-house  of  death.  Another  school, 
of  a  pantheistic  turn  of  mind,  reckoned  human  souls  particles 
struck  ofi:'  from  the  divinity.  Coming  nearer  our  own  age  of 
Materialism,  we  meet  with  such  theories  as  these.  The  soul 
is  the  result  of  generation  in  much  the  same  way  as  the  body; 
and  this  is  Material  Traducianism.  The  soul  is  the  product 
of  the  parents'  souls,  which  actually  produce  it  from  their  own 


THESIS  VI  85 

substance,  and  this  is  Spiritual  Traducianism ;  or  create  it  from 
nothing,  and  this  is  Exaggerated  Creatianism.  Eosmini  under- 
took to  split  the  difference  between  these  two  equally  false  sys- 
tems, and  maintained  that  the  human  soul,  inasmuch  as  it  is 
the  principle  of  growth  and  sensation,  derives  its  origin  from 
the  parents.  God  afterwards  presents  the  idea  of  being  to 
this  vegetative  and  sensitive  soul,  and  so  renders  it  intellectual, 
rational,  spiritual. 

We  need  not  remark  that  Plato,  Pythagoras,  and  the  moderns 
referred  to,  strangely  deceived  themselves  in  assigning  so  un- 
worthy an  origin  to  what  is  noblest  in  nature.  "Were  Plato's 
hypothesis  correct,  the  union  at  present  in  force  between  soul 
and  body  would  be  unnatural  and  galling.  The  imprisoned 
spirit  would  still  retain  some  recollection  of  the  happy  hours 
it  whiled  away  among  the  stars,  before  falling  a  victim  to  God's 
vengeance.  But  nobody  is  ready  to  grant  that  either  of  the 
above  facts  has  place.  The  union  of  body  and  soul  is  won- 
derfully natural,  and  so  pleasant  withal  that  separation  or  death 
is  the  one  evil  against  which  man  most  strenuously  contends. 

Plato  met  our  second  difficulty  by  making  it  the  foundation 
of  his  theory  about  the  origin  of  our  thoughts  or  ideas.  Each 
soul,  he  says,  comes  into  the  world  fully  equipped  with  knowl- 
edge, stored  away  during  its  celestial  sojourn,  and  elicited  or 
recalled  during  the  slavery  of  life  on  earth  by  constantly  re- 
curring suggestions.  Discere  est  reminisci.  To  learn  is  to 
recollect.  Fanciful  fabric  of  this  kind  does  credit  to  the  poetic 
longings  and  aspirations  of  Plato,  it  ill  becomes  pbilosophy. 
Sober  common  sense  in  this  particular  matter,  though  it  aban- 
dons him  to  the  mob  unfavored  of  the  Muses,  raises  the  igno- 
rant farmer  high  above  the  sage  Plato.  He  feels,  and  will 
stoutly  maintain,  that  his  ideas  had  no  more  claim  to  existence 
within  him  before  their  present  production,  than  have  the  dol- 
lars and  cents  to  existence  in  his  ample  pockets  before  he  ex- 
changes his  crop  for  hard  cash.  Eosmini  is  wrong,  because 
an  accidental  fact,  like  the  presentation  of  the  universal  idea 
of  being,  cannot  account  for  a  specific  change,  like  that  of  a 
sensitive  into  an  intellectual  soul.  Besides,  a  sensitive  soul  is 
incapable  of  any  such  universal  idea.  Otherwise  dogs  and  cats 
could  change  to  men. 

Evolution  can  have  no  part  in  the  soul's  production.     If  the 


86  PSYCHOLOGY 

souls  of  parents  cannot  produce  the  child's  soul,  much  less  can 
the  sensitive  soul  of  brutes  be  producing  cause  of  a  human 
soul.  Traducianism,  whether  it  makes  the  bodies  and  the  souls 
of  the  parents,  or  their  souls  alone,  the  efficient  cause  of  the 
child's  soul,  is  always  a  wide  remove  from  the  truth.  For  it  is 
impossible  to  consider  their  bodies  capable  of  such  an  effect, 
unless  farewell  is  taken  of  the  very  first  rule  in  all  causation. 
Effects  can  never  surpass  in  excellence  the  nature  of  their  causes. 
Surely  nobody  will  deny  that  a  spiritual  and  intelligent  soul  is 
in  a  multitude  of  respects  superior  to  a  material  and  dumb 
body.  The  souls  of  the  parents  would  accomplish  this  result 
in  one  of  two  ways.  They  would  make  the  child's  soul  from 
particles  of  themselves,  or  would  make  it  from  absolute  nothing- 
ness. But  the  human  soul  is  a  simple  substance,  and  as  such 
disclaims  all  connection  with  particles.  Parents  are  not  di- 
vine, and  creation,  or  production  from  absolute  nothingness,  is 
essentially  the  work  of  God.  Creation  means  production  with- 
out preexistent  matter,  power  without  limit,  infinite  might;  and 
God  alone  is  infinite.  God,  and  God  alone,  is  equal  to  the  task 
of  producing  human  souls.  Because  the  man  is  said  to  be  gen- 
erated, it  does  not  follow  that  the  soul  is  generated.  Because 
the  man  dies,  it  does  not  follow  that  the  soul  dies.  Genera- 
tion is  said  of  the  whole  suppositum  or  resultant  from  union 
of  body  and  soul,  just  as  death  is  said  of  the  whole  suppositum ; 
and  as  the  man  dies,  while  his  soul  goes  on  living,  so  the  man 
is  generated,  while  his  soul  is  created. 

We  therefore  maintain,  with  all  sound  Catholic  writers,  that, 
while  each  and  every  child  born  into  the  world  derives  its  body 
from  a  father  and  mother,  its  soul  is  the  workmanship  of  the 
supreme  Artificer,  and  is  immediately  and  individually  created 
by  God,  and  by  Him  breathed  into  the  organism  assuming  shape. 
The  soul  of  man  is  created  by  God,  because  it  is  finite  and  spir- 
itual. As  a  finite  being,  it  postulates  an  efficient  cause.  As  a 
spiritual  being,  it  can  result  from  no  substantial  change  in  pre- 
existent matter,  because  its  constitution  is  altogether  devoid  of 
matter;  from  no  substantial  change  in  preexistent  spirit,  be- 
cause spirits  are  incapable  of  division  and  substantial  change. 
Therefore  it  is  created,  and  creative  power  belongs  to  God  alone. 
Creative  power  is  absolutely  independent  of  everything  outside 


THESIS  VI  87 

the  agent,  and  therefore  infinite,  impossible  to  creatures.  No 
creature  can  in  any  single  ease  create,  because  such  power  would 
be,  in  the  nature  of  things,  unlimited,  and  on  a  level  with  God's 
omnipotence.  No  creature  can  be  employed  as  an  instrumental 
cause  in  the  work  of  creation,  because  in  every  such  case  the 
creature  would  be  either  a  moral  cause  by  prayer  and  petition, 
or  in  virtue  of  immanence  a  total  cause  by  its  own  activity,  an 
impossible  supposition. 

About  the  precise  time  of  the  soul's  creation,  St.  Thomas, 
following  Aristotle  and  his  crude  notions  of  embryos,  teaches 
that  the  soul  of  the  child  is  first  vegetative,  then  sensitive,  and 
last  of  all  rational.  In  the  case  of  a  male  child  the  rational 
soul  appears  only  forty  days  after  conception;  in  the  case  of  a 
female,  the  interval  is  lengthened  to  eighty  days.  Physiology 
has  weakened  this  opinion,  and  to-day  philosophers  and  theolo- 
gians commonly  agree  that  the  advent  of  the  rational  soul  is 
simultaneous  with  conception.  The  theory  of  St.  Thomas  is 
at  best  only  probable,  and  is  no  excuse  for  foeticide  perpetrated 
at  the  earliest  stage  of  conception.  The  opposite  opinion  is 
solidly  probable;  and  to  deliberately  destroy  even  probable  life 
is  most  certain  murder.  The  rational  soul  is  principle  of  all 
three  kinds  of  life  in  man,  and  this  is  reason  enough  for  its 
immediate  creation. 

Besides  assigning  the  human  soul  a  wrong  origin,  ancient 
philosophy  likewise  erred  in  its  conception  of  the  soul's  destiny 
after  man's  dissolution.  It  never  once  questioned  the  fact  of 
the  soul's  immortality,  and  all  its  mistakes  turn  on  the  kind 
of  future  awaiting  the  soul.  Its  notions  are  wonderfully  close 
to  the  truth,  and  marvels  of  intellect,  unaided  by  the  fioods  of 
supernatural  light  ushered  into  the  world  by  God's  advent 
among  men.  Our  untutored  Indians  and  the  ruder  Chinese 
entertain  notions  of  a  hereafter  analogous  to  those  of  ancient 
paganism  and  heathendom.  Rome's  greatest  epic  loves  always 
to  depict  life  beyond  the  grave  as  a  boundless  playground,  where 
warriors,  hunters,  lovers,  pursue  in  unbroken  bliss  the  sports 
and  pastimes,  that  filled  out  their  little  round  of  years  on 
earth.  His  picture  is  invariably  accompanied  by  that  com- 
panion-piece of  the  lonesome  lot  ahead  of  rash  mortals  who 
presume  to  offend  the  deity. 


88  PSYCHOLOGY 

"  Lo,  they  reach  saints'  dwelling  places,  where  a  greener  turf  o'erspreads 
Lawns,  that  level  lie  to  spirits;  where  sweet  virtue  fragrance  sheds. 
Broader  smile  the  glowing  meadows,  lit  with  light  to  men  unseen, 
And  with  stars,  whose  waning  vigor  dark  would  make  moon's  fullest 

gleam. 
Some  in  grass-grown  rings  their  prowess  test  in  bouts  with  friendly 

foes, 
Others  on  the  glinting  sea-sands  wrestle,  box,  deal  ponderous  blows. 
Merry  here  the  nimble  dancers  pound  and  pat  the  echoing  ground, 
Sing  to  shells  attuned  by  Orpheus,  when  he  woke  a  world  with  sovmd." 

^neid  VI,  640-648. 

"Tortures  dire   assuage  with   anguish   wounds  self-will   on  earth   cut 
deep ; 
Hanging  high,  some  sate  God's  justice;   others  stifling  vigils  keep. 
Deep  adown  in  lakes  of  brimstone,  hot  with  vengeful  Heaven's  ire; 
Each  and  all  are  prod  by  Furies,  births  of  unfulfilled  desire." 

^neid  VI,  739-743. 

Or  would  you  have  the  liquid  numbers  of  rare  old  Horace, 
who  in  the  midst  of  his  wine  and  his  loves  found  sweetness  in 
soberer  thoughts  like  these? 

"  I  hammer  out  a  chain  of  song. 
To  fasten  me  to  fitful  time; 
With  soulful  words  and  ringing  rhyme, 
I  link  it  tight,  and  weld  it  strong. 


■&' 


"It  renders  life  an  endless  day; 

No  rain,  no  wind  can  rust  or  wear, 
No  ages  can  its  strength  impair; 
It  binds  me  to  my  kind  for  aye. 

"  I  steal  away  from  meaner  men ; 
I  die  to  live;  my  body  sleeps. 
My  spirit,  winged  with  fame,  o'erleaps 
Dull  bounds,  too  thick  for  mortal  ken. 

"  As  long  as  priestess-virgins  tread, 

Beside  gray  years,  the  sun-flecked  stair, 

That  winds  up  to  Jove's  house  of  prayer. 

Green  laurel  grows,  to  wreathe  my  head." 

Odes  III,  30. 

Cicero,  the  most  eloquent  man  in  all  Eome,  when  every  pub- 
lic-spirited citizen  was  an  impassioned  orator,  thus  completely 
satisfies  his  mind  about  the  certainty  of  a  future  state  of  un- 
ending bliss :     "  Happiness  which  can  slip  away  is  half  misery. 


THESIS  VI  89 

Who  persuades  himself  that  stability  and  contiimed  existence 
pertain  to  a  period  of  time  admitting  interrnption  or  end? 
Heap  wealth  untold  on  a  friend,  bid  him  be  happy.  If  a  mo- 
mentary doubt,  touching  the  mere  possibility  of  losing  his  for- 
tune, find  asylum  in  his  mind,  that  friend  must  needs  expe- 
rience all  the  wretchedness  of  actual  loss.  Happiness  cannot 
dwell  with  the  anxiety  attendant  on  uncertain  possession." 

The  same  Cicero  in  a  profound  treatise,  descriptive  of  old 
age  and  its  pleasures,  introduces  Cyrus  consoling  his  children 
from  a  death-bed  in  language  like  this,  "  My  boys,  do  not  imag- 
ine that  on  my  departure  from  your  sight  I  shall  exist  no- 
where, and  be  reduced  to  empty  nothingness.  Even  while  I 
moved  among  you,  you  failed  to  discern  my  soul;  but  none 
the  less  clearly  did  you  understand  from  my  conduct  that  it 
lived  in  this  old  frame.  Believe,  therefore,  that  it  continues 
the  same,  though  no  longer  seen  of  you.  Heaven  and  earth 
could  not  persuade  me  to  fancy  that  souls  enjoy  life  only  in 
these  bodies  of  death,  and  die  when  they  break  off  all  commerce 
with  them;  that  souls  fall  away  from  knowledge,  when  they 
take  farewell  of  dull  bodies  that  know  not  a  thought.  I  hold 
fast  to  this  fundamental  truth,  that  souls  only  then  are  wise, 
when  they  begin  that  second  stage  of  existence,  freed  from"  all 
admixture  with  material  bodies." — De  Senectute,  c.  22. 

All  the  old  pagan  writers  of  repute  recognized  the  necessity 
of  a  future  life,  and  inclined  to  even  our  faith  in  the  resurrec- 
tion and  immortality  of  bodies.  But,  as  before  remarked,  they 
adopted  various  strange  notions  and  explanations  of  the  manner 
of  life  in  store  for  the  soul,  and  of  its  gradual  processes  of  de- 
velopment. Pythagoras  suggests  a  very  curious  fancy,  artis- 
tically described  by  Horace  and  Ovid.  Horace  is  recording  the 
address  a  dead  sailor  makes  to  some  passing  stranger. 

'■^Pantho's  son,  Euphorbus  brave, 
To  hell  again  is  flown; 
Dead  at  Troy,  to  death  he  gave 

But  muscles,  pelt  and  bone. 
Life  restored,  the  sage  he  played, 

Pythagoras,  nature's  seer; 
Knew  the  shield,  with  which  he  stayed 
Dread  Trojans,  mailed  with  fear." 

Odes  I,  28. 


90  PSYCHOLOGY 

Ovid  in  one  of  his  Metamorphoses,  or  "Wonderful  Changes 
wrought  in  human  forms,  leads  in  the  celebrated  philosopher 
Pythagoras,  and  makes  him  speak  as  follows: 

"  Souls,   unloosed  from  prison  houses,  flit  away  to  fuller   life ; 
Leave  the  cold  abode  of  bodies,  with  diseased  discomfort  rife. 
I  myself,  I  well  remember,  used  to  fight  in  front  of  Troy; 
Pantho's  son,  Euphorbus;  old  in  wisdom,  though  a  boy. 
Atreus'  younger  son  in  battle  launched  the  spear,  that  pierced  me 

through ; 
And    the   shield,    that    then    betrayed    me,    late    in    Juno's    shrine    I 
knew." 

Metamorphoses   XV,    161. 

Briefly,  the  al)surdities  of  metempsychosis  and  transmigra- 
tion of  souls  are  derived  from  the  earliest  promoters  of  phi- 
losophy. Men,  they  thought,  whether  conspicuously  deserv- 
ing during  life,  or  conspicuously  wicked,  merely  changed  their 
first  estate  for  another  in  the  same  or  a  different  order  of  being. 
Like  Euphorbus  in  the  story,  the  good  were  wont  to  abide 
awhile  in  the  nether  world;  whence,  after  a  period  of  moral 
cleansing,  they  issued  as  heroes  of  later  periods.  They  died 
blameless  warriors  or  kings,  and  reappeared  on  earth,  marvels 
of  thought  or  founders  of  nations.  The  bad  assumed  the  shapes 
of  various  brute  animals,  instinctively  prone  to  the  several  vices 
cherished  by  them.  It  is  highly  useful  to  note  that  though 
reason,  because  of  its  natural  weakness,  failed  to  fully  grasp 
the  dogma's  intricate  meaning,  there  is  apparent  all  through 
their  writings  a  deep  devotion  to,  a  reverent  regard  for,  that 
grand  old  truth  taught  by  unerring  nature,  the  immortality  of 
the  soul.  With  all  their  wanderings  from  the  path  of  recti- 
tude, with  all  their  vicious  inclinations  and  abominable  turpi- 
tude, they  were  men  enough  to  acknowledge  that  a  destiny  for 
better  or  worse  awaited  them,  that  they  were  to  undergo  a 
reckoning  for  their  misdeeds,  and  that  feigned  ignorance  was 
no  secure  refuge  against  the  loud  reproaches  of  a  conscience, 
not  to  be  stifled  or  hushed.  In  this  particular  they  were  heroes 
of  a  far  more  lovable  type  than  the  dullard  agnostics  of  our 
time,  weeds  in  the  luxuriant  growth  of  modern  civilization  and 
progress.  Men's  minds  have  undergone  no  essential  change  with 
the  ages,  and  nature's  lessons  are  the  same  for  ancients  and 
moderns. 


THESIS  VI  91 


TERMS 

The  rational  soul  of  man.  The  soul  of  man  is  an  incom- 
plete, not  a  complete  substance.  It  is  a  substance,  because  it 
exists  in  itself;  incomplete,  because  it  is  designed  by  nature 
to  inform  and  enliven  the  human  body,  and  so  help  to  the 
finish  of  the  complete  substance,  man.  It  is  a  spiritual  in- 
complete substance  or  form,  and  differs  from  pure  spirits,  or 
angelic  forms,  only  in  this,  that  nature  intended  it  to  be  bound 
up  in  the  human  body,  while  angels  are  ordained  to  nothing 
such.  In  other  words,  angels  are  completely  subsistent  forms, 
the  soul  is  an  incompletely  subsistent  one.  The  souls  of  plants 
and  brutes  are  incomplete  non-subsistent  substances.  They  are 
substances,  and  not  accidents,  because,  though  incapable  of  ex- 
istence apart  from  the  complete  substance,  rose  or  horse,  they 
play  a  necessary  and  intrinsic  part  in  the  constitution  of  the 
one  and  the  other.  They  cannot  like  accidents  be  present  or 
absent  without  specifically  infiuencing  the  being,  rose,  or  the 
being,  horse.  These  principles  of  plant  and  beast  are  simple 
per  se,  divisible  per  accidens;  they  have  no  parts  in  themselves, 
but  exist  whole  and  entire  in  each  part  of  the  being  they 
actuate;  but,  unlike  the  soul  of  man,  they  are  material;  the 
plant  and  the  animal  are  capable  of  neither  thought  nor  voli- 
tion, nor  of  any  act  in  itself  independent  of  and  transcendent 
to  matter. 

Of  its  nature  capable  of  existence.  In  the  order  of  the  uni- 
verse angels  stand  next  to  God.  They  are  capable  of  existence 
without  a  material  body,  and  cannot  like  the  human  soul  be  so 
clothed  with  matter  as  to  constitute  a  single  complete  sub- 
stance. 

They  are  complete  substances  in  themselves;  and  can  assume 
the  appearance  of  man,  only  as  man  can  assume  this  or  that 
shape;  they  can  assume  the  appearance  or  shape  of  man  as  an 
extrinsic  accident.  However,  their  existence  was  not  actual 
from  all  eternity;  but,  till  God  first  created,  was  a  mere  possi- 
bility. Herein  consists  the  difference  between  God's  being  and 
theirs.  He  has  been  and  is  an  actuality  from  all  eternity,  and 
never  consisted  of  mere  possibility.  Man's  soul  remained  a 
mere  possibility  longer  than  the  angels;  and  Adam  possessed 


92  PSYCHOLOGY 

the  first  human  soul,  that  passed  from  capability  to  actuality 
of  existence.  Another  difference  between  this  human  soul  and 
angelic  spirits  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  never  loses  its  capability 
of  informing  a  material  body,  and  constituting  with  it  a  single 
complete  substance,  man;  though  this  capability  can  remain  for 
a  space  unsatisfied,  as  happens  in  the  interval  between  death 
and  the  resurrection  of  bodies  at  the  last  day.  The  souls  or 
life-principles  of  plants  and  brutes  are  incapable  of  actual  exist- 
ence outside  of  material  bodies.  Their  dependence,  therefore, 
on  matter  is  most  complete,  it  is  intrinsic  as  well  as  extrinsic. 
They  are  simple  substances,  but  not  spiritual.  They  exist  whole 
and  entire  in  each  part  of  the  plant  or  animal,  as  the  case  may 
be ;  but  are  debarred  from  eliciting  a  thought  or  other  spiritual 
operation.  Thus,  their  utter  dependence  on  matter  makes  it 
impossible  for  them  to  actually  exist,  separated  from  the  bodies 
they  inform,  and  is  our  foundation  for  denying  them  immor- 
tality. Their  simplicity  or  freedom  from  parts,  would,  if  not 
interfered  with  by  their  materiality,  ensure  to  them  the  posses- 
sion of  this  rare  quality.  They  are  incorruptible  per  se,  but 
corruptible  per  accidens.  From  this  it  may  be  gathered  that 
the  immortality  of  human  souls  depends  not  so  much  on  their 
simplicity  as  on  their  intrinsic  independence  of  matter.  Souls 
nowise  transcending  the  dignity  of  matter  can  be  communi- 
cated to  effects  by  material  causes.  Hence  we  hold  that  the 
parent-fiower  and  the  parent-animal  give  complete  being  to  their 
offspring. 

Life.  Life  is  substantial  and  accidental.  Here  we  are  most 
concerned  with  accidental.  The  soul's  existence  is  substantial 
life;  its  activity,  manifest  in  thouglit  and  wish,  is  accidental. 
Substantial  life  is  a  substantial  form,  and  therefore  an  incom- 
plete substance,  which  together  with  the  matter,  tree  or  body 
in  brute  and  man,  constitutes  a  single  living  substance.  Life, 
taken  in  a  wider  sense,  and  with  a  marked  shade  of  difference 
in  meaning,  may  be  considered  an  accidental  form,  inasmuch 
as  it  gives  its  essence  and  specific  being  to  every  concrete  and 
individual  act  of  a  living  creature.  Accidental  life  is  actual 
self-motion  or  immanent  action ;  substantial  life,  the  basis  and 
support  of  accidental,  is  mere  capability  or  possibility  of  the 
same.  The  former  is  a  mere  accident,  because  it  simply  modi- 
fies or  limits  an  accident,  such  as  are  all  the  actions  of  plants, 


THESIS  VI  93 

brutes  and  men.  Substantial  life  is  for  things  alive  being 
or  essence ;  accidental  is  superadded  to  the  same,  and  is  resident 
in  every  act  put  or  placed  by  the  living  subject.  Substantial 
life,  therefore,  is  capability  of  self-motion  or  immanent  action, 
accidental  life  is  the  manifestaton  of  this  same  capability  in  ac- 
tion. 

Cannot  pof<sihIy  be  deprived.  The  creature,  who  would  at- 
tempt to  annihilate  a  human  soul,  would  present  as  sorry  an 
appearance  as  the  madman,  who  contemplated  annihilating  the 
universe.  The  one  and  the  other  undertaking  are  the  prodigious 
results  of  a  divine  act,  and  the  Maker  reserves  to  Himself  the 
power  of  annihilation,  or  reduction  to  primitive  nothingness. 
God's  all  embracing  power  reaches  to  every  possible  effect,  and 
appears  to  be  bounded  l)y  only  such  empty  imaginings  as  result 
from  combining  notions  mutually  destructive.  God's  power 
considered  merely'  in  itself  can  accomplish  everything  conceiv- 
able, everything  not  an  intrinsic  contradiction.  But  God's 
power  must  not  be  considered  merely  in  itself.  It  is  essentially 
necessary  always  to  take  into  account  His  other  attributes.  His 
wisdom,  His  Justice,  His  kindness.  These  several  qualities  are 
never  disparaged  by  any  motion  of  God's  omnipotence.  Hence, 
though  the  annihilation  of  a  human  soul  would  result  in  no 
intrinsic  contradiction,  speaking  absolutely,  it  would  neverthe- 
less be  in  palpable  want  of  harmony  with  divine  wisdom,  divine 
justice,  divine  kindness.  Since,  therefore,  God  can  admit  no 
such  want  of  harmony  into  His  works,  we  may  say  with  posi- 
tive assurance  that  the  soul  cannot  possibly  be  deprived  of  life 
or  existence. 

To  save  God's  wisdom  from  flaw  in  the  annihilation  of  a 
soul,  opponents  search  for  motives  sufficient  to  induce  Him  to 
depart  from  a  law,  that  He  manifestly  made  for  Himself  from 
the  beginning.  But  their  search  is  vain.  God  in  destroying 
human  souls  could  consult  neither  His  own  interests  nor  those 
of  souls.  By  their  eternal  preservation  the  divine  glory  will 
be  forever  celebrated  in  hell  as  well  as  in  Heaven.  "Wicked 
souls  would,  of  course,  a  million  times  prefer  to  their  in- 
terminable woe  utter  disappearance  from  the  world  of  being. 
Desire  to  comply  with  this  preference  of  theirs  would  indeed 
be  a  motive,  and  a  strong  motive,  inducing  God  to  annihilate 
them.     But  God  can  yield  to  no  motive,  however  weighty  it 


94  PSY€PIOLOGY 

appears  to  us,  if  that  motive  coll  ides  with  a  higher  duty,  He 
owes  Himself  and  His  divine  attributes.  God's  justice  could 
not  admit  the  influence  of  such  a  motive.  The  wicked  by  a  full 
and  deliberate  choice,  in  direct  and  downright  opposition  to 
God's  will,  have  cleaved  to  sin,  and  only  reap  the  reward  al- 
lotted to  Heaven  to  the  abuse  of  its  benefits  and  graces.  Jus- 
tice calls  for  a  reparation  or  penalty  as  closely  commensurate  as 
possible  with  the  damage  done.  But  the  damage  done  is  in- 
finite in  intensity,  viewing  the  person  wronged,  and  eternal 
in  duration,  looking  into  the  future.  No  creature  can  undergo 
pain  of  infinite  intensity,  but  every  creature  can  suffer  finite 
pains  throughout  eternity.  Hence  it  happens  that  any  punish- 
ment short  of  eternal  hell-fire  would  leave  divine  justice  only 
partially  sated,  and  therefore  no  justice  at  all.  Thus  would 
the  annihilation  of  condemned  souls  defeat  God's  plans,  and 
despoil  Him  of  His  most  dread  attribute. 

Division  —  Four  parts.     I.  Capable  of  existence. 

II.  Capable  of  life. 

III.  Cannot  be  deprived  of  them. 

IV.  Will  live  forever. 

PEOOFS,  I,  II,  III,  IV 

I.  Ontological  Argument.  The  soul,  separated  from  the 
body,  is  of  its  nature  capable  of  existence,  if  it  admits  of  corrup- 
tion neither  essentially  nor  accidentally.  But  the  human  soul 
admits  of  corruption  neither  essentially  nor  accidentally.     Ergo. 

\Yith  regard  to  the  Minor.  Only  beings  made  up  of  physical 
parts  admit  of  corruption  essentially.  The  soul  is  a  simple 
substance.  Only  beings  intrinsically  dependent  on  matter  ad- 
mit of  corruption  accidentally.  The  soul  is  spiritual,  or  a  sub- 
stance intrinsically  independent  of  matter.  N.B.  Proofs  for 
the  soul's  simplicity  and  spirituality  are  contained  in  pre- 
ceding thesis. 

II.  Ontological  Argument.  The  soul  can  of  its  nature  live 
after  separation  from  the  body,  if  able  to  elicit  thoughts  and 
wishes.  But  after  separation  from  tlie  body  it  can  elicit 
thoughts  and  wishes.     Ergo. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.     If  death,  or  separation  from  the 


THESIS  VI  95 

body,  deprived  a  soul  of  its  thinking  and  wishing  faculties, 
or  of  all  objects  apt  to  serve  as  foundations  for  thoughts  and 
wishes,  or  of  every  conceivable  method  of  performing  these 
operations;  then,  in  sooth,  would  it  be  impossible  for  the  soul 
to  live  after  separation  from  the  body.  But  the  faculties,  in- 
tellect and  will,  remain  in  the  separated  soul  whole  and  sound 
as  they  were  before  the  change  of  condition.  Indeed,  as  Cicero 
well  says,  they  put  on  a  new  activit}^  when  released  from  the 
bonds  of  clay  that  before  enveloped  them.  After  death  the 
human  soul  no  longer  exercises  its  vegetative  and  sensitive 
powers;  it  no  longer  helps  the  eye  to  see,  simply  because  the 
body  and  the  eye  are  disappeared  from  its  influence,  simply 
because  growth  and  sensation  are  operations  intrinsically  de- 
pendent on  matter.  But  thought  and  desire  are  operations  pe- 
culiar to  an  agent  in  itself  free  from  all  dependence  on  body-or- 
gans or  matter  of  whatever  kind.  If  this  agent  during  life  on 
earth  seems  to  depend  on  sense  for  the  material  of  its  thoughts, 
this  dependence  is  only  extrinsic,  and  does  not  at  all  enter  into 
its  nature  or  essence.  Organs  are  not  the  cause  of  thought, 
they  are  a  mere  condition.  Vision  is  impossible  without  light, 
but  nobody  ever  thought  light  the  cause  of  vision.  Only  a  fool 
could  be  guilty  of  saying  or  thinking  that  light  sees.  Eain 
and  sunshine  are  necessary  for  vegetation  without  being  its 
causes.  If  mind  and  will  were  organic,  they  would  be  for  the 
organism.  They  are  not  for  the  organism.  Mind  and  will 
cannot  add  an  inch  to  the  man's  stature,  they  cannot  improve 
his  digestion,  or  cure  his  body's  ills.  The  law  still  holds  Chris- 
tian Scientists  for  criminal  neglect. 

Neither  will  objects  be  wanting,  to  give  occupation  to  the 
mind  and  the  will.  God  and  the  angels  never  had  a  body, 
and  yet  the  mine  of  their  intellectual  treasures  is  inexhaustible. 
There  are  in  material  bodies  qualities  that  cannot  be  perceived 
by  the  unaided  senses,  which  can  well  be  perceived  by  the  un- 
aided intellect,  truth,  virtue,  the  whole  world  of  abstractions. 
Grod  Himself  can  furnish  forth  food  for  thought,  commensurate 
only  with  eternity.  The  soul  can  contemplate  itself,  recall  and 
examine  previous  argumentations  and  notions,  heaped  away  dur- 
ing life  on  this  sphere,  and  jealously  preserved  by  intellectual 
memory.  In  the  present  order  of  things,  what  the  eye  never 
sees  the  heart  never  craves  for,  nothing  exists  in  the  intellect 


96  PSYCHOLOGY 

but  what  previously  in  some  shape  or  other  existed  in  the  senses. 
But,  as  is  occasionally  foreshadowed  here  below,  the  heart  shall 
then  long  for  objects  unseen  of  the  eyes,  the  intellect  shall 
ponder  knowledge  far  beyond  the  ken  of  the  senses.  Then  the 
human  soul  shall  adapt  itself  to  a  method  of  knowing  and 
wishing  peculiar  to  the  angels. 

///.  Theistic  Ontological  Argument.  To  lose  existence,  the 
soul  should  have  to  either  corrupt  or  be  annihilated.  But  the 
human  soul  can  neither  corrupt  nor  be  annihilated.     Ergo. 

^Yith  regard  to  the  Minor.  We  have  Just  seen  that  the  soul, 
because  of  its  simplicity  and  spirituality,  admits  of  no  species 
of  corruption,  whether  essential  or  accidental.  It  can  certainly 
be  annihilated  by  no  mere  creature.  Annihilation  is  the  pre- 
rogative of  the  Creator.  Man  can  annihilate  nothing.  He  can 
induce  modifications  into  existences,  but  the  result  of  his  ut- 
most endeavor  is  always  a  change  of  condition,  never  total  de- 
struction. God  alone  is  therefore  equal  to  such  a  task.  No 
atom  is  lost  in  a  tree's  decay.  No  drop  of  water  is  missing  in 
evaporation,  freezing,  passage  from  sea  back  to  sea.  Weight 
of  the  universe  is  the  same  to-day  as  it  was  the  first  day  of 
creation.  Annihilation  and  creation  are  parallel  acts.  It  is 
just  as  easy  to  get  something  from  nothing  as  to  get  nothing 
from  something.  Only  God  can  annihilate.  But  God's  various 
attributes  make  it  quite  impossible  for  Him  to  expend  His 
energies  on  such  an  effect.  His  justice.  His  wisdom,  and  His 
goodness  render  annihilation  of  human  souls  a  manifest  ab- 
surdity. 

IV.  From  St.  Thomas  —  a,  h,  c,  d. 

a.  Theistic  Ontological  Argument.  God,  who  is  the  arti- 
ficer of  nature,  never  withdraws  from  beings  characteristics  be- 
longing to  their  essence.  But  immortality  is  an  essential  char- 
acteristic of  the  soul.     Ergo  the  soul  of  man  will  live  forever. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  It  is  of  the  essence  of  everything 
created,  angels  and  the  human  soul  alone  excepted,  to  undergo 
various  changes,  and  finally  be  resolved  into  constituent  ele- 
ments, or  suffer  corruption.  The  composite  being,  man,  is  no 
exception  to  this  rule.  Unending  duration  would  therefore  be 
for  every  creature,  but  an  angel  and  a  human  soul,  the  with- 
drawal of  a  characteristic  essential  to  it.  Hence  we  contend 
that  the  destructions  and  renewals  everywhere  apparent  in  na- 


THESIS  VI  97 

ture  are  no  arguments  against  our  Major,  but  strong  arguments 
in  its  favor.  Could  God  act  otherwise  than  as  described  in  our 
proof,  He  would  be  a  Maker  inferior  in  point  of  skill  to  many  a 
humble  artisan  we  know.  Such  inferiority  cannot  without  blas- 
phemy be  predicated  of  God. 

6.  Theistic  Teleological  Argument.  Argument  based  on 
man's  natural  craving  for  perfect  happiness,  and  consequently 
for  immortality. 

God  cannot  in  justice  render  it  absolutely  impossible  for  man 
to  satisfy  that  desire  for  perfect  happiness,  implanted  in  him 
by  nature. 

But  if  He  annihilated  the  human  soul.  He  would  render  it 
absolutely  impossible  for  man  to  satisfy  that  desire. 

Ergo  God  cannot  annihilate  the  human  soul. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  A  natural  craving  or  desire  has 
'these  several  marks.  It  has  its  origin  in  human  nature,  not  in 
education,  prejudice,  ignorance,  and  the  like.  It  is  unavoid- 
able, so  much  so  that  no  man  can  escape  its  influence.  It  is 
universal,  not  restricted  to  this  or  that  class  of  men,  this  or 
that  period  of  life,  this  or  that  condition;  but  common  alike  to 
the  whole  race,  to  rich  and  poor,  to  good  and  bad,  to  young  and 
old,  to  slave  and  master.  It  is  widely  different  from  an  ac- 
quired or  accidental  craving,  such  for  instance  as  a  craving 
for  drink,  for  tobacco,  for  sensual  pleasures,  for  intellectual 
wealth.  All  these  lower  cravings  have  for  object  goods  not 
unmixed  with  evil;  but  the  craving  of  which  we  speak  in  our 
proof  has  for  object  unmixed  good,  good  that  repudiates  all 
commerce  with  evil,  good  therefore  that  cannot  be  coupled  with 
the  slightest  chance  of  loss  or  disappearance,  ever-enduring 
good.  If  God  could  render  such  a  desire  absolutely  impossible 
of  fulfilment.  He  could  break  His  promises,  and  could  make  of 
man,  His  noblest  creature  in  the  visible  world,  a  plaything  of 
folly  and  the  laughing-stock  of  the  universe. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  Perfect  happiness  for  man  and 
the  annihilation  of  the  human  soul  are  absolutely  incompatible. 
As  long  as  our  happiness  does  not  tally  with  the  degree  of  which 
we  know  ourselves  capable,  so  long  does  it  fail  of  being  perfect. 
We  know  ourselves  capable  of  happiness  without  end,  and  are 
conscious  of  no  absurdity  when  we  wish  to  be  forever  happy. 
To  use  the  words  of  St.  Thomas,  "Brute  creation  desires  life 


98  PSYICHOLOGY 

and  being  inasmuch  as  tliey  are  a  present  possession,  not  as  a 
lasting  possession,  because  they  are  wholly  ignorant  of  what  ever- 
enduring  life  is.  We,  however,  who  know  well  what  such  exist- 
ence is,  long  for  it  with  a  longing  born  of  nature.  Each  and 
every  creature  has  its  own  natural  measure  of  desire.  In  in- 
tellectual beings,  intellectual  or  abstract  knowledge  is  the  com- 
pletest  measure  of  desire.  In  man,  this  intellectual  knowledge 
reaches  to  a  notion  of  existence  without  end.  Hence  his  as- 
pirations to  immortality.  Our  desires  in  this  matter  are  not 
bounded  by  mere  existence,  but  include  also  the  notion  of  per- 
fect happiness.  This  perfect  happiness  results  from  the  fixed 
union  of  these  three  elements,  absence  of  all  evil,  possession  of 
every  good  compatible  with  our  nature,  unquestionable  security 
against  ever  falling  away  from  this  state  of  blessedness." 

Apart  even  from  this  desire  of  perfect  happiness,  man's 
perfectibility,  his  capacity  for  progress  and  improvement,  in- 
dicates immortality.  He  seeks  truth,  and  life  is  too  short  to 
compass  all  the  truth.  St.  Augustine  says,  "  Quid  enim  fortius 
desiderat  anima  quam  veritatem  ? "  Hence  man's  name,  ani- 
mal curiosum,  the  inquisitive  being.  Nobody  can  be  said  to 
have  acquired  all  knowledge,  to  have  nothing  more  to  learn,  to 
be  beyond  improvement.  Hear  Newton,  "  I  know  not  what  the 
world  will  say  of  my  labors;  but  it  seems  to  me  I  was  like  a 
child  playing  on  the  seashore,  that  finds  now  a  smoother  pebble, 
and  then  a  more  brilliant  shell,  while  the  great  ocean  of  truth 
lay  unexplored  before  me."  Man  is  not  capable  of  infinite  de- 
velopment. He  cannot  grasp  all  trutli  simultaneously,  and  that 
is  limitation  enough.  When  Strauss  insists  on  the  saying,  old 
people  are  done,  old  people  outlive  themselves,  he  may  not  know 
that  he  is  adducing  an  argument  in  our  favor.  These  sayings 
are  declarations  that  the  old  people  left  their  work  incomplete, 
or  went  a  little  way  into  the  other  life.  History  knows  no 
golden  age  realler  than  a  dream.  Man's  imperfectibility  in 
this  life  means  impossibility,  unless  another  life  supplements 
this.  Strauss  sees  in  wasted  seed,  trampled  apples,  lost  fish- 
eggs,  an  argument  against  the  need  of  a  soul's  full  develop- 
ment. But  the  cases  are  different.  Things  material  perish  be- 
fore maturity,  and  this  is  true  of  man  himself;  because  there 
is  not  enough  water,  air,  earth,  to  supjwrt  all.  In  spirit-land 
there  is  no  crowding;  feeding  only  whets  appetite,  and  pro- 


THESIS  VI  99 

motes  health ;  one  man's  accumulation  of  intellectual  wares  beg- 
gars not  another.  It  would  be  a  wonderful  world,  indeed, 
where  no  seed  would  germinate,  where  no  young  apple  would 
develop,  where  no  fish-egg  would  grow  to  maturity.  And  this 
would  be  the  case  with  the  mind,  were  there  no  immortality. 

c.  Theistic  Ethical  Argument.  Argument  drawn  from  the 
moral  order  of  the  universe.  Man  in  pursuit  of  his  end  ought 
to  be  bound  by  a  perfect  moral  necessity  to  follow  the  dictates 
of  right  reason.  But  such  bond  supposes  the  unending  dura- 
tion of  reward  and  punishment.     Ergo. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  God  imposes  on  human  nature 
this  obligation.  His  consummate  holiness  makes  it  absurd  to 
think  that  He  can  be  for  a  moment  indifferent  to  compliance 
and  non-compliance  with  the  duty.  Worldly  rulers  can,  per- 
haps, become  so  remiss  as  to  view  with  equal  pleasure  observance 
and  violation  of  their  laws,  but  God  can  never  descend  to  such 
imperfection. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  If  the  reward  of  the  virtuous  is 
to  cease  after  a  period,  and  the  punishments  of  the  damned  are 
to  have  an  end,  men  would  not  hesitate  long  between  choosing 
the  service  of  God  and  going  over  to  the  camp  of  His  enemy. 
They  would  desert  in  a  body  to  the  devil.  There  is  not,  per- 
haps, on  earth  a  man,  woman  or  child,  who  has  not  already 
experienced,  or  will  not  in  the  near  future  experience,  one  of 
those  ordeals  which  try  the  soul  to  its  utmost.  Saints  and 
sinners  have  presented  to  them  alluring  temptations,  resistance 
to  which  even  bends  the  body  to  the  ground.  Nothing  short  of 
Heaven,  and  an  eternal  Heaven,  can  prevail  on  man  in  some 
circumstances  to  forego  a  present  sinful  gain,  an  enticing  sinful 
pleasure.  In  the  lives  of  the  saints  there  are  recorded  tempta- 
tions, overcome  only  with  closed  eyes  or  hasty  flight.  How 
many  men  would  sacrifice  the  gratification  of  a  passion,  the 
enjoyment  of  an  awfully  vivid  and  awfully  present  pleasure,  if  a 
thousand  years  in  hell  were  the  only  penalty,  if  the  gnawing 
consciousness  of  moral  guilt  were  the  only  consequence?  Few, 
few  indeed.  Even  as  matters  stand,  with  hell  wide  open  be- 
fore them,  pleasure-seekers  whose  passions  cannot  brook  delay, 
rush  over  the  precipice  with  full  deliberation  and  full  assurance 
of  results. 

Eternal  punishment  is,  then,  the  only  sanction  at  all  capable 


100  PSYCHOLOGY 

of  deterring  man  from  breaches  of  the  moral  law.  It  is,  be- 
sides, the  only  penalty  commensurate  with  the  weighty  im- 
portance and  pressing  necessity  of  that  law.  Whoever  dies  in 
sin,  foolishly  casts  himself  into  circumstances  that  leave  him 
an  enemy  to  God,  and  preclude  whatever  chances  he  might  have 
had  before  to  help  himself.  He  is,  therefore,  in  a  state  of  per- 
petual separation  from  God,  and  there  is  no  help  for  it.  God 
Himself  is  powerless  to  change  these  relations,  M'hen  once  the 
period  of  probation  is  over,  and  man  has  readied  the  term  of 
his  earthly  existence.  Justice,  too,  whose  claims  God  cannot 
after  death  disregard,  demands  that  between  the  offense  and 
the  punishment  as  perfect  as  possible  a  proportion  have  place. 
The  malice  of  sin  is  so  heinous  that  malice  more  heinous  can- 
not be  conceived.  Its  punishment,  therefore,  should  be  the 
most  painful  that  can  be  pictured.  Man's  nature  is  finite,  and 
cannot  suffer  pain  of  infinite  intensity.  The  only  particular  in 
which  he  partakes  of  the  infinite,  is  the  unending  duration  of 
his  soul.  Nothing,  then,  remains  for  the  lawmaker  to  do  but 
inflict  on  His  rebellious  subject  woes  of  finite  iutensit}^  of 
infinite  or  eternal  duration. 

d.  Consent  Argument.  Argument  drawn  from  the  universal 
consent  of  mankind.  A  judgment,  taking  its  rise  in  rational 
nature  as  such,  cannot  be  affected  with  error.  But  our  judg- 
ment concerning  the  immortality  of  the  soul  is  such.     Ergo. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  This  first  premiss  cannot  be 
denied  without  making  God,  the  artificer  of  nature,  a  most  way- 
ward tyrant  and  a  most  inartistic  Maker. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  In  the  Minor  we  simply  main- 
tain that  our  judgment  concerning  immortality  has  all  the 
elements  of  what  was  described  in  Major  Logic  as  a  judgment 
ratified  by  the  common  consent  of  mankind.  The  four  elements 
there  specified  and  their  discussion  follow.  (1)  A  claim  to 
universality,  to  long  duration  and  unchangeableness,  as  well 
among  the  ruder  as  among  the  more  civilized  nations.  During 
all  ages,  and  among  all  peoples  the  immortality  of  the  soul  has 
been  considered  a  truth  beyond  all  question.  Variations  have 
occurred  in  the  kind  of  life  awaiting  the  soul,  but  these  varia- 
tions little  affect  the  main  point  at  issue,  the  fact.  (2)  A 
claim  to  exact  agreement  with  all  the  rules  of  right  reason. 
This  claim  we  made  good  in  preceding  remarks.     (3)   A  claim 


THESIS  VI  101 

to  absolute  freedom  from  any  such  cause  as  prejudice,  ig- 
norance, and  the  like.  Its  universality  is  sufficient  guarantee 
for  this  claim.  Education,  prejudice  and  ignorance  are  not  so 
widespread  in  their  influence.  Education  cannot  overcome  na- 
ture; and,  in  the  hypothesis  of  our  opponents,  immortality 
would  be  against  nature.  "  ISTaturam  expellas  furca,  tamen 
usque  redibit."  (4)  Inculcation  of  moral  and  social  truths 
exclusively,  not  of  scientific  truths,  such  as  the  earth  moves, 
the  sun  stands  still. 

Belief  in  immortality  is  too  solidly  established  a  historical 
fact  to  be  overthrown  by  scoffers  at  religion  and  things  holy. 
Monuments  raised  to  the  memory  of  departed  friends,  funeral- 
rites,  sacrifices,  pretended  and  real  communication  with  the 
dead,  all  are  standing  proofs  of  nature's  promptings  in  the  mat- 
ter. With  certain  tribes,  wives  were  burned  alive  to  accom- 
pany their  husbands  to  the  other  world.  Slaves  were  killed  to 
serve  their  dead  masters.  Feasts  were  set  to  celebrate  their 
happiness.  Tombs  in  Egypt  were  meant  for  enduring  mansions 
or  palaces.  Inscriptions  congratulate  the  dead  on  their  entry 
into  peace  and  blessedness.  Only  a  few  select  passages  bearing 
immediately  on  the  subject  were  set  down  at  the  beginning  of 
our  remarks.  No  one  book  could  contain  the  unnumbered 
tributes  paid  this  world-old  belief  by  historians,  philosophers, 
and  poets.  This  historical  fact  has  also  peculiarities  of  its 
own,  that  commend  it  particularly  to  credit.  In  spite  of  the 
errors  and  mistakes,  with  which  the  belief  is  mixed  up,  espe- 
cially among  ruder  peoples;  in  spite  of  the  obscurity,  that  in 
earlier  ages  enveloped  it;  in  spite  of  the  seemingly  contradic- 
tory views  taken  of  the  circumstances  attendant  on  future  ex- 
istence; about  future  existence  itself  the  persuasion  has  ever 
been  deep-rooted  and  unshaken.  Skeptics  have  labored  hard 
to  eradicate  it  from  among  men,  the  wicked  have  striven  to 
prove  it  a  bugbear;  but  the  more  their  flimsy  arguments  were 
multiplied,  and  the  deeper  the  search  instituted,  the  purer  and 
stronger  grew  the  unanimity  of  mankind.  The  senses  are  dead 
set  against  immortality;  passion  is  dead  set  against  it;  high- 
handed oppression  is  dead  set  against  it.  It  is,  therefore,  vain 
to  compare  this  belief  with  the  long  since  exploded  theory  about 
the  motion  of  the  sun  and  the  fixity  of  the  earth.  What  booted 
it  to  the  senses,  or  the  passions,  or  sin,  whether  the  earth  moved 


102  PSYCHOLOGY 

or  stood  still?     The  whole  social  fabric  depends  for  its  per- 
manency on  this  single  dogma  of  immortality. 

PEINCIPLES 

A.  A  word  has  been  already  said  about  God's  omnipotence 
with  reference  to  annihilation  of  human  souls.  To  repeat,  it 
is  plain  that,  absolutely  speaking,  God  has  power  sufficient  to 
end  a  soul's  existence.  In  fact,  mere  refusal  of  cooperation 
on  the  part  of  God  would  work  the  soul's  destruction.  But  the 
question  here  is  not  so  much  what  God  can  do  in  the  abstract, 
but  what  He  will  do  in  the  concrete.  He  has  clearly  enough 
made  known  His  intentions;  and,  in  connection  with  His  other 
attributes,  He  will  not,  and  cannot  annihilate  human  souls. 

B.  When  the  soul  leaves  the  body,  a  form  is  removed  from 
its  matter,  and  begins  an  existence  peculiar  to  itself.  This 
peculiar  existence  is  entirely  natural,  due  to  the  human  soul's 
very  nature.  The  case,  then,  is  altogether  different  from  that 
urged  by  opponents,  when  they  say  that  a  form  cannot  exist 
apart  from  its  matter  without  experiencing  a  condition  of  vio- 
lence, wholly  inconsistent  with  nature.  Forms  intrinsically  de- 
pendent on  matter  cannot  exist  apart  from  matter;  but  forms 
like  the  human  soul,  intrinsically  independent  of  matter,  can 
readily  enough  exist  and  act  without  the  help  of  matter.  Sepa- 
ration becomes  highly  natural  and  expedient,  when  the  diseased 
or  maimed  body  ceases  to  be  a  fit  dwelling  place  for  the  soul. 
Union  with  the  body  is  natural  to  the  soul  in  our  present  con- 
dition. Change  of  condition  calls  for  change  in  natural  mode 
of  existence.  One  being  can  have  several  natural  modes  of 
existence,  as  is  evident  in  caterpillar,  pupa  and  butterfly. 
Separation  is  just  as  natural  to  the  soul  as  union,  though  union 
is  more  perfect,  because  the  soul  can  then  exercise  all  three  of 
its  functions.  A  separate  soul  loses  in  extent  of  activity,  to 
grow  in  intensity.  The  butterfly  is  more  a  thing  of  beauty 
than  the  caterpillar  or  pupa.  The  soul's  activity  is  less,  inas- 
much as  it  fails  of  growth  and  sensation;  but  incomparably 
greater,  inasmuch  as  it  enjoys  unhampered  use  of  its  intel- 
lectual strength. 

C.  Notwithstanding  the  certainty  that  a  future  eternity  is 
ahead,  man  cannot  but  meet  death  with  pain,  discomfort  and 


THESIS  VI  103 

anxiety.  It  is  a  violent  rending  of  soul  from  body,  a  penalty 
for  original  sin ;  and  was  therefore  meant  by  God  to  be  ac- 
companied by  disagreeable  symptoms.  But  the  bitterest  pang 
attaching  to  death,  is  not  the  bodily  torture,  but  the  mental  un- 
certainty about  the  sort  of  future  in  store  for  the  departing 
soul;  and,  if  it  was  during  life  addicted  to  sin,  the  utter  aban- 
donment of  all  the  old  haunts  of  pleasure.  Saints,  conscious 
of  duty  done  and  unstained  innocence,  the  pledges  of  a  glori- 
ous immortality,  go  out  to  meet  death  with  little  or  no  concern ; 
they  often  hail  it  with  joy.  The  fear  attendant  on  dissolution 
has  its  origin,  not  in  uncertainty  about  life  beyond  the  grave, 
but  in  uncertainty  about  the  kind  of  destiny  the  soul  has  worked 
out  for  herself.  This  dread  uncertainty  is  on  occasions  vivid 
enough  to  make  even  men  of  God  tremble.  What  must  its  ter- 
rors be  for  half-hearted  Christians,  for  out-and-out  reprobates! 

D.  Strauss  argues :  A  finite  being  is  in  naught  infinite. 
Ergo.  Answer:  Immortality  like  the  soul's  is  not  infinite,  be- 
cause it  had  a  beginning  and  is  communicated  by  another. 
The  soul  can  never  say.  Now  I  have  lived  an  infinitely  long 
time.  St.  Thomas  answered  Strauss  700  years  ago,  De  Anima, 
a.  14,  n.  4. 

E.  Biedermann  says:  Whatever  originates  in  time,  must 
also  pass  away  in  time.  Ergo.  Answer:  It  can  cease  in  time. 
Whether  it  will  or  not,  depends  on  the  good  pleasure  of  its 
creator;  and  we  know  His  pleasure  from  the  soul's  spirituality 
and  its  aspirations.     St.  Thomas  again,  1,  Q.,  75,  a.  6,  n.  2. 

F.  Strauss  denominates  our  argument  an  arbitrary  reverie; 
a  mere  assertion;  empty  babble,  called  by  the  honest  a  prevari- 
cation. He  that  does  not  inflate  himself  knows  the  finiteness 
of  his  nature,  and  infinite  duration  terrifies  him.  Answer: 
Immortality  is  not  infinite  duration.  Honest  men,  with 
Strauss  and  with  Materialists  in  general,  are  civilized  apes; 
and  he  forgets  the  long  record  of  the  past.  It  is  good  to  be 
humble;  but  to  have  lower  aims  than  those  set  for  us  by 
nature,  is  not  modesty;  it  is  hypocrisy  mixed  with  cowardice. 
Immortality  frightens  only  the  reprobate,  it  has  no  terrors  for 
the  just.     Sinners  dread,  not  long  duration,  but  hell. 

G.  The  Jews  knew  nothing  about  immortality.  Witness 
Eccles.  3.19.  "  The  death  of  men  and  beasts  is  one."  An- 
swer:   Preacher  is  showing  vanity  of  the  world.     In  things 


104  PSYCHOLOGY 

material,  food,  clothing,  wealth,  the  death  of  men  and  beasts 
is  one.  The  Jews  were  stout  believers  in  immortality,  and 
needed  no  reminder.     Even  the  Egyptians  believed  it. 

//.  Philosophers  have  denied  immortality.  P]rgo.  Answer: 
Man's  will  is  free  and  influences  his  statements.  Denial  seems 
better  to  the  immoral;  and,  therefore,  sways  their  judgment 
and  will. 

/.  Whole  nations  have  made  mistakes  in  this  matter.  No 
two  agree  in  their  conception  of  a  future  life.  Ergo.  Answer: 
Their  mistakes  turn  on  the  manner  of  immortality,  not  on  the 
fact. 

J.  Souls  alike  in  origin  and  subsequent  duration  are  prob- 
ably alike  in  finish.  But  man's  soul,  like  the  souls  of  plant 
and  brute,  begins  in  matter,  and  elicits  vegetative  and  sensitive 
operations.  Ergo,  like  souls  of  plant  and  brute,  man's  soul  is 
mortal.  Answer:  Man's  soul  has  its  origin  in  creation,  and 
along  with  vegetation  and  sensation  it  enjoys  intellectual  ac- 
tivity.    Ergo  it  ought  to  be  different  in  finish,  or  immortal. 

K.  Souls  differ  in  degree  of  mentality;  but  these  variations 
are  no  sign  of  possible  dissolution,  because  they  are  rooted  not 
in  the  soul's  substance,  but  in  organs  the  soul  employs.  Sub- 
stantially all  souls  are  of  the  same  perfection. 

L.  In  this  life,  the  soul  cannot  think  without  phantasms; 
but  in  a  higher  life  God  can  and  will  supply  the  place  of 
phantasms.  Actual  vegetation  and  sensation  disappear,  poten- 
tial remain ;  and  they  are  not  the  soul's  single  activity. 

M.  Erroneous  consent  regarding  the  sun's  motion  was  a 
scientific  judgment,  not  moral  or  natural;  and,  being  a  mere 
hypothesis,  was  far  from  firm.  Sanction  in  another  life  is 
per  se  sufficient  to  safeguard  morality;  by  accident,  and  on 
account  of  free  will,  it  sometimes  fails  of  this  effect.  History 
proves  the  natural  consequences  of  insuffieient  sanction.  Men 
are  content  with  the  goods  of  this  life  because  of  their  animal 
nature.  They  dread  death,  not  because  insecure  about  immor- 
tality, but  about  a  happy  immortality.  The  desire  a  young 
man  has  to  reach  old  age  is  natural  in  another  way,  dependent 
on  free  will. 

N.  Kant  argues:  The  soul  weakens  with  the  organism. 
Ergo.  Answer:  It  weakens,  not  in  substance,  but  in  applica- 
tion of  its  powers ;  and  this  means  extrinsic  dependence. 


THESIS  VI  105 

0.  The  separated  soul  is  the  body's  form  in  potency,  not 
actually. 

P.  The  soul's  being  is  the  body's  being,  and  something 
more,  namely  being  proper  to  it  as  a  spirit. 

Q.  Immortality  is  no  incentive  to  selfishness,  because  God, 
not  self,  is  man's  last  end. 

R.  As  a  contingent  being,  the  soul  tends  towards  nothing 
negatively,  not  positively.  It  needs  conservation  on  the  part 
of  God, 

>S^.     The  wicked  desire  not  annihilation,  but  surcease  of  pain. 

T.  Eternal  punishment  is  just,  and  not  opposed  to  the 
mercy  of  God. 

TJ.  Desire  of  happiness  is  not  to  be  confounded  with  its 
accomplishment. 

De.  Verworm  and  Immortality 

Columbia  University  lately  harbored  a  distinguished  physi- 
ologist from  the  University  of  Bonn  in  Prussia,  Dr.  Max  Ver- 
worm by  name.  On  October  26,  1910,  with  the  approval,  no 
doubt,  and  encouragement  of  the  University  authorities,  he 
undertook  to  show  a  large  audience,  presumably  made  up  of 
Columbia  students,  that  individual  souls  are  no  more  immor- 
tal than  individual  bodies.  We  venture  to  think  that  many  of 
his  listeners  were  sons  and  daughters  of  devout  Christians, 
who  hardly  know  that  they  are  paying  good  money  of  the  re- 
public to  have  their  children's  minds  infected  with  the  dead- 
liest brand  of  paganism's  poison.  We  should  hate  to  learn 
that  any  educated  Catholic  sat  the  frivolous  and  impious  lec- 
ture through,  without  raising  his  voice  in  protest.  Certainly, 
the  publicity  given  the  thing  by  the  morning  papers  ought  to 
open  the  eyes  of  Catholic  and  Protestant  parents  alike  to  the 
hellish  enormity  of  entrusting  the  education  of  their  growing 
boys  and  girls  to  advocates  or  abettors  of  a  doctrine,  that  found 
favor  with  only  the  grosser  minds  in  paganism.  The  following 
statements  are  taken  verbatim  from  the  Times'  account  of  the 
lecture,  and  for  purposes  of  convenient  reference  we  number 
them. 

1.  "  The  soul  is  no  more  immortal  than  the  body."  2. 
"  Every  act  of  consciousness  is  intimately  dependent  on  the 
brain."     3.  "  A  complex  phenomenon  ceases  when  a  single  con- 


106  PSYCHOLOGY 

dition  fails."  4.  "  Paralysis  completely  inhibits  conscious- 
ness." 5.  "A  mournful  faith  in  a  future  reward  or  punish- 
ment awakens  fear.  Hell  and  purgatory,  inventions  of  a 
gloomy  fancy,  must  give  place  to  nobler  incentives."  6. 
"  Thought  of  death  ought  not  to  arouse  fear.  Pain  and  fear 
are  physiological  properties.  The  anguish  of  death  would  dis- 
appear. Cowards  fear  death."  7.  "  Causal  view  must  yield 
to  condition-view.  Science  neglects  causes,  to  be  content  with 
conditions.  Vitalism  is  last  example  of  causal  view.  It  pro- 
claimed life  from  life,  till  science  discovered  that  life  can  pro- 
ceed from  death."  8.  "  External  factors  of  life  are  plain,  in- 
ternal factors  are  a  hopeless  complication.  We  do  not  know 
the  exact  chemical  structure  of  a  single  cell.  If  an  engineer 
lacks  but  one  part  of  a  complicated  machine,  he  cannot  put  the 
machine  together.  Hence  we  cannot  make  living  substances 
artificially  in  a  laboratory.  If  we  could  succeed  in  assembling 
internal  and  external  factors,  the  artificial  system  would  live 
like  the  natural  amoeba,  and  eventually  a  human  being  would 
result."  9.  "  Life  is  continual  destruction  and  continual  con- 
struction." 10.  "  Media  vita  in  morte  sumus,  sang  the  monk 
of  St.  Gall."  11.  "All  life  must  die,  and  all  life  is  death." 
12.  "  Dust  thou  art,  and  unto  dust  thou  shalt  return." 

And  now  we  respectfully  submit  to  Materialism's  attention 
the  following  comments.  1.  "  The  soul  is  no  more  immortal 
than  the  body."  There  can  be  no  doubt  regarding  the  body's 
mortality.  Any  graveyard  can  satisfy  the  most  skeptical.  But 
we  presume  to  think  it  quite  within  reason  to  doubt  regarding 
the  soul's  mortality.  Any  one  of  the  arguments  advanced  in 
favor  of  its  immortality,  even  the  arguments  based  on  universal 
belief,  ought  to  be  able  to  pause  the  most  rabid  Materialist,  and 
urge  him  to  at  least  waver  in  his  position.  Nobody  ever  saw 
a  dead  soul;  and,  till  he  sees  the  phenomenon,  a  physiologist 
ought  in  conscience  to  refrain  from  proclaiming  the  soul's 
mortality.  Possibly  man's  soul  dies,  because  it  is  identical  with 
his  body,  or  because  it  is  totally  submerged  in  matter,  like  the 
brute's  soul.  Identity  of  soul  and  body  is  gross  Monism;  and 
in  all  psychology  nothing,  perhaps,  is  easier  to  refute.  Man's 
soul  has  simple  and  spiritual  activities,  that  positively  preclude 
as  thorough  a  dependence  on  matter  as  that  of  the  brute's  soul. 
If  man  is  body  alone,  if  his  soul  is  an  empty  nothing,  there 


THESIS  VI  107 

can  of  course  be  no  question  of  the  soul's  mortality  or  im- 
mortality. In  that  case  man's  soul  is  the  hole  in  a  doughnut, 
and  to  talk  learnedly  about  nothing  ill  becomes  the  wise.  Ma- 
terialists hold  this  opinion,  and  escape  the  whole  difficulty  by 
denying  the  difficulty's  existence.  And  while  on  the  subject,  it 
does  seem  to  me  that  the  Materialist,  though  less  refined 
and  scholarly,  is  more  logical  than  the  Monist.  He  at  least 
sticks  to  his  colors,  and  goes  down  with  a  bad  cause.  And 
there  is  a  certain  amount  of  amiable,  even  if  imprudent,  courage 
in  stupid  perverseness.  To  deny  the  soul's  existence,  hurts 
logic  less  than  to  affirm  its  existence,  and  with  the  same  breath 
dispute  its  immortality.  2.  "  Every  act  of  consciousness  is  in- 
timately dependent  on  the  brain,"  because  of  the  union  at  pres- 
ent in  force  between  the  soul  and  the  body ;  but  this  is  far  from 
denying  that  the  soul  itself  is  intrinsically  independent  of  mat- 
ter, or  spiritual.  Consciousness  is  but  an  act  of  the  soul,  not 
the  soul  itself;  and  for  this  very  reason  a  man  can  be  uncon- 
scious without  being  dead.  An  act  can  cease  to  be,  without 
involving  its  cause's  destruction.  Were  the  soul  consciousness, 
dead  and  unconscious  would  be  synonymous,  a  verdict  that  no 
reputable  physician  would  countenance,  whatever  our  learned 
Doctor  may  say  to  the  contrary.  When  a  person  faints  or 
sleeps,  he  is  not  by  the  very  fact  a  candidate  for  the  under- 
taker. Even  so,  when  the  brain  is  hurt,  and  consciousness  is 
still,  the  soul's  substance  remains  alive  and  intact. 

3.  "  A  complex  phenomenon  ceases,  when  a  single  condition 
fails " ;  and  this  is  no  reason  why  the  cause  of  the  complex 
phenomenon  should  cease,  when  the  phenomenon  itself  ceases, 
or  the  single  condition  fails.  Thought  is  the  complex  phenom- 
enon, brain  is  its  condition,  the  soul  is  its  cause.  Naturally 
enough,  if  the  condition,  or  work  of  the  brain,  is  wanting, 
there  will  be  no  thought;  but  this  is  far  from  proving  that  no 
soul  remains.  Brain  is  to  thought  what  light  is  to  vision,  the 
soul  is  vision  itself,  or  sight.  Naturally  enough,  there  is  no 
seeing  without  light;  but  no  man  ever  yet  thought  himself 
blind  merely  because  he  was  seated  in  a  dark  room.  Turn  out 
the  lights  in  a  hall.  There  is  no  seeing,  though  every  man  in 
the  hall  has  sight ;  and  we  can  satisfy  ourselves  of  this  by  turn- 
ing on  the  lights  again.  Empty  the  hall  of  men,  then  flood  it 
with  light;  and  there  is  no  seeing  as  well  as  no  sight,  because, 


108  PSYCHOLOGY 

though  the  condition  for  seeing  is  verified,  the  cause  of  seeing 
or  the  seer  is  away.  4.  "  Paralysis  completely  inhibits  con- 
sciousness"; but  it  leaves  the  soul  whole  and  sound.  To  in- 
hibit the  act  of  an  agent,  is  not  to  destroy  the  agent  itself. 
For  the  information  of  surface-dabblers  in  philosophy,  we  again 
submit  our  proofs  for  the  soul's  spirituality,  or  intrinsic  inde- 
pendence of  matter  or  brain.  We  gather  the  soul's  nature  from 
wbat  the  soul  can  do,  just  as  we  get  the  measure  of  a  man's 
psychology  from  the  little  he  knows.  The  soul's  activity  is 
basis  for  our  certainty  about  the  soul's  intrinsic  independence 
of  matter.  The  soul,  therefore,  is  spiritual,  because  it  has  sim- 
ple and  spiritual  ideas,  ideas  of  things  that  cannot  react  on  a 
material  organ  like  the  brain.  As  examples  of  such  ideas  we 
instance  those  of  being,  necessity,  possibility,  duty,  honesty,  all 
abstract  and  all  universal  ideas.  Further,  the  mind  has  knowl- 
edge of  material  things  that  will  never  affect  the  agent's  senses. 
It  can  see  a  cause  in  its  effects,  effects  in  their  cause.  It  cor- 
rects the  work  of  the  senses.  In  psychological  reflection  the 
mind  turns  back  on  itself,  and  no  material  faculty  can  perform 
that  trick.  Whatever  effects  of  the  soul  are  patent  to  the  senses, 
fail  when  the  brain  is  hurt,  because  in  this  department  of  its 
activity  the  soul  does  allegiance  to  extrinsic  dependence  on  mat- 
ter. 5.  "  A  mournful  faith  in  a  future  reward  or  punishment 
awakens  fear."  Here  the  professor  passes  from  psychology  to 
ethics;  and  when  a  Materialist  discourses  ethics,  he  is  laying 
down  rules  for  brutes  of  the  field,  ill  at  ease  when  hungry,  con- 
tent when  their  bellies  are  full;  with  no  higher  aspiration  than 
the  ground,  with  no  wider  outlook  than  the  present  hour.  For, 
when  true  to  his  character,  he  must  maintain  tliat  man  is  only 
a  more  perfect  brute,  different  from  the  monkey  in  degree, 
not  in  kind.  If  thought  is  a  secretion  of  tlie  brain,  if  man's 
highest  faculty  is  sense,  he  is  open  to  no  subtler  impression 
than  physical  pleasure  and  physical  pain;  and  bodily  fear 
would  be  as  potent  an  incentive  with  man  as  it  is  with  the  dog 
and  the  horse,  the  lion  and  the  tiger.  It  would  be  as  arrant 
nonsense  to  talk  to  man  of  nobler  motives,  as  to  talk  to  dog 
or  cat  of  decency.  Nobility  is  a  spiritual  and  abstract  reality; 
and,  appealing  to  no  organic  faculty,  is  eminently  useless  in 
the  case  of  brutes.  For  this  reason  the  trainer  of  a  lion  carries 
a  sharp  pointed  instrument,  the  driver  of  a  horse  carries  a 


THESIS  VI  109 

whip ;  and  both  are  abundantly  supplied  with  lumps  of  sugar. 
The  prod  and  the  whip  awaken  physical  pain,  the  sugar  awakens 
physical  pleasure. 

But  anon  the  Materialist  forgets  his  part  in  tlie  play,  and 
slips  the  garb  of  a  motley  jester,  to  don  the  robes  of  a  wise 
philosopher.  Then  he  talks  of  fear  as  an  unworthy  motive, 
and  eulogizes  what  he  styles  with  unctuous  severity  nobler  in- 
centives to  virtuous  conduct.  Fear  is  not  by  half  the  weak  and 
ignoble  incentive  our  friend  paints  it.  One  wiser  than  the 
professor  from  Bonn,  is  authority  for  the  statement,  that  the 
fear  of  the  Lord  is  the  beginning  of  wisdom.  Faith  in  a  fu- 
ture reward  is  hardly  mournful.  The  crape  belongs  with  more 
right  to  Dr.  Verworm's  certainty  about  future  nothingness. 
Faith  in  a  future  punishment  is  mournful  only  in  the  case  of 
such  as  take  no  precautions  to  avoid  it.  Hell  and  purgatory 
are  no  inventions  of  a  gloomy  fancy.  They  are  facts  backed 
up  with  the  undoubted  word  of  God,  and  unprejudiced  minds 
lean  their  way  at  the  instigation  of  naked  reason.  Eeason  itself 
is  prejudiced  in  favor  of  liell  and  purgatory,  ancient  literature 
is  our  warrant  for  the  statement;  and  on  this  account  revela- 
tion encounters  small  difficulty  when  it  clamors  for  a  hearing 
on  these  topics. 

We  further  venture  to  suggest  that  two  motives  or  incentives 
to  moral  conduct  are  better  than  one,  particularly  when  the 
one  selected  is  the  weaker  of  the  two.  The  Doctor  in  the  heat 
of  argument  makes  the  usual  mistake  of  thinking  that  believers 
in  hell  and  purgatory  altogether  despise  and  neglect  approval 
of  conscience  and  remorse,  the  esteem  and  contempt  of  their 
fellows.  We  beg  leave  to  assure  him  that  we  are  just  as  much 
sticklers  for  respectability  as  himself,  and  we  court  everybody's 
and  our  own  applause;  but,  in  the  impossible  supposition  of 
future  annihilation,  we  hardly  know  whether  we  should  welcome 
the  pangs  of  self-denial,  honest  poverty,  and  life  along  the  hard 
lines  of  the  Ten  Commandments,  rather  than  risk  a  rebuff  from 
conscience,  sink  in  our  own  consideration,  or  expose  ourselves 
to  the  remote  danger  of  discovery  by  the  neighbor.  In  the 
hypothesis  of  the  Doctor,  thought  of  death  ought  not  to  arouse 
fear;  it  ought  to  arouse  despair,  as  it  regularly  does.  In  our 
hypothesis,  thought  of  death  ought  to  excite  unease,  because 
separation  is  not,  in  one  sense,  the  soul's  natural  condition;  it 


no  PSYCHOLOGY 

ought  to  excite  anxiety  and  fear,  because  nobody  is  certain 
whether  he  is  worthy  of  love  or  of  hatred.  It  may  not  be 
known  to  the  professor  tliat,  in  the  case  of  believers,  death  stirs 
less  fear  in  the  virtuous  than  in  the  wicked;  and  the  circum- 
stance is  an  indication  that  the  dying  dread  not  so  much  death 
as  the  future  lot  awaiting  them.  Suarez,  a  rascal  Jesuit,  from 
whom  the  Doctor  could  learn  a  vast  deal  of  philosophy,  died 
with  these  words  on  his  lips :  "  I  did  not  know  it  was  so  sweet 
to  die."  Whether  pain  and  fear  are  physiological  or  psycho- 
logical properties,  makes  small  difference  regarding  the  matter 
in  hand;  but  the  Doctor  can  rest  satisfied  that  the  anguish  of 
death  will  never  altogether  disappear,  and  that  Materialism 
is  the  most  hopeless  remedy  in  the  world  for  the  disease's 
cure. 

6.  If  Dr.  Verworm  wants  to  meet  death  like  a  man,  and  not 
like  a  dumb  animal,  let  him  shake  off  his  prejudices,  study 
himself  into  the  phase  of  mind  regarding  immortality,  adopted 
by  the  wisest  and  noblest  men  in  all  history,  and  then  soberly 
set  to  work  along  the  surest  path  to  a  happy  eternity,  a  life  of 
faith,  religion,  and  uniform  virtue.  Animals  have  no  dread  of 
death,  because  they  know  nothing  beyond  the  present  life. 
With  the  lielp  of  chloroform,  or  strong  drink,  or  the  stupefying 
principles  of  Materialism,  men  sometimes  approach  death  with 
all  the  dull  indifference  of  dumb  animals.  But  their  lot  is  not 
to  be  envied;  and  an  ounce  of  the  right  kind  of  cowardice  is 
worth  more  than  a  ton  of  the  wrong  kind  of  courage.  It  is 
the  old  story  of  the  goat  that  stood  on  the  track,  to  dispute 
right  of  way  with  the  locomotive.  The  goat's  owner,  happen- 
ing on  his  remains,  dismissed  the  incident  with  the  remark 
that  his  goat  had  a  powerful  lot  of  courage  with  a  plentiful  lack 
of  prudence.  In  this  case  the  goat  were  better  a  live  coward 
than  a  brave  carcass.  We  invite  the  professor  to  leave  his  shop 
a  while,  throw  himself  into  a  meditative  mood,  and  calmly 
analyze,  not  nerves  and  muscles,  but  emotions.  He  will  find 
that,  after  all,  courage,  like  despair,  is  only  a  species  of  fear. 
Fear  is  reaction  against  impending  evil.  When  tlie  impending 
evil  wears  the  aspect  of  avoidability  or  possible  escape,  fear 
becomes  courage;  when  it  seems  inevitable  and  beyond  perad- 
venture  certain,  fear  becomes  despair.  Neither  the  Materialist 
nor  the  Christian  can  escape  death,  or  whatever  evil  the  sad 


THESIS  VI  111 

fact  contains.  The  Christian  however  feels  that  with  God's 
grace  he  can  still  escape  the  evil  consequences  attendant  on 
death  in  sin,  or  an  eternal  hell;  and  so  he  welcomes  the  end 
with  courage.  The  Materialist  can  look  forward  to  nothing 
more  pleasant  than  blank  nothingness,  with  a  suspicion  of  some- 
thing worse;  and  so  despair  is  his  lot.  Be  wise  unto  sobriety, 
not  unto  destruction. 

7.  The  Doctor  is  back  to  philosophy,  when  he  tells  us 
that  the  causal  view  must  yield  to  the  condition-view;  and, 
as  usual,  he  is  again  wrong.  Neither  view  must  yield  to 
the  other.  There  is  plenty  of  room  for  the  two  views, 
and  they  must  be  kept  apart.  The  condition-view  is  peculiar 
to  science;  and  we  have  no  desire  to  do  robbery.  The  causal 
view  belongs  to  philosophy;  and,  as  physiology  is  the  science 
of  life,  psychology  is  the  philosophy  of  the  soul.  Science  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  last  causes  of  things  or  their  essences. 
Berthelot,  Pasteur,  Bernard,  and  others  too  numerous  to  men- 
tion, make  wise  acknowledgment  of  the  thing;  its  business  is 
entirely  with  positive  facts  and  their  mutual  relations.  And 
the  sooner  scientifists  wake  up  to  this  sober  truth,  the  better. 
When  science  tells  us  that  brain  is  a  condition  of  thought,  it  is 
venturing  information  it  can  well  be  supposed  to  have;  and  we 
accept  its  authority;  but  when  it  goes  farther  and  proclaims 
brain  the  cause  of  thought,  it  is  away  from  home,  on  forbidden 
ground,  and  deserves  about  as  much  credit  as  a  ditcher  dis- 
coursing on  high  art.  Science  ought  to  neglect  causes,  without 
denying  them ;  and  it  ought  to  be  content  with  conditions,  with- 
out confounding  them  with  causes.  To  deny  a  thing  is  a  rather 
strange  way  to  neglect  it.  Whether  vitalism  is  a  first,  inter- 
mediate, or  last  example  of  the  causal  view,  it  is  enough  for 
us  to  know  that  vitalism,  or  the  doctrine  that  life  proceeds  from 
life  alone,  is  come  to  stay,  and  is  surer  now  than  it  was  when 
science  was  in  its  infancy.  Science  has  actually  strengthened 
instead  of  weakening  the  position  of  vitalists.  The  ancients 
and  old  Scholastics  were  somewhat  staggered  by  the  bogie  of 
spontaneous  generation,  till  modern  science,  in  the  person  of 
Pasteur,  clearly  proved  that  seemingly  spontaneous  life  actually 
proceeded  from  preexistent  germs.  Science  can  examine  till  it 
grows  blind,  it  will  never  discover  that  life  actually  proceeds 
from  death;  and  when  science  gets  away  from  facts,  to  talk 


112  PSYCHOLOGY 

about  possibilities,  it  deserves  no  attention.     It  is  for  philoso- 
phy, not  for  science,  to  talk  about  possibilities. 

8.  The  professor's  division  of  life-factors  into  external  and 
internal  has  the  merit  of  sounding  erudite,  though  factors  with 
him  are  a  jumble  of  conditions  and  causes.  His  admission  that 
the  internal  factors  are  a  liopeless  complication,  is  a  tribute  to 
the  man's  modesty,  and  almost  tempts  us  to  think  that  his  case 
is  not  quite  so  hopeless  as  the  complication.  But  in  the  next 
breath  he  makes  bold  to  deny  what  leaders  in  his  own  chosen 
study  seem  ready  to  grant.  He  says  that  we  do  not  know  the 
exact  chemical  structure  of  a  single  cell,  the  quantitative  re- 
lations of  its  substances,  their  positions  in  space  and  the  like; 
whereas  Liebig  and  others  assert  the  contrary.  In  fact  it 
would  be  but  an  imperfect  kind  of  chemistry  and  physiology 
that  failed  of  knowing  these  several  items.  All  the  chemical 
and  physical  forces  of  an  egg  can  be  determined  with  exactness, 
we  can  blend  them  in  accurate  proportions,  positions  and  con- 
ditions, without  ever  producing  an  egg  able  to  hatch  even  a 
tadpole.  The  one  internal  factor  or  cause,  that  escapes  capture 
and  defies  science,  is  the  principle  of  life  or  the  soul,  con- 
tended for  by  the  Scholastics;  and  recalcitrants  are  rapidly 
coming  over  to  their  camp,  acknowledging  that  the  attempt  to 
assemble  elements  with  a  view  to  obtaining  life  is  a  hopeless 
undertaking.  Hence  we  cannot  make  living  substances  arti- 
ficially in  a  laboratory,  and  the  task  promises  to  remain  an 
impossibility  for  all  time. 

The  Doctor's  illustration  of  an  engineer,  unable  to  put  a 
complicated  machine  together,  because  he  lacks  one  of  its  parts, 
is  but  a  lame  subterfuge.  If  the  engineer  knew  his  business, 
he  would  not  be  long  discovering  the  missing  piece,  or  inventing 
a  substitute,  or  acknowledging  the  machine  an  impossibility.  If 
he  afterwards  found  that  another  workman,  by  assembling  the 
same  parts,  under  the  same  conditions,  produced  a  machine  in 
full  operation,  he  would  at  once  suspect  a  hidden  agency,  a 
motor  perhaps  in  the  cellar;  and  he  would  take  no  rest  till  he 
solved  the  problem.  Scientists  are  puzzling  their  heads  over 
the  egg  and  its  contents,  chemical  and  physical,  without  being 
able  to  hatch  even  a  tadpole.  A  healthy  hen  can  without  much 
ado  produce  a  chick  from  an  egg  of  her  own  making.  Scientists 
therefore  ought  to  suspect  in  the  hen  and  the  egg  a  hidden 


THESIS  VI  113 

agency,  distinct  from  chemical  and  physical  forces,  a  principle 
of  life,  the  soul  contended  for  by  Scholastics.  Otlierwise,  they 
have  on  their  hands  a  fact  that  admits  of  no  explanation. 

9.  When  the  professor  says  that  life  is  continual  destruc- 
tion and  continual  construction,  he  is  only  repeating  the  mistake 
made  by  Comte  and  other  positivists,  who  cannot  see  beyond 
their  noses;  and  like  a  woful  blunderer  he  hopelessly  mixes 
causes  and  effects.  Life  is  the  principle  or  cause  of  continual 
destruction  and  continued  construction,  not  the  destruction  and 
construction  themselves.  To  hold  his  manner  of  talk  is  about 
as  sensible  as  to  say  that  the  candle,  or  gas,  or  electricity  is 
light,  and  that  the  man  is  the  house  he  builds. 

10.  The  monk  of  St.  Gall,  responsible  for  the  touchingly 
beautiful  expression,  "  Media  vita  in  morte  sumus,"  knew  well 
what  he  was  saying,  though  his  materialistic  interpreter  alto- 
gether misses  his  meaning.  The  monastery  were  no  place  for 
him,  unless  he  believed  in  the  immortality  of  the  soul;  and  he 
held  meditative  discourse  on  the  death  of  his  body,  not  on 
the  death  of  his  soul. 

11.  All  life  intrinsically  dependent  on  matter  or  bodily  or- 
gans must  die;  the  soul  of  man,  because  intrinsically  inde- 
pendent of  matter,  can  live  forever,  and  because  of  teleological 
as  well  as  ethical  reasons  must  live  forever. 

12.  Let  the  poet  answer  his  last  fling,  "  Dust  thou  art,  to  dust 
returnest,  Was  not  spoken  of  the  soul."  If  he  sets  small  or  no 
store  by  poetry,  let  him  turn  to  the  second  chapter  of  Genesis, 
the  only  authentic  record  we  have  of  man's  creation,  and  he 
will  find,  perhaps,  to  his  surprise,  that  the  body  of  Adam,  not 
his  soul,  was  made  of  dust.  "  And  the  Lord  God  formed 
man  of  the  slime  of  the  earth;  and  breathed  into  his  face  the 
breath  of  life,  and  man  became  a  living  soul." 

We  have  been  too  busy  with  immortality's  critic  to  urge  in 
detail  philosophy's  solid  arguments  for  unwavering  certainty 
in  this  dogma  of  the  ages.  We  have  been  answering  objections, 
and  it  is  hard  to  tear  down  and  build  up  with  the  same  hand. 
In  our  thesis  we  made  good  all  our  claims,  and  set  immortality 
on  a  basis  that  cannot  be  shaken  by  feather-weights  in  the 
arena  of  controversy.  We  cannot  close  without  recalling  an  in- 
cident that  had  place  in  Brooklyn,  New  York,  soon  after  the 
publication  of  Dr.  Verworm's  views  in  the  New  York  Times. 


114  PSYCHOLOGY 

The  same  paper  is  responsible  for  the  story.  A  reverend  gentle- 
man, Mercer,  by  name,  undertook  to  enlighten  some  members 
of  a  Philosophical  Society  in  that  borough,  and  for  his  pains 
was  told  that  he  buncoed  his  audience,  and  that  clergymen  in 
general  deceived  their  congregations  to  keep  their  soft  jobs. 
We  sincerely  pity  the  Rev.  Mr.  Mercer.  It  is  disappointing 
indeed  to  deserve  bouquets,  and  get  the  decayed  growth  of  gar- 
dens. Whatever  it  means  elsewhere,  wanton  abuse  is  not  con- 
sidered in  politer  circles  a  manifestation  of  gratitude  or  a  mark 
of  chivalry.  No  doubt  he  left  the  gathering  a  wiser,  even  if  a 
sadder  man.  The  president  of  the  meeting,  a  Mt.  Rinn, 
vouchsafed  Dr.  Mercer  the  comforting  and  rather  commonplace 
bit  of  information,  that  a  blow  on  the  head  with  a  sledge-ham- 
mer, could  make  him  a  degenerate  and  a  ruffian.  The  Doctor 
might  have  replied  that,  if  the  hammer  applied  to  Mr.  Einn's 
own  head  were  heavy  enough,  it  might  produce  the  same  sad 
result.  He  preferred,  however,  to  be  more  parliamentary,  and 
suavely  dismissed  the  difficulty  with  a  reference  to  Paderewski 
and  a  battered  piano.  The  illustration  is  well  taken.  We 
merely  remark  that  it  could  be  strengthened  by  working  out  the 
figure  thuswise.  As  the  artist,  without  detriment  to  his  ability, 
necessarily  coaxes  poor  music  from  a  cracked  instrument,  on 
which  his  skill  extrinsically  depends;  so  the  soul,  without  harm 
to  its  substance,  is  hindered  of  intellectual  activity,  when  the 
brain,  the  organ  on  which  it  extrinsically  depends,  is  reduced 
to  misshapen  pulp  with  a  hammer. 


THESIS  VII 

The  intellect,  to  understand,  has  need  generally  of  the  im- 
printed intelligible  image,  as  a  determining  principle.  This 
imprinted  intelligible  image  is  the  joint  product  of  a  phantasm 
and  the  worMng  intellect,  acting  as  partial,  efficient,  subordinate 
causes.  The  receiving  intellect  and  this  imprinted  intelligible 
image  so  combine  as  efficient  causes  to  put  the  act  or  idea,  that 
the  idea  in  its  entirety  proceeds  from  both  as  from  subordinate 
causes. 

Maher,  pp.  252-378;  Jouin,  pp.  200-210. 

QUESTION 

The  Origin  of  our  Ideas.  And  now  we  approach  a  mystery, 
the  profoiindest  in  all  psychology.  It  bears  on  the  origin  and 
genesis  of  our  ideas.  That  we  have  ideas  nobody  can  in  reason 
doubt;  but  to  explain  Just  how  they  rise,  is  a  delicate  matter, 
and  calls  for  the  sharpest  kind  of  study.  After  all,  the  heart 
of  the  problem  is  to  know  how  the  mind,  an  altogether  spiritual 
faculty,  equips  itself  with  knowledge  of  material  and  particular 
objects,  to  afterwards  pass  to  universal  ideas;  how  to  get  a 
material  object,  man,  into  a  spiritual  faculty,  there  strip  him 
of  matter,  spiritualize  him,  and  hold  up  to  view  not  this  or  that 
individual  man,  as  he  exists  in  nature,  but  a  peculiar  kind  of 
man,  a  type  representative  of  every  individual  in  the  human 
species. 

Among  the  ancients  no  guide  is  safer  than  Aristotle,  and 
since  his  time  St.  Thomas  Aquinas  is  without  an  equal.  Our 
theory  is  the  joint  product  of  both,  and  cannot  be  far  wrong. 
It  would  be  useless  to  look  for  the  truth  among  modem  writers. 
The  race  of  metaphysicians  is  dead,  and  to  it  has  succeeded  a 
motley  crew  of  biologists,  physiologists,  phrenologists,  electri- 
cians; all  mere  mechanics,  without  a  single  pretense  to  the  re- 
finement of  subtler  thought.  They  can  be  called  empiricists  or 
experimenters.  They  limit  our  knowledge  to  sensation,  and  re- 
us 


116  PSYCHOLOGY 

fuse  to  see  in  man  any  higher  faculty  than  sense.  In  this  con- 
nection they  are  called  Sensists  or  Materialists.  They  have 
involved  and  intricate  ways  of  establishing  the  identity  in  force 
between  thought  and  sensation,  between  operations  of  the  mind 
and  operations  of  the  senses;  but  the  principles  underlying  their 
whole  method  are  too  openly  and  grossly  wrong  to  deserve  at- 
tention. They  virtually  reduce  man  to  the  level  of  a  brute. 
No  essential  difference  has  place  between  one  and  the  other. 
They  differ  only  in  quality  of  sensation.  A  man's  senses  are  a 
little  better  than  a  horse's,  and  that  is  all.  Like  the  brutes, 
men  are  born  to  enjoy  themselves ;  and  they  ought  to  be  content 
if  they  succeed  in  satisfying  their  animal  instincts.  They  are 
subject  to  no  law,  amenable  to  no  penalty,  begin  and  end  with 
this  present  life.  Locke  (1634-1704)  is  the  reputed  father  of 
this  system.  Condillac  (1715-1780),  Comte  (1798-1857)  fol- 
lowed closely  in  his  footsteps ;  and  it  is  safe  to  say  that,  outside 
of  Scholasticism,  all  of  to-day's  philosophy  is  more  or  less  in- 
fected with  the  same  poison.  Sensism,  far  from  undertaking  to 
explain  mind  and  the  origin  of  its  ideas,  attempts  to  destroy 
the  reality  of  both,  and  avoids  the  difficulty  by  refusing  to 
acknowledge  its  existence. 

There  are,  however,  other  wrong  systems  that  have  the  merit 
of  at  least  meeting  the  question  squarely;  and  these  have  a 
claim  on  our  attention.  Chief  among  them  is  Plato's  theory 
of  innate  or  inborn  ideas,  a  theory  that  does  large  credit  to 
the  man's  poetic  genius,  without  adding  to  his  reputation  as  a 
philosopher.  Leibnitz  (1646-1716),  Wolff  (1679-1764),  and 
Kant  (1724-1804),  have  borrowed  to  a  large  or  small  extent 
from  Plato.  Eosmini  (1797-1855),  too,  is  indebted  to  the 
same  master-mind  for  his  method.  Ontologism,  with  Male- 
branche  (1638-1715),  for  founder,  is  another  theory  not  with- 
out its  supporters  even  at  the  present  time.  Traditionalism  is 
another  explanation  ventured  by  a  school  with  a  respectable 
number  of  followers.  We  reserve  for  last  place  the  true  and 
correct  theory,  formulated  by  Aristotle,  adopted  by  St.  Thomas, 
and  by  the  whole  Scholastic  world  with  him. 

According  to  Plato,  souls  before  their  advent  into  the  world 
enjoyed  a  higher  life  among  the  stars.  In  that  superior  air 
they  owned  a  knowledge  due  to  impressions  made  by  their 
Creator.     They  had  ideas  of  every  conceivable  thing.     For  some 


THESIS  VII  117 

unknown  crime  these  souls  were  after  a  term  condemned  to 
unlovely  companionship  with  bodies  as  to  a  prison,  and  hurled 
headlong  from  sky  to  earth.  These  ideas  they  carried  with 
them  to  their  new  home,  and  one  by  one  they  rise  to  view  at 
the  instigation  of  recurrent  sensations.  Hence  all  our  present 
knowledge  is  but  a  grouping  of  old  ideas,  and  to  learn  is  to 
recollect.  Des  Cartes  (1596-1650),  is  accused  of  adopting 
innate  ideas,  but  without  reason.  The  innate  ideas  he  con- 
tends for  are  notions  derived  from  neither  outside  objects  nor 
the  will's  activity,  but  from  the  mind  itself.  However,  many 
of  his  followers  are  amenable  to  the  blame  imputed  to  their 
master.  It  costs  small  trouble  to  refute  Plato's  system.  In- 
nate ideas  are  empty  creations  of  the  fancy  and  have  no  founda- 
tion in  nature.  They  rest  on  the  hypothesis  that  our  souls 
lived  before  our  bodies,  that  the  union  in  force  between  soul 
and  body  is  unnatural  and  a  penalty,  that  there  is  a  sphere  or 
a  planet  where  universals  exist  much  as  individuals  here  on  earth. 
We  certainly  have  no  recollection  of  any  previous  life  lived  by 
the  soul;  union  with  the  body  is  in  such  measure  the  soul's 
natural  condition  that  it  rebels  against  separation,  and  death 
is  on  all  sides  reckoned  a  penalty  or  punishment;  and  our 
universal  ideas  are  easily  gathered  from  individual  objects 
without  the  intervention  of  any  so  extraordinary  a  world.  Eos- 
mini  thinks  that  our  universal  ideas  postulate  the  need  of  at 
least  one  innate  idea,  that  of  being  in  general;  but,  apart  from 
the  fact  that  his  doctrine  is  dangerously  close  to  pantheism,  our 
universal  ideas  are  easily  derived  from  individual  objects  with- 
out tlie  help  of  a  single  innate  idea. 

Ontologism,  though  it  gets  its  name  from  Gioberti  (1801- 
1852),  was  first  mooted  by  Malebranche  (1638-1715).  The 
height  of  its  offending  lies  in  the  circumstance  that  it  ascribes 
the  origin  of  our  ideas  to  immediate  vision  of  God,  We  have 
intuition  of  God,  He  is  absolute  Being,  and  in  Him  we  have 
knowledge  of  all  else.  We  must  maintain,  with  all  good  Catho- 
lics, that  immediate  knowledge  of  God  is  reserved  to  the  next 
life,  and  altogether  impossible  to  mortals.  The  only  knowledge 
of  God  within  present  reach  is  the  kind  deduced  from  the  open 
book  of  creation,  and  therefore  posterior  rather  than  antecedent 
to  our  knowledge  of  created  objects.  Besides,  were  Ontologism 
true,  it  would  seem  to  follow  that,  as  we  know  everything  in 


118  PSYCHOLOGY 

God,  we  likewise  wish  everything  in  God,  and  all  the  movements 
of  a  man's  will  would  be  honorable  and  in  strict  accord  with 
morality.  The  end  of  the  story  would  be  inability  to  sin,  and 
the  removal  of  everything  like  an  essential  difference  between 
good  and  bad,  right  and  wrong.  Further,  Ontologism  furnishes 
a  stout  defense  to  Deism,  Indifferentism  and  Rationalism.  If 
the  mind  sees  everything  in  God,  and  if  it  fails  of  the  truths 
presented  for  belief  by  revelation,  these  so-called  truths  have 
no  reality,  and  revelation  amounts  to  just  nothing.  No  truth 
would  be  absolutely  beyond  the  reach  of  reason,  and  all  need 
of  supernatural  revelation  would  be  at  an  end.  Pantheism  like- 
wise has  an  ally  in  Ontologism.  It  derives  the  mind's  activity 
from  the  soul's  close  union  with  God.  If  things  are  knowable 
only  in  God,  they  have  their  being,  not  in  themselves,  but  in 
God  alone.  In  what  measure  a  thing  is,  in  that  measure  is  it 
understood,  and  vice-versa.  The  expression,  man  is  being, 
would  seem  to  mean,  man  is  the  absolute  being  within  certain 
bounds  and  limits,  a  particle  of  God. 

Traditionalism  has  DeBonald  (1754—1840),  for  author,  with 
Bonnetty  (1798-1879),  and  Ventura  (1792-18G1),  for  cham- 
pions and  exponents.  Its  purpose  is  highly  commendable.  It 
aims  at  tearing  up  Eationalism  by  the  roots,  but  its  wrong 
methods  only  strengthen  the  error  it  attempts  to  destroy.  Ac- 
cording to  its  tenets,  the  mind  left  to  itself  never  rises  higher 
than  knowledge  of  sensible  things;  and  to  frame  universal  and 
abstract  notions,  particularly  in  the  field  of  religion,  morality 
and  politics,  needs  the  help  of  a  higher  mind.  This  higher 
mind  is  the  reason  holding  sway  in  society ;  and  because  society, 
representing  the  garnered  lore  of  ages,  hands  down  or  passes 
on  these  universal  and  abstract  notions  through  the  medium  of 
language,  the  system  is  called  Traditionalism,  and  language  is 
a  large  factor  in  its  economy. 

Here  are  some  of  its  most  manifest  absurdities.  It  is  as  im- 
possible to  think  without  the  help  of  words  as  it  is  to  see  with- 
out light.  Man  is  as  much  able  to  create,  as  he  is  to  discover 
the  truth.  With  the  gift  of  speech,  Adam  got  his  first  ideas 
immediately  from  God.  Against  Traditionalism  we  distinguish 
between  quaestio  juris  and  quaestio  facti.  As  a  matter  of 
possibility  Adam  could  have  formed  language.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  there  are  two  opinions,  1,  language  was  infused  into  Adam 


THESIS  VII  119 

with  knowledge,  2,  language  was  formed  by  Adam  with  help 
from  God.  Traditionalists  maintain  that  the  mind  cannot  be- 
gin to  think  or  continue  thinking  without  instruction  admin- 
istered through  the  agency  of  language,  that  man  is  without  the 
skill  needed  to  formulate  a  language,  or  determine  fixed  signs 
for  his  ideas;  that  primitive  revelation  was  altogether  natural, 
because  an  absolute  necessity  to  man's  mental  activity;  that 
the  mind  is  entirely  passive  in  its  acquisition  of  knowledge ; 
that  faith,  or  the  acceptance  of  truth  with  society  for  single 
authority,  is  the  basis  and  foundation  of  all  philosophy  and 
science.  We  answer:  That  instruction  through  the  medium 
of  language  fails  as  an  explanation  of  the  origin  of  our  ideas, 
must  be  plain  from  the  fact  that  a  child  learns  nothing  when 
told  that  two  sticks  are  of  equal  length,  unless  he  knows  before- 
hand what  equality  and  length  are.  The  same  word  in  differ- 
ent languages  gives  rise  to  different  ideas,  and  different  words 
in  different  languages  give  rise  to  the  same  idea.  A  word  is 
of  no  value  without  previous  knowledge  of  the  idea  it  represents. 
Ideas  are  not  understood  by  means  of  words,  but  words  are 
understood  by  means  of  ideas.  If  our  ideas  have  their  origin 
in  divine  revelation,  every  trace  of  difference  between  natural 
and  supernatural  truths  is  removed.  No  man  can  learn  from 
another,  unless  he  is  able  with  his  own  unaided  strength  to 
grasp  the  truth  proposed,  unless  he  has  ideas  before  he  sits  at 
the  feet  of  his  teacher.  St.  Thomas  says,  "  Sicut  medicus 
causare  dicitur  sanitatem  in  infirmo,  natura  operante ;  ita  etiam 
homo  dicitur  causare  scientiam  in  altero,  operante  ratione  illius; 
et  hoc  est  docere."  "  Every  teacher  is  a  doctor.  Medicine  is 
of  no  avail,  without  a  constitution  to  cooperate  with  it;  and 
teaching  is  of  as  little  avail,  without  a  mind  to  cooperate 
with  it." 

To  know  the  reality  of  God,  only  three  things  are  needed, 
notions  of  being,  cause  and  effect,  and  the  principle  of  causality ; 
a  look  or  a  glance  at  the  world;  and  the  impulse  needed  to  re- 
flect on  the  spectacle,  and  search  out  its  causes.  According  to 
the  saner  Traditionalists  these  three  requisites  are  not  beyond 
the  mind's  native  and  unaided  strength.  Order  is  the  root 
and  origin  of  every  moral  truth,  and  the  mind  is  resourceful 
enough  to  compass  the  notion  of  order  and  its  consequences. 
Religion  therefore  and  morality  are  far  from  demanding  any  so 


120  PSYCHOLOGY 

extraordinar}^  a  help  as  revelation  or  instruction.  While  words 
are  highly  conducive  to  growth  in  knowledge  and  the  accumula- 
tion of  ideas,  they  are  hy  no  means  absolutely  necessary.  To 
understand,  the  mind  is  dependent  on  phantasms,  and  words  are 
the  clearest,  readiest  and  most  flexil)lo  phantasms  at  our  com- 
mand. Because  they  are  easily  retained,  words  are  of  incal- 
culable assistance  to  the  memory.  Words  are  the  most  conveni- 
ent of  symbols,  representing  as  they  do  ideas  of  the  widest 
conceivable  variety.  They  are  the  key  able  to  unlock  the  treas- 
ury of  all  knowledge,  human  and  divine,  gathered  from  every 
side  by  the  learned  at  the  expense  of  great  labor,  committed  by 
God  to  mankind,  and  sent  down  through  the  ages  in  spoken 
and  printed  type.  And  yet,  with  all  their  advantages,  words 
are  not  an  absolute  necessity  to  thought.  We  often  think  of 
things  without  being  able  to  recall  their  names.  On  no  few 
occasions  we  are  driven  to  the  use  of  circumlocutions  and 
roundabout  methods,  simply  because  some  single  word  has 
slipped  the  memory.  At  other  times  our  thoughts  are  so  swift 
that  we  cannot  fit  words  to  them  as  they  rise. 

Dismissing  now  the  futile  attempts  made  by  Sensism,  Platon- 
ism,  Ontologism  and  Traditionalism  to  explain  the  origin  of 
our  ideas,  we  proceed  to  set  forth  and  make  good  the  one  true 
and  correct  theory,  current  among  Scholastics,  borrowed  by 
them  from  Aristotle,  its  first  propounder,  and  St.  Thomas 
Aquinas,  its  eminent  elaborator.  The  intellect  is  indifferent 
to  whatever  ideas,  all  ideas  look  alike  to  it,  it  is  capable  in 
itself  of  thinking  house,  horse  or  man ;  and,  to  elicit  a  thought, 
it  must  pass  from  this  phase  or  condition  of  indifference  to 
determined  and  well  defined  relations  with  some  set  object. 
In  other  words,  the  intellect  has  all  the  power  needed  to  ap- 
prehend whatever  object;  but  this  power  will  never  bear  fruit, 
it  will  never  result  in  a  thought,  unless  some  certain  object 
gets  in  the  way  of  the  intellect,  and,  as  it  were,  restricts  or 
limits  its  attention.  Thus,  a  magnet  is  vested  with  the  capacity 
or  power  needed  to  at^act  or  draw  all  iron;  but  it  will  never, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  draw  or  attract  iron,  unless  some  particular 
piece  of  that  metal  ig  placed  within  the  sphere  of  its  activity. 
Therefore,  the  object  on  which  this  or  that  thought  turns  is 
the  thing  that  holds  the  mind,  determines  it,  restricts  it,  and 
80  gives  its  apprehensive  or  thought-power  a  definite  and  con- 


THESIS  VII  121 

Crete  market  value.  In  this  respect  the  intellect  is  a  passive 
faculty,  inasmuch  as  it  receives  motion  and  influence  from 
another. 

In  our  present  condition  the  mind's  proper  ohject  is  the  es- 
sence of  a  material  substance  or  body.  Other  objects  can  of 
course  engage  its  attention,  but  essences  of  bodies  are  reserved 
to  it  in  a  special  way,  much  as  color  is  reserved  to  the  eye, 
sound  to  the  ear.  Bodies  are  made  up  of  essence  and  accidents. 
Sense  has  their  accidents  for  object;  mind,  their  essence.  All 
the  accidents  in  a  body  grouped  together  constitute  what  we 
call  the  material  or  less  proper  object  of  each  of  the  five 
senses.  In  addition  to  this  material  object,  we  portion  off  to 
each  particular  sense  its  own  formal  or  proper  object.  Thus, 
the  eye  deals  formally  and  properly  with  the  body's  color;  the 
ear,  with  its  sound;  the  taste,  with  its  sweetness;  the  touch, 
with  its  smoothness.  The  imagination  remains  always  a  sense, 
and  its  phantasms  are  mere  reproductions  of  work  done  by  the 
external  senses.  Whereas,  the  eye  merely  sees  color,  the  ear 
merely  hears  sounds;  the  imagination  sees,  hears,  touches, 
smells  and  tastes.  Its  formal  or  proper  object  can  well  be  said 
to  be  the  material  object  of  the  other  senses. 

To  return  now  to  the  intellect.  It  passes  from  idleness  to 
activity,  from  capability  of  thinking  to  actual  thought,  with 
help  derived  from  its  object,  the  essences  of  bodies.  These  es- 
sences are  themselves  material,  the  mind  is  spiritual,  and  there 
can  be  between  the  material  and  the  spiritual  no  so  intimate 
commerce  as  the  kind  called  for  by  an  immanent  act  like  un- 
derstanding, unless  the  material  is  first  modified.  Before  these 
essences  can  enter  the  mind,  they  must  be  somehow  or  other 
spiritualized.  The  intellect  must  be,  therefore,  equipped  with 
a  faculty  or  virtue  able  to  fit  these  material  essences  for  en- 
trance into  a  spiritual  mind.  Aristotle,  therefore,  ascribes  to 
the  intellect  a  twofold  power,  one  active,  the  other  passive; 
and  names  them  respectively  the  intellectus  agens  and  the  in- 
tellectus  possibilis,  the  working  and  the  receiving  intellect.  The 
function  of  each  is  different  and  well  defined.  It  is  the  busi- 
ness of  the  intellectus  agens  to  make  the  material  essence  ready 
for  the  intellectus  possibilis  by  modifying  or  spiritualizing  the 
same.  This  it  accomplishes  by  producing  a  species  iutelligibilis 
impressa  of  the  essence,  and  this  in  turn  is  representative  of 


122  PSYCHOLOGY 

the  essence,  now  stripped  of  its  material  environment  or  con- 
comitants. This  power  of  the  intellectus  agens  to  abstract 
from  the  material  elements  surrounding  body-essences  ought  to 
cause  no  wonder.  The  eye  is  able  to  contemplate  a  body's 
color  without  adverting  to  its  other  qualities.  The  mind  ought 
to  be  able  to  view  a  body's  essence  empty  of  all  its  accidents; 
and,  therefore,  of  all  matter,  in  which  its  accidents  are  rooted. 
The  process  no  more  results  in  change  of  matter  to  spirit  than 
the  act  of  seeing  results  in  the  change  of  a  body's  sound,  taste, 
smell  and  smoothness  to  color.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  mind 
removes  nothing  from  the  body's  essence.  It  leaves  everything 
just  as  everything  was  before  the  process  of  change  began.  As 
the  eye  singles  out  the  color  in  its  material  object,  so  the 
intellectus  agens  singles  out  the  spiritual  in  a  body's  essence, 
shuts  its  sight  to  every  material  attribute  it  contains,  and  car- 
ries away  a  species  intelligibilis  impressa  of  pure  essence  with- 
out any  admixture  of  matter.  For  purposes  of  thinking,  this 
species  intelligibilis  impressa  serves  the  mind  as  substitute  for 
the  body's  essence,  in  much  the  same  way  as  the  species  sensilis 
serves  the  eye  as  substitute  for  the  body's  color.  The  color  of 
the  seen  body  is  not  transferred  to  the  eye.  It  remains  where 
it  belongs.  But  a  substitute  for  the  color,  its  species  sensilis, 
finds  its  way  to  the  eye,  and  vision  follows.  The  body-essence 
is  not  itself  transferred  to  the  mind.  It  remains  always  where 
it  belongs,  in  material  surroundings.  But  a  substitute  for  this 
essence,  its  species  intelligibilis  impressa,  finds  its  way  into  the 
mind,  and  the  thought  or  idea  follows.  This  species  intel- 
ligibilis impressa  is  the  joint  work  of  the  imagination  and  the 
intellectus  agens.  This  species  is  not  what  is  understood  or 
thought.  The  essence  itself  is  that.  The  species  is  that  with 
whose  help  the  essence  is  thought  or  understood.  To  under- 
stand or  think  is  not  the  same  as  to  produce  these  species  or 
receive  them;  but  it  is  work  the  intellectus  possibilis  does,  when 
equipped  with  the  species  intelligibilis  impressa.  In  last  analy- 
sis, the  intellectus  agens  and  the  phantasm  cooperate  as  partial 
and  subordinate  effective  causes,  by  way  of  a  single  complete 
cause,  to  produce  the  species  intelligibilis  impressa.  The  in- 
tellectus possibilis  receives  this  first  species,  and  thus  equipped 
it  elicits  a  second,  called,  to  distinguish  it  from  the  first,  species 
intelligibilis  expressa;  and  this  last  is  in  reality  the  idea  or 


THESIS  VII  123 

thought,  the  mind-waif,  the  mind-word,  the  close  of  the  process 
called  thinking,  or  the  simple  apprehension. 

In  our  present  condition,  because  the  intellectus  agens  must 
always  have  play,  we  cannot  think  even  spiritual  things,  though 
they  give  rise  to  no  phantasm,  without  in  some  way  referring 
them  to  sensible  objects,  capable  of  arousing  phantasms.  On 
this  account  our  ideas  of  spiritual  things  are  analogical  or 
figurative ;  comparative,  not  proper.  Intellectual  memory  is  the 
intellectus  possibilis,  inasmuch  as  it  retains  old  species  im- 
presses to  elicit  with  their  help  new  thoughts  or  ideas.  And 
yet  in  all  its  operations,  so  intimate  is  the  mind's  dependence 
on  work  of  the  imagination,  we  cannot  think  or  recall  objects, 
though  actually  possessed  of  their  species,  unless  the  imagina- 
tion first  evokes  corresponding  phantasms.  This  remark  serves 
to  explain  after  what  manner  all  our  knowledge  has  its  rise  in 
the  senses,  and  in  what  measure  mind  depends  for  its  informa- 
tion on  sense.  St.  Thomas  thus  elucidates  the  point,  "  Kon 
potest  dici  quod  sensibilis  cognitio  sit  totalis  et  perfecta  causa 
intellectualis  cognitionis,  sed  magis  quodammodo  est  materia 
causae."  1,  Q.,  84;  A,  6.  Sense  supplies  us  with  phantasms, 
from  them  as  from  material  the  intellectus  agens  derives  species 
intelligibiles  impressas,  and  these  last  with  the  intellectus  pos- 
sibilis are  the  real  and  eSicient  cause  of  thought  or  intellectual 
knowledge. 

Tongiorgi,  §  361,  maintains  that,  while  the  axiom,  "Nil  in 
intellectu  quod  non  fuerit  prius  in  sensu,"  occurs  nowhere  in 
Aristotle  or  any  conspicuous  follower  of  Aristotle,  it  is  of  fre- 
quent use  with  Sensists.  After  the  mind  of  Aristotle,  it  means 
that  we  know  with  the  mind  only  what  material  things  we 
know  first  with  the  senses ;  but  what  we  discover  with  the  mind 
in  material  things  is  different  from  what  we  discover  with  the 
senses.  Moreover,  the  mind  rises  from  its  knowledge  of  ma- 
terial things  to  the  knowledge  of  things  altogether  immaterial 
or  spiritual,  with  dependence  always  on  phantasms.  In  other 
words,  our  knowledge  begins  with  the  senses,  but  never  finishes 
with  them.  According  to  Sensists  the  axiom  means  that  our 
intellectual  knowledge  is  no  wider  or  more  extensive  than  our 
sense-knowledge;  it  merely  changes  sense-knowledge  in  a  va- 
riety of  ways,  leaving  its  nature  always  the  same.  In  other 
words,  our  knowledge  begins  and  ends  with  the  senses,  it  is 


124  PSYCHOLOGY 

restricted  to  sensible,  material  objects;  and  things  spiritual  are 
an  empty  dream.  This  is  in  brief  Aristotle's  doctrine  regard- 
ing the  origin  of  ideas,  and  its  main  features  are  summarily 
set  forth  in  our  present  thesis. 

TEEMS 

The  intellect  is  the  spiritual,  inorganic  cognoscitive  faculty 
in  man,  separating  him  from  brutes,  and  capable  of  knowledge 
transcending  the  senses.  The  three  powers  in  the  soul,  are  set 
forth  in  the  subjoined  diagram: 

.J    p  ...  ^         [Material,  organic,  is  sense. 

°  [Spiritual,  inorganic,  is  intellect. 

2.  Appetitive         Jf  ^^f  7'  ."^^^^^^^  ''.  ^PPf  ^^- 
^^  [spiritual,  inorganic,  is  will. 

{When  it  moves  own  body,  is  locomotion. 
When  it  moves  outside  objects,  is  energy. 


3.  Executive 


Imprinted  intelligible  image,  or  the  species  intelligibilis  im- 
pressa,  is  a  determining  reality,  superadded  in  the  nature  of  a 
quality  to  the  intellect,  with  the  production  of  some  fixed  idea 
in  view;  it  is  the  joint  work  of  phantasm  and  working  intellect; 
it  paves  ivay,  it  determines,  it  is  the  undeveloped  photograph. 

Finished  intelligible  image,  or  the  species  intelligibilis  ex- 
pressa,  is  the  idea  in  its  completeness;  it  is  the  joint  work  of 
first  image  and  receiving  intellect;  it  is  the  developed  photo- 
graph. 

Generally,  because  when  object  is  spiritual,  there  is  no  need 
of  a  new  imprinted  intelligible  image,  an  old  image  stored 
away  suffices. 

Determining  principle,  to  enable  the  intellect  to  pass  from 
idleness  to  activity,  because  without  image  it  is  indifferent  to 
this  or  that  particular  idea. 

Phantasm  is  the  product  of  the  imagination,  the  treasure- 
house  of  sensible  images,  the  highest  of  the  senses,  an  organic 
faculty  seated  in  the  brain. 

Joint  Work  means  that  the  phantasm  and  working  intellect 
combine   as  partial,   subordinate,   efficient   causes.     The   image 


THESIS  VII  125 

and  receiving  intellect  combine  in  same  way  to  produce  the  idea. 
An  efficient  cause  by  real  and  physical  exertion  of  its  power 
produces  another  existence.  Partial  causes  are  opposed  to  ade- 
quate; subordinate,  to  coordinate.  Wlien  two  principles  to- 
gether are  the  whole  or  adequate  cause  of  an  effect,  each  of  the 
two  is  its  partial  cause.  Causes  are  coordinate,  when  they  are 
of  the  same  rank  and  nature  with  respect  to  the  effect,  and 
each  produces  its  part  of  the  effect  independently  of  the  other. 
Two  horses  drawing  a  chariot  are  partial,  coordinate,  efficient 
causes.  One  of  two  such  causes  can  by  successive  additions  to 
its  strength  become  equal  to  the  task  of  producing  singly  the 
whole  effect.  Causes  are  subordinate,  when  they  are  of  differ- 
ent rank  and  nature,  and  each  of  them  contributes  in  its  own 
particular  sphere  to  the  whole  effect,  in  such  a  way  that  one 
without  the  other  can  do  nothing,  neither  ever  becoming  able 
under  any  supposition  to  produce  the  whole  effect.  The  writer 
and  his  pen  are  partial,  subordinate,  efficient  causes.  Subor- 
dinates are  partial,  indeed,  with  respect  to  their  efficacy;  but 
they  are  whole  or  adequate  causes,  with  regard  to  their  result. 
Each  bears  on  the  whole  effect,  not  on  part  of  it. 

To  understand  means  the  first  operation  of  the  mind,  result- 
ing in  a  concept  or  idea.  We  are  studying  our  intellectual 
knowledge  in  its  root  or  origin ;  and,  therefore,  restrict  our- 
selves to  concepts  or  ideas.  These  make  up  judgments,  which 
in  turn  combine  to  form  reasoning  or  syllogisms.  We  deal 
with  direct,  not  reflex  knowledge.  Direct  puts  us  in  intellectual 
possession  of  some  outside  object,  like  a  man,  a  horse,  or  a 
house.  Eeflex  is  a  further  improvement  on,  an  elaboration 
of  direct. 

Knowledge,  like  every  act,  has  what  we  call  its  term  or  limit, 
that  in  which  the  act  ends,  finishes,  closes;  and  philosophy 
recognizes  two  kinds  of  terms  in  intellectual  knowledge,  or  an 
idea.  They  are  called  the  intrinsic  or  subjective  term,  and 
the  extrinsic  or  objective  term  of  the  idea.  The  intrinsic  term 
is  the  idea  itself,  the  actual  likeness  of  the  outside  object  ex- 
istent in  the  mind,  and  technically  called  the  species  iutelli- 
gibilis  expressa.  The  extrinsic  term  is  the  outside  object,  whose 
likeness  exists  in  the  mind;  it  is  the  man,  the  horse,  or  the 
house  of  which  we  have  an  idea. 

The  word  species  needs  explanation.     It  means  likeness,  that 


126  PSYCHOLOGY 

which  makes  some  outside  object  present  and  visible  to  the 
mind,  much  as  the  photograph  stands  for  the  man,  or  chips 
for  money.  It  is  of  two  kinds.  Tliere  is  a  species  intelligibilis 
impressa  along  with  a  species  intelligibilis  expressa.  The  first 
is  the  joint  product  of  a  phantasm  and  the  intellectus  agens,  or 
working  intellect;  the  other  is  the  joint  product  of  the  species 
intelligibilis  impressa  and  the  intellectus  possibilis,  or  receiving 
intellect;  and  the  difference  between  the  two,  to  hold  to  the  same 
illustration,  is  about  the  same  as  that  in  force  between  an  unde- 
veloped and  a  developed  photograph.  The  species  intelligibilis 
expressa  is  the  idea  itself,  and  it  is  called  the  mind-word,  be- 
cause the  mind  uses  it  as  a  symbol  of  the  outside  object,  much 
ftE  we  use  words  for  symbols  of  our  thoughts.  That  thought 
results  in  this  likeness,  this  species  intelligibilis  expressa  or 
mind-word,  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  thought  is  a  true  vital 
and  cognoscitive  act.  Because  it  is  a  true  act,  it  must  have  a 
term,  or  result;  because  the  act  is  vital,  its  term  must  be  im- 
manent or  within  the  mind;  because  it  is  cognoscitive,  the  term 
within  the  mind  must  be  a  likeness  of  the  object  outside  the 
mind. 

It  is  a  dogma  in  philosophy,  conceded  on  all  sides  and  made 
good  by  experience,  that  knowledge  arises  when  the  mind  pic- 
tures its  object,  or  assumes  towards  it  the  relationsliip  of  resem- 
blance. Hence  resemblance  enters  the  definitions  of  all  three 
species  of  truth,  logical,  ontological  and  moral.  In  logical,  the 
mind  resembles  the  object;  in  ontological,  the  object  resembles 
the  mind;  in  moral,  the  word  resembles  the  speaker's  phase  of 
mind.  And  the  species  intelligibilis  expressa  is  only  this  actual 
likeness  of  the  object  struck  off  or  delineated  in  the  mind.  In 
thought,  the  thing  understood  or  known  is  not  the  species,  or 
likeness ;  but  the  outside  object,  the  man,  the  horse,  or  the  house. 
When  we  use  our  eyes,  we  see  not  the  sensile  images  of  objects, 
but  the  objects  themselves.  And  all  this  is  borne  out  by  the 
fact  that  we  talk  about  these  outside  objects,  not  about  our 
ideas,  or  mental  acts;  and  what  Ave  talk  about,  that  is  topic  of 
our  thoughts.  Philosophy  sums  up  the  whole  thing  when  it 
says  that  the  mind-word  or  idea  is  that,  by  means  of  which  we 
understand  or  think;  while  the  outside  object  is  what  we  under- 
stand or  think.  Subjective  concept  and  objective  concept  are 
the  same  as  the  idea's  intrinsic  term  and  extrinsic  term  respec- 


THESIS  VII  127 

tively.  The  objective  concept  of  a  man  is  the  man's  essence, 
the  man  himself.  The  subjective  concept  of  a  man  is  the  idea 
of  a  man,  the  act  of  understanding  a  man. 

Our  first  ideas  are  derived  from  sensile  experience,  and  imme- 
diately from  phantasms,  the  products  of  the  imagination,  the 
chiefest  among  our  internal  senses.  From  these  first  ideas 
others  can  be  evolved  by  process  of  analysis,  comparison  and 
argumentation;  and  with  these  last  we  are  not  concerned. 
Therefore,  our  external  senses  and  our  imagination  contribute 
as  primary  sources  to  our  intellectual  knowledge.  We  have  al- 
ready disproved  the  existence  of  anything  like  innate  or  inborn 
ideas;  and  their  rejection  paves  the  way  to  cooperation  of  sense 
with  intellect  in  thought-formation.  The  denial  of  mutual  de- 
pendence between  sense  and  intellect  would  virtually  establish 
a  twofold  nature  in  man.  Eight  order  demands  that  the  senses, 
or  inferior  faculties,  minister  or  do  service  to  their  superior, 
the  intellect.  It  is  a  matter  of  experience  that  children  born 
deaf  or  blind  never  elicit  ideas  of  sounds  or  colors,  whereas 
such  as  fall  deaf  or  blind  a  long  or  short  interval  after  birth 
readily  elicit  ideas  of  both  kinds.  This  is  clear  evidence  that 
innate  or  inborn  ideas  are  the  idle  suggestion  of  a  poetic  temper, 
and  that  our  first  ideas  are  derived  from  sensile  experience, 
especially  from  phantasms.  First  ideas  invariably  deal  with 
bodies,  substances  vested  with  extension  and  resistance,  material 
for  work  of  the  senses.  They  are  opposed  to  secondary  ideas, 
which  have  spiritual  things  for  object.  These  last  are  called 
anological,  in  opposition  to  proper,  because  we  derive  them  from 
comparison  with  bodies,  material  substances  gifted  with  exten- 
sion and  resistance,  cognoscible  to  the  senses.  A  phantasm  is 
the  product,  the  species  expressa,  of  the  imagination,  the  high- 
est function  of  internal  sense.  We  take  phantasm  here  in  its 
objective  sense,  inasmuch  as  it  is  the  outside  object  actually  per- 
ceived by  the  imagination.  External  sense  can  be  called  the 
remote  medium  of  oui  intellectual  knowledge;  imagination,  its 
proximate  medium. 

Again,  we  appeal  to  experience  for  proof  that  imagination  is 
the  proximate  medium  of  our  intellectual  knowledge.  Very 
young  children  and  grown  up  idiots  cannot  acquire  ideas,  are 
outside  the  reach  of  instruction,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  their 
intellects  are  right,  and  their  external  senses  are  sufficiently  well 


128  PSYCHOLOGY 

developed.  The  mind  undergoes  no  intrinsic  change  with  the 
child's  growth,  and  it  slaves  to  no  natural  dullness.  The  eyes 
and  the  ears  of  a  young  child  are  as  clear  and  sharp  as  those 
of  any  adult.  The  difference,  therefore,  between  very  young 
children  and  adults  must  be  due  to  want  of  development  in  the 
only  remaining  factor,  the  imagination;  and  phantasms  are 
proximate  means  to  man's  intellectual  knowledge.  With  the 
external  senses  sound  and  in  good  order,  any  hurt  in  the  brain 
or  disturbance  in  the  imagination  prevents  the  mind  from  rea- 
soning out  new  knowledge  or  putting  to  good  use  knowledge 
already  possessed.  No  hurt  in  the  brain  can  hurt  tlie  mind 
taken  by  itself,  because  the  mind  is  of  its  very  nature  inorganic, 
and  therefore  incapable  of  physical  injury.  Therefore,  every 
such  hurt  interferes  with  the  process  of  thinking,  simply  because 
the  mind  is  in  natural  need  of  phantasms  for  its  object  or  the 
material  of  its  ideas.  When  engaged  in  intellectual  work,  we 
are  conscious  of  immediate  dependence,  not  on  the  external 
senses,  but  on  the  imagination ;  and  the  readier  and  richer  the 
imagination,  the  better  and  easier  our  work.  Finally,  order 
vindicates  to  the  imagination  the  prerogative  of  proximate 
means  to  our  intellectual  knowledge.  It  is  the  highest  of  the 
senses,  while  mere  intelligence  is  the  lowest  of  the  mind's  facul- 
ties; and  there  is  a  law  in  philosophy  to  the  effect  that  the 
highest  in  a  lower  class  touches  or  borders  on  the  lowest  in  a 
higher  class.  Supremum  infimi  attingit  infimum  supremi. 
Therefore,  the  working  intellect  and  the  phantasm  produce  the 
imprinted  intelligible  image;  this  image  and  the  receiving  in- 
tellect in  turn  produce  the  idea,  the  developed  intelligible  image, 
the  intelligible  image  in  its  completeness. 

Our  theory  postulates  two  distinct  functions  of  intellect  in 
its  first  operation,  simple  apprehension  or  thought,  namely  the 
working  and  the  receiving  intellect.  The  Thomists  contend 
for  a  real  distinction  between  the  two;  Suarez  denies  every  wider 
distinction  than  virtual,  and  his  reasons  commend  themselves 
to  our  approval.  One  and  the  same  faculty  can  be  active  and 
passive,  as  happens  in  the  case  of  the  receiving  intellect  and  the 
will.  The  receiving  intellect  is  passive  with  regard  to  the  im- 
printed intelligible  image,  and  active  with  regard  to  the  idea  or 
thought.  The  will  is  passive  with  regard  to  the  influence  ex- 
erted by  the  intellect,  and  active  with  regard  to  the  wish  it 


THESIS  VII  129 

elicits.  No  contradiction  has  place,  because  they  are  active 
and  passive  -ander  different  aspects,  sub  diverso  respectu.  The 
images  produced  by  the  two  are  not  in  themselves  complete  and 
independent,  but  mutually  incomplete  and  supplementary;  an- 
other sign  that  they  result  not  from  two  really  distinct  facul- 
ties, but  from  one  and  the  same  faculty  capable  of  two  different 
functions.  Were  the  working  intellect  really  distinct  from  the 
receiving,  it  would  be  forever  idle  after  death,  a  thing  hard  to 
admit.  Supposing  mere  virtual  distinction  between  the  two, 
the  difficulty  disappears.  Because  they  are  really  identical,  one 
would  be  as  active  as  the  other  after  death. 

The  working  intellect  is  not  formally  or  strictly  eognoscitive ; 
it  is  eognoscitive  in  a  merely  preparative  way.  All  its  efficiency 
centers  in  the  active  production  of  one  of  the  two  joint  prin- 
ciples coalescing  to  form  the  intellectual  act,  the  idea,  the 
thought.  Its  work  begins  and  ends  with  the  imprinted  intel- 
ligible image  or  likeness ;  and  the  idea  or  formal  cognition  is 
not  this  first  image,  but  the  joint  product  of  it  and  the  receiving 
intellect.  For  this  reason  it  is  called  the  working  intellect,  the 
intellectus  agens;  not  because  it  understands,  but  because  it 
makes  outside  objects  ready  to  be  understood,  spiritualizes  them 
after  a  fashion  in  the  imprinted  intelligible  image,  and  thus 
paves  the  way  for  their  entrance  into  a  spiritual  and  immaterial 
soul. 

And  here  another  mystery  confronts  us,  this  spiritualization 
of  the  outside  object.  We  must  maintain  that  the  mind  under- 
stands not  the  imprinted  intelligible  image,  but  the  correspond- 
ing outside  object;  and  this  latter  never  ceases  to  be  material, 
a  body,  a  substance  vested  with  extension  and  resistance.  Plato 
thought  to  solve  the  mystery  by  introducing  innate  or  inborn 
ideas,  conveyed  to  the  mind  from  the  first  by  the  mind's  maker. 
The  difficulty  seemed  to  be  otherwise  insuperable  because  of  his 
formula,  "  Like  knows  like,"  or  a  spiritual  soul  can  know  only 
spiritual  things.  Aristotle,  improving  on  Plato,  changed  his 
teacher's  formula  to  the  following:  "  The  thing  known  assumes 
in  the  mind  the  mind's  own  quality."  In  other  words,  material 
things  exist  in  the  spiritual  mind  after  a  spiritual  manner.  In 
more  general  terms,  the  formula  runs  this  way,  "  Whatever  is 
received  adopts  the  quality  of  its  receiver."  "  Aequale  cognos- 
citur  ab  aequali,"  says  Plato.     "  Cognitum  est  in  cognoscente 


130  PSYCHOLOGY 

ad  niodum  cognoscentis,"  or  "  Receptum  est  in  recipiente  ad 
modum  recipieutis,"  says  Aristotle.  The  upshot  of  the  whole 
thiug  is  that  the  imprinted  intelligible  image  takes  the  place, 
usurps  the  function,  of  the  outside  object.  One  is  the  other, 
the  image  is  after  some  fashion  the  outside  object.  We  clear 
the  mystery  by  recognizing  in  things  a  twofold  value,  entitative 
and  representative.  The  agreement  of  image  and  object  is  not 
of  course  in  point  of  entitative  value,  but  in  point  of  representa- 
tive value;  non  in  essendo,  sed  in  repraesentando.  And  in  the 
field  of  knowledge  this  agreement  is  sufificient  basis  for  identify- 
iug  one  with  the  other.  Agreement  in  essendo  has  place,  when 
two  things  agree  generically  or  specifically,  as  a  man  and  a 
horse,  a  man  and  a  man.  Agreement  in  repraesentando  has 
place,  when  one  of  the  two  contains  a  something  able  to  lead  us 
to  knowledge  of  the  other,  as  a  man  and  his  photograph,  the 
imprinted  intelligible  image  and  its  outside  object.  In  the  im- 
age its  entitative  value  must  be  sedulously  kept  apart  from  its 
representative  value.  The  marble  in  the  statue  is  a  different 
thing  from  the  Cajsar  it  represents.  In  the  same  way  the  phys- 
ical being  of  the  image  is  a  different  thing  from  tlie  being  of 
the  image  inasmuch  as  it  represents  this  or  that  outside  object. 
Small  need  to  recount  the  differences  in  force  between  the  image 
and  its  object.  The  image  is  always  an  accident,  the  object  is 
often  a  substance;  tlie  image  is  simple  and  without  parts,  the 
object  is  often  a  compound ;  the  image  is  a  particular  and  con- 
crete thing,  the  object  is  often  a  universal  and  abstract  entity; 
the  image  is  a  thing  that  can  exist  or  cease,  it  comes  and  goes, 
the  object  is  often  a  thing  that  goes  on  forever.  Agreement  in 
entitative  value,  in  essendo,  is  not  needed  between  the  imprinted 
intelligible  image  and  its  object,  because  its  whole  purpose  is  to 
effect  such  a  union  between  the  mind  and  its  object  that  the 
mind  be  prepared  or  made  ready  to  elicit  a  vital  or  immanent 
likeness  of  the  object;  and  such  a  likeness  is  compatible  with 
generic  and  specific  differences,  or  independent  of  agreement  in 
essendo.  The  idea  itself,  the  thought,  lacks  agreement  in  es- 
sendo with  its  object;  and  yet,  when  we  think,  we  think  the 
object.  The  imprinted  intelligible  image  is  in  far  less  need 
of  any  so  close  agreement  as  entitative. 

To  return  now  to  the  intellectus  possibilis,  the  receiving  in- 
tellect.    Unlike  the  working  intellect,  it  is  formally  and  strictly 


THESIS  VII  131 

cognoscitive.  It  receives  the  imprinted  intelligible  image,  and 
with  its  help  elicits  the  idea  or  thought  in  a  finished  state.  Be- 
cause of  this  twofold  process  it  is  called  in  Latin,  patibilis  or 
possibilis.  It  is  patibilis,  or  receptive,  or  capable  of  suffering 
at  the  hands  of  another,  inasmuch  as  it  receives  the  imprinted 
intelligible  image  from  the  working  intellect ;  and  possibilis  or 
possible,  or  capable  of  becoming  things,  inasmuch  as  it  has  the 
power  of  transforming  itself  into  everything  conceivable  in  the 
universe  by  the  vital  and  immanent  expression  of  wdiatsoever 
reality.  It  can  become  everything  in  much  the  same  sense  as 
the  photograph  becomes  the  man  it  represents. 

The  reality  of  imprinted  intelligible  images  once  admitted, 
we  must  admit  in  the  mind  a  certain  inborn  faculty  able  with 
the  help  of  phantasms  to  evolve  these  images.  We  cannot  assign 
the  phantasm  for  adequate  and  complete  cause  of  such  images, 
because  these  images,  as  intellectual  forms  and  therefore  spiritual 
accidents,  are  of  an  essentially  higher  order  than  phantasms 
which  are  acts  of  the  whole  man,  body  and  soul  acting  as  a 
single  principle,  and  therefore  organic  and  material  accidents. 
The  reception  of  phantasms  into  the  intellect  cannot  be  assigned 
as  adequate  and  complete  cause  of  these  images.  First  of  all, 
it  is  quite  impossible  for  the  intellect  to  receive  unmodified 
phantasms,  phantasms  as  such.  The  intellect  is  an  inorganic 
faculty  and  phantasms  are  organic  accidents.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  phantasms  undergo  no  change  in  the  process  of  thought. 
They  remain  what  they  were,  and  the  imprinted  intelligible 
image  is  far  from  being  a  modified  phantasm.  It  is  a  third 
entity,  derived  from  the  joint  energy  of  the  working  intellect 
and  the  phantasm.  Aristotle's  formula,  the  thing  known  as- 
sumes in  the  mind  the  mind's  own  quality,  is  no  proof  that  a 
phantasm  received  into  the  intellect  is  adequate  and  complete 
cause  of  the  imprinted  intelligible  image.  The  phantasm  is 
of  its  nature  and  essence  organic,  and  to  transform  it  into  an 
inorganic  being  like  the  imprinted  intelligible  image  would 
be  not  to  change  but  to  destroy  it.  Therefore  the  phantasm 
and  the  receiving  intellect  are  not  of  themselves  enough  to 
account  for  the  idea  or  thought,  and  we  must  admit  the  addi- 
tional function  denominated  the  working  intellect.  Aristotle 
dismisses  the  matter  with  this  simple  proof.  The  soul  of  man 
is  intrinsically  intellectual,  and  because  nature  is  never  lacking 


132  PSYCHOLOGY 

in  necessary  helps,  and  because  she  never  imposes  a  task  with- 
out at  the  same  time  supplying  everything  needed  for  its  ac- 
complishment, the  soul  of  man  must  be  intrinsically  and  abun- 
dantly equipped  witli  all  the  requisites  for  intellectual  acts  like 
ideas  and  tlioughts.  But  thought  is  impossible  witliout  the  im- 
printed intelligible  image,  and  this  in  turn  is  impossible  with- 
out the  intrinsic  equipment  we  call  the  working  intellect.  Ergo 
the  soul  of  man  is  equipped  with  the  working  intellect,  or  fac- 
ulty able  with  the  help  of  phantasms  to  produce  the  imprinted 
intelligible  image. 

The  working  intellect  works  only  in  conjunction  with  phan- 
tasms, and  phantasms  are  possible  only  when  there  is  question 
of  objects  perceptible  to  the  senses.  When  the  object  of  the 
idea  or  thought  is  spiritual,  not  sensible,  the  receiving  intellect 
performs  the  whole  operation,  without  any  distinct  employment 
of  the  working  intellect.  Old  imprinted  intelligible  images 
stored  away  in  the  memory  are  called  into  play,  and  for  this 
reason  our  ideas  of  spiritual  objects  are  anological  and  not 
strictly  proper;  they  are  based  on  our  knowledge  of  sensible 
objects  and  are  evolved  from  it  by  comparison  and  kindred 
processes.  The  words  in  our  language  expressive  of  spiritual 
objects  are  figurative;  for  instance,  idea,  concept,  notion.  The 
energy  of  the  working  intellect  is  restricted  to  the  imprinted 
intelligible  image.  Every  other  intellectual  operation  belongs 
immediately  to  the  receiving  intellect,  mediately  to  the  work- 
ing intellect.  Therefore  ideas,  judgments,  syllogisms,  the  de- 
rivation of  new  ideas  from  old  ones,  memory,  all  are  the  work 
of  the  receiving  intellect.  The  Scholastics  ascribe  a  triple  ef- 
ficacy to  the  working  intellect;  it  lights  up  the  phantasm,  it 
makes  the  object  of  the  phantasm  ready  for  the  intellect,  it 
produces  the  image.  Suarez  sees  herein  only  three  ways  of  ex- 
pressing one  and  the  same  thing,  the  production  of  the  image. 
To  derive  the  image  from  a  phantasm  and  from  individuating 
notes  are  different  things.     The  latter  expression  is  incorrect. 

Division.     Three  parts. 

I.     Need  of  image  as  determining  principle. 
II.     Image,  joint  result  of  phantasm  and  working  intellect. 
III.     Image  and  receiving  intellect  combine  as  partial  subordi- 
nate efficient  causes  to  produce  idea. 


THESIS  VII  133 


PEOOFS  I,  II,  III 

/.  1°.  The  need  of  the  image  is  rooted  in  the  twofold  fact 
that  the  mind  views  all  objects  with  indifference;  and  that,  to 
know,  the  mind  must  assume  the  relation  of  resemblance  with 
its  object.     Hence  our  argument. 

To  apprehend  a  set  object,  the  mind  must  la}''  aside  its  in- 
difference to  all  objects,  and  restrict  its  attention  to  this  par- 
ticular object.  This  can  be  effected  only  by  intrinsic  union  of 
the  mind  with  its  object,  or,  failing  that,  with  some  likeness 
representative  of  the  object,  and  fitted  to  enter  the  mind.  In- 
trinsic union  of  mind  and  object  is  impossible.  One  is  spirit- 
ual; the  other,  material.  Therefore  union  of  mind  with  the 
object's  likeness  is  the  one  way  left;  and  this  likeness,  the  only 
likeness  fitted  to  enter  the  mind,  is  what  we  call  the  imprinted 
intelligible  image.  Ergo  the  intellect,  to  understand,  has  need 
generally  of  the  imprinted  intelligible  image  as  a  determining 
principle. 

N.B.  The  material  phantasm  cannot  unite  with  the  mind 
to  remove  its  attitude  of  indifference,  either  as  a  mere  condi- 
tion, or  a  form,  or  a  cause  immediately  with  the  mind  effective 
of  the  idea.  Therefore  all  its  activity  is  restricted  to  coopera- 
tion with  the  mind  in  the  production  of  a  principle,  able  by  in- 
trinsic union  to  help  the  mind  elicit  the  idea.  And  this  com- 
bined effort  of  phantasm  and  mind  results  precisely  in  what 
we  termed  the  imprinted  intelligible  image.  Mere  presence  of 
the  phantasm  as  a  condition  could  never  intrinsically  affect  the 
mind's  attitude  of  indifference.  "Witness  magnet  and  wood. 
The  phantasm  could  never  enter  the  mind  as  a  form,  because 
its  proper  seat  is  the  whole  man,  the  composite  made  up  of 
body  and  soul;  whereas  the  mind  dwells  altogether  in  the  soul. 
The  phantasm  is,  besides,  a  quantitative  accident,  and  cannot 
be  form  to  a  simple  substance  like  the  mind ;  it  is  an  individual 
and  material  thing,  whereas  the  mind  apprehends  things  uni- 
versal and  spiritual.  The  naked  phantasm  cannot  work  in  con- 
junction with  the  mind,  because  its  material  quality  bars  it 
from  intrinsic  union  with  the  mind.  Phantasm  and  mind  not 
like  two  horses,  but  like  pen  and  hand. 

2°.  The  need  of  this  image  can  likewise  be  gathered  from 


134  PSYCHOLOGY 

comparison  with  sensation.  The  senses,  to  perceive,  need  im- 
printed sensile  images  of  their  objects.  In  a  parallel  way,  the 
mind,  to  understand,  ouglit  to  have  imprinted  intelligible  images 
of  its  objects. 

N.B.  The  two  images,  the  imprinted  and  the  resultant  or 
developed,  are  means  by  which  the  mind  knows  its  object,  but 
after  difl'ereut  manners.  The  imprinted  is  effective  merely,  the 
resultant  or  developed  is  formal  as  well  as  effective. 

//.  The  working  intellect  and  tlie  phantasm  are  the  image's, 
a.  efficient  causes,  h.  partial,  c.  subordinate,  a  single  complete 
principle  of  activity. 

a.  Efficient  causes.  They  are  principles  producing  another 
existence  by  the  real  and  physical  exertion  of  their  powers. 

h.  Partial.  Neither  is  equal  to  the  whole  effect.  The  image 
gets  its  spirituality  from  the  working  intellect;  its  power  to 
represent,  from  the  phantasm.  The  illumination  or  elevation 
derived  from  intellect  to  phantasm  is  extrinsic,  and  leaves  the 
phantasm  wholly  the  same  in  itself.  It  remains  always  quite 
material.  A  parallel  instance  is  the  case  of  two  boys,  unable 
of  themselves  to  haul  a  boat,  and  equal  to  the  task  when  helped 
by  four  others.  The  same  two  boys  are  now  partial  causes  of 
the  whole  effect,  and  undergo  no  change  whatever.  An  engine 
could  lend  them  the  same  assistance,  and  the  two  boys  would 
still  be  partial  causes,  without  becoming  engines.  Between  the 
phantasm  and  working  intellect  there  is,  of  course,  want  of  pro- 
portion as  far  as  physical  entity  is  concerned  ;  but  proportion 
between  them  in  point  of  power  and  causality  is  present,  and 
that  is  enough.  Proportion  of  entity  is  wanting  between  the 
two  boys  and  the  engine,  but  tliat  prevents  nobody  from  calling 
the  boys  and  the  engine  causes  of  the  effect.  To  work  together, 
they  must  unite,  not  indeed  in  being  or  entity,  but  in  power, 
like  the  boys  and  the  engine. 

c.  Suhordijiate.  The  phantasm  and  working  intellect  are  of 
different  rank  and  nature;  the  phantasm  contributes  to  the 
image  its  representative  quality,  the  intellect  its  spirituality; 
in  such  a  way  that  one  without  the  other  can  do  nothing,  neither 
ever  becoming  able  under  any  supposition  to  produce  the  whole 
effect.  One  is  principal,  the  other  instrumental;  like  the  pen- 
man and  his  pen,  the  sculptor  and  his  chisel. 


THESIS  VII  135 

in.  a.  The  receiving  intellect  is  partial  cause  of  the  idea. 
6.  The  image  is  partial  cause  of  the  idea. 

a.  A  vital  act  must  proceed  from  a  vital  principle  or  cause. 
But  ideas  are  vital  acts,  and  the  intellect  is  vital  principle  or 
cause.     Ergo  ideas  proceed  from  the  intellect. 

N.B.  If  the  image  were  sole  cause,  the  idea  would  be  pro- 
duced in  the  intellect  but  not  by  it. 

&.  When  of  two  principles  one  completes  the  other  in  the 
order  of  efficiency,  the  first  assumes  the  quality  of  partial  effi- 
cient cause.  But  the  image  completes  the  receiving  intellect  in 
the  order  of  efficiency.  Ergo  the  image  is  partial  efficient  cause 
of  the  idea. 

N.B.  The  image  contributes  determinateness  to  the  receiv- 
ing intellect,  it  is  the  phantasm  spiritualized. 

a.  and  h.  An  idea  is  the  vital  expression  of  a  set  object.  Its 
vitality  comes  from  the  receiving  intellect,  its  expressiveness  of 
a  set  object  comes  from  the  image.  Ergo,  because  the  whole 
act  is  vital  and  at  the  same  time  expressive  of  the  object,  the 
whole  act  proceeds  from  one  and  other  principle.  They  are, 
besides,  of  a  different  rank  and  nature;  and  one  without  the 
other  is  unequal  to  the  effect,  or  idea. 

N.B.  Of  the  two  principles,  the  mind  is  the  more  important, 
because  origin  of  the  idea's  vitality.  In  point  of  specification 
the  image  is  the  more  important,  because  origin  of  the  idea's 
determinateness.  The  image  can  be  called  the  mind's  form,  or 
formal  cause  of  the  idea,  inasmuch  as  it  determines  the  mind 
and  gives  specific  value  to  the  idea ;  and  the  imprinted  image 
is  efficient  cause  of  the  idea,  inasmuch  as  it  actively  cooperates 
with  the  mind,  after  making  it  immediately  ready  for  the  act. 
Therefore,  thought  is  a  new  act,  distinct  from  the  first  image, 
its  production  and  its  reception.  The  developed  image  is  in  the 
intellect  in  a  vital  way,  and  the  whole  act  arises  from  the  in- 
tellect, and  remains  in  the  intellect. 

Two  Assertions,    a.  h. 

a.  1.  Our  ideas  of  individual  material  things  are  particular 
and  proper,  not  general  and  common. 

2.  Their  imprinted  intelligible  images  are  likewise  particular 
and  proper. 


136  PSYCHOLOGY 

S.Q.  Cajetan  denies  tlie  whole  statement,  asserting  that  the 
mind  first  forms  universals,  and  passes  from  them  to  particular 
individuals  hy  a  process  of  argumentation.  St.  Thomas  denies 
the  second  part,  asserting  that  the  mind  first  knows  universals, 
and  then  by  a  species  of  reilection  on,  or  return  to,  the  phan- 
tasm, knows  clearly  and  distinctly  particular  individuals.  In 
other  words,  we  have  developed  images  of  particulars,  imprinted 
images  of  universals  alone. 

TERMS 

Ideas  are  particular  and  proper,  when  the  notes  they  em- 
brace belong  to  one  set  object  and  to  no  other,  and  when  tliey 
clearly  separate  this  set  object  from  every  other  like  it,  e.  g. 
Peter,  They  are  general  and  common  when  they  are  universals, 
e.  g.  man.  When  proper  means  definite  and  distinct,  when 
common  means  confused  and  indefinite,  our  ideas  of  particu- 
lars are  rather  common  than  proper.  Constituent  notes  are 
less  clear  in  particulars  than  in  universals. 

PROOFS 

a.  1°.  In  the  judgment,  Peter  is  a  man,  one  term  is  par- 
ticular; the  other,  universal.  To  frame  judgment,  we  must 
have  like  ideas  of  both.     Ergo  particular  and  proper. 

2°.  Developed  image  and  imprinted  image  ought  to  be  of  the 
same  order.  If  one  is  particular,  the  other  ought  to  be  par- 
ticular and  proper.  Developed  images  are  particular  and 
proper.  Ergo  imprinted  images  ought  to  be  particular  and 
proper, 

]S[,B.  A  thing's  individuality  is  not  constituted  by  its  mat- 
ter, but  by  its  entire  reality.  The  individual  stripped  of  its 
matter,  still  remains  an  individual. 

b.  Knowledge  of  individual  particular  objects  precedes  knowl- 
edge of  universals. 

1°.  First  images  are  basis  of  first  knowledge.  Images  of  in- 
dividual particular  objects  are  the  first  we  receive.  Ergo  knowl- 
edge of  individual  particular  objects  precedes  knowledge  of  uni- 
versals, e.  g.  this  body  before  body ;  this  sound  before  sound. 


THESIS  VII  137 

2°.  Particular  and  proper  ideas  can  be  foundation  for  uni- 
versals,  not  vice-versa.     Ergo. 

3°.  Children  first  get  idea  of  this  red  thing,  then  successively 
they  get  ideas  of  thing,  quality,  color,  red. 

4°.  Experience  is  proof  that  we  first  know  individual  par- 
ticular objects. 

To  Reconcile  Seeming  Differences  Between  the 

Scholastics 

Suarez  refuses  efiicient  causality  to  the  phantasm  in  the  pro- 
duction of  the  image,  confining  it  to  the  working  intellect.  He 
makes  the  phantasm  matter  for  the  image,  or  incentive  for  the 
intellect,  or  model  cause.  He  calls  the  production  of  the  image 
no  vital  and  immanent,  but  a  transient  act.  Hence  the  work- 
ing intellect  is  not  cognoscitive,  but  merely  preparative.  His 
reason  is  parity  with  the  will.  The  will  is  the  whole  cause  of 
its  operation,  though  intellectual  knowledge  necessarily  pre- 
cedes. In  like  manner  the  working  intellect  ought  to  be  whole 
cause  of  the  image,  though  the  phantasm  necessarily  precedes. 
Opponents  to  Suarez  try  to  show  that  the  phantasm  would  in 
that  case  be  deprived  of  all  causality  in  the  production  of  the 
images;  but  to  my  mind  they  fail  to  make  clear  how  model 
causality  would  be  absent.  Such  causality  is  always  extrinsic 
and  calls  for  no  intimate  or  intrinsic  union  with  the  efiicient 
cause.  We  maintain  against  Suarez  that  the  phantasm  exerts 
what  efficient  causality  belongs  to  the  instrument,  the  pen  in 
the  case  of  writing,  the  chisel  in  the  case  of  a  statue.  For  such 
causality  merely  extrinsic  union  between  the  principal  agent 
and  instrument  is  needed,  and  of  this  the  material  phantasm 
is  capable.  The  production  of  the  first  image  is  no  vital  or 
immanent  act  in  strict  sense,  because,  though  its  term  or  result 
dwells  in  the  intellect,  it  proceeds  from  a  partial  principle  out- 
side of  the  intellect.  On  the  contrary,  the  production  of  the 
second  image  or  idea  is  a  vital  act,  because  it  proceeds  in  its 
entirety  from  the  intellect,  equipped,  of  course,  and  intrinsically 
equipped  with  the  first  image ;  and  because  it  remains  in  the  in- 
tellect. The  material  nature  of  the  phantasm  bars  intimate 
union  with  the  working  intellect,  and  as  a  mere  instrument  it 
demands  only  extrinsic  union.     The  spiritual  nature  of  the  first 


138  PSYCITOLOGY 

image  fits  it  for  intrinsic  union  with  the  receiving  intellect,  and 
renders  the  idea  a  vital  or  immanent  act.  The  image  cannot  be 
called  an  instrument,  as  compared  with  the  receiving  intellect. 
The  two  are  equally  principal.  The  phantasm  is  and  must  be 
called  an  instrument  as  compared  with  the  working  intellect. 

Opinion  of  St.  Thomas 

Two  reasons  why  phantasm  cannot  immediately  combine  with 
receiving  intellect  to  produce  ideas.  1.  Phantasm  is  likeness  of 
individual  thing.  2.  It  exists  in  a  body-organ  and  is  organic. 
Ergo  it  cannot  pass  to  receiving  intellect,  which  represents  uni- 
versal, and  is  immaterial. 

N.B.  Sensile  image  can  pass  to  eye  because  both  represent 
individual  things  and  are  organic. 

Illumination  of  Phantasm 

Phantasms  are  made  intelligible  by  working  intellect,  as  col- 
ors are  made  visible  by  light. 

IST.B.  Two  opinions  about  color  and  light,  1°.  Light  gives 
color  the  power  to  excite  vision.  2°.  Light  merely  clarifies  the 
medium  air. 

Light  makes  color  actually  visible,  the  working  intellect  makes 
the  phantasm  actually  knowable.  Color,  made  actually  visible 
by  light,  impresses  its  likeness  on  the  retina ;  the  phantasm, 
made  actually  knowable  by  the  working  intellect,  impresses  its 
likeness  on  the  receiving  intellect.  Color  in  tlie  presence  of 
light  becomes  actually  visible,  to  the  extent  that  it  becomes  able 
to  excite  vision,  not  to  the  extent  that  it  is  actually  seen.  The 
phantasm  is  made  actually  knowable  by  the  working  intellect, 
to  the  extent  that  it  becomes  able  to  excite  the  receiving  intel- 
lect, not  to  the  extent  that  it  is  actually  known. 

The  two  kinds  of  illumination  for  phantasm  are  root-illumina- 
tion and  formal  illumination.  Eoot-illumination  is  derived  from 
intellectual  soul.  Because  sensation  in  man  is  more  potent  than 
in  brutes,  phantasm  is  more  potent  in  man  and  better  fitted  to 
produce  image.  Formal  comes  from  fact  that  working  intel- 
lect enters  into  intimate  union  with  phantasm,  and  raises  it  as 
principal  raises  instrumental.  Because  immaterial,  its  union 
with  phantasm  is  restricted  to  latter's  universal  aspect,  neglect- 
ing its  material  surroundings.     Hence   a  twofold   abstraction, 


THESIS  VII  139 

1.  formal,  2,  causal.  One  rids  the  phantasm  of  material  sur- 
roundings, and  views  it  in  the  light  of  a  universal,  making  it, 
as  far  as  view  is  concerned,  homogeneous  with  the  receiving  in- 
tellect, or  immaterial.  The  other  views  the  phantasm  as  ma- 
terial or  stuff  for  the  cause  of  intellectual  knowledge  or  thought. 
The  working  intellect  plays  the  part  of  formal  cause ;  the  phan- 
tasm, the  part  of  material  cause.  The  image  is  spiritual  on  the 
side  of  the  working  intellect ;  it  is  representative  of  the  object  on 
the  side  of  the  phantasm.  The  phantasm  therefore  contributes 
efficiency  and  determinateness  to  the  working  intellect  in  the 
production  of  the  image.  The  illumination  and  the  abstraction 
attributed  to  the  working  intellect  are  one  and  the  same  act. 
Light  at  the  same  time  manifests  color  in  the  object  and  ab- 
stracts from  its  sweetness  and  other  qualities,  being  of  no  serv- 
ice to  impress  them  on  the  palate  or  other  senses. 

Opinions  of  Mastrius,  Conimbricenses  and  Others 

The  working  intellect  acts  not  on  the  phantasm,  but  with  it. 
The  phantasm  undergoes  no  intrinsic  change  or  elevation;  but 
the  addition  of  outside  light  from  the  working  intellect  raises 
it  to  the  dignity  of  participation  as  an  efficient  cause  in  the 
production  of  the  image.  The  working  intellect  is  no  complete 
and  whole  cause  of  the  image;  the  phantasm  cooperates  with  it 
in  the  role  of  a  less  principal  cause.  The  image  in  point  of 
being  is  spiritual,  and  this  quality  it  gets  from  the  working  in- 
tellect; in  point  of  power  to  represent,  it  pictures  the  object, 
and  this  it  gets  from  the  phantasm.  Matter  cannot  act  on 
spirit  as  a  complete  and  whole  cause,  or  even  as  a  more  prin- 
cipal cause;  but  it  can  act  on  spirit  as  a  partial  or  less  prin- 
cipal cause.  The  phantasm  becomes  no  instrument,  in  the 
hands  of  the  working  intellect,  with  intrinsic  elevation  like  that 
of  the  pen  in  the  writer's  hand.  It  simply  remains  a  less  prin- 
cipal cause,  acting  in  conjunction  with  the  working  intellect, 
like  the  boy  aided  by  four  others  in  hauling  a  boat  that  calls  for 
the  strength  of  five.  The  boy's  power  is  not  intrinsically  modi- 
fied, it  is  merely  helped  from  the  outside.  The  two  together, 
phantasm  and  intellect,  constitute  a  single  whole  and  complete 
cause ;  one  contributing  to  the  image  its  spirituality ;  the  other, 
its  representative  value.  The  Conimbricenses  say  that  the  phan- 
tasm, in  spite  of  its  material  nature,  is  made  fitter  and  more 


140  PSYCHOLOGY 

able  by  extrinsic  union  with  the  working  intellect  to  produce 
beyond  its  natural  capacity  a  spiritual  effect.  With  them  the 
illumination  of  the  phantasm  is  not  root-illumination,  as  Ca- 
preolus  thinks;  nor  formal,  as  Cajetan  thinks;  but  efficient. 
They  are  far  from  meaning  that  the  working  intellect  intrin- 
sically modifies  the  phantasm  by  pouring  new  light  into  it. 
But,  like  a  light  shining  from  the  outside,  it  raises  it  by  a  share 
in  its  own  radiance  to  the  dignity  of  participation  as  a  partial 
cause  in  the  effective  production  of  the  image.  The  working 
intellect  is  called  an  outside  light,  not  to  deny  it  the  union  in 
force  between  the  two  partial  causes,  but  to  deny  anything  like 
intrinsic  elevation,  resulting  to  the  phantasm  from  a  share  in 
the  working  intellect's  own  being  or  reality.  They  vindicate 
efficient  causality  to  the  phantasm  for  two  reasons,  to  secure 
determinateness,  and  to  account  for  the  element  of  representa- 
tion in  the  image.  They  reject  model  causality  on  the  ground 
that  it  is  rather  passive  than  active ;  whereas  the  causality  of  the 
phantasm  is  essentially  active.  The  working  intellect  does  not 
produce  the  image  from  the  phantasm,  as  the  artist  or  sculptor 
produces  his  painting  or  statue,  with  an  eye  on  his  model. 

Opinions  of  Cajetan,  Capreolus  and  Scotus 

These  writers  agree  with  us  in  ascribing  efTicient  causality  to 
the  phantasm.  Cajetan  and  Capreolus  make  the  phantasm  an 
instrumental  cause;  Scotus  with  us  makes  it  a  partial  cause, 
uniting  with  the  intellect  to  form  the  complete  and  whole  cause 
of  the  image.  Each  of  the  two  opinions  is  highly  probable. 
Instrument,  however,  must  be  taken  in  its  wider  sense;  and 
must  be  made  to  mean  whatever  lends  assistance  to  another  in 
the  production  of  an  effect.  The  phantasm  is  no  instrument  in 
strict  and  proper  sense,  because  it  derives  no  intrinsic  elevation 
from  the  working  intellect.  When  two  such  causes  are  hetero- 
geneous, like  the  phantasm  and  working  intellect,  one  cannot  of 
itself  produce  an  effect  of  the  same  nature  as  the  effect  ascribed 
to  both.  The  parity  of  two  lamps  and  one  lamp  producing 
light,  fails  in  this  that  the  partial  causes  are  homogeneous. 

P.S.  Suarez  thus  explains  the  whole  process  of  thought. 
With  the  eyes  we  see  Peter;  this  sensile  image  is  transferred 
to  the  imagination,  where  it  becomes  a  phantasm;  the  working 
intellect  in  union  with  the  phantasm  produces  the  individual 


THESIS  VII  141 

particular  imprinted  intelligible  image  of  Peter,  and  the  re- 
ceiving intellect  in  union  with  this  last  produces  the  idea  of 
Peter,  who  is  an  individual  particular  object.  Then  the  re- 
ceiving intellect  by  a  second  effort,  prescinding  or  abstractive 
in  nature,  without  any  new  image,  omits  all  the  individuating 
attributes  of  Peter,  without  a  care  for  his  individual  differences 
with  other  men,  forms  an  idea  of  his  specific  nature,  his  quality 
of  man,  and  this  idea  is  what  we  call  the  direct  universal.  At 
last  by  a  third  effort,  after  employing  the  same  process  with 
regard  to  several  men,  by  a  method  comparative  in  nature,  this 
quality  of  man  in  Peter  is  conceived  as  a  quality  common  to 
a  multitude  of  individuals,  and  in  this  way  is  conceived  what 
we  call  the  reflex  universal. 

PEINCIPLES 

A.  The  greater  contains  the  less.  Ergo,  the  intellect  by  it- 
self is  equal  to  the  task  of  producing  the  image. 

Answer.  In  its  own  order,  I  grant;  in  another  order,  I  deny. 
The  intellect  cannot  by  itself  understand,  neither  can  it  produce 
the  image.  The  phantasm  is  needed  not  in  the  cognoscitive 
order,  but  in  the  order  of  determinateness  and  representation. 
Four  quarts  of  wine  do  not  contain  three  quarts  of  water.  It 
might  be  true  of  milk. 

B.  No  proportion  between  phantasm  and  working  intellect. 
Ergo. 

Answer.  In  point  of  being,  I  grant;  in  point  of  causality  or 
power,  I  deny.  The  phantasm  is  not  formally  and  intrinsically 
united  with  the  intellect. 

C.  An  active  is  superior  to  a  passive  agent.  Phantasm  is  ac- 
tive, intellect  is  passive. 

Answer.  In  question  of  two  whole  and  complete  causes,  I 
grant;  in  question  of  two  partial  causes,  I  deny.  Besides,  the 
agens  is  active  as  well  as  passive. 

D.  Matter  cannot  act  on  spirit.     Ergo. 

Answer.  As  whole  cause  or  more  principal,  I  grant;  as  par- 
tial or  less  principal,  I  deny. 

E.  Image  is  made  out  of  phantasm.     Ergo,  material  cause. 
Answer.     As  virtually  containing  the  image,  I  grant;  as  stuff 

of  image,  I  deny. 


142  PSYCHOLOGY 

F.  The  effect  follows  the  weaker  of  the  two  causes. 
Answer.     In   syllogisms,   1   grant;  outside   of   syllogisms,   I 

deny.  The  saying  holds  good  for  the  conclusion  in  a  syllogism. 
In  this  present  case  the  effect  follows  both  causes,  getting  spir- 
ituality from  the  working  intellect,  and  representative  power 
from  the  phantasm. 

G.  Image  cannot  be  explained,  unless  phantasm  receives  some- 
thing from  intellect. 

Answer.     Example  of  boys  hauling  boat  with  engine  explains 
things. 


THESIS  VIII 

There  exists  in  man  a  rational  appetite  or  will,  which  can 
desire  every  good  proposed  by  the  intellect,  and  nothing  but 
good.  All  the  objects  of  its  actual  desires  must  in  some  measure 
assume  a  relation  of  fitness  with  the  subject. 

Maher,  pp.  378-425;  208-228.     Jouin,  pp.  171-180. 

Division.  Our  thesis  contains  four  parts.  I.  Man  has  a  will. 
II.  The  will  has  for  object  every  good.  III.  The  will  never  has 
evil  for  object.  IV.  Every  object  of  man's  wishes  must  re- 
dound to  the  wisher's  interests. 

QUESTION 

All  morality  resides  in  the  will,  and  a  thorough  knowledge  of 
Ethics  is  impossible  without  an  equally  thorough  knowledge  of 
the  nature  of  the  human  will.  Freedom  of  will  is  an  all  im- 
portant factor  in  the  discussion;  but  experience  is  so  loud  in 
its  declaration  of  this  natural  dogma  that  we  can  for  the  pres- 
ent leave  it  untouched.  It  is  a  large  question,  and  will  get 
proper  attention  in  next  thesis.  Here  we  contend  that  man  has 
a  will,  that  good  is  the  only  object  capable  of  setting  its  activ- 
ity in  motion,  and  that  an  element  of  selfishness  is  naturally, 
and,  therefore,  necessarily  bound  up  in  every  human  desire. 

TEEMS 

Rational  appetite  or  will  is  a  spiritual,  inorganic  faculty  of 
the  soul,  capable  of  seeking  good  by  acts  elicited  under  the  di- 
rection of  the  intellect.  It  is  opposed  to  sensitive  appetite,  com- 
mon to  man  and  beast,  dealing  with  merely  material  or  sensi- 
ble goods.  The  most  apparent  difference  between  these  two  fac- 
ulties is  furnished  forth  in  the  freedom  inherent  in  one,  alien 
to  the  other.     There  are,  of  course,  other  differences  more  im- 

143 


144  PSYCHOLOGY 

portant  and  more  characteristic;  but  since  they  depend  for 
illustration  on  objects  not  common  to  man  and  beast,  a  com- 
mon foundation  for  comparison  is  wanting  and  contrast  loses. 
But,  supposing  the  objects  of  appetite  in  some  definite  instance 
the  same,  freedom  in  the  case  of  man,  necessity  in  the  case  of 
brutes,  become  distinguishing  characteristics.  Thus,  a  hungry 
horse  when  confronted  with  oats,  and  equipped  with  all  the 
usual  requirements  for  the  enjoyment  of  a  good  meal,  cannot 
refrain  from  eating.  A  man  on  the  very  verge  of  starvation, 
can,  in  the  midst  of  plenty  and  in  spite  of  most  vehement  de- 
sire and  utmost  relish,  shut  his  lips  tight,  and  persistently  re- 
fuse to  touch  food.  The  reason  is  plain.  A  horse's  highest 
faculty  of  desire  is  sensitive  appetite,  a  necessary  agent,  which 
in  the  presence  of  certain  conditions  must  act.  Man  has,  in 
addition  to  this  sensitive  appetite,  a  spiritual  faculty  of  desire 
called  will,  a  free  agent  forced  to  act  by  no  combination  of  cir- 
cumstances, by  no  array  of  outward  conditions.  The  will  in 
man  is  absolute  mistress  of  all  the  sensitive  appetite's  motions, 
and  can  on  all  occasions  command  them  authoritatively.  The 
will  can,  therefore,  say  nay  to  whatever  sensitive  instincts 
threaten  harm  to  man's  higher  good.  It  can  for  purposes  of 
virtue  order  fasting,  though  the  body  would  be  much  benefited 
by  feasting.  It  can,  for  purposes  of  fame,  keep  out  of  bed 
whole  nights  at  a  time  men  bent  on  winning  an  election  or 
solving  some  deep  intellectual  problem.  But,  like  other  mas- 
ters, the  w4U  can,  if  so  inclined,  surrender  its  supremacy,  and 
follow  the  behests  of  lower  appetites.  To  escape  a  quarrel  with 
the  senses,  it  can  eat,  drink,  and  make  merry,  even  to  the  death 
of  the  soul.  It  can  yield  to  sleep,  that  lands  the  sleeper  in  a 
hospital  or  the  morgue. 

Every  good.  Like  the  two  other  transcendental  qualities  of 
being,  one  and  true,  good  admits  of  no  essential  definition.  The 
three  might  be  called  being  without  division,  being  with  mind- 
conformity,  being  with  fitness;  but  indivision,  conformity,  and 
fitness  are  themselves  being;  and  what  ought  to  be  the  specific 
difference  is  contained  in  the  genus.  Good  can  he  best  de- 
scribed as  ivhal  a  thing  possesses  in  virtue  of  its  perfection, 
completeness  or  finish. 

Aristotle  offers  tJiis  other  description,  "  Good  is  what  every- 
thing seeks."     The  first  assigns  the  real  cause  of  a  thing's  good- 


THESIS  VIII  145 

ness.  A  thing  is  good,  not  because  ever3'thing  seeks  it,  but  be- 
cause it  is  perfect,  complete  or  finished.  Quite  the  contrary, 
one  thing  is  sought  by  another  because  it  is  good.  Transcen- 
dental goodness  in  foundation,  is  a  thing's  being  or  perfection; 
formall}^,  it  is  the  same,  with  the  quality  of  fitness  or  desirable- 
ness added.  Perfection  is  nothing  more  than  finish.  Thus,  a 
work  is  said  to  be  perfected  when  finished;  God's  attributes  are 
said  to  be  perfections,  because  they  are  the  ne  plus  ultra  in  their 
several  spheres.  God's  wisdom  is  a  perfection,  because  it  is  as 
capacious  as  wisdom  can  well  be,  when  pushed  to  its  limit.  Our 
wisdom  is  perfect,  when  it  is  as  far-reaching  as  man  can  ambi- 
tion. Every  class  of  beings  has  its  own  grade  of  perfection, 
and  our  wisdom  can  as  truly  be  called  a  perfection  as  God's. 
However,  only  God's  wisdom  can  be  called  absolute  perfection. 
The  degrees  of  perfection  conceivable  are  without  number.  A 
thing  is  said  to  be  first  finished  or  made,  when  it  passes  from 
the  state  of  possibility  to  that  of  actuality.  A  clock  is  said  to 
be  finished  or  completed,  when  from  having  been  a  clock  in 
possibility  it  becomes  a  clock  in  fact.  After  its  completion  a 
being  can  acquire  other  and  other  perfections.  Hence  the  first 
obvious  division  of  good  things;  good  in  some  respects,  and 
good  in  every  respect.  God  alone  is  absolutely  good;  but  our 
thesis  holds  true,  if  every  being  is  good  in  some  particular  or 
other.     Another  division  of  goods : 


fl.  Eeal 


[2.  Apparent 


3.  Becoming 

4.  Agreeable 

5.  Useful 


Explanation  of  Diagram:  1.  Good  in  itself,  that  which  is  in 
reality  and  truth  the  good  it  is  thought  to  be,  and  is  suited  to 
the  desires  most  in  harmony  with  the  nature  that  seeks  it.  Such 
desires  have  their  origin  in  the  specific  portion  of  a  being. 

2.  Evil  in  itself;  good  in  the  mind;  apprehended  as  good; 
that  which  is  not  the  good  it  is  thought  to  be,  because  it  is 
suited  to  desires  less  in  harmony  with  a  nature.  Such  desires 
have  their  origin  in  the  generic  portion  of  a  being.  The  spe- 
cific portion  of  man  is  rationality,  his  generic  portion  is  ani- 
mality.  Desires  originating  in  his  reason,  his  spiritual  desires, 
aim  at  his  only  true  good;  desires  originating  in  his  body,  the 


146  PSYCHOLOGY 

seat  of  animality,  his  carnal  desires,  have  only  apparent  good 
for  object,  and  are  often  directly  opposed  to  his  real  good.  Ap- 
parent good  is  real  good,  when  reason  rules.  Eeal  good  opposed 
to  reason  becomes  apparent. 

S.  Very  like  real  good,  inasmuch,  as  it  is  something  befitting 
the  whole  man,  and  is  loved  for  itself.  And  yet  hardly  any 
good  is  so  purely  becoming  as  not  to  admit  modifications, 
partaking  of  the  nature  of  the  useful  and  the  agreeable,  e.  g. 
virtue. 

Ji-.  Befitting  man  as  a  whole,  and  loved  not  precisely  because 
of  itself,  but  because  of  the  pleasure  attendant  on  its  possession. 
It  often  partakes  of  the  nature  of  an  apparent  good,  inasmuch 
as  it  ministers  to  only  what  is  generic  in  man,  and  opposes  rea- 
son, e.  g.  trip  to  the  country. 

5.  Sought  not  at  all  for  itself,  but  because  it  serves  as  a  step- 
ping-stone to  some  other  good.  It  would  not  be  missed,  if  only 
the  good  it  helps  to  procure  could  be  obtained  without  its  assist- 
ance, e.  g.  medicine. 

N.B.  Nearly  every  good  in  nature  is  a  mixture  of  the  three, 
and  is  one  or  other  according  to  the  view  taken  of  it. 

Other  examples  are  light  for  plants ;  moisture  for  roots ;  straws 
for  the  swallow;  downward  motion  for  a  stone,  rest  for  the  same, 
occupation  of  proper  place. 

Proposed  hy  the  intellect.  The  will  is  a  blind  faculty  and 
needs  guidance.  Though  condemned  to  inactivity  till  it  re- 
ceives a  message  from  the  mind,  it  invariably  shapes  its  own 
course,  and  reserves  to  itself  the  right  to  accept  or  reject  the  ad- 
vice of  its  friend  the  intellect. 

Nothing  hut  good.  Since  everything  positive  is  good,  the  ca- 
pacity of  human  desire  is  without  limit.  Evil  is  a  negation, 
and  sin  itself  physically  considered,  or  viewed  as  a  positive 
something,  is  good.  Evil  is  the  denial  of  good.  More  properly, 
it  consists  in  the  absence  of  some  good  that  a  being  should 
have  or  own.  Hence  want  of  sight  is  no  evil  in  a  stone  or  a 
tree;  but  it  is  an  evil  in  a  horse  or  a  man.  Something  good 
always  serves  as  a  foundation  for  evil.  In  other  words,  there 
is  nothing  in  the  universe  wholly  and  solely  bad.  Lazy  pupils 
furnish  the  leaves  of  the  trees  with  their  food  in  the  shape  of 
nitrogen.    Whatever  is,  is  good;  good  and  being  are  convertible. 


THESIS  VIII  147 


PEOOFS  I,  II,  III,  IV 

I.  1°.  Man  often  longs  for  objects,  which  are  beyond  the 
sphere  of  sensitive  appetite.  Ergo,  besides  sensitive  appetite, 
man  must  be  equipped  with  some  superior  faculty  of  desire, 
spiritual  and  rational,  a  will. 

With  regard  to  the  Antecedent.  Virtue,  eternal  life,  God, 
honor  are  such  objects. 

With  regard  to  the  Consequent.  No  effect  can  be  without  its 
proportionate  cause. 

2°.  God  has  implanted  in  every  creature  a  tendency  or  mo- 
tion towards  self-perfection  in  strict  accord  with  that  creature's 
nature.  But  man's  nature  is  supra-sensitive,  intellectual,  ra- 
tional. Ergo,  the  faculty  in  man  corresponding  to  this  tend- 
ency or  motion  is  supra-sensitive,  rational,  a  will. 

II.  1°.  Experience  is  witness  that  no  conceivable  good  es- 
capes the  attention  of  man.     Ergo. 

2°.  The  energy  of  the  wiU  has  for  measure  the  energy  of  the 
intellect.  But  the  intellect  is  capable  of  knowing  all  entity,  all 
being,  all  good.     Ergo,  the  will  can  desire  every  good. 

III.  No  faculty  can  embrace  a  thing  outside  the  sphere  of 
its  formal  object.  But  evil,  the  opposite  of  good,  is  outside  the 
formal  object  of  the  will.  Ergo,  the  will  cannot  desire  evil, 
i.  e.  it  can  desire  nothing  but  good. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  Evil,  as  such,  is  nothing.  Evil, 
as  such,  is  absence  of  good;  and  good  proposed  by  the  intellect 
is  the  will's  formal  object. 

IV.  1°.  The  good  we  seek,  we  want  for  ourselves  or  others. 
If  for  ourselves,  our  statement  stands.  If  for  others,  then,  be- 
cause these  others  are  some  way  connected  with  us,  their  good 
is  in  a  measure  our  advantage;  or  we  find  in  the  very  act  of 
wishing  some  feature  of  self-profit,  whether  it  be  usefulness,  or 
pleasure,  or  fitness.     Ergo. 

N.B.  From  acts  of  benevolence  the  quality  of  fitness  can 
never  be  absent. 

2°.  Every  movement  of  the  will  is  a  striving  towards  some 
object,  in  which  the  will  seeks  rest;  and  no  agent  looks  for  rest 
in  a  good  thing  absolutely  without  the  relation  of  fitness  for 
himself.     Ergo. 


148  PSYCHOLOGY 


PKINCIPLES 


A.  The  last  part  of  our  thesis  is  at  seeming  variance  with 
what  theology  teaches  concerning  perfect  love  of  God.  Perfect 
love  of  God  is  love  of  such  sort  as  thoroughly  excludes  all  mo- 
tives of  selfishness,  and  tends  towards  God  for  His  sake  alone. 
Imperfect  love  has  for  basis  and  support,  not  the  infinite  per- 
fections of  God,  but  some  profit  we  expect  to  derive  from  the 
act,  e.  g.  eternal  happiness  in  Heaven,  escape  from  the  pains 
of  hell.  It  would  thus  seem  that,  because  a  man's  own  interests 
cannot  be  absent  from  any  movement  of  his  will,  perfect  love 
of  God,  which  of  its  very  nature  banishes  all  thought  of  self, 
becomes  impossible.  But  a  little  reflection  removes  the  diffi- 
culty. ^Nothing,  certainly,  is  more  in  harmony  with  the  dig- 
nity of  human  nature  than  perfect  love  of  God ;  and  every  act 
of  the  kind,  whether  the  agent  adverts  to  the  fact  or  not,  is 
a  consummate  perfection.  Therefore,  at  the  very  instant  of  per- 
fect love  man  necessarily  assumes  a  new  dignity,  and  adds  to 
his  wealth  of  perfections.  All  this,  too,  without  once  making 
his  own  profit  the  ground  for  positing  his  act  of  love.  Of 
course,  if  he  changes  his  motive,  and  makes  the  fitness  of  the 
act  the  reason  for  his  acting,  he  falls  away  at  once  from  per- 
fect love.  In  other  words,  self-profit  is  a  condition  necessarily 
involved  in  even  perfect  love  of  God.  It  never  rises  to  the  dig- 
nity of  a  motive.  Or,  as  theologians  express  it,  self-profit  is 
the  ontological  root  of  even  perfect  love,  it  is  not  perfect  love's 
motive-root.  The  distinction  means  simply  this,  tliat,  inde- 
pendently of  the  lover's  intention,  the  element  of  self-profit  is 
mixed  up  with  every  object  able  to  elicit  emotions  of  love.  This 
element  is  wrapped  up  in  the  very  being  of  the  object  in  ques- 
tion, and  cannot  be  separated  from  it.  But  nothing  prevents 
the  lover  from  neglecting  in  his  calculations  this  inborn  element, 
and  choosing  for  motive  whatever  consideration  he  sees  fit  to 
adopt.  This  consideration,  to  constitute  an  act  of  perfect  love, 
must  be  God  alone,  or  God's  infinite  perfections. 

B.  An  elicited  act  proceeds  from  the  will  solely,  it  begins  and 
ends  in  the  will.  An  ordered  act  proceeds  from  the  will  in  con- 
junction with  another  faculty;  it  begins  in  the  will  and  ends 
with,  e.  g.  the  intellect,  the  senses,  or  the  power  of  motion.     A 


THESIS  VIII  149 

mere  wish  is  an  elicited  act;  the  raising  of  the  hand  is  an  or- 
dered act. 

C.  The  intellect,  the  end,  and  the  sensitive  appetite  act  on  the 
will.  The  intellect  exerts  a  moral  influence  on  the  will  by  way 
of  persuasion,  inasmuch  as  a  formal  Judgment  of  the  mind  is 
a  prerequisite  for  deliberate  and  free  acts  of  the  will.  In  other 
words,  the  intellect  sets  the  will  in  motion  by  proposing  to  it 
something  desirable.  The  end  exerts  figurative,  not  a  physical, 
influence;  inasmuch  as  it  attracts  the  will  by  its  desirableness. 
Its  effect  is  wholly  confined  to  the  intentional  order,  not  the 
order  of  execution.  The  sensitive  appetite  exerts  merely  indi- 
rect influence  on  the  will;  inasmuch  as  it  vindicates  to  some 
object  an  appearance  of  fitness,  and,  by  concentrating  the  atten- 
tion on  the  good  sought,  affects  the  mind's  judgment,  and 
through  its  agency  the  will. 

D.  Apart  from  the  soul's  vegetative  powers,  the  will  can  issue 
orders  to  all  the  soul's  forces.  It  wields  over  the  sensitive  ap- 
petite the  authority  of  a  king  over  his  subjects,  not  that  of  a 
master  over  his  slave.  It  rouses  the  mind  to  attention,  and  to 
assent  in  judgments  not  immediately  evident. 

E.  The  manner  of  desire  is  the  characteristic  that  chiefly  dis- 
tinguishes appetites,  not  their  objects.  Eational  appetite  de- 
termines itself,  shapes  its  own  course.  Sensitive  appetite  is  de- 
termined from  without,  is  guided  by  another.  The  objects  of 
the  two  appetites  may  be  identical,  the  manner  of  desire  is  in 
each  case  different. 


THESIS  IX 

Man's  will  enjoys  freedom  of  choice,  and  no  previous  judg- 
ment holds  it  to  a  set  decision.  Fatalism,  therefore,  and  De- 
terminism are  absurd. 

EicTcahy.     Free  Will  and  Four  English  Philosophers. 

QUESTION 

We  stand  for  free  will.  Our  opponents  stand  for  Fatalism 
or  Determinism.  The  Calvinists  or  Presbyterians  as  a  body 
belong  to  this  class,  because  of  their  belief  in  predestination. 
Determinists  pretend  to  differ  from  fatalists,  but  the  difference 
is  small. 

TERMS 

Will  is  rational  appetite,  a  spiritual,  inorganic  faculty,  ap- 
petitive of  good  at  the  instigation  of  the  intellect.  It  seeks 
good,  shuns  evil;  and  its  various  operations  are  grouped  under 
the  nine  names  already  attributed  to  the  manifestation  of  pas- 
sion or  sensitive  appetite,  as  species  of  the  two  generic  emo- 
tions, love  and  hate.  They  are  desire,  delight,  hope,  despair; 
abhorrence,  displeasure,  fear,  courage ;  and  anger.  Though 
their  names  are  the  same,  the  operations  are  quite  different. 
Love  and  desire  in  the  will  are  quite  other  than  love  and  de- 
sire in  the  appetite ;  and  the  kind  of  knowledge  basing  the  emo- 
tions is  the  radical  measure  of  their  difference.  They  are  as 
far  apart  in  nature  and  perfection  as  intellect  and  sense.  In 
man  sense  and  intellect  work  together  in  mutual  harmony,  and 
the  two  appetites,  superior  and  inferior,  will  and  appetite,  so 
easily  merge  that  it  is  a  task  to  make  separate  study  of  them 
in  our  consciousness.  Sufl&ce  it  to  say  that  the  passions  or 
manifestations  of  sensitive  appetite  betray  themselves  in  body- 
changes,  and  turn  invariably  on  material,  concrete  and  par- 
ticular goods;  while  the  manifestations  of  will,  our  wishes,  re- 

150 


THESIS  IX  151 

strict  themselves  to  the  soul  and  regularly  turn  on  spiritual, 
abstract  and  universal  goods.  When  particular  goods  occupy 
the  will's  attention,  they  are  viewed  in  the  light  of  universals; 
and  we  were  at  some  pains  to  make  this  point  clear  in  our 
Ethics,  Thesis  V.  We  could  perhaps  with  profit  label  emo- 
tions of  the  will  in  a  way  calculated  to  keep  them  distinct  from 
the  passions;  and  with  all  modesty  we  venture  these  several 
names,  wish,  enjoyment,  longing,  discouragement;  aversion,  sad- 
ness, dread,  fortitude  and  rage.  It  might  be  better  still  to  call 
the  passions  desire,  delight,  longing,  despair;  abhorrence,  sad- 
ness, dread,  courage ;  and  rage ;  reserving  for  movements  of  the 
will  wish,  joy,  hope,  discouragement;  aversion,  displeasure,  fear, 
fortitude;  and  anger.  Sense  precedes  intellect  in  the  field  of 
knowledge,  and  in  the  field  of  desire  appetite  is  before  will. 
Previous  delight  would  seem  to  be  an  indispensable  requisite  for 
desire.  The  child  first  experiences  good  resident  in  color, 
sound,  food  or  whatever  else;  delight  results,  and  at  some  long 
or  short  interval  after  the  experience  closes,  some  incident  awak- 
ens a  phantasm  of  the  now  absent  good,  and  desire  ensues.  In 
a  parallel  way,  intellectual  knowledge  of  some  absent  blessing 
can  urge  the  will  to  wish  its  possession.  In  last  analysis,  every 
wish  involves  a  triple  process,  thought  of  good;  appreciation 
of  its  goodness ;  and  tension,  attraction,  impulse  towards  it. 
Sense,  the  regulator  of  passion,  is  of  very  wide  extent,  and 
practically  without  limit.  Utilitarians  are  wrong,  when  they 
maintain  that  all  our  wishes  are  towards  pleasure  and  away 
from  pain.  The  will's  formal  object  is  good ;  and  good  is  three- 
fold, becoming,  agreeable  and  useful;  honestum,  delectabile  and 
utile.  Becoming  good  can  stir  the  will  as  well  as  agreeable 
good;  and,  when  that  is  the  case,  our  wishes  are  not  towards 
pleasure  and  away  from  pain.  Many  of  our  desires  are  un- 
selfish, and  primarily  trample  our  personal  pleasure.  We  can 
choose  right  for  its  own  sake  against  the  maximum  of  pleasure. 
The  Hedonistic  paradox  vouches  for  the  same  truth;  deliberate 
pursuit  of  pleasure  is  suicidal,  pleasure  kills  pleasure. 

Choice.  Choice  supposes  a  conflict  of  desires.  The  stronger 
desire  ought  to  win,  though  free  will  can,  up  to  the  last  mo- 
ment, keep  it  from  victory.  The  strength  or  weakness  of  a 
desire  is  measured  by  the  force  of  its  motives;  and  every  mo- 
tive is  a  mixture  of  these  several  elements,  subjective  conscious- 


152  PSYCHOLOGY 

ness  of  the  object's  goodness,  its  own  objective  goodness,  char- 
acter of  the  man,  and  degree  of  attention  or  absorption  given 
to  object.  Many  of  our  acts  are  spontaneous,  and  void  of  de- 
liberation, e.  g.  dressing,  eating,  walking,  talking.  In  acts  of 
the  kind  choice  plays  little  or  no  part;  and  they  are,  as  a  rule, 
morally  right  or  wrong  indirectly  and  in  cause.  At  other  times 
we  are  beset  by  different  motives,  urging  different  courses  of 
conduct;  and  we  simply  must  choose.  Some  of  these  motives 
are  moral  obligation,  worldly  advantage,  pleasure.  Delibera- 
tion then  has  place.  We  weigh  things,  Ijalance  them,  and 
often  the  process  covers  only  an  inappreciable  amount  of  time. 
Choice  or  decision  follows;  and  this  act  is  constituted  by  the 
acceptance  of  some  suggested  course,  or  its  rejection.  Psy- 
chologists distinguish  four  different  types  of  choice  or  selec- 
tion, and  they  admit  of  easy  understanding.  Eeasouable  deci- 
sion has  clear  balance  on  one  side.  Impetuous  decision  is  im- 
patient of  suspense.  Acquiescent  follows  present  inclination, 
line  of  least  resistance.  Anti-impulsive  calls  for  painful  and 
prolonged  endeavor;  it  is  like  driving  a  thorn  into  one's  own 
flesh.  James,  vol.  2,  p.  534.  All  four  kinds  are  sure  signs  of 
freedom,  the  fourth  kind  is  unimpeachable  evidence.  Volition 
is  another  name  for  choice,  and  quite  a  different  thing  from  mere 
desire.  Desire  may  embrace  two  contending  courses  of  action, 
while  volition  necessarily  embraces  one  and  rejects  the  other. 
Some  descriptions  of  common  terms.  Instinct  means  uncon- 
sciously purposive  impulse.  Impulse  means  tendency  towards 
good  obscurely  felt;  it  is  feeling-prompted  movement.  Desire 
implies  tension,  yearning  towards  absent  good.  Motive  is 
whatever  attracts  the  will.  Intention  is  end  energizing  the  will. 
Choice  is  selection  of  means.  Purpose  signifies  deliberately 
formed  intention  with  regard  to  a  series  of  future  acts.  Wish 
is  mere  desire  without  effort  or  intention. 

Choice  is  a  manifestation  of  self-control,  a  very  important 
factor  in  morality;  and  tliis  control  is  pliysical,  prudential  or 
moral.  Physical  is  exerted  when  we  keep  down  our  temper, 
keep  down  manifestations  of  it.  Prudential  is  control  of 
thought.  It  may  be  direct  or  indirect.  Direct,  when  one  says, 
I  will  not  be  angry.  This  is  a  weak  means,  because  it  fixes 
attention  on  the  feeling  we  want  to  escape.  Indirect,  when 
we  transfer  our  attention  to  some  other  matter;  when  we  make 


THESIS  IX  153 

a  determined  effort  to  think  of  something  else.  Children  should 
be  trained  to  self-control.  They  are  helped  to  self-restraint  by 
recollection  of  a  past  prohibition  or  painful  experience.  Hence, 
spare  the  rod,  and  spoil  the  child.  Hence  judicious  expression 
of  approval  or  disapproval  is  a  great  need.  Self-control  comes 
after  physical  appetite,  or  instincts  and  desires.  It  develops 
with  habits,  which  are  acquired  aptitudes  for  particular  modes 
of  action.  With  Carpenter  the  physiological  basis  of  habits  is 
growth  of  organism  to  mode  in  which  exercised.  He  makes 
their  psychological  basis  association  by  contiguity.  Habit  is  a 
second  nature  or  bent.  Some  rules  for  habits.  Bain  offers 
this.  Make  a  vigorous  start,  and  admit  no  exception  till  habit 
is  rooted.  James  has  this :  Make  your  nerves  an  ally,  not  an 
enemy.  Seize  first  chance  to  keep  resolution.  Add  a  little 
gratuitous  exercise  every  day.  Self-denial  is  the  only  means 
to  strengthen  will.  Order  is  a  great  help.  School-life  and 
discipline  of  games  contribute  much  to  same  result.  This  self 
control  is  needed  for  individual  and  state ;  it  is  the  moral  ele- 
ment in  education ;  there  can  be  no  morality  without  religion. 
Character  is  a  combination  of  habits  and  temperament;  it  is 
part  nurture,  and  part  nature.  Characters  are  strong,  obsti- 
nate and  vacillating  or  weak.  Temperaments  are  choleric  or 
energetic,  sanguine  or  vivacious,  phlegmatic  or  somnolent,  mel- 
ancholic or  introspective. 

Fatalism.  For  a  fair  exponent  of  Fatalism  we  choose  Jona- 
than Edwards.  He  was  born  at  Windsor  on  the  banks  of  the 
Connecticut  in  1703.  At  thirteen  he  entered  Yale,  when  seven- 
teen graduated,  and  at  the  early  age  of  nineteen  was  a  preacher 
in  'New  York,  He  labored  afterwards  in  and  about  Boston, 
wrote  much  of  a  metaphysical,  political  and  religious  nature, 
was  called  to  the  presidency  of  Princeton  University  in  Jan- 
uary, 1758,  and  two  months  later  yielded  to  a  fatal  attack  of 
smallpox.  He  was  a  lovable  character,  and  a  glance  at  his  dead 
portrait  is  sufficient  proof  that  to  know  him  was  to  revere  him. 
Friends,  allowing  their  affection  to  run  away  with  their  good 
sense,  thoughtlessly  lavish  on  him  such  titles  as  the  greatest 
theologian  that  lived  in  the  Christian  ages,  the  Metaphysician 
without  a  rival,  the  wisest  and  the  best  of  mankind.  There  is 
no  denying  that  he  was  a  pure  and  upright  man,  but  to  say 
that  he  knew  as  much  theology  as  some  of  to-day's  obscure  work- 


154  PSYCHOLOGY 

ers  is  an  exaggerated  untruth.  His  knowledge  of  metaphysics 
was  painfully  limited,  and  shockingly  at  fault  on  questions  that 
demanded  but  a  small  amount  of  penetration.  An  infatuated 
reviewer  hazards  the  remark  that  his  defense  of  Calvinistic  di- 
vinity remains  unanswered  and  unanswerable.  He  triumph- 
antly goes  on :  "  The  subject  since  then  has  hardly  been  one 
of  controversy,  though  it  has  been  occasionally  talked  about. 
Scholars  have  no  need  to  be  informed  that  Edwards  never  en- 
tertained any  such  doctrines  as  tlie  word  Fatalism  describes." 
Some  of  the  assertions  made  in  Edwards'  own  work  prove  this 
brag  arrant  nonsense.  We  quote  at  length,  "  We  say  with  pro- 
priety that  a  bird  let  loose  has  power  and  Liberty  to  fly.  But 
one  thing  more  I  would  observe  concerning  what  is  vulgarly 
called  Liberty;  namely,  that  power  and  opportunity  for  one  to 
do  and  conduct  as  he  will,  or  according  to  his  choice,  is  all 
that  is  meant  by  it,  without  taking  into  the  meaning  of  the 
word  anytliing  of  the  cause  or  original  of  that  choice;  or  at  all 
considering  how  the  person  came  to  have  such  a  volition; 
whether  it  was  caused  by  some  external  motive,  or  internal 
habitual  bias ;  whether  it  was  determined  by  some  internal  ante- 
cedent volition,  or  whether  it  happened  without  a  cause ;  whether 
it  was  necessarily  connected  with  something  foregoing,  or  not 
connected.  Let  the  person  come  by  his  volition  or  choice  how 
he  will;  yet  if  he  is  able,  and  there  is  nothing  in  the  way,  to 
hinder  his  pursuing  and  executing  his  will,  the  man  is  fully  and 
perfectly  free,  according  to  the  common  and  primary  notion  of 
freedom.  But  the  word  as  used  by  Arminians,  and  Pelagians, 
and  others,  who  oppose  the  Calvinists,  has  an  entirely  different 
signification.  These  several  things  belong  to  their  notion  of 
Liberty.  1st.  That  it  consists  in  a  self-determining  power  of 
the  will,  or  a  certain  sovereignty  the  will  has  over  itself  and  its 
own  acts,  whereby  it  determines  its  own  volitions,  so  as  not  to 
be  dependent  in  its  determinations  on  any  cause  without  itself, 
nor  determined  by  anything  prior  to  its  own  acts.  2nd.  In- 
difference belongs  to  Liberty  in  their  notion  of  it,  or  that  the 
mind  previous  to  the  act  of  volition  be  in  equilibrio.  3rd.  Con- 
tingence  is  another  thing  that  belongs  and  is  essential  to  it,  not 
in  the  common  acceptance  of  the  word,  as  that  has  been  already 
explained,  but  as  opposed  to  all  necessity  or  any  fixed  and  cer- 
tain  connection   with  some  previous  ground  or   reason  of  its 


THESIS  IX  155 

existence.  They  suppose  the  essence  of  Liberty  so  much  to 
consist  in  these  things,  that,  unless  the  will  of  man  be  free  in 
that  sense,  he  has  no  real  freedom,  howmuchsoever  he  may  be 
at  Liberty  to  act  according  to  his  will.  The  brute  creatures  are 
not  moral  agents,  because  they  do  not  act  from  choice  guided 
by  understanding,  or  with  a  capacity  of  reasoning  and  reflect- 
ing, but  only  from  instinct."  These  are  a  few  of  Edwards' 
utterances  concerning  the  will;  and  the  fear  they  betray  about 
entering  deeply  into  the  question,  and  their  insistence  on  ideas 
common  to  the  uneducated  crowd,  are  signs  of  a  surface-knowl- 
edge, afraid  of  the  light.  Fatalism  is  a  child  of  Satan,  and  like 
Satan  it  loves  the  dark.  We,  who  form  part  of  the  multitude 
styled  by  Calvinists  Arminians,  feel  confident  enough  of  our 
position  to  invite  scrutiny,  and  descend  to  the  minutest  pos- 
sible details.  These  Arminians  were  a  sect  among  Calvinists, 
who  rejected  Calvin's  doctrine  of  predestination.  They  got  their 
name  from  a  Dutch  professor.  Jacobus  Arminius,  who  headed 
the  sect,  called  Eemonstrants. 

The  author,  no  doubt,  means  well;  and  much  of  his  inac- 
curacy is  due  to  the  feebleness,  with  which  he  takes  hold  of  his 
subject,  and  the  dread  he  has  of  penetrating  beyond  mere  ap- 
pearances. Fatalism  is  consistent  with  the  freedom  of  a  bird, 
not  with  the  freedom  of  a  man;  it  is  consistent  with  immunity 
from  violence,  not  with  immunity  from  necessity.  In  the  case 
of  a  bird  freedom  is  used  figuratively.  Birds  are  free  only  by 
analogy.  Liberty  or  freedom  is  a  property  of  the  will,  in  much 
the  same  way  as  laughter  is  a  property  of  the  man.  Choice, 
taken  as  a  power,  may  be  identified  with  liberty  and  freedom; 
taken  as  an  act,  it  is  the  final  result  or  effect  of  the  will's 
operation.  The  will  itself  is  best  defined  as  rational  appetite, 
that  faculty  spiritual  and  inorganic,  which  by  acts  elicited 
under  the  guidance  of  the  intellect  seeks  after  good.  Edwards 
is  impatient  at  our  leading  into  the  discussion  notions  of  cause 
of  volition,  indifference  of  will,  and  the  like.  In  his  shallow- 
ness he  fails  to  see  that  liberty  cannot  be  half  understood,  un- 
less the  nature  of  the  will  and  of  its  operations  is  beforehand 
mastered.  Many  causes  can  be  ascribed  to  each  movement  of 
the  will.  Thus,  the  intellect  exerts  on  the  will  an  influence 
peculiar  to  moral  causes,  that  of  persuasion;  or,  according  to 
St.  Thomas,  the  intellect  sets  the  will  going,  only  in  as  much 


156  PSYCHOLOGY 

as  it  proposes  to  the  same  a  thing  desirable.  The  end  sought 
exercises  an  influence,  best  described  as  attraction  or  beckoning 
towards.  The  sensitive  appetite,  common  to  man  and  beast, 
is  on  occasions  no  small  factor,  when  the  will  is  about  to  put 
an  act.  These  various  causes  play  an  important  part  in  man's 
human  doings;  but  when  the  question  of  liberty  or  freedom  is 
uppermost,  they  fall  back  before  what  we  designate  the  deter- 
mining cause  of  the  will's  choice. 

If  I  understand  Edwards  and  his  brother  Calvinists  aright, 
God,  and  God  alone,  is  such  determining  cause.  It  must  be 
remembered  that  God  is  said  to  be  the  first  cause  universally, 
whether  guiding  cause,  drawing  cause,  or  determining  cause. 
For  from  Him,  the  uncreated  cause,  all  these  created  causes 
derive  their  full  efficacy,  and  on  Him  they  depend  for  all  their 
validity.  But  He  is  no  more  the  second  determining  cause 
than  He  is  our  intellect  and  our  will;  He  is  no  more  the  cause 
of  my  free  choice  than  He  is  of  the  building  on  which  the  work- 
men are  now  engaged.  Man's  will  is  itself  the  only  determin- 
ing cause,  consistent  with  human  liberty.  No  created  good,  as 
experience  teaches,  is  such  cause;  no  uncreated  good  is  such, 
unless  we  bid  adieu  to  liberty,  and  agree  to  reckon  man  a  neces- 
sary agent,  with  only  that  shadow  of  choice,  which  consists  in 
invariably  doing  what  another,  even  though  that  other  be  God, 
determines  on  having  done.  Nor  need  this  species  of  self- 
causation  frighten  the  reverent.  It  does  not  make  of  the  will, 
or  of  the  act  of  the  will,  a  self-existent  being.  Ijt  simply  makes 
of  the  will,  which  was  primarily  made  by  God,  a  self-determin- 
ing cause.  It  does  not  annihilate  the  influence  exerted  by  other 
causes,  such  as  God,  the  intellect,  the  end  and  such  like;  but 
it  vindicates  to  the  will  the  awful  power  of  ultimately  shaping 
its  own  choice. 

Now  that  the  faculty,  whose  property  is  much-disputed  lib- 
erty, is  sufficiently  familiar,  we  shall  labor  to  clear  up  difficul- 
ties liable  to  arise  from  this  other  source.  Liberty  in  its  sim- 
plest acceptation  means,  not  precisely  power  that  any  one  has 
to  do  as  he  pleases,  but  rather  freedom  or  immunity  from  some- 
thing. Liberate,  deliver  and  liberty  are  all  words  from  the  same 
Latin  stock.  Liberty  is  not  a  power  or  a  faculty,  it  is  a  prop- 
erty of  some  power  or  faculty,  called  the  will.  Liberty  is  not 
choice.     It  precedes  choice,  and  for  particular  instances  ceases 


THESIS  IX  157 

when  choice  begins  to  exist.  Liberty,  too,  has  many  aspects.  It 
may  be  what  philosophers  are  pleased  to  call  immunity  from 
force  or  immunity  from  necessity.  The  former  is  immunity 
from  external  violence,  the  only  kind  known  to  the  bird  men- 
tioned by  Edwards.  The  latter  is  immunity  from  an  inner 
force,  and  to  this  kind  birds  and  everything  less  than  man  are 
utter  strangers.  Instinct  dominates  and  determines  all  their 
activity.  Immunity  from  necessity  can  be  threefold,  that  of 
contradiction,  that  of  contrariety  and  that  of  specification.  The 
first  is  in  play  when  the  will  chooses,  for  instance,  between  lov- 
ing and  not  loving;  the  second,  when  it  chooses  between  loving 
and  hating;  the  third,  when  it  chooses  between  walking  and 
studying. 

But  the  most  striking  peculiarity  of  all  in  man's  liberty,  is 
that  state  of  absolute  indifference,  in  which  it  must  continue 
up  to  the  very  moment  of  its  choice.  It  is  an  active,  not  a  pas- 
sive indifference;  and  consists  in  the  circumstance,  that,  though 
every  conceivable  condition  in  the  shape  of  ability,  inducement, 
inclination  and  the  like,  be  present  and  fulfilled,  the  will  is 
still  able  to  allow  its  ability  to  lie  idle,  to  close  its  eyes  to  the 
inducements,  and  deny  its  inclinations.  Expressed  otherwise, 
this  indifference  is  contained  in  the  power  inherent  in  the  will 
to  adopt  one  of  several  alternatives  offered,  whether  the  alter- 
native adopted  be  more  in  accordance  with  common-sense  or 
not,  whetlier  it  has  more  motives  in  its  favor  or  not,  whether 
it  is  in  the  very  opinion  of  the  chooser  destined  to  injure  or 
benefit  him.  Leibnitz  and  a  few  other  philosophers  are  of  opin- 
ion that  it  is  impossible  for  the  human  will  to  choose  an  object 
or  a  line  of  conduct,  which  is  calculated  in  the  mind  of  the 
chooser  to  prove  damaging  in  the  event.  But  experience  is 
argument  enough  to  upset  every  such  theory.  A  man's  will 
may  very  decidedly  lean  towards  something,  the  man  may  know 
in  his  heart  that  such  and  such  a  decision  alone  will  meet  with 
reason's  approval,  he  may  count  as  sure  his  eternal  damnation 
in  the  case  of  a  refusal;  and  yet,  up  to  the  very  moment  of 
choosing,  his  will,  though  biassed  by  these  different  reflections 
and  emotions,  nevertheless,  ultimately  determined  by  itself  solely, 
can  reject  the  something  to  which  his  eternal  salvation  is  at- 
tached. If  God  deprived  man  of  this  dread  power,  man  would 
not  be  a  free  being;  and  man's  service  would  be  worth  about 


158  PSYCHOLOGY 

as  much  as  that  of  brute  beasts,  and  as  little  deserving  of  eternal 
reward.  God  can  suggest  motives,  His  saving  grace  can  do  a 
vast  deal  towards  guiding  His  servants  aright;  but  at  the  close 
of  all,  man  has  his  destiny  in  his  own  hands.  Fatalism  affects 
man's  daily  life  more  closely  and  ruinously  than  other  false 
systems  encountered  in  philosophy.  A  fatalist,  whether  he  con- 
siders himself  doomed  to  felicity  or  perdition,  is  a  wretched 
character,  indeed;  and  in  either  event  is  open  to  tremendous 
moral  dangers.  If  satisfied  that  Heaven  depends  not  on  his 
efforts,  but  on  God's  kindness,  a  door  is  thrown  open  to  all 
sorts  of  excesses  and  license.  If  satisfied  that  in  spite  of  all 
his  honest  efforts  he  is  to  associate  throughout  eternity  with 
criminals,  the  only  alternative  is,  of  course,  to  give  liis  passions 
full  fling,  and  make  this  earth  his  Heaven. 

Determinism.  Fatalism  or  Determinism  is  the  doctrine  we 
combat  in  this  thesis.  Mill  endeavors  to  distinguish  between 
Fatalism,  which  he  repudiates,  and  Determinism,  which  he  ad- 
vocates. In  Fatalism  our  conduct  is  fixed  by  fate  or  external 
circumstances,  in  a  way  independent  of  our  feelings  and  wishes. 
In  Determinism  our  conduct  is  fixed  by  our  feelings  or  wishes, 
and  these  in  turn  are  fixed  by  our  character.  The  determinist 
can  try  to  shape  his  own  or  another's  conduct  by  appeals  to 
feelings,  though  the  attempt  is  mere  sham.  The  fatalist  must 
abandon  every  such  attempt.  Determinism  is  a  soft  Fatalism, 
which  claims  the  name  of  freedom.  Fatalism  is  too  gross  a 
theory  to  appeal  to  modern  refinement,  freedom  of  will  proves 
too  much  a  source  of  annoyance  to  the  irreligious.  Determin- 
ism would  seem  to  have  been  hit  upon  as  a  happy  means  of 
escape  from  the  reproach  of  silliness  and  remorse  of  conscience. 
Determinism  differs  too  little  from  Fatalism  to  deserve  a  new 
name.  It  is  but  another  phase  of  a  theory  old  as  Sophocles 
and  his  story  of  (Edipus.  With  the  ancients,  man  had  no  con- 
trol over  his  destiny.  Some  outside  force,  like  the  divinity, 
fate,  chance,  Nemesis,  arranged  at  its  own  pleasure  every  detail 
in  a  man's  life;  and,  as  occasions  arose,  man  without  any  choice 
in  the  matter  simply  followed  this  fixed  schedule.  He  might 
be  eminently  virtuous,  or  eminently  wicked ;  but  personal  en- 
deavor counted  for  just  nothing  in  his  life's  history.  No  mat- 
ter what  effort  he  made  to  escape  the  perpetration  of  murder, 
at  the  hour  and  on  the  day  decreed  by  fate,  he  found  liimself 


THESIS  IX  159 

betrayed  into  the  act,  and  was  all  wonder  at  the  occurrence,  as 
inevitable  as  it  was  unforeseen.  And  fate  consulted  only  its 
own  plans  in  formulating  its  decrees.  Its  victim's  honesty  or 
wickedness  was  never  taken  into  account.  Foreknowledge  of 
his  future  dispositions  never  operated  with  fate  to  save  him 
from  crime;  and  its  helpless  victim,  when  the  crisis  came, 
thought  himself  a  hero,  only  to  discover  suddenly  that  he  was 
a  parricide,  or  an  adulterer  of  the  vilest  type.  The  predestina- 
tion of  the  reformers  is  this  Fatalism  of  the  ancients,  trans- 
ferred to  modern  times.  With  them,  God  is  fate ;  and  man  has 
about  as  much  to  do  with  his  salvation  or  damnation  as  he  has 
to  do  with  the  shape  of  his  nose.     These  false  teachers, 

"  Complacent  fold  their  scarlet  hands, 

And  Heavenward  roll  their  rheiuny  eyes 
To  thank  the  god,  pound-penny  wise. 
Who  freedom  tied  with  iron  bands; 
"  Then  bade  his  slaves  work  out  their  fate. 
And  choose,  where  choice  is  out  of  reach; 
Predestining  beforehand  each 
To  everlasting  love  or  hate " 

We  believe  with  Fatalists  that  some  certain  men  are  predes- 
tined to  Heaven,  some  certain  others  to  hell;  but  always  with 
dependence  on  the  free  exercise  of  their  will.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  every  man  born  into  the  world  is  going  to  die  a  saint  or  a 
sinner;  his  last  moment  is  going  to  find  him  in  the  state  of 
grace  or  in  the  state  of  sin.  In  every  emergency  of  life,  from 
the  cradle  to  the  grave,  he  is  most  assuredly  going  to  make 
definite  choice  between  two  or  more  fixed  lines  of  conduct;  he 
is  going  to  infallibly  yield  to  or  resist  temptation ;  and  God's 
wisdom  would  be  an  imperfect  thing,  unless  He  knew  from  all 
eternity  what  was  going  to  be  the  outcome  of  the  struggle  in 
each  individual  case.  But  we  are  no  Fatalists.  God's  fore- 
knowledge of  things  is  far  from  interfering  with,  or  destroying, 
man's  free  will.  God  does  not  first  decree  things,  and  then 
make  man's  conduct  measure  up  to,  or  fit  in  with  His  decrees. 
He  first  foresees  the  free  and  untrammeled  conduct  of  men, 
and  then,  without  exerting  the  pressure  of  a  hair  on  their  free- 
dom. He  makes  His  decrees  measure  up  to  or  fit  with  men's 
conduct.  Men  may  profess  to  see  a  species  of  iron  cruelty  in 
the  arrangement;  but,  whether  cruel  or  not,  there  was  no  alter- 


160  PSYCHOLOGY 

native  for  God,  in  the  event  that  He  wanted  to  create  men  free, 
and  safeguard  His  other  attributes.  The  cruelty  of  Fatalism  is 
immeasurably  more  abominable  and  despotic;  absolutely  sub- 
versive of  morality;  provocative,  at  the  same  time,  of  overween- 
ing presumption  and  abysmal  despair,  of  sottish  laziness  and 
ungenerous  cowardice.  It  is  no  cruelty  in  God  to  let  free  agents 
work  out  their  destiny  for  weal  or  woe  along  the  lines  of  their 
own  nature;  and  God  is  not  to  blame  for  man's  abuses.  In 
another  order  He  could  hinder  these  abuses,  but  not  in  the  pres- 
ent; and  this  self-imposed  helplessness  is  no  imperfection  in 
God. 

Determinism  is  a  refinement  of  Fatalism;  invented,  to  save 
its  parent  from  the  shame  attaching  to  idiocy ;  and  encouraging 
blind  adherents  to  persevere  in  their  folly,  with  the  thin  assur- 
ance that,  in  spite  of  fate,  they  still  are  free.  A  man's  con- 
duct, they  say,  is  determined  by  a  mixture  of  internal  and  ex- 
ternal agencies,  making  up  his  character.  Character,  we  have 
seen,  is  the  result  of  inherited  constitution  and  personal  acts, 
culminating  in  habits.  Of  these  two  factors  in  character,  habit 
is  far  and  away  the  more  important;  and,  because  it  is  the  ele- 
ment we  determine  or  manufacture  for  ourselves,  it  is  founda- 
tion for  the  conviction  that  character  is  the  man,  and  that  a 
man  is  what  he  makes  himself.  The  constitution  we  inherit 
from  our  parents  is,  in  substance,  quite  beyond  our  control. 
It  may  create  trouble  for  us  in  the  moral  order,  it  may  pave 
the  way  of  virtue  with  roses,  and  exempt  us  from  struggles, 
that  are  nothing  short  of  an  inheritance  to  others.  But  we 
know  our  limitations;  our  constitution  and  tendencies  are  no 
secrets  to  ourselves;  and,  as  it  is  our  duty  to  fight  every  wrong 
inclination,  even  when  inherited;  and,  as  it  would  be  superlatively 
cruel  and  absurd  to  think  that  every  such  battle  means  sure 
defeat,  we  must  carry  about  with  us  a  power  able  to  correct 
even  our  constitution,  to  follow  its  behests  when  they  are  right, 
and  manfully,  heroically  spurn  them  aside  when  they  are  wrong. 
Therefore,  even  from  the  viewpoint  of  constitution,  man's  will 
is  not  determined  but  free.  Moral  evil  consists  not  so  much 
in  having  wrong  tendencies,  tastes  and  inclinations,  as  in  yield- 
ing to  them,  and  supinely  allowing  them  to  sway  our  whole 
conduct.  Temptation  is  no  wrong,  consent  to  it  constitutes  all 
the  blame;  and  in   Determinism  consent  and   temptation   are 


THESIS  IX  161 

identical,  when  defeat  is  the  outcome,  because  dissent  in  that 
case  is  out  of  the  question. 

Habits  are  the  other  feature  of  character,  and  Determinism 
would  have  us  think  that  habits  determine  us,  in  emergencies 
of  choice,  to  this  or  that  line  of  conduct.  Whatever  influence 
habit  exercises  over  our  free-will,  and  we  are  far  from  attribut- 
ing to  habit  any  decisive  or  determining  influence,  that  influ- 
ence is  rooted  in  movements  the  will  elicited,  when  the  will  ad- 
mitted the  separate  acts  constituting  the  habit.  The  resultant 
of  habit  may  be  an  indeliberate  act,  put  without  choice  or  ef- 
fort ;  but  the  habit  itself  is  resultant  of  free  and  deliberate  acts, 
whether  they  be  few  or  many.  Thus  it  happens  that  every 
indeliberate  act,  due  to  habit,  is  free,  at  least  in  cause; 
while  every  deliberate  human  act  is  free  in  itself  and  by  very 
nature. 

Along  with  natural  disposition  and  acquired  habits,  our  op- 
ponents mass  together  a  multitude  of  external  conditions,  influ- 
ences, and  motives  as  determining  causes  of  our  conduct.  We 
stand  ready  to  grant  that  these  several  elements  enter  largely 
into  the  economy  of  free-will  as  persuaders,  counselors,  weights 
in  its  adoption  of  a  policy;  but  we  emphatically  deny  that  they 
necessarily  constrain  the  will,  or  irresistibly  hold  it  to  either 
of  any  two  alternatives.  They  may  urge  the  will,  advise  it, 
bring  pressure  to  bear  on  it;  but  the  will  itself  remains  always 
master  of  the  situation,  and  never  loses  its  power  to  refuse  to 
be  persuaded,  to  reject  even  the  wisest  advice,  and  resist  every 
species  of  outside  pressure,  even  to  its  own  loss  and  discomfiture. 
And  this  is  exactly  what  we  mean  by  free  will.  It  is  stronger 
than  disposition,  stronger  than  habit,  stronger  than  whatever 
combination  of  environment,  education,  and  motives.  It  can 
prefer  folly  to  wisdom,  vice  to  virtue,  pain  to  pleasure,  loss  to 
gain,  hell  to  Heaven;  conscious,  all  the  while,  that  it  is  tram- 
pling under  foot  better  instincts,  degrading  its  owner's  dignity, 
sacrificing  the  greater  for  the  less,  and  accumulating  a  rich 
store  of  bitter  remorse  and  piercing  regret. 

Professor  James  on  the  whole  stands  for  freedom  of  will. 
But  he  hesitates.  He  makes  his  position  a  matter  of  choice, 
and  flatters  determinists  with  the  acknowledgment  that  psychol- 
ogy is  unable  to  solve  the  problem,  and  definitely  decide  one 
way  or  the  other.     His  psychology  may  be  unequal  to  the  task; 


162  PSYCHOLOGY 

and  the  circumstance  ought  to  have,  at  least,  tempted  him  to 
revise  his  work,  and  diligently  search  it  for  flaws.  The  system 
of  psychology,  unable  to  explain  so  patent  a  fact  as  free  will, 
must  be  radically  wrong  and  imperfect.  He  prefers  to  leave 
the  question  of  free  will  altogether  out  of  his  account;  because, 
he  says,  if  it  exists,  it  can  only  be  to  hold  some  one  ideal  object 
a  little  longer  or  a  little  more  intensely  before  the  mind,  and  so 
make  more  effective  one  of  two  alternatives,  which  present  them- 
selves as  genuine  possibles.  He  makes  choice  the  outcome  of 
attention,  and  seems  blind  to  the  circumstance,  that  we  can  in 
an  instant  admit  one  of  two  alternatives,  after  giving  whole 
hours  to  the  consideration  of  its  opposite.  Dynamically,  he 
makes  free  choice  an  operation  amongst  those  physiological  in- 
finitesimals, which  calculation  must  forever  neglect.  Here  he 
may  be  scattering  that  mind-dust,  of  which  he  speaks  in  an- 
other chapter;  and,  whether  or  no,  he  is  throwing  the  dust  of 
obscurity  into  the  eyes  of  his  readers.  Choice  is  a  matter  to 
be  decided  by  psychology,  not  by  physiology;  unless  we  want 
to  surrender  our  trade  and  all  turn  materialists.  And  choice  in 
psychology  is  no  operation  among  infinitesimals,  but  among  defi- 
nite agencies,  written  in  as  large  characters  as  a  Hippodrome 
sign,  and  closer  to  the  man  than  his  nose. 

James  thus  analyzes  Determinism  and  Fatalism.  Fatalism 
affirms  the  impotence  of  free  effort;  Determinism,  its  unthink- 
ability.  The  latter  admits  the  name,  acknowledges  effort  which 
seems  to  breast  the  tide,  but  claims  the  effort  as  a  portion  of 
the  tide.  Variations  or  exertions  of  free  effort  are  in  this  sys- 
tem mathematically  fixed  functions  of  the  ideas  themselves; 
and  these,  in  turn,  are  the  tide.  This  tide-theory  fits  in  with 
James'  own  fancy;  because,  in  his  doctrine  concerning  the 
origin  of  our  ideas,  he  is  a  rank  associationist.  He  and  his 
fellow-conspirators  agi:>inst  sound  philosophy  forget  that,  even 
if  flow  of  thought  be  conceived  as  a  tide,  the  cause  of  the  tide 
still  awaits  explanation ;  and  that  is  where  his  theory  fails,  and 
where  our  theory  succeeds.  The  cause  of  the  tide  is  the  in- 
tellect, a  spiritual  and  inorganic  faculty  of  an  immortal  soul, 
which  James  and  men  of  his  ilk  hate  to  admit.  The  cause  of 
choice  or  selection  is  the  will,  another  spiritual  and  inorganic 
faculty  of  the  same  immortal  soul;  and  to  refuse  to  acknowl- 
edge an  intellect,  is  to  refuse  to  acknowledge  a  will. 


THESIS  IX  163 

The  explanation  of  free  effort  offered  by  Professor  Lipps 
likewise  appeals  to  his  favor.  This  learned  professor  wants  to 
explain  the  very  simple  phenomenon  of  self-determination,  and 
pompously  explains  just  nothing.  When  opportunity  to  choose 
arises,  two  masses  of  ideas  contend  for  our  consent;  one  larger, 
the  other  smaller.  The  larger  invariably  and  irresistibly  wins; 
and  yet  we  are  said  to  determine  ourselves,  because  the  more 
abundant  mass  is  conceived  as  ourselves,  while  the  less  abun- 
dant mass  is  conceived  as  the  resistance.  Which  would  all  be 
very  beautiful,  if  ideas  were  in  the  will  and  not  in  the  intellect. 
The  truth  of  the  thing  is  that  the  will  determines  itself  at  the 
instigation  of  the  intellect.  The  will  is  the  cause  of  our  wishes, 
as  the  intellect  is  the  cause  of  our  ideas.  Ideas  have  about  as 
much  to  do  with  our  wishes  as  outside  objects  have  to  do  with 
our  ideas;  with  this  difference,  that  the  will  enjoys  freedom, 
to  which  the  intellect  is  a  stranger. 

And  this  brings  us  to  the  dishonest  estimates  of  Scholastic  doc- 
trine seriously  put  forward  by  our  opponents.  James  calls  them 
caricatures  of  the  kind  of  supposition  free  will  demands.  Men 
like  John  Fiske  are  nothing  short  of  dishonest,  when  they  tell 
their  readers  that  in  our  system  volitions  arise  without  cause 
and  are  ascribed  to  blind  chance.  For  their  instruction,  we 
repeat  that  mind  or  self  is  the  cause  of  our  volitions,  and  that 
chance  plays  no  part  whatever  in  the  transaction.  It  is  equally 
unjust  and  untrue  to  say  that  volition  with  us  is  motiveless. 
Volition  with  us  is  not  wthout  motives,  but  between  them.  We 
adopt  the  examples  Fiske  himself  proposes.  We  can  suspect 
an  enemy  of  murder,  because,  while  disposition  is  not  a  de- 
termining, it  is  still  a  weighty  motive.  Hence  we  give  the 
enemy  a  fair  trial,  and  proceed  with  due  caution.  And  this  is  a 
wise  provision  of  law,  for  we  often  discover  that  some  former 
friend  really  perpetrated  the  deed.  As  Mr.  Fiske  sees  things, 
the  enemy  would  have  no  choice  in  the  matter  but  to  kill;  and 
we  should  ourselves  be  murderers,  if  we  hanged  the  man  who 
killed  another  from  resistless  impulse.  It  is  not  good  law  to 
punish  the  insane.  When  a  man  hurls  himself  from  a  high 
window,  the  first  impulse  is  to  account  him  insane;  because, 
though  the  instinct  of  self-preservation  is  not  a  determining 
motive,  it  is  nevertheless  a  weighty  motive,  and  the  suicide's 
choice  seems  so  absolutely  devoid  of  reason  that  we  charitably 


164  PSYCHOLOGY 

suppose  him  stripped  of  that  faculty.  And  yet  men  have  thrown 
themselves  from  high  windows  without  heing  insane;  and  if 
they  survived  the  shock,  they  were  arrested  and  hauled  to  court 
for  trial,  and  on  no  few  occasions  punished  with  imprisonment. 
Were  Mr.  Fiske  their  judge,  he  could  not  in  conscience  pass 
sentence  of  condemnation  on  attempted  suicides,  because  in  his 
theory  the  poor  fellows  did  simply  what  they  could  not  help 
doing.  We  can,  as  well  as  he,  frame  a  theory  of  human  ac- 
tions; but  with  us  the  theory  will  be  always  subject  to  correc- 
tion, with  him  it  will  be  always  infallible.  Tlierefore,  all  the 
man's  rhetoric  about  the  mother  strangling  her  first-born,  the 
miser  casting  his  gold  into  the  sea,  the  sculptor  breaking  in 
pieces  his  statue,  goes  for  naught;  unless  it  goes  to  prove  what 
we  readily  grant,  that  the  will  in  free  choice  is  always  influ- 
enced, though  never  determined  by  motives.  His  conception 
of  history  is  as  wrong  as  his  philosophy.  History  is  a  record 
of  facts,  not  a  compilation  of  men's  motives,  environments  and 
dispositions.  Free  agents  are  able  to  cut  loose  from  motives, 
environments  and  dispositions;  and  to  suppose  that  they  un- 
varyingly act  in  accord  wdth  them,  is  to  make  a  grievous  mis- 
take, and  substitute  idle  and  uncertain  speculation  for  the 
truth.  It  is  to  measure  facts  by  theories,  gather  a  man's  wis- 
dom from  the  size  of  hat  he  wears,  and  multiply  the  absurdities 
that  make  modern  science  man's  greatest  shame  as  well  as  his 
crowning  glory. 

Freedom  of  choice.  Freedom  is  immunity  from  something, 
and  is  of  three  kinds,  freedom  of  nature,  freedom  from  sin,  and 
freedom  from  woe.  St.  Paul  thus  beautifully  describes  all 
three.  "  Having  no  necessity,  but  having  power  of  his  own 
will,"  I  Cor.  vii,  37.  "  Being  freed  from  sin,  we  have  been 
made  servants  of  justice."  Eom.  vi,  18.  "  Delivered  from  the 
servitude  of  corruption  into  the  liberty  of  the  glory  of  the 
children  of  God."  Piom.  viii,  21.  We  have  to  do  with  the 
freedom  of  nature;  and  it  is  of  two  kinds,  immunity  from  ex- 
trinsic violence,  and  immunity  from  intrinsic  violence;  or  from 
force,  and  from  necessity.  Immunity  from  force  makes  an  act 
spontaneous  or  voluntary,  and  is  common  to  minerals,  plants 
and  brutes  with  men.  The  word  s])ontaneous  is  ajjplicable  to 
whatsoever  beings;  to  fire  and  plants,  as  well  as  to  man.  The 
word  voluntary  in  its  strict  sense  applies  to  man  alone,  though 


THESIS  IX  165 

in  a  wider  sense  it  can  be  said  of  brutes.  Usually,  spontaneous 
is  reserved  for  acts  of  the  sensitive  appetite;  voluntary,  for  acts 
of  the  rational  appetite  or  will.  Seeing  and  walking  are  said 
to  be  voluntary  in  a  mediate  way,  because  of  a  command  issued 
by  the  will. 

Immunity  from  necessity  is  man's  peculiar  possession;  and 
is  called  freedom  of  indifference,  freedom  of  choice,  and  free 
will.  It  is  threefold,  that  of  contradiction,  that  of  contrariety, 
and  that  of  specification.  It  can  be  best  described  as  that 
quality,  in  virtue  of  which  the  will  can,  when  every  needed 
prerequisite  for  action  is  present  and  fulfilled,  elicit  an  act  or 
refrain  from  doing  so,  elicit  a  good  act  or  a  bad  act,  elicit 
any  one  of  several  specifically  difi^erent  acts.  Freedom  is  neither 
an  act  nor  a  habit,  but  a  quality  of  the  will.  Its  indifference 
is  towards  the  act  called  second,  not  the  act  called  nearest  first 
or  remotest  first.  The  will  is  in  actu  primo  proximo  to  choice 
or  election,  called  actus  secundus,  when  every  prerequisite,  in- 
trinsic and  extrinsic,  for  action  is  present  and  fulfilled. 

This  indifference  of  the  will  must  be  objective  and  sub- 
jective, both  passive  and  active.  Objective  is  on  the  part  of 
the  object,  and  is  verified  when  the  good  in  question  is  of  such  a 
nature  that  it  can  be  either  embraced  or  rejected.  Objective 
is  needed,  because  freedom  can  turn  on  only  such  an  object;  it 
is  not  enough,  because  it  affects  only  the  judgment,  and  free- 
dom is  a  matter  of  will,  not  of  intellect.  Subjective  is  on  the 
part  of  the  will,  and  consists  in  the  circumstance  that  the  will 
is  prepared  and  ready  to  act  or  be  acted  on;  the  indifference 
being  active  and  passive  respectively.  Subjective  passive  is 
needed,  because  the  act  as  immanent  must  be  received  in  the 
will;  it  is  not  enough,  because  otherwise  bodies  with  respect 
to  accidents,  and  prime  matter  would  be  free.  Subjective  ac- 
tive indifference  is  needed  in  two  senses,  separate  from  nearest 
first  act  and  conjoined  with  nearest  first  act;  in  separate  sense, 
because  even  without  the  needed  prerequisites  the  will  must  be 
in  root  capable  to  choose.  This  indifference  in  separate  sense 
is  not  enough,  because  otherwise  the  intellect  would  be  free, 
inasmuch  as  it  is  indifferent  before  the  phantasm  cooperates. 
In  conjoined  sense,  because  it  is  the  one  thing  wanting,  when 
all  else  is  supplied;  it  is  enough,  because  to  act  follows.  Free- 
dom is  likewise  divided  into  physical  and  moral.     Physical  is 


166  PSYCHOLOGY 

freedom  from  violence,  whether  extrinsic  or  intrinsic.  Moral  is 
freedom  from  law,  or  the  right  to  choose  between  opposites 
without  damage  to  any  prescription  of  moralit}'. 

Previous  judgment.  The  will  acts  at  the  instigation  of  the 
intellect.  Good  is  its  object,  and  intellect  is  what  distinguishes 
good  from  evil.  The  intellect,  therefore,  discovers  good  to  the 
will ;  and  when  that  good  is  less  than  God  intuitively  seen,  the 
will  has  power  to  embrace  or  reject  it.  Judgments  preceding 
work  of  the  will  are  conceived  as  of  two  kinds,  speculative  and 
practical.  The  first  is  worded  this  way,  "  This  object  is  open 
to  choice  or  rejection."  The  second  is  worded  this  way,  "  This 
object  ought  to  be  chosen,  if  you  want  to  be  prudent;  it  may 
be  rejected,  if  you  want  to  be  imprudent."  The  judgment, 
"  I  choose  this,"  is  not  previous,  but  consequent  to  work  of  the 
will;  and  announces  the  will's  decision,  resulting  from  the  free 
and  untrammeled  use  of  its  own  native  activity.  A  whole  army 
of  judgments,  speculative  and  practical,  may  precede  the  will's 
choice.  They  may  influence  the  will  by  urging,  advising,  pro- 
posing motives;  but  they  never  determine  the  same  in  such 
fashion  that  any  one  of  several  alternatives  becomes  impossible. 
That  impossibility  arises  only  after  the  will  has  made  definite 
choice,  and  it  constitutes  what  we  call  consequent,  not  ante- 
cedent necessity. 

The  Thomists  would  seem  to  attribute  to  their  practical 
judgment  a  constraining  force,  destructive  of  freedom.  But, 
as  good  Catholics,  they  cannot  run  counter  to  a  dogma  of  faith; 
and  free  will  is  such  a  dogma.  Therefore,  they  have  recourse 
to  the  rather  weak  explanation  that  their  practical  judgment  is 
itseK  free,  and  man's  choice  has  its  freedom  from  this  circum- 
stance. It  might  be  better  to  reject  every  species  of  practical 
judgment,  with  an  appearance  even  of  Determinism,  and  say 
that  the  only  previous  judgment  required  is  speculative.  It 
is  hard  to  see  how  freedom  can  stand  with  the  judgment,  "  This 
must  be  done,"  for  prerequisite;  and  it  is  harder  still  to  see 
how  any  such  imperative  judgment  squares  with  the  truth, 
when  any  two  finite  goods  are  proposed  as  alternatives  for 
choice.  Such  a  judgment  would  be  a  lie  pure  and  simple,  as 
we  know  from  experience.  It  is  the  business  of  the  intellect 
to  furnish  light  to  the  will,  not  to  determine  it.  Praemotio 
physica  is  another  Thomistic  theory  at  seeming  variance  with 


THESIS  IX  167 

the  truth;  but  we  choose  to  postpone  its  discussion  to  Natural 
Theology.  It  bears  on  God's  cooperation  with  His  creatures, 
and  was  seemingly  invented  to  safeguard  His  eternal  decrees, 
His  dominion,  and  wisdom.  Let  it  be  enough  for  the  present 
to  remark  that  without  any  praemotio  physica,  or  interference 
with  man's  free  will,  God's  cooperation,  decrees  and  wisdom 
can  be  otherwise  kept  safe  from  danger.  Foreknowledge  of 
man's  free  acts  guides  God  in  His  decrees,  and  man's  free  acts 
precede  God's  knowledge,  not  of  course  in  the  order  of  time, 
but  in  the  order  of  nature. 

Division  —  Two  parts.     I.  Man's  will  enjoys  freedom  of  choice. 

II.  No    previous    judgment   determines 
the  will. 

PROOFS,  I,  II 

I.  Free  will  is  a  fact,  and  no  amount  of  bad  philosophy  can 
reason  away  facts.  It  can  confuse  people,  but  not  convince 
them. 

1.  The  fact  of  consciousness.  The  deeds  we  daily  do  are  in 
our  power,  ourselves  for  witnesses.  At  our  own  good  pleasure 
we  do  this,  and  we  do  that,  and  we  do  their  opposite ;  and, 
while  actually  engaged  in  the  performance  of  some  particular 
work,  we  feel  altogether  free ;  we  feel  in  such  sort  masters  of 
ourselves  that  we  could  equally  well  act  otherwise,  if  disposed 
to  incur  the  reproach  of  imprudence  and  blame;  and  all  this 
without  a  change  in  circumstances,  without  a  change  in  our 
motives. 

2.  The  fact  of  common  agreement  among  men..  Even  De- 
terminists  in  practical  every-day  life  shape  their  conduct  in 
strict  accord  with  our  theory.  They  talk  Determinism,  to  act 
Free-will.  They  ascribe  objective  value  to  all  these  several 
ethical  notions,  imputability,  responsibility,  virtue,  vice,  justice, 
injustice,  merit,  blame,  right,  duty.  They  advise  and  exhort 
their  friends.  They  lay  down  rules,  enact  laws,  proffer  counsel, 
draw  up  petitions,  assign  rewards,  and  inflict  penalties.  In 
Determinism,  environment,  character,  and  habits  inexorably 
fix  a  man's  conduct;  all  three  are  out  of  his  control;  he  does 
simply  what  he  cannot  help  doing;  and   in   this  sorry  event 


168  PSYCHOLOGY 

tiiese  several  ethical  notions  are  absolutely  without  meaning  or 
substance.  This  universal  consent  of  mankind  with  a  bearing 
on  the  reality  of  free-will  is  no  mere  theoi'etical  tenet,  like  the 
earth's  movement  around  the  sun,  but  aai  eminently  practical 
dogma,  of  vital  importance  in  men's  affairs,  and  the  very  basis 
of  civil  and  political  society. 

3.  The  metaphysical  fact  of  relationship  between  intellect 
and  will.  We  will  as  we  know.  Determinism  goes  to  the  ab- 
surd lengths  of  binding  the  will  to  necessarily  embrace  what 
the  mind  clearly  tells  the  will  need  not  be  embraced.  In  other 
words,  Determinism  is  a  huge  lie,  open  discord  between  the 
objective  and  subjective.  Objective  indifference,  we  have  seen, 
is  a  reality  vouched  for  by  the  mind.  Every  good  with  which 
we  are  acquainted,  God  Himself  not  excepted,  sails  into  our 
notice  as  a  mixture  of  attractive  and  repellent  qualities,  wears 
in  our  eyes  tlie  double  aspect  of  good  and  evil.  The  subjective 
element,  corresponding  to  this  objective  indifference,  is  in  De- 
terminism iron  necessity,  the  unfailing  and  uniform  impossi- 
bility of  escape  from-  what  has  repellent  features.  It  is  highly 
unnatural  to  constrain  God's  noblest  creature  to  embrace  with- 
out fail  a  fixed  good,  that  he  here  and  naw  knows  to  be  alto- 
gether unnecessary. 

II.  Practical  judgment,  as  understood  by  Thomists,  would 
seem  to  destroy  free  will.  That  faculty  is  not  formally  free 
which  is  no  longer  indifferent,  no  longer  vested  with  ownership 
in  its  act,  when  once  every  prerequisite  for  the  act  is  verified. 

But  such  a  faculty  is  the  will,  when,  in  the  theory  of  our 
opponents,  the  last  practical  judgment  is  uttered.  Ergo,  in 
the  theory  of  our  opponents  the  will  is  not  free. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  This  practical  judgment  is  a 
prerequisite  for  the  act;  because  without  it,  they  contend,  the 
will  can  elicit  no  act,  and  with  it  the  will  is  no  longer  indif- 
ferent to  several  alternatives,  but  necessarily  restricted  and  de- 
termined to  one. 

N.B.  The  act  of  the  will,  they  say,  is  not  absolutely,  but 
only  conditionally  determined;  it  is  mediately  free,  inasmuch 
as  the  will  allows  itself  to  be  swayed  by  the  motives  provoking 
the  practical  judgment.  This  subterfuge  is  nothing  worth,  be- 
cause the  will  would  in  this  event  be  swayed  either  by  chance 
or  by  a  second  practical  judgment.     Chance  is  no  cause  at  all. 


THESIS  IX  169 

and  this  second  practical  judgment  would  call  for  a  third,  and 
a  fourth,  and  a  fifth  without  end.  Again,  they  say  this  prac- 
tical judgment  has  its  origin  in  a  certain  predilection  of  the 
will.  If  this  predilection  is  one  of  the  prerequisites  for  the 
act  of  choice,  the  will  is  no  longer  free,  but  determined.  If  it 
is  not,  the  will  is  free;  but  no  last  practical  judgment  is  needed 
among  the  prerequisites. 

P.S.  Additional  proofs  of  free  will  from  Maker,  pp. 
398-425. 

Ethical  —  Psychological  —  Metaphysical 

Ethical  Argument.  1.  Obligation.  If  I  am  bound  to  ab- 
stain from  an  evil  deed,  it  must  be  really  possible  for  me  that 
this  deed  shall  not  occur.  And  the  obligation  is  plain.  "  Eight 
conduct  is  not  merely  a  beautiful  ideal,  which  attracts  me.  It 
commands  me  with  an  absolute  authority.  It  obliges  me  un- 
conditionally." Noel.  In  the  Determinist  theory  no  other 
choice  than  that  actually  elected  was  really  possible  to  the  sin- 
ner throughout  his  life,  and  the  present  criminal  choice  is  in- 
exorably determined  by  the  equally  inevitable  choices  that  went 
before. 

2.  Remorse  and  repentance.  These  emotions  are  possible 
only  in  case  of  acts  I  freely  did,  acts  that  were  mine,  acts  I 
could  have  avoided.  No  remorse  or  repentance  accompanies 
harm  done  through  no  fault  of  mine,  but  by  accident,  harm 
not  in  my  power.  Determinism  makes  both  classes  of  acts 
equally  the  inevitable  outcome  of  my  nature  and  circumstances. 
With  it,  crime  is  as  unavoidable  as  an  earthquake. 

3.  Merit  and  desert.  We  deserve  reward  or  punishment  only 
by  acts  that  are  free.  Other  acts  deserve  neither.  Witness  the 
"  I  could  not  help  it,"  of  the  child  about  to  be  punished.  In 
Determinism,  punishment  is  purely  preventive,  not  retributive. 
Praise  and  blame  are  not  just  rewards  for  self-sacrifice,  but 
judicious  incentives  for  future  services.  Like  the  old  saying, 
"  gratitude  is  a  delicate  sense  of  favors  to  come." 

Jf..  Responsibility.  I  might  fasten  a  plague  on  the  whole  city, 
administer  poison  to  father  and  mother,  and  yet  not  be  re- 
sponsible, or  morally  guilty,  or  justly  punishable;  because  it 
was  not  my  free  act,  because  I  could  not  help  it.  Maniacs  and 
somnambulists    are    judged    unaccountable    for    same    reason. 


170  PSYCHOLOGY 

Three  things  constitute  responsibility,  binding  authority,  knowl- 
edge of  this  authority's  will,  and  power  to  perform  or  abstain 
from  the  act ;  in  fewer  words,  duty,  knowledge  of  duty,  and 
freedom. 

6.  Justice  means  volition  according  to  law.  In  Determin- 
ism, all  volitions  are  as  much  according  to  law  as  the  ebbing 
tide.     Moral  law  is  physical  law ;  and  whatever  is,  is  right. 

N.B.  Determinism  distorts  moral  conceptions.  It  gives 
new  meanings  to  notions  as  old  as  the  world.  Right  science 
accepts  facts  as  they  are,  examines  without  manufacturing 
them,  interprets  without  transforming  them. 

Psychological  argument,  from  consciousness,  or  introspective 
analysis  of  our  own  volitions. 

1.  Att-ention.  I  myself  guide  the  course  of  my  own  thoughts. 
This  phenomenon  is  clear  in  recalling  a  forgotten  fact,  or  in 
guessing  a  riddle.  Alexander  alleges  the  example  of  two  weights 
pulling  as  twelve  and  eight.  Endow  these  weights  with  active 
power  of  selective  attention,  and  twelve  can  become  five,  eight 
can  become  twenty. 

2.  Deliheration.  There  may  be  question  of  investing  my 
money  or  selecting  a  servant.  Deliberation  is  plainly  an  exer- 
cise of  free  volition.  I  freely  recall  and  detain  the  reason  or 
motive  before  my  consciousness.  I  have  had  experience  of  the 
opposite  kind,  passive  oscillation  of  rival  impulses,  and  can 
therefore  compare. 

3.  Choice,  or  decision.  This  is  the  culmination  of  freedom. 
I  may  be  tempted  to  excuse  a  fault  by  a  lie,  to  commit  some 
small  dishonesty.  The  evil  thought  may  be  present  before  ad- 
vertence; then  its  sinfulness  appears,  and  the  struggle  begins. 
I  decide  to  consent  or  resist.  The  act  of  decision  is  mine ;  it  is 
free,  not  determined  by  habit  or  motive;  and  this  very  circum- 
stance is  ground  for  remorse  or  congratulation. 

J/..  Resistance  to  persistent  temptation.  This  is  activity  along 
the  line  of  greatest  resistance,  volition  against  the  prepon- 
derating impulse  or  motive.  Motive  of  virtue  attracts  without 
making  my  course  the  pleasanter. 

N.  B.  Spinoza  objects,  saying  that  men  deceive  themselves 
in  thinking  that  they  are  free,  because  they  know  not  the  cause 
of  their  actions.  A  difl'crent  act  is  conceivable,  and  this  they 
confuse  with  possibility.     Answer:    We  know   self   to  be   the 


THESIS  IX  171 

cause,  and  the  possibility  of  the  act  is  conceived  as  a  hypo- 
thetical reality  easily  reducible,  and  too  often  reduced,  to  an 
absolute  reality. 

Metaphysical  argument,  from  imperfection  of  created  goods. 
Every  good  on  earth  is  a  mixture  of  good  and  evil.  Will  is 
determined  by  adequate  object  alone,  perfect  good,  God  in- 
tuitively seen.  Element  of  good  is  attractive;  element  of  evil, 
repellent.  What  of  its  very  nature  repels,  cannot  irresistibly 
attract. 

N.B.  Free  will  upsets  Materialism,  and  this  is  the  rock  of 
offense.  It  calls  for  a  spiritual  faculty,  superior  to  matter,  not 
completely  controlled  by  physical  organisms.  If  the  will  is 
free,  man  is  more  than  an  organized  frame. 

PEINOIPLES 

A.  Psychological  —  B.  Metaphysical  —  C.  Physiology, 
Physics,  Statistics. 

A.  Psychological.  1.  Abusive  lies.  Bain  says,  free  will  is 
a  power  that  comes  from  nothing,  has  no  beginning,  follows  no 
rule,  respects  no  time  or  occasion,  operates  without  impartiality. 
Maudsley  says,  free  will  is  an  unmeaning  contradiction  in  terms, 
an  inconceivability  in  fact.  Stout  calls  it  a  Jack-in-the-box,  it 
springs  into  being  of  itself,  as  if  it  were  fired  out  of  a  pistol. 
Answer:  Lies  need  no  answer.  Choice  in  Determinism  re- 
sembles the  pistol-bullet.  It  is  about  as  free,  meritorious,  and 
blameworthy.     Recall  the  Brockton  murder  described  by  James. 

2.  Introspection  tells  us  that  we  are  always  determined  by 
motives,  unable  as  we  are  to  resist  strongest  or  most  pleasurable. 
Answer:  Introspection  tells  us  the  contrary.  Involuntary  acts 
are  determined  by  character  and  motives,  and  they  are  nu- 
merous. Deliberate  acts  are  influenced,  but  not  determined  by 
them. 

3.  The  strongest  motive  always  prevails.  Answer:  The 
strongest,  meaning  the  ultimately  prevalent,  I  grant;  and  that 
is  tautology,  or  by  consequent  necessity.  The  strongest,  mean- 
ing the  most  pleasurable,  I  deny;  or  by  antecedent  necessity. 

If.  Free  wiU  is  liberty  to  desire  or  not  desire.  Impossible. 
Ergo.  Answer:  This  is  an  unfair  description.  Lewes  is 
fairer.     Desire  is   ambiguous.     It  can   mean  consciousness   of 


172  PSYCHOLOGY 

want,  and  rejection  of,  or  consent  to  feeling.     Free  will  is  de- 
sire in  second,  not  in  first  sense. 

5.  Our  neighbors  are  always  determined  by  character  and 
motives.  Social  life  is  impossible  without  forecasts.  Men's 
conduct  is  as  measurable  as  the  movements  of  a  planet.  An- 
swer: Such  forecasts  deal  with  external  acts,  and  many  such 
are  indeliberate.  The  will  is  influenced,  though  not  inexor- 
ably determined,  by  character  and  motives  in  even  deliberate 
acts.  Only  the  virtuous  resist  the  solicitations  of  pleasure. 
Mental  association  somewhat  accounts  for  these  forecasts. 
Character  and  motives  are  the  only  factors  in  others  known  to 
us,  their  wills  are  hidden.  Eeflection  enables  us  to  praise  or 
blame,  and  therefore  ascribe  moral  acts  to  free  will. 

6.  SeK  or  the  Ego  is  a  mere  aggregate  or  series  of  states 
without  anything  permanent.  Answer:  I  deny.  Self  is  per- 
manent subject,  enduring  one  and  same  in  varied  changes. 

7.  Spencer  denies  a  permanent  self  or  Ego.  Answer:  So 
much  the  worse  for  Spencer.  Consciousness  is  evidence.  Mem- 
ory and  reflection  are  evidence.  Consciousness  of  a  permanent 
self  cannot  certainly  prove  it  transitory. 

B.  Metaphysical.  1.  Nothing  exists  without  a  cause.  Ergo 
no  free  will.  Answer:  Self,  the  Ego,  the  will,  is  cause  of 
choice. 

2.  Free  will  is  against  the  law  of  causation.  Answer:  This 
objection  mixes  two  things,  nothing  without  a  cause,  and  uni- 
formity of  nature.  Uniformity  in  physical  order  is  different 
from  uniformity  in  sphere  of  the  mind.  The  law  is  not  yet 
completely  establislied  in  physical  nature.  In  sphere  of  the 
mind  exceptions  are  innumerable. 

C.  Physiology,  Physics  and  Statistics. 

1.  Uniformity  is  rigid  among  corporeal  changes.  Ergo 
equally  rigid  in  mental  correlates.  Answer:  Mind  depends  on 
body,  but  its  acts  are  not  determined  and  conditioned  by  body. 
Ladd  says,  "  Physiology  neither  disproves  nor  verifies  the  pos- 
tulate of  free  will." 

2.  Physics,  and  Conservation  of  Energy.  Answer:  This  law 
would  prove  that  no  bodily  movement  was  ever  influenced  by  a 
mental  act;  and  this  is  against  experience. 

3.  Statistics.  BucJcle  says,  "  Suicide  is  the  product  of  gen- 
eral conditions  in  society.     The  felon  only  carries  into  effect 


THESIS  IX  173 

what  is  a  necessary  consequence  of  preceding  circumstances,  and 
all  this  is  proved  by  statistics."  Answer:  Free  will  is  com- 
patible with  general  uniformity  in  even  individual  conduct, 
because  indeliberate  acts  are  outcome  of  character  and  motives; 
because  a  man  cannot  act  without  motives,  and  the  commonest 
motives  are  pleasure,  interest,  and  duty;  because  motives  influ- 
ence without  determining.  Statistics  are  for  the  community, 
not  for  an  individual.  Xo  two  of  all  the  suicides  were  pre- 
cisely alike  in  antecedents.  If  it  could  be  shown  that  three 
hundred  precisely  similar  sheaves  of  motives  actuated  three 
hundred  suicides,  something  would  perhaps  be  accomplished. 

D.  Theology.  God's  foreknowledge  would  be  uncertain. 
Answer:  There  is  no  future  or  past  with  God,  all  is  present. 
He  foresees  free  acts  without  determining  them.  God's  vision 
does  not  affect  our  freedom.  Eecall  Dante's  boat  and  the  man 
on  shore. 

E.  Psychology  would  be  impossible  as  a  science.  There 
would  be  nothing  uniform,  no  law  in  theory  of  free  will. 
Answer:  Psychology  has  abundance  of  other  material  for  laws. 
The  interference  of  free  will  is  ethically  momentous,  psycho- 
logically small.  Besides,  free  will  knows  conditions,  and  is  not 
altogether  lawless. 

(F)  Hobhes, — (G)  Hume, —  (H)  Mill,  are  all  opposed,  with 
Locke,  to  free  will.  From.  Rickaby,  8.  J.,  "  Free  Will  and  Four 
English  Philosophers." 

F.  Hobbes.  1.  It  is  no  dishonor  to  God,  to  say  that  He 
can  so  order  the  world  as  sin  may  be  necessarily  caused  thereby 
in  a  man.  Power  irresistible  justifies  all  actions.  Ergo,  God 
can  force  a  man  to  sin,  and  then  punish  him  without  being  un- 
just. Answer:  Mill  has  to  say  on  this  god  of  Hobbes.  "  I 
will  call  no  being  good,  who  is  not  what  I  mean  when  I  apply 
that  epithet  to  my  fellow  creatures;  and  if  such  a  being 
can  sentence  me  to  hell  for  not  calling  Mm  so,  to  hell  I  will 
go." 

2.  Laws  prohibiting  necessary  acts  are  not  unjust.  All  law 
is  just,  because  the  subject  consents.  Theft,  though  necessary, 
can  be  punished  to  deter  others.  Necessary  acts  of  theft  are 
noxious,  and  we  justly  destroy  all  that  is  noxious,  both  beasts 
and  men.  Answer:  There  is  a  difference  between  punishing 
and  blaming.     We  blame  men  as  well  as  punish  them. 


174  PSYCHOLOGY 

3.  Consultation  precedes  choice,  and  therefore  consultation  is 
not  in  vain.  Answer:  But  the  consultation  of  Hobbes  was  de- 
termined by  antecedent  circumstances,  reaching  farther  back 
than  the  l)irth  of  the  consultor.  Hobbes  sees  danger  in  this 
doctrine.  Hence  his  request  to  the  Marquis  of  Newcastle  and 
the  Bishop  of  Londonderry  to  keep  private  what  he  writes  here. 

J^.  Praise  and  dispraise  depend  not  on  the  necessity  of  the 
action.  We  praise  what  is  good,  and  dispraise  what  is  evil. 
Necessary  acts  can  be  good  or  evil.  Answer:  Praise  touches 
excellences  proper  to  thing's  nature.  Lianimate  things  are 
praised  for  their  beauty  and  usefulness;  plants  and  brutes,  for 
full  growth ;  men,  for  stature,  strength,  beauty,  quick  wit,  com- 
mand.    Man  is  alone  praiseworthy,  when  he  exercises  free  will. 

5.  Piety  means  two  things,  to  honor  God  in  our  hearts, 
thinking  mightily  of  His  power,  and  to  signify  that  honor  by 
words  and  acts.  Necessity  allows  of  both.  Ansiver:  Power 
is  the  quality  in  God  best  known  to  beginners.  After  power, 
comes  justice.  The  tyro  fears,  the  proficient  hopes,  the  expert 
loves.     The  god  of  Hobbes  is  not  good,  he  is  only  omnipotent. 

6.  The  prayer  is  decreed  together  in  the  same  decree,  wherein 
the  blessing  is  decreed.  Answer:  The  prayer  is  foreseen  in 
the  decree,  wherein  the  blessing  is  decreed.  Prayer  is  the  ac- 
knowledgment of  God's  dominion,  but  it  is  for  that  very  reason 
free.     Forced  acknowledgment  is  no  homage. 

7.  Sin  can  be  voluntary,  and  yet  necessary.  Answer:  Nec- 
essary sin  is  no  contradiction.  It  has  place  in  hell.  Love  in 
Heaven  is  voluntary  and  necessary.  Love  of  an  object,  that 
completely  satisfies,  is  necessary  and  voluntary.  A  toy  satisfies 
the  child;  God,  a  seraph.  Man  occupies  a  middle  position; 
nothing  on  earth  completely  satisfies  him.  Ergo,  voluntary  in 
man  means  free.     Eead  Ecclesiasticus  xv,  11. 

8.  Necessity  is  not  compulsion,  as  is  plain  in  the  case  of  a 
sailor  throwing  his  cargo  into  the  sea.  Love,  revenge,  lust  are 
free  from  compulsion,  but  are  necessary  acts.  Answer:  Aris- 
totle thus  defines  compulsion,  "  violence  from  without,  the 
party  compelled  contributing  nothing  of  his  own."  Goods  cast 
into  the  sea  are  no  fair  example  of  compulsion.  A  deed  done 
by  compulsion  of  fear  is  not  necessitated.  Passion  weakens 
freedom,  and  fear  is  strongest  of  the  passions.  The  popular 
impression  that  fear  compels,  is  grounded  in  the  fact  that  other 


THESIS  IX  175 

passions  are  home-products,  while  fear  is  an  importation  from 
outside. 

9.  The  last  dictate  of  the  understanding  necessitates  the  act, 
as  the  last  feather  breaks  the  horse's  back.  Answer:  Here  is 
the  process.  Speculative  Judgment  comes  first,  This  is  open 
to  choice,  so  is  that.  Hypothetical  practical  judgment  follows. 
This  ought  to  be  chosen,  if  I  want  to  be  prudent ;  and  that  can 
be  chosen,  if  I  want  to  be  imprudent.  Absolute  practical  judg- 
ment closes  the  process,  I  choose  this,  and  I  want  to  be  prudent ; 
or  I  choose  that,  and  I  want  to  be  imprudent.  The  absolute 
practical  judgment  is  but  a  mental  expression  of  the  willed 
act,  and  is  altogether  consequent  to  the  will's  determination. 
The  hypothetical  practical  judgment  precedes  the  will's  act,  and 
leaves  everything  undetermined.  Hence  our  distinction.  The 
last  judgment  of  the  mind  determines  the  will,  the  last  specu- 
lative judgment,  I  deny.  The  last  practical  judgment,  I  dis- 
tinguish. The  last  hypothetical,  I  deny.  The  last  absolute,  I 
distinguish  again.  With  antecedent  necessity,  I  deny.  With 
consequent  necessity,  I  grant.  We  cannot  actually  choose  a 
thing,  and  remain  free  to  choose  its  alternative.  But  the 
necessity  we  impose  on  ourselves  is  consequent,  not  antecedent 
to  our  actual  choice. 

10.  Water  has  liberty  to  descend,  because  there  is  no  im- 
pediment in  the  nature  of  water.  Its  inability  to  ascend  is  not 
want  of  liberty,  but  want  of  power.  In  the  same  way  man  has 
liberty,  even  when  necessitated ;  because  there  is  no  impediment 
in  his  nature.  His  inability  to  choose  an  alternative  is  not 
want  of  liberty,  but  want  of  power.  Answer:  Water  and 
brutes  are  free  metaphorically.  Things  are  said  to  be  free, 
when  allowed  to  act  according  to  their  nature.  ISTatures  are 
different,  and  ought  to  be  of  different  powers.  Man  ought  to 
be  free  in  one  way;  water  and  brutes,  in  another.  Hobbes 
makes  them  all  free  in  the  same  way.  Like  Edwards,  Hobbes 
knows  only  one  kind  of  freedom,  that  from  force  or  violence. 
He  knows  nothing  about  freedom  from  necessity.  Intrinsically, 
water  is  just  as  free  to  ascend  as  it  is  to  descend.  All  the  dif- 
ference is  extrinsic.  Water  has  no  real  freedom  at  all.  Free- 
dom means  choice,  and  water  never  chooses.  Somebody  chooses 
for  it.  Somebody  removes  the  impediment,  and  it  flows. 
Somebody  sets  an  impediment  in  its  path,  and  it  stops  flowing. 


176  PSYCHOLOGY 

An  up-slope  is  an  impediment,  a  down-slope  is  its  removal ;  and 
the  water  never  makes  either.  Water  seems  to  be  free,  just  as 
the  meadow  seems  to  smile,  or  the  medicine  seems  to  be  healthy. 
All  metaphors  are  as  close  approaches  to  the  truth.  Man's 
proper  freedom  is  from  within,  not  from  without.  He  enjoys 
the  inferior  kind  of  freedom  common  to  rivers  and  birds.  We 
call  it  freedom  from  force  or  violence.  But  his  rational  nature 
calls  for  a  higher  kind,  denominated  freedom  from  intrinsic 
constraint  or  necessity.  Something  in  water  makes  flowing 
necessary,  when  impediments  are  removed.  Nothing  in  man 
makes  it  necessary  for  him,  in  whatever  emergency,  to  choose 
one  alternative  rather  than  another.  Nothing  outside  of  man 
can  constrain  his  will,  though  many  outside  impediments  can 
constrain  his  other  faculties;  and  while  his  will  is  never  under 
restraint,  the  man  himself  can  be  said  to  be  in  that  condition. 

11.  I  conceive  that  nothing  taketh  beginning  from  itself,  but 
from  the  action  of  some  other  immediate  agent  without  itself. 
The  cause  of  will  is  not  the  will  itself,  but  something  else  not 
in  its  own  disposing.  Answer:  Spontaneous  volitions  are 
traceable  to  necessary  causes,  reflex  volitions  ordinarily  are  not. 
This  is  but  a  repetition  of  the  aged  Scholastic  difficulty,  Omnia 
mota  moventur  ab  alio,  everything  moved  is  moved  by  another, 
whatever  has  motion  is  moved  by  another.  And  the  answer  is 
easy.  There  is  a  difference  between  moving  and  necessitating. 
Hobbes  has  to  prove,  not  that  the  will  is  moved,  but  that  it  is 
necessitated  by  another.  Many  outside  things  move  the  will. 
The  intellect  moves  it  by  proposing  good,  and  this  is  termina- 
tive  motion.  God  moves  it  by  concurrence  or  cooperation. 
But,  when  an  agent,  like  the  will,  enjoys  active  indifference, 
nothing  outside  moves  it  determinately  and  physically,  but  only 
morally  and  in  the  order  of  thought. 

12.  A  sufficient  cause  is  a  necessary  cause.  Every  alternative 
actually  chosen  is  by  the  very  fact  a  sufficient,  and,  therefore, 
a  necessary  cause.  Ergo,  no  free  will.  Answer:  An  object 
that  has  drawbacks  is  no  sufficient  cause  for  a  necessary  voli- 
tion. If  a  volition  follows,  it  will  be  not  necessitated  but  free. 
There  is  sufficient  cause  for  a  free  volition,  not  sufficient  cause 
for  a  necessary  volition. 

13.  It  is  necessary  that  to-morrow  it  shall  rain  or  not  rain. 
If  it  be  not  necessary  it  shall,  it  is  necessary  it  shall  not  rain. 


THESIS  IX  177 

Answer:  Either  is  true  determinately,  I  deny;  —  indetermin- 
ately, I  grant.  Hobbes  answers,  necessity  remains,  though  we 
know  it  not.  Take  this  example.  It  is  necessary  that  to- 
morrow Philip  shall  sin  or  not  sin.  Hobbes  cannot  show  that 
sin  in  Philip  to-morrow  is  either  a  necessity  or  an  impossibility 
antecedent  to  his  exercise  of  free  will,  but  only  consequent  on 
same;  and  we  admit  consequent  necessity  or  determination. 
He  mixes  two  things,  the  assertion  of  Philip's  sinning  to-mor- 
row necessarily  involves  the  denial  of  his  not  sinning,  and  the 
assertion  of  Philip's  sinning  to-morrow  involves  the  denial  of 
his  necessarily  not  sinning. 

G.  Hume.  1.  The  exceeding  multitude  and  variety  of  the 
antecedents  to  volition,  alone  prevent  us  from  determining  ac- 
curately in  all  cases  the  result,  which  uniformly  and  necessarily 
follows.  Answer:  Freedom  of  will  is  not  based  on  the  im- 
possibility of  predicting  a  man's  conduct.  It  is  quite  as  im- 
possible to  predict  the  weather,  and  nobody  on  this  account 
calls  the  weather  free.  The  basic  argument  for  free  will  is 
consciousness  of  the  fact;  and  this  is  strengthened  by  others, 
in  which  impossibility  of  prediction  forms  no  part.  The  con- 
duct of  a  man  cannot  be  predicted  with  anything  like  absolute 
certainty;  and  free  will  is  the  chief  cause,  not  antecedents.  It 
is  easier  to  make  a  guess  at  the  weather.  Of  course  man  is 
amenable  to  motives,  environment,  habit  and  disposition;  but 
these  several  factors  exert  no  determining  influence.  They  are 
on  so  many  occasions  discounted,  that  predictions  based  on 
their  constancy  are  altogether  unreliable.  The  number  of  in- 
stances sufficing  for  an  induction  in  the  grosser  region  of  mat- 
ter, is  not  sufficient  in  the  finer  domain  of  intelligence. 

2.  Because  God  is  the  ultimate  author  of  all  our  volitions, 
human  actions  either  have  no  moral  turpitude  at  all,  or  they 
must  involve  our  Creator  in  the  same  guilt.  Answer:  Hume 
solves  the  difficulty  by  declaring  it  a  sublime  mystery,  to  pry 
into  which  is  temerity.  To  reconcile  free  will  with  God's 
prescience,  or  to  defend  absolute  decrees  and  free  God  from 
sin,  exceeds,  he  thinks,  all  the  power  of  philosophy.  In  our 
system,  the  mystery  admits  of  easy  solution.  God's  prescience 
is  consequent  to  man's  exercise  of  his  free  will,  not  indeed  in 
the  order  of  time,  but  in  the  order  of  nature. 

H.    Mill.     1.  Freedom  is  consistent  with  divine  foreknowl- 


178  PSYCHOLOGY 

edge.  Ergo,  with  human.  Answer:  No  parity.  God  is  in- 
finite, man  finite.  With  God,  duration  is  eternity;  with  man, 
time.  Eternity  is  nunc  stans,  time  is  nunc  fluens.  There  is 
no  past  or  future  with  God.  What  will  happen  a  hundred 
years  hence,  is  present  in  the  now  of  God.  Men  must  wait  till 
it  happens.  St.  Augustine  reduces  the  three  tenses  to  one, 
the  present.  The  present  of  things  past  is  memory ;  the  present 
of  tilings  present  is  intuition;  the  present  of  things  future  is 
expectation. 

2.  "  We  know  that  we  are  not  compelled  to  obey  any  par- 
ticular motive.  We  feel  that,  if  we  wish  to  prove  that  we  have 
the  power  of  resisting  the  motive,  we  could  do  so  (that  wish 
being,  it  needs  scarcely  be  observed,  a  new  antecedent) ;  and 
it  would  be  humiliating  to  our  pride,  and  paralyzing  to  our 
desire  of  excellence,  if  we  thought  otherwise."  Answer:  This 
looks  like  our  own  doctrine.  The  parenthesis  makes  it  De- 
terminism, because  it  makes  our  volitions  and  actions  invariable 
consequents  of  our  antecedent  states  of  mind.  We  maintain 
that  our  conduct  and  volitions  are  consequents  of  choice,  and 
choice  can  oppose  antecedent  states  of  mind.  It  can  reject 
what  the  mind  approves,  and  approve  what  the  mind  rejects. 
Hammered  iron  is  the  invariable  consequent  of  antecedent  con- 
ditions. Crime  is  not,  as  can  be  readily  seen  in  the  case  of 
saint  and  sinner,  with  the  same  disposition  and  the  same  mo- 
tives at  their  disposal.  According  to  Mill,  Abel  would  never 
do  right,  if  placed  with  Cain's  character  in  an  occasion  similar 
to  that  in  which  Cain  does  wrong. 

3.  Determinism  means  that  the  given  cause  will  be  followed 
by  the  effect,  subject  to  all  possibilities  of  counteraction  by  other 
causes.  Necessity,  or  the  doctrine  of  Hume,  in  common  use 
stands  for  the  operation  of  those  causes  exclusively,  which  are 
supposed  too  powerful  to  be  counteracted  at  all. 

Answer:  Hume  adds  to  uniformity  of  sequence  an  element 
of  uncounteractableness.  But  in  Mill's  philosophy,  as  in 
Hume's,  whatever  is  actually  uncounteracted  is  practically  and 
in  the  concrete  uncounteractable;  and,  therefore,  to  happen  and 
to  happen  of  necessity  are  one. 

Jf.  Determinism  is  remote  from  Fatalism;  and  yet  most  De- 
terminists  are  Fatalists.  A  Fatalist  half  believes, —  and  no- 
body is  a  consistent  Fatalist, —  not  only  that  whatever  happens 


THESIS  IX  179 

is  the  infallible  result  of  the  causes  which  produce  it,  and  that 
is  Determinism,  but  also  that  there  is  no  use  in  struggling 
against  it.  According  to  Fatalists,  a  man's  character  is  formed 
for  him,  and  not  by  him.  According  to  Determinists,  a  man's 
character  is  formed  in  part  for  him,  and  in  part  by  him. 

Answer:  In  Determinism  we  make  our  own  character,  if  we 
will;  but  if  we  will,  comes  from  no  effort  of  our  own,  but 
from  circumstances  or  external  causes,  which  we  cannot  help. 
As  Mill  foolishly  puts  it,  our  characters  are  formed  for  us  in 
the  ultimate  resort,  by  us  as  intermediate  agents. 

5.  The  Free-will  doctrine,  by  keeping  in  view  precisely  that 
portion  of  the  truth,  which  the  word  necessity  puts  out  of 
sight,  namely,  the  power  of  the  mind  to  cooperate  in  the 
formation  of  its  own  character,  has  given  to  its  adherents  a 
practical  feeling  much  nearer  the  truth  than  has  generally 
existed  in  the  minds  of  Necessitarians.  Determinism  is  good 
for  the  culture  of  others;  free  will,  for  self -culture. 

Answer:  Mill  would  here  seem  to  be  a  Libertarian.  He 
makes  three  concessions.  We  are  able  to  modify  our  char- 
acter, if  we  will;  we  are  masters  of  our  habits  and  temptations, 
not  they  of  us;  we  could  resist  habit  or  temptation,  even  when 
we  yield  to  it.  Perhaps  he  means,  we  could,  but  cannot;  could, 
if  circumstances  were  different;  cannot,  as  they  are. 

6.  What  I  am  able  to  do  is  not  a  subject  of  consciousness, 
we  are  conscious  of  what  is,  not  of  what  will  or  can  be.  Con- 
sciousness is  not  prophetical. 

Answer:  I  do,  I  can,  I  am,  are  three  facets  of  the  same 
truth.  I  do,  implies  I  can;  I  do  and  I  can,  imply  I  am.  I 
can  do  a  thing,  does  not  mean  I  shall  do  it.  I  can,  is  not 
prophetic.  I  can  use  my  endeavor,  is  a  fact  of  present  con- 
sciousness. These  endeavors  will  be  adequate  to  the  occasion, 
is  an  inference  from  past  to  future,  and  is  prophetical. 

7.  I  dispute  altogether  that  we  are  conscious  of  being  able 
to  act  in  opposition  to  the  strongest  present  desire  or  aversion. 
When  we  think  of  ourselves  hypothetically  as  having  acted 
otherwise  than  we  did,  we  always  suppose  a  difference  in  the 
antecedents, — 'We  picture  ourselves  as  having  known  something 
that  we  did  not  know,  or  not  knowing  something  that  we  did 
know,  which  is  a  difference  in  the  external  motives;  or  as  having 
desired  or  dishked  something  more  or  less  than  we  did,  which 


180  PSYCHOLOGY 

is  a  difference  in  the  internal  motives.  Ergo  antecedents  de- 
termine volition. 

Answer:  ^lill  here  proves  himself  an  absolute  Necessitarian, 
a  Fatalist.  If  a  man's  aversion  to  crime  is  weaker  than 
temptation,  he  must  commit  it.  If  his  desire  is  weaker  than 
his  horror,  he  must  abstain  from  it.  And  this  is  Fatalism. 
Rickaby  explains  the  case  by  saying  that  in  two  alternatives, 
when  one  complacency  is  stronger  than  the  other,  the  man  can 
wait  and  do  nothing  till  the  other  complacency  becomes  the 
stronger.  After  a  long  or  short  repetition  of  this  process  he 
eventually  selects  that  one  of  the  two  alternatives,  to  which  he 
last  adverted.  Mill  could  well  rejoin  that  the  alternative,  to 
which  he  last  adverted,  was  the  stronger  of  the  two,  and  so 
determined  or  necessitated  his  choice.  In  this  case  the  cir- 
cumstance of  last  advertence  would  be  the  determining  factor. 
It  might  be  better  to  say  that  though  the  two  alternatives  con- 
tended simultaneously  for  notice,  and  that  though  one  ap- 
peared stronger  than  the  other,  the  man  could  still  choose, 
and  often  does  choose  the  weaker.  Free  will  does  not  neces- 
sarily mean  the  actual,  but  the  possible  choice  of  either.  In 
fact,  free  will  exists  no  more  in  this  or  that  particular,  when 
once  actual  choice  has  been  made.  To  prove  his  free  will,  a 
man  need  not  necessarily  choose  the  weaker  alternative.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  he  generally  chooses  the  stronger,  but  always 
with  an  abiding  conviction  that  he  could  have  chosen  the 
weaker. 

8.  There  are  two  ends,  which  in  the  Necessitarian  theory  are 
sufficient  to  justify  punishment,  the  benefit  of  the  offender  and 
the  protection  of  others.  Answer:  There  is  another  feature 
that  renders  it  altogether  unjust,  and  that  is  the  blame  in- 
volved in  punishment.  In  addition  to  pain,  punishment  in- 
volves blame;  and  this  is  never  imputed  to  agents  unable  to 
help  themselves.  Mill  maintains  that  we  can  know  that  we 
ought  to  be  punished  for  our  misdeeds  without  knowing  that 
our  wills  are  free.  He  affirms  that  the  ordinary  notion  of 
justice  is  altogether  a  mistake.  It  is  expedient  for  the  greatest 
happiness  of  the  greatest  number,  that  a  man  who  has  been 
compelled  to  crime  should  suffer  a  penalty  able  on  the  next 
occasion  to  hold  him  to  virtue,  and  this  is  Utilitarianism.  In 
this  event,  lunatics  ought  to  be  punished,  as  they  are  open  to 


THESIS  IX  181 

the  agency  of  fear.  But  no  civilized  country  has  yet  descended 
to  that  meanness. 

9.  The  true  doctrine  maintains  against  Asiatic  Fatalism,  that 
of  Oedipus,  wherein  a  superior  power  overrules  our  desires,  and 
Modified  Fatalism,  wherein  our  character  is  made  for  us,  not 
by  us,  that  our  character  is  in  part  amenable  to  our  will. 

Answer:  This  is  Eoundabout  Fatalism.  Thus,  we  can  im- 
prove our  character  by  our  own  voluntary  exertions,  which  sup- 
pose that  there  was  already  something  in  our  character,  which 
led  us  to  improve  it,  and  accounts  for  our  doing  so.  He  de- 
rives our  volitions  from  our  characters  and  circumstances,  our 
character  from  our  volitions  and  circumstances,  and  our  voli- 
tions again  from  our  character  and  circumstances.  Unless  our 
character  and  circumstances  cause  and  determine  us  to  do  so, 
we  shall  make  no  voluntary  efforts  for  the  improvement  of  our 
character. 

I.  a.  Will  is  moved  by  greater  desire.     Ergo. 

b.  Fear  necessitates  will.     Ergo. 

c.  Will  requires  aid  of  intellect  to  pass  from  potency  to 
act.     Ergo. 

d.  Will  in  first  act  is  still  indifferent  to  will  in  second 
act.     Ergo. 

e.  While  eliciting  an  act  the  will  cannot  not  elicit  the  act. 
Ergo. 

f.  Will  acts  in  virtue  of  motion  received  from  first  cause. 
Ergo. 

g.  An  act  foreknown  by  God  will  infallibly  take  place. 
Ergo. 

Answers:  a.  Will  is  moved,  attracted,  influenced,  I  grant; 
determined,  necessitated,  I  deny. 

b.  Fear  exercises  greatest  stress  on  will,  I  grant;  fear  ne- 
cessitates, I  deny. 

N.B.  When  fear  dethrones  reason,  act  is  not  human ;  and 
only  human  acts  are  free.  When  deliberation  is  absent,  act  is 
not  human  and,  of  course,  not  free. 

c.  Requires  intellect  to  pass  from  potency  to  first  act,  I 
grant;  from  potency  to  second  act,  I  deny.  Will  in  first  act  is 
ready  to  wish,  will  in  second  act  is  actually  wishing. 


182  PSYCHOLOGY 

d.  Will  in  first  act  is  indifferent,  with  merely  passive  indif- 
ference, I  deny ;  with  active,  I  grant. 

e.  Constraint  is  antecedent,  I  deny;  constraint  is  consequent, 
I  grant. 

f.  This  motion  of  first  cause  is  antecedent  and  necessitating, 
I  deny;  simultaneous  and  indifferent,  I  grant. 

g.  Will  infallibly,  certainly  take  place,  I  grant;  will  in- 
fallibly and  with  necessity  take  place,  I  again  distinguish;  a 
necessary  act,  I  grant;  a  free  act,  I  deny. 

J.     a.  What  God  foresees  will  necessarily  take  place.     Ergo. 

b.  Omission  of  an   act   foreseen   by   God   is   impossible. 
Ergo. 

c.  Free  will  depends  on  God's  foreknowledge,  and  this 
in  turn  is  independent  of  free  will.     Ergo. 

Answers:  a.  With  logical  or  consequent  necessity,  I  grant; 
with  physical  or  antecedent,  I  again  distinguish;  in  necessary 
agent,  I  grant;  in  free,  I  deny. 

b.  Logically  or  consequently  I  grant;  physically,  or  ante- 
cedently, I  again  distinguish;  in  necessary  agent,  I  grant;  in 
free,  I  deny. 

c.  Depends  on  God  as  spectator,  I  grant;  as  determining 
cause,  I  deny. 


THESIS  X 

The  Truth  About  Hypnotism 


Division 
Statement  of  Question 

A.  Definition 

B.  Division  I,  II,  III 

C.  Hypnotic  Sleep 

D.  Ethics  of  Hypnotism. 

E.  Church  and  Hypnotism. 


Maker,  pp.  594-603. 


QUESTION 


Our  theme  is  in  point  of  fact  an  old  one.  The  name  it  uses 
for  present  disguise  is  of  comparatively  recent  origin.  Error 
has  as  many  changes  of  spots  as  the  proverbial  leopard,  and 
error's  changes  are  generally  no  less  superficial.  We  are  to-day 
fighting,  in  the  domains  of  theology  and  philosophy,  theories 
done  to  death  centuries  ago,  and  resurrected  whole.  Hypno- 
tism used  to  be  called  Mesmerism,  Animal  Magnetism,  Braid- 
ism  and  other  isms  too  numerous  to  mention.  Mesmer,  a 
German  physician  (1733-1815),  in  the  course  of  enquiries  into 
the  nature  and  cure  of  diseases,  thought  he  discovered  in  a 
certain  magnetic  fluid  the  vehicle  of  all  the  ills  to  which  this 
flesh  is  heir;  and,  acting  on  his  discovery,  proceeded  to  make 
the  world  whole  through  the  agency  of  the  wonderful  fluid.  He 
was  of  opinion  that  every  animal,  whether  man  or  beast,  carries 
about  a  stock  of  this  commodity,  and  that  disease  is  the  out- 
come of  a  disorder  in  its  distribution,  which  can  easily  be  set 
to  rights  by  a  few  passes  of  the  hand  and  shakes  of  the  head. 
There  is  no  denying  the  fact  that  certain  infirmities,  notably 
those  of  nervous  origin,  are  eminently  susceptible  to  treatment 
of  this  sort.     Bread-pills  in  boarding-colleges  have  worked  won- 

183 


184  PSYCHOLOGY 

derful  revolutions  in  the  health  of  boys  and  girls,  and  have 
often  saved  the  victims  of  a  too  vivid  imagination  from  early 
graves.  Even  so,  Mesmer,  by  instilling  large  faith  into  his 
patients,  restored  to  use  many  a  stiffened  limb,  and  broke  up 
the  beginnings  of  many  a  serious  malady.  He  himself  in- 
sisted that  everything  was  due  to  animal  magnetism,  the  ex- 
istence of  which  is  to-day  roundly  denied  by  the  soberer  and 
more  eminent  students  of  medicine.  Braid  was  an  English- 
man, who  followed  in  the  footsteps  of  Mesmer,  and  met  witli 
success  so  phenomenal  that  the  new  remedy  became  identified 
with  his  name. 

A.  For  a  definition  of  hypnotism,  I  open  my  Century  Dic- 
tionary, and  find  there  this  accurate  description,  "  An  abnormal 
mental  condition,  characterized  by  insensibility  to  most  im- 
pressions of  sense,  with  excessive  sensibility  to  some  impres- 
sions, and  an  appearance  of  total  unconsciousness.  This  is 
true  especially  of  that  variety  of  this  condition  which  is  arti- 
ficially induced,  usually  by  concentrating  the  attention  of  the 
subject  upon  some  object  of  vision,  as  a  bit  of  bright  glass, 
or  on  the  operator,  who  generally  aids  in  producing  the  result 
by  making  a  few  light  passes  with  his  hands.  When  in  this 
condition,  the  mental  action  and  volition  of  the  subject  are  to 
a  large  extent  under  the  control  of  the  operator.  The  state 
begins  in  a  gradual  loss  of  taste,  touch,  and  the  sense  of  tem- 
perature ;  next,  colors  are  imperfectly  distinguished ;  then,  forms 
grow  indistinct;  and  then  the  eye  is  immovable,  and  nothing  is 
seen.  The  ear  never  sleeps  in  these  experiments.  The  subject 
believes,  and  at  last  does,  all  that  is  commanded.  Senses  fall 
completely  under  control  of  the  hypnotizer;  and  in  many  cases 
the  interval  between  normal  waking  and  hypnotic  sleep  covers 
only  a  minute." 

The  word  hypnotism  is  of  Greek  parentage,  and  claims  rela- 
tionship with  hypnotizo,  the  exact  equivalent  of  "  to  put  to 
sleep."  The  name  is  admirably  well  chosen,  as  the  whole 
process  consists  in  producing  sleep,  or  lulling  all  the  senses 
but  hearing  into  unconsciousness.  Some  very  remarkable  pe- 
culiarities attach  to  this  hypnotic  sleep,  and  render  it  widely 
different  from  nature's  sweet  restorer.  Thus,  for  instance,  all 
adepts  in  the  art  of  hypnotizing  agree  that  the  ears  of  the 
subject  under  their  influence  never  once  lose  their  acuteness 


THESIS  X  185 

and  susceptibility  to  sound.  The  other  four  senses  of  sight, 
smell,  touch,  and  taste  are  all  topsy-turvy  during  the  spell, 
and  wholly  incapable  of  discriminating  between  colors,  odors, 
surfaces,  and  flavors;  but  the  hearing  is  wide  awake,  and  de- 
tects every  whisper.  This  very  circumstance  makes  it  possible 
for  the  artist  to  ply  his  trade  and  perform  tricks  that  be- 
wilder the  witnesses.  For,  the  senses  being  the  gateways  of 
the  mind,  the  artist  through  the  subject's  ear  has  at  least  one 
entrance  to  the  subject's  mind;  and,  once  inside,  he  can  there 
create  impressions,  that  the  other  senses  would,  if  awake,  cor- 
rect. The  hypnotic  state  can,  therefore,  be  characterized  as 
an  incomplete  sleep,  a  doze.  It  has  many  points  in  common 
with  these  several  phenomena,  notably  that  of  delicacy  of  hear- 
ing. It  is,  like  them,  interrupted  by  noise  not  above  the  or- 
dinary, or  even  by  deep  silence,  when  some  regular  chain  of 
sounds  preceded.  For  instance,  it  has  been  the  experience  of 
many  to  awake  early  at  night,  when  slumber  is  not  deep,  be- 
cause a  clock  in  the  room  suddenly  stopped  ticking.  These 
same  persons,  a  few  hours  later,  when  in  the  middle  of  their 
sleep,  would  hardly  awake,  if  the  world  stopped  going  around. 
A  man  under  hypnotic  influence  hears  the  operator's  voice  dis- 
tinctly. He  answers  in  that  disconnected  sort  of  language  com- 
mon to  dreams.  He  sees,  but  so  obscurely  that  he  cannot  dis- 
tinguish a  horse  from  a  broomstick.  He  smells  and  tastes,  but 
cannot  distinguish  a  cabbage  from  a  rose,  a  potato  from  an 
orange. 

In  this  matter  of  hypnotism,  a  common  every  day  drunk  is 
an  interesting  study,  and  presents  many  analogies.  Thus,  when 
well  tightened  up,  the  victim  of  too  much  conviviality  loses, 
along  with  self-respect  and  gentility,  several  at  least  of  his  five 
senses.  His  power  of  locomotion  is  so  badly  beyond  control 
that,  try  as  he  will,  he  cannot  make  progress,  except  by  tacking ; 
and  sometimes  his  fetches  are  so  wide  that  he  lurches  all  the 
way  to  the  car-tracks  before  steering  to  the  east  or  west,  as  the 
case  may  be.  I  have  seen  them  leave  the  sidewalk  altogether, 
dart  through  the  railing  in  front  of  a  stranger's  residence,  con- 
tinue straight  down  the  area-steps  to  the  basement  door,  and 
then  turn  back  only  because  they  found  the  door  locked.  Peo- 
ple with  some  experience  in  this  line  aver  that  the  houses  on 
either  side  of  the  street  play  a  sad  trick  on  the  eyes,  and  seem 


186  PSYCHOLOGY 

to  lean  till  they  form  an  arch  overhead.  They  likewise  aver 
that,  as  soon  as  they  themselves  take  up  a  position  of  rest  at 
a  corner,  the  houses  on  the  opposite  side,  with  their  numbers 
in  flaring  evidence,  seem  to  pass  in  mock  procession.  And  all 
this  with  such  an  air  of  reality  that  they  count  it  best  to  wait 
just  where  they  are,  till  their  house  passes  along.  They  con- 
fess to  snakes,  and  are  frecjuently  detected  with  their  arms 
thrown  lovingly  around  a  cold  lamp-post  or  trolley  pole,  ad- 
dressing it  as  a  friend  with  effusiveness  and  a  copious  abun- 
dance of  tears.  I  allege  these  instances,  only  to  prove  my 
contention,  that  hypnotism  is  in  most  cases  merely  on  a  level 
with  events  in  daily  life,  that,  because  of  their  commonness, 
excite  in  us  no  wonder.  To  understand  this  the  more  thor- 
oughly, let  us  examine  in  detail  some  of  the  startling  perform- 
ances of  hypnotism. 

B.  Division.  They  can  be  conveniently  ranged  in  three 
classes.  Let  the  first  embrace  such  as  proceed  from  deception 
practiced  on  the  senses.  Under  the  second  we  can  include  all 
such  as  turn  on  the  obedient  deference  the  subject  pays  to  the 
commands  of  the  hypnotist.  Under  the  third  class  we  can  group 
marvels  that  are  merely  fraudulent  appearances,  the  result  of 
trickery  and  magic;  or,  if  the  realities  they  are  represented  to 
be,  outside  tlie  sphere  of  natural  agencies,  due  entirely  to  the 
interference  of  beings  of  another  and  a  higher  order,  namely  evil 
spirits  or  demons. 

I.  Phenomena  of  the  first  and  second  classes  present  little 
or  no  difficulty  to  the  student  of  philosophy,  at  all  acquainted 
with  the  operations  of  the  senses  and  the  mind's  dependence  on 
the  senses  for  its  ideas.  Thus,  the  whole  process  consists  sim- 
ply in  this,  that  the  operator,  generally  a  man  gifted  with  a 
pair  of  dark  flashing  eyes,  looks  fixedly  at  his  victim,  and,  after 
a  few  bewildering  movements  of  the  hands,  has  the  subject 
completely  at  his  mercy.  Four  of  the  patient's  senses  are  half 
asleep  and  practically  useless.  His  hearing  is  wide  awake,  and 
the  performance  begins.  First,  for  instance,  a  potato  is  thrust 
into  his  hand,  and  he  is  told  with  monotonous  solemnity  that 
he  holds  an  orange.  He  is  tlien  commanded  to  eat  the  orange, 
and  he  devours  the  potato  with  an  air  of  relish  and  avidity, 
thinking  all  the  while  that  he  is  really  eating  an  orange.  The 
explanation  is  easy  and  simple.     The  man's  sense  of  touch  is 


THESIS  X  187 

numb,  and  cannot  discern  the  difference  between  the  shape  of 
a  potato  and  that  of  an  orange.  His  sense  of  taste  is  equally 
numb  or  drowsy,  and  cannot  distinguish  the  flavor  of  a  po- 
tato from  that  of  an  orange.  All  the  while,  however,  his  hear- 
ing is  wide  awake.  It  never  for  a  moment  abandons  him;  and 
as  it  is  for  the  present  the  only  channel  through  which  he 
receives  ideas,  he  thinks,  without  any  means  of  correcting  the 
mistake,  that  everything  is  just  as  it  is  represented  by  the  op- 
erator. He  thinks  that  he  grasps  an  orange,  that  he  tastes 
an  orange,  that  he  eats  an  orange.  Numerous  other  tricks 
can  be  practiced  on  him  while  the  spell  lasts.  A  bundle  of 
rags  can  be  laid  in  his  arms,  and,  at  the  suggestion  of  the 
operator,  he  will  fondle  and  toss  the  same  as  though  it  were 
a  real  live  baby.  A  rod  and  line  can  be  put  in  his  hands,  and 
he  will  sit  at  the  edge  of  the  stage  and  fish  contentedly.  Or 
he  will  prance  about  boy-fashion  on  a  broomstick,  as  though  he 
were  riding  a  cavalry-horse.  It  is  worth  noting,  in  this  first 
series  of  marvels,  that  the  hypnotist's  words  are  always  accom- 
panied by  actions.  He  would  be  powerless  in  the  four  experi- 
ments just  enumerated,  unless  he  actually  slipped  a  potato  into 
the  hand  of  the  subject,  laid  a  bundle  of  rags  on  his  arm,  or 
furnished  him  with  fishing  tackle  and  a  broomstick.  I  call 
your  attention  to  this  circumstance,  as  it  will  afterwards  serve 
to  mark  off  the  difference  between  the  mind's  activity  in  the 
two  conditions  of  dreaming  and  hypnotism. 

II.  Passing  now  to  the  second  class  of  phenomena,  such  as 
turn  on  the  obedience  rendered  the  hypnotist  by  his  subject,  we 
see  in  them  nothing  very  extraordinary.  After  inducing  sleep, 
he  issues  a  series  of  orders  that  are  faithfully  executed.  He 
bids  the  man  walk,  sit  down,  dance;  and  all  these  different 
attitudes  are  assumed  in  order.  He  tells  the  victim  that  it  is 
warm,  and  the  victim  unbuttons  his  coat  for  a  breeze.  He  tells 
him  in  the  next  breath  that  it  is  cold,  and  the  victim's  teeth 
chatter.  He  places  a  piece  of  hot  iron  in  close  proximity  to 
the  face  and  hands  of  the  victim  without  creating  any  sensa- 
tion of  pain  or  discomfort.  All  this  time  the  victim's  tem- 
perature, subjectively  speaking,  undergoes  no  change.  Every- 
tliing  is  the  result  of  a  catalepsy  or  partial  paralysis,  produced 
by  the  sleep  in  which  he  is  wrapped.  For  my  part,  I  do  not 
wonder  that  the  victim  of  hypnotism  falls  into  the  prescribed 


188  PSYCHOLOGY 

attitudes,  unbuttons  his  coat,  shivers,  and  experiences  no  in- 
convenience when  brought  near  hot  iron.  The  wonder  would 
be  if  the  contrary  happened.  While  under  hypnotic  influence, 
the  mind  and  will  of  the  patient  are  absolutely  at  the  mercy 
of  the  operator,  for  the  very  evident  reason  before  advanced. 
Every  sense  but  that  of  hearing  is  practically  dead.  Touch 
is  of  no  more  value  to  him  than  it  is  to  a  paralytic.  His  mind 
is  wholly  dependent  on  his  ears  for  ideas,  and  whatever  statement 
the  operator  makes  is  necessarily  accepted  as  true.  Hence,  if 
he  says  that  it  is  warm,  the  patient  must  believe  that  it  is 
warm,  and  behave  accordingly.  If  he  says  that  it  is  cold,  there 
is  nothing  left  for  the  patient  to  do  but  shiver.  If  he  says  that 
a  plate  of  hot  iron  is  cold,  the  patient  has  nothing  to  help  him 
detect  the  fraud.  The  will  acts  only  at  the  instigation  of  forms 
conceived  in  the  mind;  and,  as  the  operator  holds  the  Tcey  to  his 
victim's  mind  through  the  single  sense  of  hearing,  his  orders 
are  communicated  to  the  will  of  the  victim,  and,  whether  they 
prescribe  walking,  sitting  or  dancing,  are  immediately  executed. 
The  whole  groundwork,  therefore,  of  hypnotism  is  founded  on 
these  two  evident  principles  of  Scholastic  philosophy.  "  Nil  in 
intellectu,  quod  non  fuerit  prius  in  sensu,"  and  "  Nil  volitum 
nisi  praecognitum."  They  mean  in  cold  English,  "  Man's  mind 
derives  its  every  idea,  in  root  at  least,  from  the  senses,"  and 
"  Man's  wishes  derive  life  and  being  from  his  thoughts."  The 
two  principles  are  shadowed  forth  in  our  old  saying,  "  What 
the  eye  never  sees,  the  heart  never  craves  for." 

C.  Hypnotic  Sleep.  It  would  be  here  in  order  to  discuss 
the  third  class  of  phenomena,  such  as  speaking  or  understand- 
ing a  hitherto  unknown  tongue,  mind-reading,  vision  through 
walls  and  bandages,  detection  of  hidden  diseases  and  marvels 
of  the  kind.  But,  as  we  have  serious  doubts  about  the  reality 
of  these  phenomena,  or  admit  their  reality  only  on  the  sup- 
position that  they  are  due  to  the  agency  of  evil  spirits  or  de- 
mons, we  prefer  to  dismiss  them  for  the  present  with  this  slight 
notice.  Later  we  shall  have  more  to  say  regarding  them.  We 
wish  to  further  pursue  our  investigation  into  the  phenomena  of 
the  first  and  second  classes.  I  have  said  before,  and  I  now 
repeat,  that  the  phenomena  of  the  first  and  second  classes  are 
no  great  marvels  of  themselves,  and  admit  of  easy,  natural 
explanation.     But   we   cannot   deny    that   the    hypnotic    sleep. 


THESIS  X  189 

which  makes  them  possible,  possesses  some  mystery;  and  that 
its  production  seems,  at  first  sight,  something  of  a  miracle. 
However,  experience  can  be  of  much  valuable  service  to  us 
here,  and  we  can  strip  this  strange  sleep  of  many  of  its  weird 
characteristics  by  viewing  it  in  the  light  of  kindred  occurrences, 
that  make  all  too  faint  an  impression  on  us  because  of  their 
frequency.  I  have  already  alluded  to  the  stupefying  effect  of 
strong  drink  on  a  man's  senses.  Let  me  call  your  attention  to 
a  few  facts  in  your  own  experience  equally  strange.  Some 
preachers  have  the  happy  faculty  of  putting  their  listeners  to 
sleep.  You  must  know  friends,  whose  heavy  conversation  is  a 
mild  narcotic,  producing,  first,  half  suppressed  gapes,  then 
humiliating  nods,  and  last  of  all  oblivious  drowsiness.  Mothers 
know  well  the  soporific  effect  of  the  human  voice,  when  properly 
modulated;  and  they  lead  many  an  annoying  baby  to  the  land 
of  dreams  with  a  lullaby.  If  you  analyze  these  cases,  you  will 
find  that  sleepiness  invariably  follows  on  the  constant  recur- 
rence of  the  same  tone.  The  ear  tires  of  monotony,  and  com- 
municates its  disgust  to  the  other  senses.  The  whole  man 
then  sinks  under  the  weight  of  fatigue  and  seeks  rest  in  sleep. 
Nor  is  the  ear  the  only  organ  thus  affected.  The  eye  is  just  as 
sensitive  to  an  immovable  light,  if  particularly  soft;  to  a  pair 
of  twisted  eyeballs  gleaming  steadily  in  the  dark;  and  to  a 
series  of  bright  plates  or  colors  passed  i-n  rapid  succession  be- 
fore it.  This,  then,  is  the  whole  secret  of  the  hypnotist's  suc- 
cess. Nature  has  gifted  him  with  no  magic  power,  no  hidden 
force,  no  magnetic  fluid,  no  supernatural  influences.  All  such 
talk  is  silly  nonsense,  and  the  fustian  of  fakirs.  Nature  has,  per- 
haps, given  him  a  pair  of  strikingly  dark  eyes  with  a  lustrous 
sparkle,  a  raven  black  mustache,  the  pompous  and  martial  bear- 
ing of  a  drum-major  on  parade;  but  beyond  this  she  has  be- 
stowed on  him  no  hypnotic  abilities  denied  the  meanest  of  her 
children.  He  rolls  his  lively  eyes,  he  utters  a  few  sonorous 
words  in  even  stress  and  with  mock  solemnity,  he  makes  a  few 
poetically  rounded  gestures  with  his  shapely  hands,  and  the 
hoodooed  patient  obediently  falls  asleep.  From  the  fact  that 
he  singles  out  definite  portions  of  the  hands,  and  forehead, 
and  ears,  designated  as  the  locations  of  certain  sense-nerves, 
making  repeated  passes  over  them,  I  have  no  doubt  that  he 
produces  in  the  senses  of  touch,  taste,  and  smell  effects  of  the 


190  PSYCHOLOGY 

same  nature  as  those  produced  by  monotony  in  the  sense  of 
hearing,  and  by  quick  flashes  of  light  in  the  sense  of  vision. 

It  must  likewise  be  remarked  that  nearly  all  his  power  comes 
from  the  patient  on  whom  he  practices.  If  weak  willed  and 
anxious  to  submit  to  his  influence,  the  hypnotist's  task  is  easy. 
Many  a  timid  young  miss,  they  say,  looks  around  for  a  con- 
venient place  in  which  to  faint,  when  made  listen  to  thrilling 
stories  of  the  hypnotic  art,  or  the  darker  secrets  of  fortune- 
telling.  A  calm,  cool  person,  with  his  will  in  his  hands,  with 
complete  power  over  self,  master  of  his  every  nerve  and  muscle, 
aware  of  hypnotism's  hollow  pretensions,  can  be  refractory  un- 
der every  attempt,  can  successfully  resist  the  efforts  of  all  the 
hypnotists  in  Christendom.  Such  a  man,  however,  is  a  rare 
bird,  and  seldom  met  with  at  hypnotic  seances.  The  crowd, 
that  usually  flocks  to  entertainments  of  the  sort,  is  made  up  of 
nervous,  excitable,  fidgety  men  and  women,  boys  and  girls, 
only  too  ready  to  believe  that  the  magician  is  vested  with  irre- 
sistible forces.  And,  just  as  hypnotism  is  nothing,  has  nothing, 
can  do  nothing,  without  your  consent  and  assistance,  so  with 
your  consent  and  assistance  it  can  make  good  nearly  all  its 
claims  at  the  present  day. 

Hypnotism  is,  therefore,  a  particular  kind  of  sleep,  de- 
termined by  definite  physiological  causes,  without  the  interven- 
tion of  any  unknown  or  supernatural  agent.  A  dream  presents 
as  many  difficulties  to  the  enquiring  student  as  hypnotic  sleep. 
The  reason  is  not  far  to  seek.  We  are  so  little  impressed  by 
dreams,  that  we  never  stop  to  enquire  into  their  nature  and 
conformation,  only  because  they  are  in  constant  attendance  on 
our  sleeping  hours.  Hypnotism  arrests  our  attention,  because 
it  falls  to  the  lot  of  only  a  chosen  few  to  experience  its  weird 
spell.  There  are,  however,  differences  between  the  two  states 
of  dreaming  and  hypnotism,  as  before  renuirked;  and  it  may 
be  worth  our  while  to  here  record  a  few.  The  impressions 
received  in  one  state  and  the  other  are  so  vivid  and  lifelike, 
that  you  cannot  help  believing  them  realities  instead  of  repre- 
sentations. And  yet  no  impression  whatever  can  be  conveyed 
in  hypnotic  sleep,  unless  the  operator  at  the  very  birth  of  the 
impression  suggests  some  definite  thought.  He  must,  in  other 
words,  place  a  potato  in  the  patient's  hand,  a  rag-baby  in  his 
arms,  to  successfully  deceive.     In  dreams,  on  the  contrary,  no 


THESIS  X  191 

such  necessity  is  apparent.  An  impression  had  days,  months, 
years  before,  and  faithfully  recorded  in  the  imagination,  can 
give  rise  to  a  dream  as  true  to  life  as  the  scene  that  first 
produced  the  impression.  Sometimes,  of  course,  a  dream  is 
the  outcome  of  a  present  sensation;  as,  when  an  arm  or  limb 
gets  into  some  uncomfortable  position,  when  the  shoulders  are 
pressed  heavily  by  the  bedclothes,  or  when  the  hand  rests  sud- 
denly on  the  hard  wood  or  cold  iron  of  the  bedstead.  But, 
generally,  our  dreams  are  the  growth  of  old  impressions,  stored 
away  somewhere  in  the  lumber-room  of  the  imagination.  These 
impressions  are  kept  in  equilibrium  during  the  day  by  the  mul- 
titude of  thoughts,  that  usually  beset  us  in  busy  work-time. 
At  night,  however,  they  resume  their  force,  and  the  dream  be- 
gins. Though  sometimes  difficult  to  trace  the  connection  be- 
tween past  or  present  sensations  and  the  dream  in  hand,  such 
a  connection  always  exists.  Thus,  for  instance,  you  may  have 
been  conversing  with  some  friend  at  a  street  corner,  just  as  a 
throbbing  locomotive,  with  flaming  headlight,  rushed  by.  That 
night  you  dream  of  a  railroad  accident;  or,  mayhap,  your  fancy 
converts  the  locomotive  into  a  lion,  with  the  headlight  for  eyes 
of  fire,  and  the  puffing  for  loud  roars.  If  your  hand  rests  on 
some  cold  object,  you  are  prone  to  dream  of  death,  of  mer- 
maids. From  mermaids  you  pass  to  mummies  wrapped  in  an- 
tediluvian bandages;  from  mummies  to  Egyptian  hieroglyphics, 
and  so  on  without  limit.  When  dreaming,  your  own  brain 
suggests  everything.  When  under  hypnotic  influence,  you  are 
dependent  on  the  operator  for  suggestions.  If  he  puts  a  dish 
of  ammonia  under  your  nose,  and  tells  you  that  you  are  smelling 
a  rose,  you  feel  persuaded  that  you  are  smelling  a  rose,  though 
your  eyes  run  with  tears. 

III.  Before  passing  to  the  moral  aspect  of  hypnotism,  its 
influence  for  good  and  evil,  it  may  be  well  to  insert  here,  by 
way  of  parenthesis,  a  few  remarks  about  such  hypnotic  phenom- 
ena of  the  third  class  as  we  summarily  dismissed  earlier  in 
the  paper.  We  said,  then,  if  you  remember,  that  many  such 
phenomena  are  smart  tricks  and  empty  appearances,  contend- 
ing at  the  same  time  that  others  are  due  entirely  to  the  inter- 
vention of  evil  spirits.  With  regard  to  tricks  we  feel  safe  in 
taking  this  single  position.  We  may  not  be  able  to  detect  and 
lay  bare  the  inner  mysteries  of  some  fraud,  hinging  on  the 


192  PSYCHOLOGY 

dexterity  of  a  magician;  but  we  know  from  antecedent  reasons 
that  nature  is  incapable  of  such  an  effort,  and  that  the  God  of 
nature  would  not  allow,  for  the  trivial  purpose  of  tickling  men's 
curiosity,  so  momentous  a  departure  from  nature's  laws.  We 
conclude,  then,  that  the  whole  business  is  a  cleverly  contrived 
piece  of  deception,  and  that  the  magician  at  least  knows  where 
the  deception  begins  and  leaves  off.  With  regard  to  evil  spirits, 
I  can  well  afford  to  be  brief.  My  audience  is  composed  of 
believers,  willing  to  stake  their  lives  on  the  truth  of  God's 
word  as  contained  in  the  Bible;  and  the  Bible  is  clear  about 
the  existence  of  evil  spirits,  and  about  their  interference  in  the 
affairs  of  men.  We,  then,  as  Catholic  philosophers,  claim  that 
the  scale  of  being  in  the  universe  is  nicely  graded,  and  that  be- 
tween God  and  man  there  is  a  species  of  existences  superior  to 
man,  inferior  of  course  to  God.  These  existences  are  pure 
spirits;  and,  whether  buried  in  hell  or  glorious  in  Heaven,  are 
gifted  with  rare  powers  of  intelligence,  more  conversant  with 
the  secrets  of  nature  than  the  combined  wisdom  of  our  own  and 
every  other  age.  And  yet  they  are  God's  obedient  servants. 
Their  activity  is  held  in  check  by  His  supreme  will.  They 
accomplish  only  such  refsults  as  He  in  His  wisdom  sanctions. 
Every  devil  is,  therefore,  a  consummate  wizard;  and  every 
devil  was  acquainted  with  the  hidden  possibilities  of  electricity 
and  the  wonders  of  the  X-ray  long  before  Edison  or  Eoentgen 
was  born.  The  business  of  the  fallen  angels  is  to  drag  souls 
to  hell;  and,  to  further  this  purpose,  they  use  all  the  resources 
of  their  wisdom.  I  can  conceive  that  God  Himself,  after  hav- 
ing put  at  man's  disposal  the  authority  of  His  sacred  word 
and  the  guidance  of  His  true  Church,  allows  these  spirits  of 
darkness  to  test  man's  faith  by  the  performance  of  wonders  in 
the  persons  of  iniquitous  tools.  Armed  with  this  permission, 
the  devil  can  communicate  some  of  his  skill  to  an  unprincipled 
man.  This  agent,  sacrificing  everything  to  love  of  fame  and 
greed  of  money,  can  turn  his  advantage  to  good  profit;  and 
weak-minded  men  and  women,  who  hang  on  his  words,  will  by 
degrees  fall  victims  to  the  mistake  of  thinking  they  see  God's 
finger,  where  men  of  faith  and  sound  sense  plainly  discern  the 
devil's  tail.  The  next  step  in  their  downward  progress  is  to 
banish  the  supernatural  altogether  from  the  horizon  of  their 
lives,  and  drift  into  unbelief,  the  paganism  of  modern  times. 


THESIS  X  193 

Their  ruin  is  wrought  by  performances  like  the  following. 
Their  little  idol,  they  say,  reads  in  a  dark  room,  with  his  eyes 
tightly  bandaged.  He  sees  with  the  soles  of  his  feet.  He 
readily  and  without  previous  study  understands  and  talks  a 
foreign  tongue.  He  describes  some  distant  capital,  some  cele- 
brated park,  never  in  the  course  of  his  life  visited.  He  detects 
through  the  flesh  the  progress  of  a  disease,  and  prescribes  effi- 
cient remedies.  He  sees  the  soul  through  the  walls  of  the  body, 
reads  its  thoughts,  its  desires,  its  passions,  and  crimes.  Now, 
these  are  marvels  certainly;  so  striking  withal,  that  I  suspect 
the  veracity  of  pretended  witnesses  to  their  reality.  The  ut- 
terances of  these  witnesses  assuredly  are  not  articles  of  faith; 
and,  when  my  faith  is  silent  in  matters  opposed  to  all  the 
Physics  and  Philosophy  I  know,  I  beg  leave  to  be  incredulous. 
However,  if  brought  face  to  face  with  these  vaunted  facts,  I 
should  still  suspect  a  trick  somewhere;  and,  if  driven  from  even 
this  corner,  I  should  as  a  last  resource  fall  back  on  the  inter- 
vention of  evil  spirits,  working  with  Heaven's  sanction.  From 
the  science  of  Physics,  I  know  that  the  eye,  not  the  foot,  is  the 
organ  of  sight;  that  light  is  the  natural  medium  of  vision;  and 
that,  to  be  seen,  an  object  must  needs  be  present.  From  ex- 
perience and  the  very  nature  of  language,  I  know  that  hard 
study  and  continued  practice  are  the  only  means  appointed  to 
acquire  facility  in  a  foreign  tongue.  From  philosophy  and 
theology,  I  know  that  the  heart's  secrets  are  a  man's  own  and 
God's;  and  that,  unless  willingly  betrayed  by  some  outward 
emotion  depicted  in  the  face  or  movements,  they  remain  sealed 
mysteries  to  outsiders.  When,  then,  some  wizard  of  no  great 
reputation  for  piety  or  zeal  pretends  to  upset  by  his  unaided 
self  all  these  well  authenticated  laws,  my  faith  issues  no  com- 
mand to  believe;  and  I  claim  the  privilege  to  doubt,  and  to 
doubt  most  uncompromisingly. 

D.  Ethics  of  Hypnotism.  Enough,  then,  of  the  shallow  pre- 
tensions of  hypnotism  in  this  last  phase.  A  word,  now,  about 
hypnotism's  danger  in  the  case  of  the  subject;  and  I  am  done. 
It  has  been  unwisely  compared  in  this  matter  of  danger  to  the 
use  of  anassthetics.  The  comparison  is  faulty  in  many  respects. 
A  person  under  the  influence  of  anaesthetics  is  indeed  no  longer 
master  of  his  body;  but  his  soul  is  his  own.  A  person  under 
the  influence  of  hypnotism  is  deprived  of  even  that  possession. 


194  PSYCHOLOGY 

His  mind  and  his  will  are  at  the  mercy  of  the  operator. 
Hence,  tliouj^h  many  a  future  of  wrecked  hopes  dates  its  be- 
ginning from  the  imprudent  use  of  ana3sthetics,  the  use  of 
an;>?sthetics  is  nowise  forbidden,  when  proper  precautions  are 
taken.  The  strong  right  arm  of  a  friend  seated  near  can 
easily  preclude  every  possibility  of  harm.  But  the  strong  right 
arm  of  a  friend  is  powerless  to  shield  the  victim  of  hypnotiza- 
tion.  Everything  depends  on  the  integrity  of  the  operator. 
The  victim's  mind  is  active,  his  will  is  active;  and  yet  over  the 
one  and  the  other  the  victim  has  as  little  control  as  persons 
asleep  have  over  their  own.  He  is  absolutely  at  the  mercy  of 
the  hypnotist  for  good  or  evil.  He  is  not  free  to  accept  or 
reject  the  suggestions  prompted.  His  mind  can  be  filled,  in 
spite  of  himself,  with  pictures  that  will  torment  his  soul,  and 
drag  it  down  to  hell,  even  when  awake.  Threats  can  drive  him 
to  the  perpetration  of  filthy  and  horrid  crimes.  A  martyr 
could,  of  course,  resist  these  threats;  but  martyrs  always  die  in 
full  possession  of  their  senses,  and  hemmed  round  about  with 
the  abundant  grace  of  God.  Even  if  no  harm  came  of  the 
experiment,  when  you  reflect  that,  in  surrendering  yourself  to 
the  influence  of  hypnotism,  you  are  simply  putting  yourself 
into  the  hands  of  another  man,  to  be  by  him  lifted  up  to 
Heaven  or  buried  in  the  mire  of  sin,  you  cannot  but  consider 
the  proceeding  extremely  dangerous  and  foully  wrong.  Every 
novice  in  the  study  of  morality  understands  that  the  victim 
of  hypnotism  is  not  directly  responsible  for  his  actions  during 
the  precise  period  of  the  spell;  but  in  hypnotism,  as  well  as  in 
drunkenness,  we  recognize  two  kinds  of  responsibility.  When 
bereft  of  the  untrammeled  use  of  his  free  will,  a  man  is  capable 
of  only  indirect  responsibility.  But  that  same  man,  who,  with 
his  eyes  wide  open  to  the  danger,  submits  to  the  process  of 
hypnotization  or  drinks  to  excess,  is  directly  responsible  during 
the  last  moments  of  consciousness  for  whatever  violence  he 
does  the  laws  of  morality  while  intoxicated  or  hypnotized.  In 
that  last  moment  he  makes  deliberate  choice  of  all  the  crimes 
and  sins  he  afterwards  commits,  and  must  before  God  stand 
the  consequences  of  his  choice. 

E.  Church,  and  Hypnotism.  In  this  paper,  which  is  by  no 
means  exhaustive  of  the  subject,  I  have  studiously  avoided  all 
reference  to  documents  of  the  Church  on  the  question  in  hand. 


THESIS  X  195 

issued  at  various  intervals  in  her  history.  Suffice  it  to  say 
that  she  is  loud  in  her  denunciation  of  everything  savoring  of 
hypnotism,  of  everything  with  even  a  remote  semblance  to  that 
devil-worship,  which  is  the  crying  evil  of  our  times.  The  ques- 
tion has  been  already  submitted  to  the  Holy  See  for  decision. 
Our  Church,  with  all  that  caution  characteristic  of  her  pro- 
ceedings, has  declared  against  hypnotism  only  when  it  involves 
superstition,  applies  physical  means  otherwise  forbidden,  or 
seeks  unlawful  ends  or  objects.  In  medicine,  when  employed 
by  a  man  of  skill  and  integrity,  with  all  due  precautions  against 
danger  to  the  patient,  its  use,  in  view  of  the  Church's  decision, 
can  hardly  be  condemned.  Its  employment  for  purposes  of  idle 
curiosity  I  should  not  hesitate  to  brand  a  crime.  When  it  pre- 
tends to  phenomena,  that  transcend  the  forces  of  nature,  it  is 
little  short  of  idolatry  or  devil-worship.  To  even  assist  at  hyp- 
notic seances,  may  easily  constitute  a  sin;  to  submit  to  the 
process  of  hypnotism,  outside  of  real  need  in  the  field  of  medi- 
cine, rarely  or  never  escapes  the  imputation  of  sin.  We  have 
no  more  right  to  enter  the  hypnotic  state  from  motives  of  curi- 
osity, then  we  have  to  get  drunk  for  the  purpose  of  knowing 
how  it  feels  to  be  intoxicated.  And,  therefore,  we  Catholics 
must  leave  hypnotism  severely  alone.  The  less  we  have  to  do 
with  these  modern  fads  and  cults,  the  better.  We  should  be 
frightened  from  all  participation  in  affairs  of  the  sort  by  the 
reflection,  that  hypnotism  and  kindred  practices  are  curses  of 
modern  civilization,  and  effective  tools  in  the  hands  of  the 
enemy  for  the  destruction  of  faith  and  the  damnation  of  souls. 


PART  II  — NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

INTRODUCTION 

We  are  now  come  to  the  crown  and  consummation  of  our 
work.  Philosophy  is  our  topic;  and,  if  philosophy  is  knowledge 
of  things  in  their  last  causes,  this  present  department  of  the 
study,  because  it  deals  with  God,  the  absolutely  last  cause  of 
everything,  more  deserves  the  name  than  any  preceding  chap- 
ter. Natural  Theology  is  more  philosophy  than  Logic,  Psy- 
chology or  Ethics,  and  claims  as  such  our  deepest  attention  and 
utmost  reverence.  Theodicy  is  another  name  for  Natural  Theol- 
ogy, and  was  first  introduced  by  Leibnitz.  It  means  the  justifi- 
cation of  God,  and  was  framed  by  its  inventor  with  a  particular 
view  to  what  he  considers  the  hardest  problem  in  the  whole  study, 
the  reconciliation  of  God's  attributes  with  the  evil  in  the  uni- 
verse. Theology  itself  means  discourse  or  reasoning  about  God. 
Plato  and  Aristotle  use  the  word.  St.  Thomas  makes  Aristotle 
call  Orpheus,  Hesiod  and  Homer  the  poets  of  Theology.  Max 
Muller  derives  the  Greek  "  Theos "  from  the  Sanscrit,  Deva, 
meaning  light,  splendor,  the  Brilliant.  St.  Paul  describes  God 
as  dwelling  in  inaccessible  light.  St.  Gregory  calls  the  vision 
of  God,  incircumscriptum  lumen,  light  without  limit,  a  sky 
with  no  horizon.  The  epithet,  natural,  is  prefixed,  to  separate 
this  branch  of  the  science  from  its  near  neighbor,  supernatural 
or  dogmatic  theology.  Wide  differences  keep  the  two  apart.  In 
Natural  Theology  we  rely  altogether  on  unaided  reason,  or  our 
conclusions  are  quite  independent  of  any  special  help  from 
Heaven.  We  base  no  argument  on  Scripture  or  tradition,  though 
as  devout  Catholics  we  are  keen  to  the  need  of  formulating  no 
doctrine  opposed  to  revelation  as  interpreted  by  the  Church,  the 
pillar  and  ground  of  truth.  Dogmatic  theology  reserves  to  it- 
self all  such  extraneous  assistance ;  and,  whereas  we  philosophers 
advance  only  such  principles  as  approve  themselves  to  the  veriest 

pagan,  and  most  consummate  stranger  to  the  written  and  spoken 

197 


198  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

word  of  God,  theologians  properly  so  called  have  first  recourse 
for  argument  to  revelation,  embodied  in  Scripture,  tlie  Fatliers 
and  the  Councils,  and  make  reason  a  species  of  appendage  to 
faith.  On  this  account  Natural  Theology  is  best  described  in 
full  as  l-nowUdge  of  God  compassed  in  the  light  of  reason. 
Dogmatic,  on  the  contrary,  is  knowledge  of  God  compassed  in 
the  light  of  revelation. 

Eeason  naturally  enough  precedes  revelation,  and  in  this  re- 
spect Natural  Theology  makes  the  mind  ready  for  supernatural. 
It  puts  on  a  solid  footing  what  we  call  the  praeambula  fidei,  the 
preliminaries  to  faith,  and  secures  reason's  voucher  for  truths 
that  lie  worlds  beyond  the  sphere  of  reason's  limited  grasp  and 
comprehension.  In  this  sense  philosophy  is  handmaid  to  theol- 
ogy, and  the  open  book  of  creation  is  key  to  the  scaled  page 
of  revelation.  As  compared  with  the  knowledge  of  God  we  get 
from  our  catechism,  the  notions  of  God  we  derive  from  Natural 
Theology  are  dim,  unfinished  and  pitifully  indistinct.  The 
most  we  can  hope  to  do  is  establish  the  existence  of  God,  vin- 
dicate to  Him  and  explain  His  most  characteristic  attributes, 
and  set  in  a  clear  light  His  influence.  His  intervention,  His 
interference  in  the  world's  constitution  and  history.  We  there- 
fore divide  our  treatise  into  three  main  parts,  the  existence  of 
God,  His  attributes,  and  His  influence  or  activity  in  created 
nature.  In  the  first  we  contend  that  the  one  sound  argument 
able  to  put  the  truth  of  God's  existence  on  a  solid  basis,  is  essen- 
tially an  a  posteriori  argument,  derived  from  the  contingent 
nature  of  created  things,  from  the  physical  order  apparent  in 
the  universe,  from  the  moral  order  everywhere  acknowledged, 
and  from  the  common  consent  of  mankind.  In  rejecting  other 
arguments  as  insufficient  and  misleading  we  run  counter  to  a 
host  of  opponents.  AVe  have  to  do  with  Ontologism  as  preached 
by  Malebranche,  1715,  Gioberti,  1852,  Rosmini,  1855,  and 
Ubaghs,  1856;  with  the  ontological  or  a  priori  argument  of  St. 
Anselm,  1109,  Descartes,  1G50,  Leibnitz,  1716;  and  with  the 
treacherous  attempt  of  Kant,  1781,  to  undermine  all  certainty 
about  God's  existence,  by  proclaiming  it  an  impossible  problem 
for  the  speculative  reason,  abandoning  the  belief  to  what  he 
Btyles  practical  reason,  an  internal  voice,  categorically  command- 
ing the  performance  of  good  and  avoidance  of  evil,  a  voice  man 
cannot  disregard  without  harm  to  his  dignity,  a  voice  without 


INTRODUCTION  199 

meaning  in  the  event  of  refusal  to  acknowledge  a  supreme  law- 
giver. Jacobi,  1810,  imitates  Kant,  when  he  reduces  our  cer- 
tainty about  God  to  a  kind  of  irresistible  spiritual  feeling. 
Bonald,  18^0,  applies  traditionalism  to  the  same  truth  and  re- 
stricts certainty  to  primitive  revelation  on  the  subject.  Lamen- 
nais,  1854,  was  moved  by  the  same  line  of  reasoning  to  refer 
everything  to  the  common  consent  of  mankind,  making  it  the 
universal  criterion  of  truth.  Hamilton  and  Mansel  ascribe  our 
certainty  in  the  matter  to  harmony  between  the  belief  and  our 
moral  instincts.  Herbert  Spencer  borrows  his  best  arguments 
in  favor  of  agnosticism  from  principles  advocated  by  Mansel. 
All  these  several  philosophers,  from  Kant  down,  are  enemies  in 
the  camp,  they  are  mere  pretenders,  and  by  setting  truth  on  a 
crumbling  foundation,  easily  overturned  by  truth's  adversaries, 
they  are  doing  the  cause  of  righteousness  and  religion  a  world 
of  wrong.  Catholics  among  them,  like  Jacobi,  Bonald  and 
Lamennais,  may  have  been  sincere  in  their  convictions;  but 
they  were  stubbornly  proud,  and  their  sincerity  is  small  recom- 
pense for  the  harm  their  theories  have  already  done  and  still 
continue  to  do. 

Our  argument  dates  back  to  the  days  of  Plato,  348,  b.  c, 
and  Aristotle,  b.  c.  322.  It  was  maintained  by  St.  Augustine, 
430,  St.  Thomas  Aquinas,  1274,  and  all  the  Schoolmen;  by 
Bacon,  1626,  and  Locke,  1704.  St.  Anselm,  Descartes  and 
Leibnitz  acknowledged  its  cogency,  and  were  far  from  resting 
their  case  on  the  ontological  argument.  In  their  writings  all 
three  draw  on  finite  things  to  establish  the  truth  of  God's  exist- 
ence. Scientific  minds  of  the  first  rank  take  sides  with  us, 
men  like  Kepler,  Newton,  Faye,  Sir  John  Herschel,  Sir  Wil- 
liam Thomson,  and  others  too  numerous  to  mention.  We  there- 
fore have  no  reason  to  be  ashamed  of  the  position  we  take.  The 
scientific  world  and  the  world  of  riglit  philosophy  are  with  us, 
and  it  would  be  the  height  of  folly  to  bow  down  before  the 
authority  of  crooked  reasoners  like  Kant  and  Spinoza  and  In- 
gersoll,  or  giants  of  a  later  growth,  like  that  Bowne  of  Boston 
University,  who  unblushingly  says  that  theism,  the  fundamental 
postulate  of  our  total  life,  cannot  be  demonstrated  without  as- 
sumption, and  that  it  is  strictly  proved  by  nothing. 


THESIS  I 

From  created  things  of  earth,  from  the  order  apparent  in  the 
physical  universe,  from  the  moral  order  naturally  known  to  us, 
finally  from  the  common  consent  of  manlcind,  we  prove  a  pos- 
teriori that  there  is  a  God. 

Boedder,  pp.   1-85;  149-233;  325-344.     Jouin, 
pp.  219-228. 

QUESTION 

Agnostics  are  our  chief  opponents,  and  this  term  agnostic  is 
but  a  Greek  twist  for  our  Latin  ignoramus  or  Anglo-Saxon 
dunce.  They  make  open  boast  of  the  title  agnostic,  and  the 
term  translated  means  the  man  who  never  knows.  What  in 
common  language  is  an  ignoramus,  becomes  in  the  smoother 
diction  of  polished  refinement  an  agnostic.  Herbert  Spencer, 
Ingersoll  and  men  of  their  ilk,  who,  for  reasons  best  known  to 
themselves,  take  sides  against  the  universe  of  thought  and  cham- 
pion the  cause  of  wretches  weak-minded  and  vicious  enough 
to  sacrifice  principle  to  pleasure,  and  slink  away  from  the  most 
palpable  responsibility  catalogued  in  the  duties  of  life,  are  by 
their  ovnx  confession  agnostics,  and  as  sucli  deserve  small  or 
no  consideration  at  our  hands.  They  are  not  honest  with  them- 
selves, and  the  first  step  in  the  way  to  religious  knowledge  is 
sincerity.  Their  blind  followers  are  more  appealing  objects  of 
pity,  and  we  pause  to  remind  them  that  their  leaders  are  by 
their  own  acknowledgment  agnostics.  Words  are  but  words, 
and,  whether  the  symbol  used  to  express  the  condition  be  of 
Greek  or  Latin  or  Anglo-Saxon  parentage,  it  is  a  dismal  busi- 
ness to  borrow  knowledge  from  the  man  who  never  knows.  The 
process  is  wonderfully  like  borrowing  money  from  a  pauper, 
feeding  on  the  air,  or  reading  by  the  light  of  night's  inky  dark- 
ness. Happily  enough  for  Spencer  and  Ingersoll  themselves, 
their  ignorance  is  but  partial;  and  though  agnostics,  when  God 
or  religion  is  in  question,  they  are  reputed  oracles  of  wisdom  in 

200 


THESIS  I  201 

matters  scientific  and  legal.     The  two  are  besides  well  equipped 
with  the  gift  of  fluency,  ease  and  richness  of  expression.     They 
have  led  thousands  astray,  and  the   philosophy   of   Kant,   no 
doubt,  proved  their  own  undoing.     Vigorous  measures  must  be 
taken  with  them  and  their  followers,  no  single  concession  must 
be  made  their  empty  vaporings,  and  we  must  guard  against  the 
'  mistake  of  that  good  easy  man,  Dean  Mansel,  who  in  the  dual 
capacity  of  Protestant  divine  and  lecturer  at  Oxford  threw  down 
his  arms  in  the  fight,  declaring  that  faith  in  revelation  alone, 
or  the  transmitted  word  of  God,  could  be  sufficient  guarantee 
for  certainty   about   God's  existence.     Champions   thus   faint- 
hearted and  unskilled  are  a  hurt  to  the  cause  they  uphold,  and 
unwittingly,  perhaps,  treat  the  devil  to  a  victory,  when  they 
set  up  manikins  easily  overturned  by  a  breath  of  wind. 

There  was  a  school  of  philosophers,  named  Traditionalists, 
who,  though  perhaps  adverse  to  receiving  into  their  ranks  so 
radical  an  expounder  of  their  tenets  as  this  Oxford  preacher, 
partook  in  no  small  degree  of  his  notions,  and  were  perhaps 
in  some  measure  responsible  for  his  wanderings.  Tradition, 
they  contended,  handed  down  from  father  to  son,  as  the  de- 
positary of  a  truth  once  communicated  by  God  to  mankind, 
is  the  groundwork  of  our  belief  in  God's  existence.  Few  were 
unthinking  enough  to  maintain  further  that  all  other  demon- 
strations establishing  God's  existence  were  idle  and  proved  noth- 
ing. We  ourselves  make  use  of  the  very  argument  they  ad- 
vance, but  assign  it  only  its  own  modicum  of  importance,  and 
are  better  pleased  with  the  expression,  common  consent  of  man- 
kind, than  with  tradition,  a  word  always  more  or  less  suspected 
by  merely  natural  philosophers.  We  venture  to  think  it  impera- 
tively necessary  and  marvelously  easy  to  convince  an  ordinary 
understanding  of  God's  existence,  without  any  recourse  what- 
ever to  such  extrinsic  motives  as  the  testimony  of  the  race  or 
the  traditions  of  Christianity. 

The  Ontologists,  under  the  leadership  of  Malebranche,  whose 
acquaintance  we  made  in  Major  Logic  when  discussing  the 
criterion  of  truth,  applying  a  test  there  shown  to  be  inadequate, 
think  that  God's  existence  is  made  sure  to  our  reason  by  that 
immediate  knowledge  of  God,  and  by  that  familiar  intercourse, 
which  they  fancy  He  has  vouchsafed  us.  Apart  from  the  two 
last  theories,  common  to  even  a  few  Catholics,  there  are  in  the 


202  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

Church  two  classes  of  philosophers,  who,  though  a  unit  about 
the  possibility  and  necessity  of  proving  God's  existence,  sep- 
arate when  the  species  of  argument  allowable  and  conclusive 
enters  into  the  question. 

St.  Anselm,  supported  by  a  smaller  number  of  adherents, 
holds  out  for  the  validity  of  what  we  call  an  a  priori  proof. 
St.  Thomas,  and  his  followers  are  far  more  numerous,  finds 
fault  with  such  proof,  and  contends  that  man's  reason  cau 
never  in  this  matter  attain  to  anything  beyond  an  a  posteriori 
proof.  To  the  better  understanding  of  these  differences  of 
opinion,  it  will  much  help  to  make  clear  the  distinction  between 
an  a  priori  and  an  a  posteriori  demonstration.  Priority  in  the 
ontological  order  is  said  with  reference  to  the  truth  contained 
in  the  conclusion  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  to  the 
truths  contained  in  the  premisses.  Of  course,  in  the  logical 
order,  or  in  the  order  of  existence  in  the  mind,  the  premisses 
always  precede  the  conclusion,  no  matter  to  what  species  the 
demonstration  belongs;  but  in  the  ontological  order,  or  in  the 
order  of  existences  outside  the  thinking  subject,  the  reverse  may 
be  the  case,  and  is  the  case  in  all  a  posteriori  demonstrations. 
In  an  a  priori  demonstration,  therefore,  the  truth  bound  up 
in  the  conclusion  depends,  in  the  order  not  of  thought  but  of 
being,  on  the  truths  contained  in  the  premisses.  In  an  a  pos- 
teriori the  truth  involved  in  the  premisses  depends,  in  the 
same  order  of  being,  on  the  truth  contained  in  the  conclusion. 
This  priority  or  dependence  may  be  twofold,  physical  and  meta- 
physical. It  is  physical,  when  that  peculiar  to  cause  with  ref- 
erence to  its  effects ;  metaphysical,  when  that  peculiar  to  essence 
with  reference  to  attributes  derived  from  essence.  Wheu,  there- 
fore, we  come  to  decide  on  the  question  at  issue  between  St. 
Anselm  and  St.  Thomas,  we  have  merely  to  ask  and  answer  the 
question.  Are  the  truths  of  the  premisses,  used  in  any  conclu- 
sive demonstration  of  God's  existence,  dependent  on  or  inde- 
pendent of  the  truth  contained  in  this  assertion,  God  exists? 
In  our  opinion  the  truths  contained  in  the  premisses  are  de- 
pendent on  the  truth  expressed  in  the  conclusion,  and  the  only 
legitimate  demonstration  is,  therefore,  a  posteriori.  Thus,  be- 
cause God  exists,  created  nature  exists;  because  God  exists, 
physical  order  exists,  and  so  of  our  other  arguments.  God 
does  not  exist  in  the  real  order,  the  order  outside  of  our  mind, 


THESIS  I  203 

because  created  nature  exists,  or  physical  order,  and  so  of  the 
rest.  Our  knowledge  of  His  existence  is  certainly  brought  about 
or  caused  by  the  existence  of  created  nature,  physical  order  and 
such.  But  such  existence  of  God  is  existence  in  the  order  of 
thought,  or  logical;  in  which  order,  we  said,  the  conclusion  is 
always  dependent  on  the  premisses.  St.  Anselm's  syllogism, 
if  a  demonstration  at  all,  can  with  justice  enough  be  denomi- 
nated a  priori.  But  a  glance  at  its  make-up  must  convince  the 
mind  that  one  of  two  faults  is  inseparable  from  it.  It  is  either 
a  begging  of  the  question,  or  an  unpardonable  passage  from 
the  logical  to  the  real  order  of  being,  from  beings  as  they  exist 
in  the  mind  to  beings  as  they  exist  outside  the  mind. 

It  runs  as  follows :  God  is  the  most  perfect  being,  the  be- 
ing whose  superior  cannot  be  even  conceived.  But  such  a  being 
cannot  possibly  be  considered  non-existent.  Ergo  God  actually 
and  really  exists.  Here  is  another  form  of  the  same  argument: 
God  is  the  most  perfect  being.  But  actual  and  real  existence 
cannot  be  wanting  to  such  a  being.  Ergo  God  really  and  ac- 
tually exists.  God  in  the  first  premiss  can  have  two  meanings, 
God  within  the  mind  eliciting  the  judgment  or  the  notion  of 
God,  and  God  outside  of  that  mind,  or  the  objective  reality  of 
God.  If  the  first  meaning  be  chosen,  it  must  undergo  no 
change  in  the  conclusion.  Filled  out,  the  conclusion  will  then 
read:  God  in  the  mind,  or  the  notion  of  God,  is  the  notion 
of  a  being  endowed  with  real  and  actual  existence.  But  this 
conclusion  is  not  to  the  point.  We  do  not  wish  to  prove  that 
our  notion  of  God  is  such  and  such,  but  we  wish  to  prove  that 
God  Himself  is  such  and  such.  If  the  second  meaning  be 
chosen,  the  conclusion  is  indeed  what  we  would  have,  but  the 
question  was  begged  in  the  Major.  For  in  asserting  there  that 
God  outside  of  the  mind,  or  the  objective  reality  of  God,  is  the 
most  perfect  being,  we  at  once  clothe  Him  with  real  and  actual 
existence,  whereas  the  whole  argument  was  instituted  to  dis- 
cover whether  God  actually  and  really  exists  or  not.  There- 
fore, St.  Anselm's  argument  must  suppose  from  the  very  start 
that  God  exists.  Based  on  this  supposition,  it  is  an  admirable 
and  conclusive  proof  that  God,  if  there  is  actually  such  a  being, 
can  never  have  existed  in  mere  possibility,  but  must  have  al- 
ways existed  really  and  actually.  Briefly,  it  fixes  with  cer- 
tainty the  necessary  mode  of  God's  existence,  not  the  fact  of 


204  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

His  existence.  The  fact  of  God's  existence  must  be  derived 
from  some  other  source.  With  St.  Thomas  we  hold  that  the 
only  legitimate  source  at  our  disposal  is  the  world  about  us,  the 
product  of  God's  might ;  and  that  therefore  passing  from  effect 
to  cause,  we  argue  a  posteriori  ad  prius,  or  from  what  comes 
second  to  what  comes  first.  Here  is  an  instance  of  a  proper  a 
priori  argument.  The  soul  is  a  substance,  simple  and  spiritual- 
But  all  substances,  simple  and  spiritual,  are  immortal.  Ergo 
the  soul  is  immortal. 

TERMS 

From  the  created  things  of  earth: 

Creation  was  discussed  at  some  length  in  Cosmology,  and 
acquaintance  with  many  of  the  remarks  there  made  can  with 
profit  be  renewed.  We  there  proved  that  this  world  is  the  crea- 
tion of  some  omnipotent  cause.  We  proved  the  world  produced 
from  nothing,  and  production  from  nothing  demands  omni- 
potence. This  conclusion  was  forced  upon  us  by  a  considera- 
tion of  the  world's  changes  and  modifications.  They  are  plainly 
apparent  to  every  observer,  and  to  the  reasoning  mind  they  as 
plainly  make  manifest  the  world's  contingency,  and  therefore 
its  production  by  another.  Contingency  and  actual  existence 
are  more  potent  signs  of  production  by  another  than  blaze  and 
smoke  are  of  fire.  Tliis  other,  or  producing  being,  whose  au- 
gust prerogative  it  is  to  exist  from  eternity  without  ever  being 
produced,  and  to  create  from  the  beginning  of  time  everything 
in  the  universe  but  Himself,  is  God.  Our  notion  then  of  God, 
from  this  first  or  fundamental  view,  is  representative  of  a  being 
unproduced  Himself,  and  therefore  without  a  cause ;  the  Maker 
of  everything  else,  and  therefore  the  cause  to  which  all  else 
must  be  referred  as  effect.  Unlike  St.  Anselm,  we  do  not  argue 
from  this  notion  or  logical  being  to  the  reality  it  represents. 
We  begin  with  tilings  sensibly  present  to  us,  and  from  the  real 
order  of  existences  about  and  around  us  we  pass  to  the  central 
existence  of  all,  invisible  indeed  to  our  eyes  of  flesh,  but  none 
the  less  real  on  that  account.  Hence  too  our  argument  is  a 
posteriori  in  that  God's  existence,  the  truth  in  the  conclusion, 
is  the  cause  not  the  effect  of  the  world's  existence,  the  truth  in 
the  premisses.     An  actual  existence,  unproduced,  necessary,  non- 


THESIS  I  205 

contingent,  is  that  wJiicli  so  exists  from  eternity  that  it  is  equally 
impossible  for  it  to  have  never  existed,  to  cease  existing,  or  to 
experience  a  change  in  its  mode  of  existence.  An  actual,  pro- 
duced, hypothetical,  contingent  being  is  that  which  at  some  pe- 
riod of  time  did  not  actually  exist,  ivhich  can  in  itself  at  any 
moment  cease  existing,  and  is  capable  of  constantly  undergoing 
changes  in  its  mode  of  existence.  Such  are  the  created  things 
of  earth. 

From  the  order  apparent  in  the  universe: 

Order  is  the  becoming  arrangement  or  disposition  of  several 
things,  based  on  fixed  relations,  and  designed  for  the  attainment 
of  certain  ends.  Order  is  the  work  of  reason,  and  rational 
agents  work  towards  an  end  with  knowledge  and  choice.  This 
is  a  very  general  definition,  admitting  of  applications  innumer- 
able, and  too  abstruse  for  any  single  individual,  no  matter  how 
highly  gifted,  to  follow  to  the  end  and  describe.  An  astronomer 
can  acquaint  you  with  some  of  the  wonders  of  intellect  apparent 
in  the  heavens.  If  honest,  he  will  tell  you  that  life  is  all  too 
short  to  pursue  with  anything  like  complete  satisfaction  one 
branch  of  his  work.  The  botanist  can  find  in  the  most  neg- 
lected flower  traces  of  an  intelligence  infinitely  more  capable 
than  the  skill,  which  enables  the  most  consummate  artist  to 
trace  even  on  canvas  the  despised  flower's  outlines,  and  at- 
tempt to  fill  in  with  tints  that  can  be  dreamed  of,  but  never 
conveyed.  The  student  of  Natural  History  can,  after  years  of 
painful  research,  communicate  to  admiring  listeners  a  few  of 
the  baffling  secrets  hidden  away  in  the  anatomy  and  habits  of 
animals.  But  with  all  their  progress,  all  their  devotion,  no 
astronomer  has  yet  produced  a  system  of  planets  and  stars 
comparing  favorably  with  ours,  no  botanist  or  artist  has  yet 
produced  a  single  violet,  no  Cuvier  has  yet  constructed  a  diminu- 
tive house-fly. 

Cicero,  the  poet  of  eloquence,  thunderstruck  at  the  various 
sights  let  in  on  his  eyes,  rapturously  exclaims :  "  We  scorn 
calling  that  thing  a  man,  which,  while  gazing  at  the  steady 
motions  in  the  sky  above,  at  the  unvarying  march  of  the  stars, 
can  be  blind  to  the  presence  of  an  intellect  in  the  work,  can 
with  stupid  effrontery  maintain  that  all  is  the  result  of  chance, 
though  no  mind  has  yet  measured  the  wisdom  obtruding  it- 


206  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

self  everywhere.  Look  at  this  earth  of  ours  hanging  in  the 
middle  of  the  universe,  held  together  by  the  swing  of  its  rapid 
revolution,  clotlied  with  flowers,  fields  of  green,  trees  and  fruits, 
so  nicely  scattei'ed  over  its  surface,  that  this  otlierwise  tedious 
and  wearisome  multiplicity  is  toned  by  a  variety,  that  ministers 
to  pleasure  without  ever  disgusting  witli  surfeit.  See  too  the 
streams  of  soothing  coolness  which  flow  on  forever,  the  mighty 
rivers  running  down  to  the  sea,  their  bank-slopes  bright  with 
the  freshest  green,  the  recesses  of  hillside  grots,  the  jutting 
crags,  the  lowering  mountains,  the  stretches  of  level  plain. 
What  a  collection  of  beasts,  how  graceful  the  airy  sweeps,  how 
soft  the  songs  of  the  birds !  Must  I  lead  in  on  the  scene  fair 
nature's  king  and  guardian,  him  who  keeps  jealous  watch  over 
her  vast  extent,  who  checks  the  ravages  of  destructive  brutes 
that  would  turn  her  into  a  desert,  the  growths  of  luxuriant 
vegetation,  that  would  make  of  her  a  wilderness?  Behold  the 
meadows,  the  islands,  the  seashores,  that  glisten  with  his  toil, 
dotted  with  his  homes  and  his  cities.  Were  man's  eyes  once 
so  touched  by  Heaven  as  to  see  as  plainly  as  does  the  mind 
these  wonders,  could  he  for  a  moment  doubt  about  God's  exist- 
ence ?  "  Thus  Cicero.  Epicurus  and  his  herd,  because  it  was 
more  convenient  for  them,  and  less  a  reproach  to  their  gross 
lives,  pretended  to  see  only  a  blind  chance  at  work  in  nature, 
and  scouted  the  idea  of  final  causes  or  ends.  In  Ontology  we 
upset  tliis  ignoble  view  of  nature;  and,  in  opposition  to  the 
imaginings  of  Epicurus,  advanced  solid  reasons  in  proof  of  our 
belief  that  every  agent  works  unto  an  end,  be  that  agent  God, 
angel,  man  or  creature  inferior  to  man.  It  is  hardly  worth 
while  to  here  repeat  what  was  there  said.  It  will  be  sufficient 
for  us  to  again  reflect  upon  it. 

From  the  moral  order  culturally  Tcnown  to  us: 

We  base  our  argument  on  no  set  system  of  revealed  or  natural 
religion.  We  discuss  man's  instincts  in  their  nakedness,  whether 
Catholicity  has  ennobled  and  elevated  them,  whether  Protestant- 
ism has  weakened  and  poisoned  them  witli  uncertainty,  or 
whether  Mohammedanism  has  degraded  and  almost  submerged 
them  in  the  sink  of  sensual  vice.  Our  platform  is  as  broad 
as  the  earth  and  takes  in  all  shades  of  belief,  all  the  variations 
of  creeds  revealed  by  God,  or  manufactured  by  men.     We  ap- 


THESIS  I  207 

peal  to  that  whisper,  which,  perhaps  more  faint  and  indistinct 
in  the  bosom  of  the  grosser  pagan  of  savagery  than  in  the  re- 
fined Christian  of  virtuous  civilization,  nevertheless  manages 
to  make  itself  heard,  when  the  tumult  of  passion  is  loudest,  and 
when  its  voice  is  most  unwelcome.  We  pretend  only  to  show 
the  necessary  connection  between  the  existence  of  God  and  that 
familiar  monitor,  which  prompts  man  to  sin  in  the  dark,  and 
drives  the  guilty  soul  to  recesses,  whence  it  would,  if  possible, 
shut  out  the  light  of  an  unseen  eye.  Man  may  have  faith  of 
no  description  whatever,  he  may  be  the  veriest  heathen  or  pagan 
alive,  but  he  has  a  conscience.  It  is  an  awkward  possession 
on  occasions,  a  companion  whose  dogged  persistence  is  at  times 
extremely  uncomfortable.  But  there  it  is,  and  there  is  no  help 
for  it.  It  is  God's  minister,  and  we  can  no  more  get  rid  of  it, 
than  we  can  get  rid  of  ourselves.  It  is  the  executive  of  a  moral 
force;  and,  extending  to  secrets  over  which  policemen  have  no 
control,  it  exercises  a  wider  and  more  effective  influence.  The 
moral  force,  whose  interests  it  advances,  is  familiar  to  all  as 
the  Natural  Law.  Law  in  general,  for  want  of  a  fuller  defini- 
tion, we  here  describe  as  the  prescjiption  of  a  superior  forbid- 
ding or  commanding  some  certain  action.  Its  effect  in  the 
subject  is  an  almost  instinctive  impulse  to  consider  himself 
bound  by  the  strictest  kind  of  moral  necessity  to  acquit  himself 
of  a  duty,  and  stand  away  from  the  object  under  ban.  The 
Natural  Law  we  can  with  sufficient  correctness  call  that  pre- 
scription which  is  founded  on  the  very  essences  of  things,  inde- 
pendently of  all  merely  human  activity'  and  manifested  to  man 
by  the  pure  light  of  reason,  without  any  profound  elucuhrations 
in  the  philosopliic  lore  of  right  and  wrong.  It  forbids  actions 
intrinsically  evil,  prescribes  actions,  the  non-performance  of 
which  would  be  intrinsically  evil.  Conscience  is  reason,  inas- 
much as  it  advertises  man  of  his  duty  in  this  matter,  praising 
him,  chiding  him,  accusing  him,  as  circumstances  require.  This 
argument  extends  to  deeper  details  than  the  mere  existence  of 
God.  It  proves  God  a  supreme  being,  a  re  warder  and  avenger, 
infinitely  holy  and  just,  all  powerful  and  knowing  to  a  degree 
absolutely  without  bounds.  The  dictates  of  conscience  are  not 
simple  figments  of  the  mind,  without  any  foundation  in  reality, 
owing  their  entire  being  to  the  work  of  the  intellect.  They 
are  as  stern  facts  as  the  mind  itself.     They  rise  up  and  declare 


208  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

themselves,  whether  the  man  wishes  to  entertain  them  or  slight 
them.  The  mind  never  creates  them,  it  simply  perceives  them. 
If  remorse  depended  on  ourselves  alone,  it  would  seldom  annoy 

118. 

Common  consent  of  manHnd: 

It  is  safe  to  say  that  the  tendencies  of  modern  science  are 
atheistic.  Certainly  nature  is  not  to  blame  for  this  perversion 
of  her  lessons.  She  silently  but  eloquently  puts  forth  the  claims 
of  God;  and  reason,  untrammeled  by  any  sordid  passion,  dis- 
tinctly and  gladly  hears  her  whispers.  But  pride  distorts  the 
sermon,  and  hearkens  to  only  its  own  uncertain  conclusions. 
Passion  cannot  entirely  blot  out  sentiments  born  with  the  man, 
but  it  can  and  does  deaden  these  sentiments,  and  so  obscure 
them  that  they  virtually  disappear.  No  wonder  then  that  after 
long  years  of  intimacy  with  erring  self-conceit  men  find  them- 
selves with  scarcely  a  vestige  of  truths  implanted  in  their  very 
nature,  and  originally  ready  to  burst  forth  spontaneously.  The 
devil  went  so  utterly  blind  with  pride  that,  though  much  closer 
to  God's  august  presence  than  we,  he  one  day  lost  consciousness 
of  God's  might,  and  challenged  Omnipotence  to  battle.  Who 
is  going  to  be  surprised  then,  if  weak,  ignorant  men,  with  pas- 
sions alert  and  strong,  away  off  from  God's  absorbing  counte- 
nance, wrap  themselves  up  in  themselves,  and  refuse  to  pay  to 
a  being  infinitely  their  superior  the  homage  of  acknowledgment? 
For  a  species  of  atheism  the  devil  was  hurled  from  Heaven ; 
for  a  species  of  atheism  more  ignoble  still,  no  corner  in  hell 
can  be  found  too  warm.  Angelic  atheism  had,  to  my  mind, 
some  redeeming  features;  but  human  atheism,  which  is  never 
more  than  practical,  unsupported  by  any  theory  with  the  least 
shadow  of  substance,  is  extremely  abominable.  There  may  be 
practical  atheists,  men  degraded  and  dull  enough  to  openly 
profess  unbelief  in  God,  to  shape  their  lives  much  as  they  would, 
if  there  were  no  God;  but  no  human  heart  has  yet  been  so 
poorly  moulded  by  God  as  to  honestly  believe  that  its  Maker 
does  not  exist. 

It  is  not  my  intention  to  enter  into  the  literature  and  re- 
mains bequeathed  to  us  by  nations  coeval  with  the  birth  of  the 
world,  to  interpret  hieroglyphic  inscriptions  traced  on  the  tiles 
and  sepulchres  of  Babylon  and  Egypt,  nor  even  to  lay  before 


THESIS  I  209 

you  the  results  of  devoted  research  among  their  ruins.  Vol- 
umes have  been  already  written  on  the  subject,  and  the  almost 
unanimous  verdict  of  students,  worthy  of  credit,  is  that  belief 
in  God's  existence  is  as  old  as  the  world  itself;  that,  though 
very  absurd  notions  have  crept  into  religious  systems  such  as 
those  of  Greece  and  Rome,  the  fundamental  idea  of  the  actuality 
of  some  superior  existence  has  uniformly  been  cleaved  to.  Here 
at  home  the  Puritan  ministers  Roger  Williams  and  John  Eliot, 
who  were  among  the  first  white  men  in  close  contact  with  the 
Indians,  persistently  declare  that  they  never  once  in  the  course 
of  all  their  wanderings  happened  on  a  single  red  man,  not  per- 
suaded of  the  existence  of  God.  Darwin  and  his  materialistic 
followers  may  theorize  and  theorize,  may  give  out  as  their  deeply 
rooted  conviction  that  man  began  as  a  monkey,  and,  after  suc- 
cessive stages  of  evolution,  by  a  subtle  and  fatal  use  of  Dialec- 
tics hit  upon,  among  other  erroneous  principles,  that  of  God's 
existence.  "  Descent  of  Man,"  vol.  1,  page  204.  Ingersoll  may 
prate  about  ignorance,  fear,  prejudice,  the  cupidity  of  priests 
and  what  not.  Facts  nevertheless  stubbornly  refuse  to  give  way 
to  theories;  and,  though  I  spend  a  year  endeavoring  to  prove 
a  horse  a  tree,  I  reap  for  reward  of  my  pains  only  obloquy, 
shame  and  the  reputation  of  being  a  fool.  Plato  has  somewhere 
in  his  voluminous  works  this  pithy  saying,  "  Greeks  and  all 
the  peoples  outside  Greece  profess  belief  in  the  existence  of 
God."  Cicero  takes  the  one  sensible  view  of  variety  of  creeds, 
when  he  says,  "  Among  men  there  is  no  race  so  completely  un- 
civilized as  not  to  know,  though  ignorant  perhaps  of  His  true 
nature,  that  a  God  must  be  acknowledged."  Plutarch,  the  cele- 
brated historian  of  ancient  heroes,  replying  to  a  certain  opponent 
of  his,  remarks,  "  If  you  travel  much,  you  will  no  doubt  visit 
cities  without  walls,  without  kings,  without  dwellings,  without 
resources,  without  a  currency,  without  a  literature.  Nobody 
has  yet  discovered  a  city  without  temples  and  gods,  without 
rituals,  oaths,  shrines;  without  sacrifices  instituted  to  call  down 
blessings  and  avert  evils." 

Polytheism,  or  the  worship  of  several  gods,  is  an  absurdity 
in  itself;  but  it  none  the  less  clearly  points  out  the  tendency 
of  the  human  mind,  and  establishes  none  the  less  solidly  the 
fact  for  which  we  here  contend.  Besides,  polytheism  invariably 
recognized  one  divinity  superior  to  the  rest,  and  so,  virtually 


210  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

if  not  explicitly,  was  a  profession  of  monotheism  or  one-god- 
serviee.  Jupiter  was  God  with  the  Romans;  Zeus,  God  with 
the  Greeks;  Juno,  Apollo,  Mars,  Diana,  Venus,  were  princes 
and  princesses  in  Jove's  kingdom,  endowed  with  many  high 
prerogatives,  but  denied  that  supremacy  which  could  alone 
make  them  gods. 

God: 

It  is  not  our  business  to  prove  that  God  is  one  in  substance 
and  triple  in  person,  that  He  once  descended  to  earth  and  as- 
sumed human  nature.  We  are  in  the  domain  of  natural  theol- 
ogy. The  mysteries  of  the  Most  Holy  Trinity  and  the  Incar- 
nation belong  to  supernatural  or  revealed  theology,  and  pre- 
suppose the  gift  of  faith.  The  God,  whose  existence  we  estab- 
lish in  this  present  thesis,  is  the  one  ens  a  se  in  the  world,  the 
unproduced  and  necessary  being;  the  first  cause  of  everything. 
Himself  without  a  cause;  the  all  powerful,  all  wise,  all  holy, 
all  just  being,  who  presides  over  the  interests  and  destiny  of 
man.  Later  we  prove  Him  the  being  whose  superior  cannot  be 
even  conceived,  and  from  this  prerogative  all  others  flow.  He 
is  therefore  infinitely  perfect,  infinitely  simple  and  peculiarly 
one.  He  is  an  utter  stranger  to  change,  eternal  and  immeas- 
urable. 

PROOFS  I,  II,  III,  IV 

/.  a.  There  exist  beings  which  were  produced.  But  pro- 
duced beings  ultimately  suppose  as  cause  a  being  non-produced. 
Ergo,  this  non-produced  being,  or  God  exists. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  There  exist  beings  which  undergo 
at  least  accidental  changes.  But  such  beings  are  produced  be- 
ings.    Ergo,  produced  beings  exist. 

With  regard  to  this  Minor.  An  actual  non-produced  being 
can  undergo  no  change.  Ergo,  the  beings  in  question  are  pro- 
duced beings. 

With  regard  to  this  Antecedent.  An  actual  non-produced 
being  is  a  necessary  being.  But  a  necessary  being  can  undergo 
no  change.  (In  what  state  would  it  be  necessary?  In  none.) 
Ergo,  an  actual  non-produced  being  can  undergo  no  change. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.     Multiply  men  beyond  the  num- 


THESIS  I  211 

ber  of  the  stars,  and  to  the  whole  multitude  no  higher  epithet 
can  be  applied  than  that  of  rational.  Increase  of  number  could 
never  result  in  changing  their  dignity  to  that  of  the  angelic  or 
divine.  Majus  et  minus  non  mutant  speciem.  Even  so  with 
produced  beings.  Thougli  they  include  everything  in  the  uni- 
verse, one  alone  excepted,  they  must  ever  and  always  be  styled 
produced  beings,  and  must  therefore  have  their  actual  existence 
from  something  outside  of  themselves.  Outside  of  themselves, 
however,  since  they  take  in  the  whole  round  of  produced  beings, 
there  can  be  only  the  non-produced  being,  whom  we  reverently 
call  God.  Production  from  another  is  an  attribute  essential  to 
things  subject  to  change ;  it  is  not  an  element  that  may  be  pres- 
ent or  absent,  and  still  have  the  same  influence  on  their  actual 
existence.  Without  production  there  is  for  them  no  such  thing 
as  actual  existence. 

N.B.  Produced  beings  can  come  from  produced  beings  as 
from  proximate  causes,  not  as  from  ultimate  causes.  All  these 
proximate  causes  are  produced  beings,  and  no  matter  how  much 
you  multiply  them,  you  will  never  get  from  the  collection  a 
non-produced  being.  All  the  plants  in  the  world  will  not  make 
a  horse.  Produced  beings  and  non-produced  being  differ  as 
widely  as  plant  and  horse,  specifically;  yea,  even  more  widely. 
But  this  collection  of  produced  beings  is  unintelligible  without 
a  cause.  Otherwise  you  would  have  an  effect  without  a  cause. 
This  cause  must  be  outside  the  collection,  which  embraces  all 
produced  being,  and  must  therefore  be  a  non-produced  being, 
God. 

&.  Everything  actual  is  either  produced  or  non-produced. 
But  it  is  impossible  for  all  to  be  produced.  Ergo,  there  exists 
at  least  one  non-produced,  God. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  Everything  produced  is  an  effect. 
But  there  can  be  no  effect  without  a  cause.  Ergo,  it  is  impos- 
sible for  all  to  be  produced. 

N.B.  Beings  at  this  moment  existing  and  beings  that  have 
already  existed  form  a  series,  closed  at  least  as  far  as  this  end 
of  the  line  is  concerned.  Since  an  actual  indefinite  series  is 
impossible,  it  must  be  closed  also  at  the  other  end  of  the  line. 
Since,  further,  the  last  being  at  this  end  of  the  line  is  a  pro- 
duced being, —  otherwise  it  would  be  a  cause  with  no  effect 
whatever, —  the  last  being  at  the  other  end  of  the  line,  or  the 


212  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

first  being  of  the  series,  must  be  a  producer  only,  as  the  pro- 
ducers must  alwaj's  be  just  as  many  as  the  beings  produced. 
The  first  being  in  the  series  cannot  produce  the  second,  and 
then  be  itself  in  turn  produced  by  the  second.  For  through 
the  instrumentality  of  the  second  it  would  produce  itself,  or 
exercise  an  activity,  which  by  supposition  it  does  not  yet  possess. 

//.  There  exists  in  the  surrounding  universe  an  order  of 
things  undeniably  wonderful.  But  such  an  order  supposes  as 
capable  cause  some  being,  in  intellect  far  above  the  visible  works 
of  the  universe,  an  all-wise  being,  God.     Ergo,  God  exists. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  Its  vastness,  variety,  intricate 
simplicity,  perfection,  long  continuance,  make  this  world's  order 
truly  wonderful. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  This  order  arises  not  from  the 
essences  of  its  constituents,  because  they  are  things  subject  to 
change,  and  therefore  wholly  indifferent  of  themselves  to  this 
or  that  combination.  It  arises  from  neither  hap-hazard  nor 
accident.  Otherwise,  nothing  at  all,  or  at  most  a  cause  without 
intelligence  would  be  on  an  equal  footing  with  a  cause  full  of 
intelligence.  "W^ierefore  it  has  its  origin  in  some  being  wholly 
distinct  from,  and  immeasurably  superior  to,  tiie  whole  visible 
universe,  the  being  we  know  as  God.  The  establishment  of  an 
intelligence  greater  than  any  with  which  we  are  acquainted, 
would  serve  to  confound  atheists;  but  the  intelligence  here  dis- 
played is  nothing  short  of  infinite.  It  is  the  intelligence  of  the 
actual  non-prodiiced  being  already  proved,  and  therefore  in- 
finite. 

///.  Everybody  at  times,  even  against  his  will,  feels  himself 
urged  by  the  most  exacting  kind  of  moral  necessity  to  perform 
some  actions  and  omit  others.  But  this  natural  impulse  be- 
tokens the  existence  of  some  supreme  Lawgiver,  a  rewarder  and 
avenger,  absolutely  holy  and  just,  all  powerful  and  omniscient. 
Ergo,  God  exists. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  The  sting  of  conscience,  remorse 
of  conscience,  are  by-words,  and  represent  a  psychological  ex- 
perience that  falls  to  the  lot  of  saint  and  sinner  alike. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  Our  inability  to  escape  from 
pleasant  and  irksome  feelings,  attendant  on  good  and  evil  done, 
is  an  unerring  sign  that  the  being  responsible  for  these  emo- 
tions is  extraneous  to  ourselves,  superior  to  us,  human  nature's 


THESIS  I  213 

supreme  Lawgiver.  Reason  is  rather  passive  than  active  in 
this  matter  of  conscience.  It  does  not  precisely  shape  these 
dictates  itself,  it  merely  perceives  them,  in  much  the  same  way 
as  it  perceives  universality.  If  their  presence  or  absence  de- 
pended on  our  will,  unpleasant  pangs  would  be  exceedingly 
rare.  Neither  is  conscience  still,  when  once  its  message  of  re- 
proof or  congratulation  is  conveyed.  It  further  excites  a  dread 
of  future  punishment,  a  hope  of  future  reward,  and  therefore 
proclaims  the  existence  of  an  all-powerful  avenger  and  rewarder. 
The  deeds  falling  under  the  blame  or  praise  of  conscience  are 
not  necessarily  outward  and  open  to  the  gaze  of  the  world. 
They  are  oftener.  perhaps,  thoughts  and  intentions,  hidden  from 
men's  eyes,  divulged  to  not  even  a  father,  motlier,  husband 
or  wife,  but  so  securely  wrapped  up  in  the  saint's  or  cul- 
prit's bosom  as  to  go  out  only  with  death  and  descend  to  the 
grave  with  him.  Surely,  then,  if  our  fear  and  hope  have  any 
foundation  at  all,  and  to  think  otherwise  is  absurd,  the  being, 
who  inspires  the  one  and  the  other,  must  be  possessed  of  a 
vision  infinitely  more  piercing  than  any  falling  under  human 
observation. 

IV.  It  is  a  judgment  ratified  by  the  common  consent  of 
mankind,  that  there  exists  a  divinity  or  God,  to  whom  worship 
is  due.  But  such  a  judgment  cannot  be  false.  Ergo,  God 
exists. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  This  first  premiss  is  largely  a 
matter  of  history,  and  has  been  so  often  and  so  overwhelmingly 
verified,  that  any  further  details  on  the  subject  would  hardly 
be  an  addition  to  the  facts  already  gathered,  and  indisputably 
substantiated  by  men  of  established  probity  and  learning.  Suf- 
fice it  to  say  that  atheists  themselves  do  not  attack  the  univer- 
sality of  the  belief.  They  rest  content  with  a  vain  inquiry  into 
the  motives  prompting  the  belief.  Fear,  they  say,  cupidity 
and  fraud,  prejudice  and  ignorance  are  at  the  bottom  of  this 
huge  mistake,  not  nature.  But  their  assertions  are  emptier 
than  the  air  that  gives  them  voice.  Fear  is  the  parent  of 
atheism,  not  of  belief  in  God.  It  is  a  fact  of  history  that  the 
most  fearless  and  most  courageous  of  nations  have  ever  been 
loudest  in  their  profession  of  God's  existence,  and  sincerest  in 
their  reverent  worship.  A  man  never  assumes  the  dread  re- 
sponsibilities entailed  by  belief  in  God  out  of  fear.     It  is  a 


214  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

characteristic  of  fear  to  shirk  responsibility.  On  second  thought 
I  should  hesitate  to  denominate  fear  the  cause  of  either  atheism 
or  belief  in  God.  Fear  in  the  one  case  and  the  other  is  an 
effect  of  certainty  about  God's  existence,  and  would  be  wholly 
meaningless  and  easily  divested,  could  that  certainty  be  once 
weakened.  It  is  just  as  silly  to  deny  the  existence  of  God,  as 
it  is  to  deny  that  well  grounded  fear  and  respectful  reverence, 
which  it  prompts.  Cicero  made  of  Epicurus,  a  fair  counter- 
part of  our  Ingersoll  in  point  of  blasphemy,  the  following  re- 
proachful but  honest  remark,  "  I  never  yet  in  the  course  of  a 
life-time  met  the  man,  who  stood  more  in  awe  of  what  he  pro- 
fessed to  regard  idle  grounds  for  fear,  death,  namely,  and  the 
gods."  It  is  impossible  to  believe  that  recalcitrant  men  were 
ever  so  short-sighted  and  servile  as  to  allow  overbearing  and 
greedy  rulers,  spiritual  or  temporal,  to  thrust  on  them  this  to 
the  rebellious  most  irksome  belief.  I  ratlicr  fancy  that  fraud 
and  cupidity  have  been  obstacles  to  its  growth  and  propaga- 
tion. No  human  law,  attended  with  so  much  and  so  persistent 
inconvenience,  would  be  long  tolerated  by  a  single  people,  to 
say  nothing  of  the  whole  world.  Prejudice  may  exert  a  wide 
influence,  when  it  countenances  ease  and  remissness,  or  min- 
isters to  any  passion.  But  its  influence  is  limited  indeed,  when 
it  stands  in  the  way  of  self-gratification  and  self-indulgence. 
The  circumstance  that  a  father  and  mother  followed  such  and 
such  a  line  of  belief,  may  be  of  great  weight  with  the  young 
and  uneducated,  when  a  religion  is  to  be  chosen.  But  men  are 
wont  to  grow  out  of  youth  and  diffident  ignorance.  They  are 
not  slow  to  put  aside  prejudices  less  imj)ortant  in  their  bearing 
on  life  than  this.  Besides,  prejudice  in  the  case  of  the  child 
does  not  incline  him  to  belief  precisely  in  God,  but  to  a  par- 
ticular kind  of  belief  in  God.  Ignorance  is  perhaps  the  emptiest 
of  all  the  causes  alleged  by  atheists.  Aristotle,  St.  Thomas, 
Cicero,  Plato,  Kepler,  Newton  and  all  learned  men  of  note  are 
living  illustrations  of  that  beautiful  saying  ascribed  to  Bacon, 
"  Sips  of  pliilosophy  may  indeed  lead  up  to  atheism,  but  fuller 
draughts  lead  the  soul  on  to  God." 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  A  judgment  ratified  by  the  com- 
mon consent  of  mankind  cannot  be  false,  because  it  takes  its  rise 
in  rational  nature  as  such  ;  and  reason  as  such,  or  reason  per  se 
is  infallible,  unless  we  want  to  make  man  a  being  designed  for 


THESIS  I  215 

the  truth  and  destined  to  never  compass  it;  unless  we  want  to 
make  reason  an  instrument  designed  to  defeat  its  own  purpose. 
Every  such  judgment  has  four  qualities,  separating  it  from  what- 
soever other  judgments,  no  matter  how  universal.  1.  It  has  a 
claim  to  universaliiy,  to  long  duration  and  unchangeableness  as 
well  a)nong  ruder  as  among  more  civilized  peoples.  2.  It  has  a 
claim  to  exact  agreement  with  all  the  rules  of  rigid  reason.  S. 
It  has  a  claim  to  absolute  freedom  from  any  such  cause  as  preju- 
dice, ignorance  and  the  like.  Its  universality  is  sufficient  guar- 
antee for  this  claim.  Jf.  It  has  a  claim  to  the  exclusive  incul- 
cation of  moral  and  social  truths,  not  of  scientific  truths.  Small 
harm  comes  of  scientific  mistakes,  moral  mistakes  reach  to  eter- 
nity.    Nature  provides  for  morality,  not  for  science. 

PRINCIPLES 

A.  From  Boedder.     Nat.  Theol.,  pp.  15-24. 

Ontologists  contend  for  no  intuitive  vision,  such  as  the  elect 
enjoy  in  Heaven.  They  contend  for  direct  consciousness  of 
God's  existence.  Our  ideas,  they  say,  are  occasioned  by  sensa- 
tions, tliey  are  not  caused  by  them  or  the  mind,  but  by  God 
immediately  present,  like  a  sun  in  the  middle  of  a  thinking 
world. 

Answer.  We  must  make  an  effort  to  feel  sure  of  God's  exist- 
ence.    It  costs  labor  to  dispel  doubts. 

Matter  is  direct  object  of  mind,  not  spirit;  like  owl  in  mid- 
day, when  confronted  with  spiritual.  The  idea  of  God's  exist- 
ence is  implanted  in  us  by  God,  inasmuch  as  He  gave  us  a 
reason  capable  of  at  once  grasping  His  existence. 

If  we  saw  God  immediately,  we  should  see  His  essence.  We 
see  everything  in  God  as  we  see  everything  in  the  sun,  in  prin- 
ciple of  knowledge,  not  in  object  known. 

B.  Objections  raised  by  Ontologists : 

1.  Notion  of  infinite  cannot  be  gotten  from  finite.  We  have 
notion  of  infinite.     Ergo,  immediate. 

2.  Harmony  of  order.  God  first.  Ergo  idea  of  God  ought 
to  be  first  idea  and  immediate. 

3.  God,  man's  last  end,  first  object  of  will.  Ergo,  first  object 
of  intellect  and  immediate.  God  is  first  truth.  Ergo,  first 
known. 


216  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

4.  God  alone  intelligible  by  Himself,  creation  intelligible 
only  in  God.     Ergo,  God  first  and  immediate. 

5.  Universals,  based  on  direct  intuition  of  God,  because  eter- 
nal, necessary,  unchangeable.     Ergo. 

Ansicers.  1.  Infinite  can  be  gotten  from  finite  analogically, 
by  positivo-negative  concepts. 

2.  This  harmony  is  not  needed  except  in  perfect  knowledge 
like  God's.  In  Imman  knowledge  truth  is  possible  without  this 
order.     We  can  know  a  book  first,  and  then  its  author. 

3.  To  be  last  end,  God  must  be  known  and  wished  not  first, 
but  somewhere  in  life  or  after  death.  God  is  subsistent  truth, 
not  truth  in  the  abstract  and  common  to  creatures.  Skeptics 
can  deny  the  second  truth,  not  the  first. 

4.  Creatures  have  existence  distinct  from  God,  though  not 
independent.  Existence  is  basis  of  intelligibility.  Ergo,  crea- 
tures have  intelligibility  distinct  from  God.  God  is  cause  of 
their  intelligibility,  as  He  is  of  their  existence. 

5.  They  are  negatively  eternal;  logically,  not  physically. 
God  is  physically  and  really  eternal,  necessary  and  unchange- 
able.    Otherwise  universals  would  be  gods. 

C.  Difference  between  St.  Anselm,  Descartes  and  Leibnitz: 
St.  Anselm  argues  from  notion,  God  the  greatest  being  that 

can  be  conceived.  Descartes  argues  from  notion,  existence 
contained  in  clear  and  distinct  idea  of  God.  Leibnitz  argues 
from  notion,  God  possible,  because  no  contradiction  proved  in 
concept  of  God. 

Answer.  All  forms  sin  because  unwarranted  passage  from 
ideal  to  real.  Monk  Gaunilo  pointed  it  out  in  St.  Anselm's 
time.  He  refuted  argument  with  story  of  the  Lost  Island, 
greater  than  any  conceivable,  inscribing  his  work,  Opusculum 
pro  Insipienti,  a  reference  to  the  Scripture,  The  fool  hath  said 
in  his  heart,  There  is  no  God.  The  Lost  Island  must  be  a 
reality,  because  the  greatest  conceivable  island.  Anselm  an- 
swered by  saying  that  his  argument  was  good  for  only  the  in- 
finite being,  not  for  finites. 

Answer.  St.  Anselm  assumes  that  the  idea  of  infinite  being 
is  not  a  contradiction,  and  this  without  warrant,  unless  he  first 
appeals  to  an  a  posteriori  proof.  Suppose  many  self-existent 
beings,  and  no  being  would  be  infinite. 

D.  Agnostics  especially  deny  an  intelligent  first  cause.     They 


THESIS  I  217 

admit  some  kind  of  first  cause,  like  the  forces  of  matter,  nebular 
hypothesis,  atoms  and  such. 

Answer.  Our  unproduced  cause  must  be  intelligent  because 
some  of  its  effects,  men,  are  intelligent;  it  is  infinite  because 
unproduced.  Ergo,  no  begging  of  question.  Opponents  deny 
a  finite  intelligent  first  cause.  Ergo,  no  need  to  prove  God 
infinite.  Later  we  prove  God  infinite  from  the  notion  of  neces- 
sary or  actual  non-produced  being. 

E.  Urrahuru:     Tlieod.,  D.  1,  c.  2,  a  1,  vol.  7,  pp.  89-95. 

1.  Contingency  of  things  created  not  yet  proved.     Ergo. 

2.  Though  individual  creatures  are  contingent,  collection  may 
be  necessary.  The  door  is  not  the  house,  neither  is  the  window ; 
but  all  the  parts  together  can  be  called  the  house.  One  horse 
may  not  be  able  to  haul  a  load,  equal  to  the  strength  of  five. 
Not  lawful  to  argue  from  distributive  to  collective.  Ergo,  all 
contingents. 

3.  In  the  supposition  of  an  infinite  series  there  would  be  no 
first  cause.     Ergo,  all  contingents. 

4.  A  can  produce  B,  and  then  disappear  to  be  later  produced 
by  B.     Ergo,  all  contingents. 

5.  World  could  be  eternal,  and  therefore  necessary.  Ergo, 
no  first  cause,  and  all  contingents. 

6.  A  necessary  being  can  be  from  another,  or  produced. 
Ergo,  all  contingents. 

7.  Conclusion  follows  weaker  part.  Contingent  in  prem- 
isses. Ergo,  necessary  out  of  place  in  conclusion.  "  Latius 
patet  conclusio  quam  praemissae  " ;  from  contingent  to  necessary. 

Answers.  1.  Contingency  proved  in  Cosmology.  Change 
proves  contingency. 

2.  Not  lawful,  when  distributive  is  the  collective  inadequately 
taken,  I  grant ;  when  the  distributive  is  the  collective  in  no  sense 
whatever,  I  deny.  Necessity  belongs  to  contingents  not  even 
inadequately.  In  contingents  there  is  not  even  a  partial  apti- 
tude for  necessity.  Ergo,  necessity  cannot  be  said  of  collec- 
tion. The  door  is  the  house  inadequately  taken,  and  so  is  the 
window.  No  contingent  being  is  the  necessary  being  inade- 
quately taken. 

3.  Infinite  series,  an  absurdity,  because  series  denotes  some 
first  and  infinite  denotes  no  first;  square  circle.  Wliether  ab- 
surd or  not,  the  whole  infinite  series  of  contingents  must  have 


218  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

an  outside  cause.  In  a  crowd  of  one  hundred,  to  have  a  hun- 
dred wliipped  men,  either  somebody  outside  the  hundred  must 
whip,  or  somebody  in  the  hundred  must  whip  himself,  or  be 
whipped  by  another,  whom  he  has  mediately  or  immediately 
whipped.  The  cause  of  the  series  is  in  or  outside  the  series. 
If  out,  necessary  being;  if  in,  each  has  cause,  and  one  will  me- 
diately or  immediately  be  cause  of  itself. 

4.  A  ought  to  have  cause  before  it  produced  B,  not  after. 
Otherwise  it  could  not  perish  after  its  production  of  B. 

5.  World  could  be  eternal  by  its  very  essence,  I  deny;  by 
favor  of  the  first  cause,  I  grant.  Only  a  thing  eternal  by  its 
very  essence  is  necessary,  a  thing  eternal  by  favor  is  contingent. 

C).  A  necessary  being  can  lie  ens  ab  alio,  or  from  another, 
when  it  proceeds  from  a  first  cause  working  necessarily,  not 
when  it  is  necessary  by  its  very  essence. 

7.  This  axiom  is  a  rule  regulating  the  formal  truth  of  syl- 
logisms, and  the  weakness  in  question  is  that  of  negative  as 
compared  with  positive,  particular  as  compared  with  universal. 
It  has  no  bearing  on  the  relative  dignity  of  trutlis  in  premisses 
and  conclusion.  Necessary  being  occurs  in  premisses,  and  there- 
fore has  right  to  a  place  in  the  conclusion.  Contingents  pre- 
suppose necessary.  Contingents  exist.  Ergo,  necessary  exists. 
We  do  not  derive  God  from  contingents,  but  from  necessary 
connection  between  necessary  being  and  contingents.  A  neces- 
sary being  or  God  exists  necessarily  not  contingently,  because, 
though  contingent  beings  in  the  premisses  are  contingent  in 
themselves,  when  once  placed  in  existence,  they  necessarily  exist; 
and  God  in  the  conclusion  exists  the  same  way,  necessarily. 
The  inquiry  cannot  be  pursued  to  infinity. 

F.  From  Urrahuru:     1.  c,  pp.  97-102. 

1.  Creature-causes  are  enough  to  explain  effects.  Ergo,  no 
first  cause. 

2.  Spencer.  World  cannot  be  ens  a  se.  Ergo,  no  ens  a  se 
possible. 

3.  Mill.  Neither  experience  nor  reason  proves  first  cause. 
Experience  teaches  only  second  causes.  Eeason  is  no  voucher 
for  principle  of  causality.  Experience  alone  vouches  for  suffi- 
ciency of  cause;  and  experience  teaches  that  effect  can  surpass 
cause.  More  perfect  beings  are  evolved  from  less  perfect ;  world 
from  nebulous  mass. 


THESIS  I  219 

4.  Present  things  have  beginning.  Not  so  primal  elements, 
which  are  eternal. 

Answers.  1.  Enough,  immediately  and  proximately,  I  grant; 
remotely  and  mediately,  I  deny. 

X.B.     A  first  cause  must  always  be  supposed. 

2.  A  stone  cannot  understand.  Ergo,  nothing  can  under- 
stand. 

3.  Experience  is  silent  about  first  cause,  does  not  deny. 
Principle  of  causality  is  not  due  to  experience,  it  is  analytic. 
Life  in  less  perfect  explains  evolution  to  more  perfect.  Sup- 
posing the  nebular  hypothesis  true,  God  gave  the  nebulous  mass 
power  to  become  world.  Certainly  the  nebulous  mass  cannot  be 
without  cause.     Ergo,  first  cause. 

4.  Primal  elements  are  contingent,  and  could  never  begin 
without  cause,  even  if  eternal. 

G.  From  Urraburu:     1.  c,  pp.  104-107;  pp.  111-124. 

1.  Numbers  are  greater  and  greater  without  greatest  conceiv- 
able number.  Same  of  bodies.  Ergo,  contingent  beings,  a  pari, 
without  necessary,  ens  ab  alio  without  ens  a  se. 

2.  According  to  argument,  a  most  perfect  man  ought  to  be 
the  cause  of  all  other  men.     Absurd. 

3.  God  ought  to  be  primus  motor  immobilis.  He  is  not,  be- 
cause of  intellect  and  will.  Faculties  are  eternal,  thoughts  and 
wishes  are  in  time.     God  passes  from  potency  to  act.     Ergo. 

4.  Vital  faculty  moves  itself.     Ergo,  vital  faculty  is  God. 

5.  An  eternal  world  would  not  be  in  potency,  but  would  be 
actus  purissimus.     Ergo. 

6.  Primal  elements  of  world  get  motion  from  their  essence. 
Ergo. 

Answers.  1.  No  parity,  greater  and  greater  numbers  are  al- 
ways in  same  class.  Same  of  bodies.  Ens  a  se  and  ens  ab  alio 
are  in  different  classes.     Numbers  will  not  give  bodies. 

2.  Essence  is  the  same  in  all  men.  No  man  is  more  perfect 
than  another  in  essence.  Essence  of  ens  a  se  is  different  from 
essence  of  ens  ab  alio. 

3.  God  moves  Himself  without  dependence  on  another.  The 
axiom,  Omne  motum  ab  alio  movetur,  is  said  of  physical  mo- 
tion, not  of  metaphysical,  like  thought  and  wish.  Created  in- 
tellects and  wills  pass  from  potency  to  act,  not  God's.  He  is 
actus  purissimus.     His  intellect  and  will  are  from  eternity,  like- 


220  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

wise  His  tlioughts  and  wishes.  Effects  ad  extra  are  in  time. 
Terms  are  in  time.  Aristotle,  when  lie  calls  God  primus  motor 
immobilis,  means  that  there  is  in  God  no  physical  motion,  mo- 
tion peculiar  to  inert  bodies,  which  is  always  from  and  by  an- 
other. Plato  says  that  God  moves  others  by  moving  Himself, 
and  he  is  talking  of  uncreated  metaphysical  motion,  thought 
and  wish.  Thought  and  wish  in  creatures  are  self-motion,  work 
of  intellect  and  will,  though  they  must  always  be  started  by 
another.  Intellect  and  will  move  themselves,  but  under  motion 
from  another.  The  will  wishes  under,  not  from  and  by,  mo- 
tion from  the  intellect;  the  intellect  thinks  under  motion  from 
the  species.  Thought  and  wish  in  God  arc  self-motion  witliout 
dependence  on  anything  distinct  from  intellect  and  will.  God's 
intellect  is  God's  will,  and  both  are  God  Himself. 

4.  Adequately  and  without  dependence  on  God,  as  first  cause, 
I  deny ;  inadequately  and  with  dependence,  I  grant.  Vital  fac- 
ulty moves  itself  under  motion  from  another,  God  moves  Him- 
self without  such  dependence. 

5.  It  would  be  in  potency  after  its  creation,  and  therefore  in 
itself  in  potency  before  creation. 

6.  Primal  elements  get  not  existence  from  their  essence. 
Even  in  this  hypothesis  God  is  needed. 

H.  From  Urrahuru.     Order  in  world.     1.  c,  pp.  130-142. 

1.  Kant:  a.  From  analogy  between  nature  and  art.  Ergo, 
not  certain. 

b.  Argument  proves  need  of  architect,  not  need  of  creator  of 
matter. 

c.  Finite  effect  calls  for  no  infinite  cause. 

2.  God  not  omnipotent,  because  as  such  He  ought  to  be  able 
to  use  means  out  of  proportion  with  effects.  Finite  causes  can 
do  as  much  as  God. 

3.  God  would  have  to  sanction  everything  done  in  the  world, 
like  capture  of  fly  by  spider. 

4.  Atoms  could  combine  to  form  order  in  tlie  world.  Organ- 
ism and  wonders  it  can  perform.  Tyj)e  in  an  urn  after  a  suffi- 
cient number  of  pourings  would  assume  the  form  of  Virgil's 
^neid. 

5.  No  order  in  the  world: 

a.  No  finality ;  some  creatures  have  no  purpose,  rudimentary 
organs,  parasites,  bacilli,  pain. 


THESIS  1  221 

b.  We  ought  to  know  whole  world  to  be  able  to  decide  finality. 

c.  World  a  machine.  We  ought  to  know  end  of  whole  world, 
and  how  each  part  conspires  to  that  end. 

d.  Like  shooting  a  million  guns  to  kill  a  hare;  seeds  lost; 
a  few  saved  by  chance  to  perpetuate  species;  geniuses  lost  by 
poverty,  carelessness  of  parents,  laziness  and  such. 

Everything  from  chance,  no  finality. 

Answers,  a.  Argument  not  from  analogy,  but  from  meta- 
physical principle,  order  is  the  work  of  intelligence.  Order  in 
nature  calls  for  mind  as  well  as  order  in  art.  Analogy  used  to 
illustrate,  insisted  upon,  because  it  serves  to  disprove  atheism. 
Eelative  notion  of  God's  intelligence  enough;  absolute,  not 
needed.  The  world  is  not  so  perfect,  but  that  it  could  be  more 
perfect.  But  everything  in  the  world  has  some  point  of  per- 
fection. Imperfections  are  relative,  and  in  harmony  with  per- 
fection as  a  whole. 

b.  This  architect,  being  ens  a  se,  must  likewise  be  the  creator 
of  matter.  Besides,  we  use  the  argument  to  prove  God  a  real- 
itj',  not  to  prove  Him  the  creator  of  matter. 

c.  Finite  effect  cannot  always  be  produced  by  finite  cause. 
Examples  are  creation  of  world,  knowledge  of  future  free  con- 
tingents. Enough,  immediately  and  proximately,  I  grant;  re- 
motely and  mediately,  I  deny.  A  second  finite  cause  could 
produce  the  world,  but  dependent  on  a  first  infinite  cause.  This 
finite  effect  ultimately  calls  for  an  unproduced,  and  therefore 
infinite  cause. 

2.  Omnipotence  can  use  means  out  of  proportion,  means  in- 
trinsically repugnant,  I  deny;  intrinsically  possible  and  out  of 
proportion,  I  again  distinguish,  with  ordinary  power,  I  deny; 
with  absolute  power,  I  grant.  God  always  employs  His  ordi- 
nary power.  Absolute  power  means  omnipotence  without  re- 
gard to  other  attributes;  ordinary  power  means  omnipotence 
viewed  in  connection  with  other  attributes  like  wisdom,  justice 
and  the  rest. 

3.  God  would  have  to  sanction,  with  His  approval,  I  deny; 
with  His  permission,  I  grant. 

4.  Atoms  could  form  order  under  direction  of  first  cause;  not 
otherwise.  Organisms  get  their  power  from  first  cause.  The 
forces  of  matter  directed  by  an  intelligence  can  accomplish 
wonders;  not  otherwise.     We  are  not  ignorant  of  what  the  forces 


222  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

of  matter  can  do  when  left  to  themselves,  and  when  guided  by 
God  or  man.  The  example  of  Virgil's  ^neid  and  type  is  little 
worth. 

a.  The  type  are  made  by  intelligent  beings. 

b.  They  arc  j)laccd  in  an  urn,  poured  through  a  hole,  and  set 
on  proper  ends;  intelligence. 

c.  They  occupy  a  finite  space,  stand  in  forms;  not  verified 
in  atoms. 

The  order  apparent  in  brute  work  comes  from  God.  The 
laws  supposed  by  Evolutionists  to  guide  matter  in  its  opera- 
tions are  meaningless,  unless  there  exists  a  Legislator. 

5.  a.  Some  creatures  have  no  purpose  known  to  us,  I  grant; 
known  to  God,  I  deny.  Many  ends  are  assignable  to  rudi- 
mentary organs,  bacilli,  parasites,  pain. 

b,  c.  It  is  not  necessary  to  know  all  the  order  in  the  world. 
We  know  enough  to  establish  God. 

d.  2^ot  like  hunter  and  hare  in  case.  God  shoots  where  hare 
is,  the  million  guns  shoot  a  million  hares.  Not  every  seed  is 
meant  by  God  to  grow  to  a  plant.  Some  are  meant  to  supply 
food  to  the  birds,  and  these  in  turn  preserve  such  seed  as  become 
plants.  Geniuses  are  to  be  evolved  with  dependence  on  men's 
free  will.     Not  all  are  intended  by  God  to  fully  develop. 

/.     From   Urrahuru.     Common  consent.     1.  c,  pp.  158-164. 

1.  Atheists  numerous. 

2.  Other  universal  opinions  proved  false.  Examples  are,  mo- 
tion of  sun,  no  antipodes. 

3.  Different  opinions  about  God  rob  consent  of  universality. 

4.  Polytheism  can  be  proved  from  common  consent.     Ergo. 

Answers.  1.  Practical  atheists  are  numerous,  I  grant ;  theo- 
retical, I  deny.  Atheists  with  the  Greeks  were  men  who  denied 
the  gods  of  the  state;  and  they  were  better  theists  than  their 
neighbors,  e.  g.  Socrates.  The  Hebrews  are  called  atheists  by 
Pliny.  The  atheists  of  to-day  rest  on  fool  reasons.  They  deny 
a  personal  God,  not  a  first  cause.  There  never  was  a  nation 
of  pantheists  or  atheists. 

Barbarians  are  poor  examples  to  cite  in  favor  of  any  sys- 
tem, passion  kills  moral  instincts.  Buddhist  philosophers  are 
atheists,  not  the  common  people.  500  millions  of  people,  few 
philosophers. 

2.  Scientific,  not  ethical.     See  page  215. 


THESIS  I  223 

3.  Different  opinions,  about  God's  existence,  I  deny;  about 
God's  qualities,  I  grant. 

4.  Polytheism  never  universal,  Hebrews  always  monotheists; 
philosophers  wise  to  absurdity.  Jupiter  alone  God;  not  last- 
ing, because  dead ;  against  reason. 

J.  From  Urraburu.     Moral  order,  conscience.     1.  c,  pp.  166- 
171. 

1.  Eemorse  disappears  with  crime.     Ergo,  no  criterion. 

2.  Believers  are  sinners  as  well  as  atheists. 

3.  Other  motives  able  to  keep  men  virtuous,  honor,  esteem, 
self-respect. 

Answers.     1.  Eemorse  disappears,  I  deny;  weakens,  I  grant. 

2.  Believers  are  sinners,  because  they  are  free.  Motives  for 
sin  fewer  and  weaker  in  believers. 

3.  Other  motives,  universal  and  sufficient,  I  deny;  particular 
and  indifferent,  I  grant. 

K.  From  Urrahuru.     General.     1.  c,  pp.  173-181. 

1.  Infinite  good  ought  to  exclude  evil. 

Ansiver.  From  Himself,  I  grant;  from  others,  I  again  dis- 
tinguish ;  if  necessary  agent,  I  grant ;  if  free  agent,  I  deny. 

2.  The  good  are  afflicted,  the  wicked  prosper. 

Ansiver.  Affliction  meant  for  higher  good,  I  grant;  affliction 
not  meant  for  higher  good,  I  deny.     Uses  of  adversity. 

3.  Energy  in  world,  enough  to  explain  things. 

Answer.  Placed  in  it  by  first  cause,  I  grant;  had  of  itself, 
I  deny. 

4.  Qualities  of  God  not  proved. 

Ansiuer.  Existence  not  proved,  I  deny;  qualities,  I  grant. 
An  sit  and  quid  sit. 

5.  Spencer: 

a.  Infinite  duration  inconceivable. 

b.  God  is  not  finite  beings.     Ergo,  not  all  being,  not  infinite. 

c.  Absolute  has  relations,  mind,  will,  creation. 

d.  Has  consciousness,  if  free;  and  that  says  relations. 

e.  God  can  do  all  things  and  can  do  no  evil.  He  punishes 
and  pardons.  He  can  foresee  and  prevent  evil,  and  yet  permits 
it. 

Answers,  a.  Simple  infinite  duration  can  be  conceived  some- 
how, not  in  itself;  successive  cannot.  Eternity  means  no  be- 
ginning, no  end,  no  succession. 


224  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

b.  God  contains  all  finites  virtually  and  eminently.  To  be 
finites  formally  would  be  an  imperfection. 

c.  No  real  relation  in  God,  only  logical,  which  adds  nothing 
real  to  God,  mere  external  denomination. 

d.  No  real  relation. 

e.  One  act,  different  terms;  moral  evil  as  such  needs  no 
cause,  it  is  nothing  positive.  He  permits  and  does  physical 
evil  for  good  reasons.  He  permits  moral  evil  without  doing  it; 
men  are  free. 

Other  seemingly  contradictory  qualities  urged  by  Agnostics: 
He  is  everywhere   and  nowhere;   immovable   and  works  ad 

extra.     He  is  good  without  quality;  large  without   quantity; 

whole,  without  parts;  free  and  unchangeable. 

6.  Kant. 

We  prove  necessary  being  infinite,  and  then  infinite  being 
necessary,  or  necessarily  existing.  Ergo,  our  argument  is  a 
priori. 

Ansiver.  We  prove  a  posteriori  existence  of  necessary  being, 
and  then  in  turn  this  being  is  infinite  because  necessary.  And 
all  the  while  God  is  real,  not  notional,  as  with  St.  Anselm. 
Our  argument  is  not  from  an  idea,  but  from  the  real  existence 
of  things  in  the  universe.  Once  God's  existence  is  proved  real. 
His  other  attributes  can  be  demonstrated  from  ideas.  Our  ar- 
gument would  be  a  priori,  if  it  ran  this  way :  The  necessary 
exists.     Ergo,  the  contingent  exists. 

7.  God  is  imaginary,  no  real  being. 

Answer.  We  know  God  by  analogical  concepts,  belonging  to 
Him  alone,  as  to  a  most  real  being.  God  is  pictured  as  a  man 
only  because  of  our  weakness  and  limitations.  Our  concept  of 
God  is  objective,  inasmuch  as  it  follows  our  concept  of  phys- 
ical realities.  It  is  not  logical  like  St.  Anselm's.  All  the 
analogy  is  between  God's  attributes  and  man's,  not  between  the 
existence  of  a  necessary  being  and  that  of  contingents.  Rela- 
tion of  dependence  between  God  and  creatures  is  real  on  the 
part  of  creatures;  and  in  this  thesis  we  want  to  prove  the  exist- 
ence of  God,  not  His  perfections.  There  is  a  distinction  of 
reason,  on  our  part,  between  God's  essence  and  His  existence, 
and  therefore  we  can  reach  one  without  reaching  the  other. 

L.  From  Boedder,  pp.  149-233.     Traditionalism: 


THESIS  I  225 

1.  Faith  and  science  have  different  objects.  Existence  of 
God,  a  dogma  of  faith.     Ergo,  above  reason. 

Answer.  Motive  makes  difference,  science  based  on  reason; 
faith,  on  the  authority  of  God's  word.  Some  dogmas  above 
reason,  others  not.  God's  existence,  object  of  science  as  well 
as  of  faith.  God  reveals  truths  within  reach  of  reason,  to 
lessen  difficulty.  Men  incapable  and  lazy.  Knowledge  would 
come  late  in  life.     There  would  be  more  room  for  error. 

2.  Impossible  to  pass  from  finite  to  infinite.  Ergo,  tradi- 
tion needed. 

Answer.     Impossible  at  one  bound,  not  by  successive  steps. 
M.  First     Cause  —  Kant,     Spencer,     Mill.     Boedder,     Nat. 

Theol,  pp.  152-165. 
Kant:     1.  Ontological  proof  unsound. 
Answer.     We  agree. 

2.  Uncertain  about  principle  of  causality. 
Answer.     That  is  scepticism. 

3.  Must  fall  back  on  ontological. 

Answer.  We  argue  a  posteriori;  from  contingent  to  neces- 
sary, and  then  to  infinite. 

4.  Argument  from  design  fails.  Architect  needed,  not  crea- 
tor, unless  recourse  is  had  to  ontological  proof. 

Answer.     We  prove  creator  a  posteriori. 

5.  Mere  intelligent  mind  enough. 

Answer.  Not  enough;  must  be  outside  of  order  and  crea- 
tures. 

Spencer:  1.  Self  existent  is  inconceivable.  Ergo,  atheism, 
pantheism  and  theism  are  wrong;  agnosticism  right.  Self  ex- 
istent, without  beginning,  impossible  to  conceive,  because  of 
infinite  past  time. 

Answer.  Impossible  to  materialists,  who  recognize  only  or- 
ganic or  sensible  knowledge.  God's  duration  is  not  time,  but 
eternity;  and  in  eternity  there  is  no  succession;  everything  is 
at  once. 

Mill :  1.  Our  argument,  because  world  is  changeable,  it  needs 
a  cause.  Add,  and  this  cause  is  without  a  cause,  and  you  have 
the  truth.  Elements  of  world  are  essentially  unchangeable. 
Ergo,  no  need  of  cause. 

Answer.    Essentially   unchangeable   elements   would   be   in- 


226  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

capable  of  changed  combinations,  and  these  combinations  would 
have  to  be  effected  by  another. 

2.  Causes  within  our  experience  had  their  cause.  Ergo,  no 
such  thing  as  cause  without  a  cause. 

Answer.  They  have  their  causes,  because  they  are  creatures 
and  contingent.  It  is  not  of  the  essence  of  causation  to  have  a 
cause,  but  an  accident  or  circumstance  due  to  contingency. 

3.  Conscious  production  requires  a  mind,  not  unconscious 
production,  and  world's  production  may  be  of  latter  kind.  Be- 
sides, effect  can  be  superior  to  cause,  as  in  tree  and  seed. 

Ansivei'.  LTnconscious  production  would  not  explain  con- 
scious creatures.  Effect  cannot  surpass  cause;  life  and  organ- 
ism explain  seeming  departure  from  rule.  Tree  not  superior 
to  its  complete  cause. 

N.  Physical  order  or  design.  Mill,  Lange,  MallocJc.  Boed- 
der,  pp.  165-182. 

Mill:  1.  Mechanism  of  eye  explained  by  survival  of  fittest, 
by  chance,  exclusive  of  finality. 

Answer.  This  is  only  pushing  the  difficulty  back.  Self-con- 
structing machine  calls  for  even  higher  intelligence.  Same  as 
old  theory,  fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms,  and  this  calls  for  in- 
telligence. 

2.  Paley's  watch  gets  motion  from  without.  Organisms  are 
different,  and  get  motion  from  within. 

Answer.  Same  as  the  old  theory,  anima  mundi,  and  this  calls 
for  an  outside  cause,  self-existent.  Monism  and  pantheism  are 
wrong.     Dualism  is  right,  God  and  the  world. 

3.  Omnipotence  needs  no  design.     It  can  use  any  means. 
Answer.     It  cannot  use  intrinsically  impossible  means.     By 

absolute  power  it  can  use  any  meana,  not  by  ordinajy  power, 
and  it  can  freely  use  either. 

Lange:     1.  Clumsy  providence,  great  waste  of  organisms. 

Answer.  Bread  and  eggs  no  waste  when  meal  for  the  phi- 
losophers, and  yet  seeds  are  destroyed  in  their  making.  A  best 
world  is  impossible,  except  in  relative  sense.  God's  absolutely 
last  purpose  is  His  own  extrinsic  glory.  His  relatively  last 
purpose  is  the  happiness  of  mankind.  He  chooses  and  uses 
best  means  for  this  twofold  purpose. 

Mallock:     1.  God  misses  bull's-eye  ofteuer  than  He  hits  it. 


THESIS  I  227 

Answer.  It  all  depends  on  what  the  bull's-eye  is.  If  it  is 
the  maturity  of  all  seeds,  yes ;  if  it  is  His  glory,  no. 

0.  In  general,  Darwin.     Boedder,  pp.  182-200. 

According  to  his  son  Francis,  Darwin  never  denied  the  exist- 
ence of  God.  He  first  lost  faith  in  the  gospels,  then  faith  in 
God.  He  was  a  non-aggressive  agnostic.  He  has  three  objec- 
tions to  argument  from  design: 

1.  There  is  no  more  design  in  organisms  than  in  course  the 
wind  blows.  All  adaptation  in  nature  cannot  be  referred  to 
creative  design.  Instances,  rocks  from  precipice  to  form  house, 
change  of  rock-pigeons  into  fantails,  innocent  man  struck  by 
lightning,  swallow  devouring  gnat. 

Answer.  Every  effect  in  creation  was  foreseen  by  one  act  of 
the  mind,  and  at  the  same  time  ordained. 

2.  Rudimentary  organs  serve  no  purpose. 

Answer.  Man  need  not  know  purpose;  angels  perhaps  know. 
Clown  visiting  artist's  workshop  and  amazed  at  utensils.  St. 
Augustine  has  fine  passage  on  this  subject.  A  surprised  fly  on 
the  top  of  Liberty  Statue.  Many  assignable  purposes,  balance 
of  organism,  excretions  removing  material  from  blood. 

3.  Suffering  in  sentient  beings,  without  purpose.  Men  and 
animals.     Bacilli  in  human  organism,  cat  teasing  mouse. 

Answer.  Not  for  suffering's  sake;  God  is  not  cruel  or  wan- 
ton. Some  higher  purpose,  patience,  precautions  for  health. 
Natural  Selection  regulates  things  for  Darwin,  but  Natural 
Selection  calls  for  intelligence  in  Creator. 

4.  Different  opinions  about  God. 

Answer.     About  qualities,  I  grant;  about  existence,  I  deny. 

5.  Origin  of  things  an  insoluble  mystery.     Ergo  agnostic. 
Answer.     He  grants  premisses  and  connection,  but  refuses 

conclusion.     That  is  skepticism. 

6.  Mind  sprung  from  amoeba  cannot  solve  problem. 
Answer.     This  is  false  humility.     The  mind  is  spiritual,  the 

work  of  creation,  and  sprung  from  no  amoeba.  Darwin  finishes 
thus :  "  I  have  had  no  practice  in  abstract  reasoning,  and  I 
may  be  all  astray." 

P.  Pantheism  —  Spinoza,  Ficlite,  Hegel.  Boedder,  pp.  200- 
209. 

1.  Spinoza.     Whole  system  based  on  definition  of  substance. 


228  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

"  That  which  is  in  itself,  and  is  conceived  by  itself  alone,  that 
is  to  say,  that  of  which  the  concept  can  be  formed  without  in- 
volving any  other  concept." 

Answer.  Definition  is  ambiguous.  It  can  mean  a  complete 
individual  physical  being,  as  distinguished  from  its  properties 
and  accidents,  and  this  is  correct;  or  self-existent  being,  inde- 
pendent of  every  other  being  as  subject  of  inhesion  or  produc- 
ing cause,  and  this  is  pantheistic  and  wrong.  Taken  the  sec- 
ond way,  tliere  is  only  one  substance,  God ;  taken  the  first  way, 
there  are  many  substances. 

2.  Fichte:  The  Ego  is  all  reality  or  God.  Knowledge  of 
existences  separated  from  the  Ego  impossible.  This  feature  of 
theory  was  suggested  by  Kant's  doctrine  about  the  speculative 
reason's  inability  to  have  certainty  regarding  the  objectivity  of 
things.  The  most  expeditious  w^ay  to  solve  the  difficulty  was 
to  remove  the  object  altogether,  and  make  the  world  one  infinite 
subject,  God.  God,  therefore,  is  all,  and  we  are  but  modes  and 
accidents  of  God.  The  most  expeditious  w^ay  to  cure  pain,  is 
to  kill  the  patient.  Fichte  could  find  no  bridge  to  carry  him 
from  real  subject  to  real  object.  If  he  sat  down  and  thought 
hard  of  the  reality  of  his  opponents,  the  process  might  prove  a 
help. 

3.  Hegel  took  the  other  alternative  and  did  away  with  the 
subject.  With  him  God  and  Idea  are  one.  This  is  to  say  that 
Being  and  Idea  are  one.  The  statement  is  true  of  God  alone, 
not  of  men.  In  God,  because  of  His  simple  essence,  being  and 
idea  are  one.  Everything  in  God  is  one.  His  divine  essence. 
With  Hegel  the  universal  alone  is  real,  the  singular  is  unreal; 
and  this  theory  dates  back  to  Plato.  He  confounds  things  as 
they  are  in  themselves  with  things  as  they  exist  in  our  minds. 
Of  course  the  concept  of  being  in  general  embraces  all,  God  and 
creatures.  But  no  concrete  reality  corresponds  to  such  concept. 
It  is  a  logical  being,  with  mere  foundation  in  fact.  In  Hegel's 
theory  all  men  would  be  one  man,  and  a  single  death  would  be 
the  race's  destruction. 

N.B.     Monists  are  atheists,  because  their  god  is  no  God  at 

aU. 

Q.  Aristotle  and  necessity  of  eternal  motion,  or  an  eternal 

world.     Boedder,  pp.  209-214. 
Aristotle  admitted  God,  but  had  no  idea  of  creation  or  pro-. 


THESIS  I  229 

ductioii  from  nothing.     Hence  his  mistake.     He  has  three  ar- 
guments to  prove  the  world  eternal : 

1.  A  thing  to  be  changed  must  exist,  and  a  thing  to  exist  must 
be  changed.     Ergo,  eternal  change. 

Answer.  World  comes  of  creation,  production  from  nothing, 
and  this  entails  no  real  change. 

2.  Time  means  motion,  and  time  had  no  beginning.  Ergo, 
motion  is  eternal. 

Answer.  Aristotle  mixes  time  with  duration.  There  are 
two  kinds  of  duration,  time  and  eternity.  Time  means  succes- 
sion and  has  beginning.  Eternity  means  no  succession,  and 
has  no  beginning.  Aristotle  urges  and  says,  before  the  first 
moment  of  time  there  was  no  time.  But  the  word  before  means 
time  before  the  first  moment.  Ergo,  the  very  expression  means 
that  time  had  no  beginning. 

Answer.  The  word  before  is  said  of  imaginary  time,  it  is  a 
help  to  language;  or  it  may  refer  to  eternal  duration  preceding 
time.  Kant  uses  same  argument  to  prove  the  world  eternal. 
Empty  time  is  impossible;  and,  unless  the  world  exists  from 
eternity,  there  would  be  empty  time  preceding  its  creation. 

Answer.  Empty  time  is  impossible,  it  is  no  time.  Eeal  time 
began  with  the  created  world.  Eternity  alone  existed  before 
that. 

3.  Motion  is  from  God.  God  is  unchangeable.  Ergo  mo- 
tion is  eternal. 

Answer.  God  is  free.  His  creative  act  is  eternal,  its  effect 
appeared  in  course  of  time.  Like  king's  decrees.  They  are 
made  to-day,  go  into  effect  next  year.  Cousin  urges  a  similar 
difficulty;  God  had  to  create  from  eternity  or  not  at  all.  Ergo, 
world  eternal. 

Answer.  He  chose  freely  to  create  from  eternity  and  have 
effects  appear  in  time.  God  is  essentially  a  cause,  only  inas- 
much as  He  can  cause,  not  inasmuch  as  He  actually  causes. 
He  is  a  cause  by  extrinsic  denomination  when  His  effects  ap- 
pear.    King  and  law,  above. 

R.  Dean  Mansel  —  Limits  of  Religious  Thought.  Eight  lec- 
tures at  Oxford.     Boedder,  pp.  214-232. 

His  conclusion,  difficulties  are  insuperable,  but  only  subjec- 
tive, not  objective.  Faith  in  Christ  is  enough.  Spencer  calls 
this  eternal  war  between  our  mental  faculties  and  moral  obli- 


230  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

gations,  the   radical  vice  of  religion.     Here  are   Hansel's  in- 
superable difficulties : 

1.  The  absolute  and  infinite  being  must  contain  all  finite  per- 
fections and  imperfections,  all  evil  possible  and  actual. 

Answer.  Created  perfections  are  in  God  not  formally,  but 
eminently,  stripped  of  their  imperfection.  Privation,  like  evil, 
is  not  in  God  at  all.  Beauty  is  not  lessened  by  its  representa- 
tion in  wood,  metal,  stone;  God  is  not  lessened  by  creatures, 
imperfect  representations  of  Him. 

2.  The  absolute  being  cannot  be  a  cause,  which  says  relation 
to  an  effect.  It  cannot  be  infinite  because  of  the  added  per- 
fection accruing  from  new  relation. 

Answer.  A  free  cause  like  God  says  no  real  relation.  Ef- 
fects work  no  change  in  God.  All  the  change  is  extrinsic  to 
God.  He  is  cause  from  eternity,  His  effects  are  in  time.  God 
is  His  thought,  not  merely  the  cause  of  His  thought.  There 
are  no  accidents  in  God,  nothing  but  substance. 

3.  Consciousness  destroys  the  absolute.  It  is  relative,  say- 
ing subject  and  object. 

Answer.  That  is  hardly  true  of  our  own  consciousness,  much 
less  of  God's.  In  God's  knowledge  subject  and  object  are  not 
distinct.  Even  in  our  own  case,  consciousness  can  have  self 
for  object.  Subject  and  object  are  necessarily  distinct  only  in 
sensible  knowledge,  not  in  intellectual  knowledge. 

4.  God's  attributes  are  opposed  to  His  simplicity. 
Answer.     His  essence,  in  virtue  of  its  self-existence,  contains 

without  division  and  composition,  equivalently  and  superemi- 
nently all  conceivable  perfections. 

5.  He  is  omnipotent,  and  yet  unable  to  do  evil. 

Answer.  Evil  as  such  is  a  privation,  and  no  reality.  God 
cannot  start  to  do  something  and  do  nothing.  He  is  the  cause 
per  accidens  of  evil,  inasmuch  as  He  is  the  cause  per  se  of  what- 
ever physical  reality  attaches  to  moral  evil. 

6.  God's  wisdom  and  freedom  are  irreconcilable. 

Answer.  His  decrees  are  from  eternity,  and  as  free  as  they 
are  eternal.  There  is  a  difference  between  necessarily  or  in- 
fallibly knowing  and  knowing  with  necessity. 

7.  God  cannot  be  a  personal  being,  because  personality  is  a 
limitation  and  a  relation. 

Answer.     Personality  is  subsistence  of  an  intelligent  nature. 


THESIS  I  231 

Subsistence  means  the  existence  of  a  natural  whole,  as  distin- 
guished from  the  existence  of  the  component  parts  of  a  natural 
whole.  Arm  and  the  body  are  examples  of  non-subsistent  be- 
ings. The  soul  enjoys  incomplete  subsistence.  The  whole  man 
is  a  subsistence.  Our  notion  of  personality  involves  no  idea  of 
relation  or  limitation.  Personality  is  not  consciousness,  though 
it  implies  consciousness.  Besides,  consciousness  does  not  neces- 
sarily imply  difference  between  subject  and  object.  In  psycho- 
logical reflection  subject  and  object  are  same. 

S.  Ingersoll,  the  American  Agnostic. 

Agnosticism  in  this  country  had  an  able  defender  in  the  per- 
son of  Col.  Eobert  G.  Ingersoll,  who  two  or  three  decades  ago 
traveled  from  city  to  city,  delivering  lectures  with  the  avowed 
purpose  of  shaking  belief  in  the  existence  of  God.  He  ac- 
quainted the  world  with  no  new  information,  serving  up  only 
the  age-old  difficulties  answered  time  and  time  again.  But  he 
was  a  speaker  of  remarkable  skill,  able  to  garnish  his  lies  with 
all  the  graces  of  eloquence ;  and  religious  error,  never  without 
its  charms  for  the  wicked,  borrowed  new  attractiveness  from 
its  advocate's  smooth  diction,  splendid  imagery  and  rhetorical 
cunning.  At  the  height  of  his  success  he  ventured  an  article 
in  the  North  American  Review  of  December,  1889.  It  was 
entitled,  "  Why  Am  I  an  Agnostic  ?  "  and  can  be  considered  a 
fair  specimen  of  his  methods.  We  purpose  a  running  commen- 
tary on  the  article,  quoting  him  verbatim,  and  answering  as 
circumstances  require. 

"  The  cruelties  of  a  supposed  Deity  " —  Can  we  account  for 
the  cruelty  of  the  judge,  who  condemns  the  murderer  to  death 
by  hanging;  for  the  cruelty  of  the  king,  who  throws  into  prison 
the  wretch  presumptuous  enough  to  slap  him  in  the  face;  the 
cruelty  of  the  mother,  who  makes  the  flesh  of  her  boy  tingle 
for  some  misdeed  or  other ;  the  cruelty  of  the  farmer,  who  lines 
the  road  to  his  orchard  with  watchdogs;  the  cruelty  of  the  hus- 
band, who  looks  on  and  sees  his  wife  die;  the  cruelty  of  the 
railroad  director,  who  sits  in  his  ofiice  and  reads  of  lives  cut 
down  by  his  locomotive;  the  cruelty  of  the  surgeon,  who  lances 
the  wound  to  effect  a  cure,  who  lops  off  an  arm  to  keep  the 
heart  going?  We  can;  and  it  is  no  harder  to  account  for  the 
cruelties  of  a  supposed  Deity. 

"Why?  why??  why???"     Because  He  knew  that  sufferings 


232  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

patiently  endured  in  this  life  for  His  sweet  sake,  are  pledges 
of  eternal  felicity,  and  that  Heaven  is  the  reward  of  only  he- 
roic sacrifices;  and  because  He  knew  that  timely  chastening  is 
most  salutary  medicine,  and  that  briars  scattered  over  some 
paths  liave  led  tlie  travelers  to  pastures,  from  which  roses 
would  have  diverted  them ;  and  because  He  knows  that  eternity 
will  furnish  ample  time  for  the  adjustment  of  differences,  and 
the  renewal  of  the  quality  of  justice  between  destroyers  of  souls 
and  of  bodies  and  their  victims;  because  of  innumerable  other 
reasons,  which  will  occur  in  myriads  to  the  mind  of  him,  who 
sits  down  and  consults  his  own  heart  and  his  own  unbiassed 
judgment. 

"  The  man  who  knows  the  limitations  of  the  human  mind," 
is  no  Agnostic,  unless  the  word  has  changed  its  meaning.  In 
sooth  he  is  more  gnostic  or  knowing  than  ordinary  men,  for 
whom  the  terms,  Creator,  Preserver,  Providence,  have  not  lost 
all  meaning.  The  man  who  fails  of  ascertaining  first  or  final 
causes,  of  comprehending  the  supernatural,  or  of  conceiving  of 
an  infinite  personality,  so  far  from  knowing  the  limitations  of 
the  human  mind,  is  ignorant  of  its  most  elementary  capabilities. 
The  Agnostic  can  give  no  value  to  human  testimony,  as  he  can, 
if  logical,  give  no  value  to  the  testimony  of  intrinsic  evidence 
itself.  As  soon  as  he  gives  any  value  whatever  to  one  or  the 
other,  no  matter  how  insignificant,  he  ceases  to  be  an  Agnostic. 

The  conclusions  to  which  a  mind  comes  do  not  make  or 
change  the  objective  realities,  which  form  the  basis  of  the  con- 
clusion. The  judgment  a  man  forms  can  be  tainted  with  pre- 
judices and  ignorance;  but  such  judgments,  as  well  as  tliose 
free  from  all  taint,  in  nowise  create  or  modify  the  realities  in 
themselves,  which  exist  before  and  after  all  human  judgments 
with  precisely  the  same  characteristics.  God's  existence  does 
not  depend  on  the  fact  that  mankind  universally  recognizes  it, 
but  this  recognition  depends  on  the  fact  that  God  exists.  God's 
existence  is  the  foundation,  its  recognition  is  the  house.  This 
universal  recognition  would  in  other  words  be  impossible,  un- 
less God  in  reality  existed.  However,  under  given  conditions, 
such  for  instance  as  had  place  before  the  creation  of  man,  God 
could  have  existed  and  been  entirely  independent  of  all  outside 
recognition.  Even  now,  though  it  is  impossible  for  Him  to 
exist  without  a  definite  relation  to  man's  recognition,  this  rela- 


THESIS  I  233 

tion  is  not  that  of  dependence;  it  is  not  the  relation  between 
man's  knowledge  of  God's  existence  and  that  existence  itself. 

It  does  occur  to  man  that  it  is  necessary  to  account  for  the 
existence  of  an  infinite  personality.  In  the  opinion  that  there 
can  be  a  designer,  who  was  not  designed,  there  is  no  absurdity 
whatever,  if  absurdity  means  a  contradiction  in  terms.  Man 
does  not  take  it  for  granted  that  matter  was  created  and  that 
its  Creator  was  not.  He  does  not  assume  that  a  Creator  ex- 
isted from  eternity  without  cause,  and  created  what  is  called 
matter  out  of  nothing.  Man,  or  at  least  man  as  a  thinking 
animal,  assumes  nothing,  takes  nothing  for  granted  in  this 
matter,  but  what  Ingersoll  himself  and  men  with  a  grain  of 
common  sense  assume  and  take  for  granted.  In  our  thesis  on 
Creation  we  proved  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  thoughtful  that 
matter  was  created,  and  that  its  Creator  was  not.  We  proved 
too,  and  later  on  will  more  explicitly  prove,  that  this  Creator 
existed  from  eternity  without  cause,  and  that  He  created  what 
is  called  matter  out  of  nothing. 

"  How  could  such  a  being  be  intelligent  ?  "  He  Himself,  or 
His  unfathomable  essence  contained  subjects  enough,  and  more 
than  enough  for  thought.     He  could  know  Himself. 

"  How  could  such  a  being  be  powerful  ?  "  Suppose  that  a 
giant  never  struck  a  blow,  never  lifted  a  pin  from  the  ground, 
never  once  exerted  the  mighty  force  within  him  on  outside 
objects,  would  he  therefore  cease  to  be  powerful?  His  essence 
was  from  the  beginning,  to  suggest  an  idea  and  a  multitude  of 
ideas.  What  would  be  the  consequence,  if  relations  did  not 
exist  in  the  sense  in  which  Ingersoll  understands  them?  In- 
gersoll's  mind  is  so  that  it  can  conceive  aright  of  very  little  in 
matters  of  a  higher  order,  and  nature  has  its  Maker  to  thank 
that  in  the  present  state  of  things  matters  depend  very  little 
on  Ingersoll's  understanding  or  misunderstanding  them;  and 
the  sooner  he  wakes  up  to  the  full  force  of  this  little  truth,  the 
better. 

After  all  the  works  written  on  the  subject,  only  ignorant 
stupidity  can  confound  creation  with  production  without  an 
eflBcient  cause.  Nobody  can  conceive  of  production  destitute 
of  both  material  and  efficient  cause;  but  production  without  a 
material  cause  only,  is  easy  enough  of  conception.  We  postu- 
late nothing  in  this  matter.     We  have  already  proved  the  ex- 


234  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

istence  of  God,  and  He  can  well  be  efficient  cause  of  creation. 

"  "We  cannot  conceive  of  the  destruction  of  substance."  His 
reason  for  this  assertion  is  threadbare  and  worthless,  upset  time 
and  time  again.  His  persistence  in  clinging  to  all  such  worn 
out  and  long  exploded  notions,  is  only  another  proof  that  In- 
gersoll  is  either  ver}'  ignorant  as  far  as  acquaintance  with  books 
is  concerned,  or  very  insincere.  We  cannot  conceive  of  the  de- 
struction of  substance,  forsooth,  because  we  never  saw  it  de- 
stroyed, nor  otherwise  experienced  a  sensation  tallying  with  its 
destruction.  We  could  not,  for  precisely  this  same  reason,  con- 
ceive of  substance  as  it  exists.  We  see  and  touch  only  acci- 
dents. Yet  IngersoU  must  feel  sure  that  he  has  come  to  the 
knowledge  of  or  conceived  substance,  as  it  exists.  He  cannot, 
however,  he  complains,  conceive  of  substance  destroyed  or  an- 
nihilated. The  indestructible  certainly  cannot  be  created ;  but 
outside  of  God  everything  is  destructible,  and  therefore  admits 
of  creation. 

"  These  questions  should  be  answered  by  every  one," —  not 
according  to  the  structure  of  his  mind,  but  according  to  the 
truth,  according  to  the  facts  before  him  and  visible  to  him. 

"  In  the  realm  of  thought  majorities  do  not  determine "  for 
the  wise;  but  they  generally  have  the  truth  on  their  side.  The 
flagman  at  a  street-crossing  does  not  determine  the  certain  ap- 
proach of  the  train ;  but  it  is  highly  dangerous  to  cross  the 
tracks,  when  he  signals  you  back.  A  gathering  of  clouds  in 
the  sky  does  not  necessarily  determine  a  downfall  of  rain;  but 
when  the  clouds  huddle  together,  it  is  imprudent  to  fare  forth 
attended  by  a  high  silk  hat,  without  a  rainstick  or  some  such 
protection. 

"  Each  brain  is  a  kingdom,  each  mind  is  a  sovereign,"  but 
some  brains  are  kingdoms  blessed  with  anarchy,  some  minds 
are  dethroned  and  puling  sovereigns.  The  universality  of  a 
belief  tends  always  to  prove  its  truth.  In  certain  circumstances, 
as  in  this  question  of  God's  existence,  it  absolutely  proves  its 
truth.  Belief  in  God  and  belief  in  the  devil  were  produced  by 
neither  ignorance,  nor  fear,  nor  selfishness.  It  is  a  fact  of 
history  that  the  most  ignorant  nations  have  been  the  least  re- 
ligious, and  that  the  most  fearless  and  most  magnanimous  peo- 
ples have  been  most  steadfast  and  consistent  in  holding  to  the 
notion  of  a  divinity.     Old  Greece  and  old  Rome  are  certainly 


THESIS  I  235 

far  from  being  open  to  the  reproach  of  ignorance,  cowardice 
and  selfishness.  But  old  Greece  and  old  Kome  were  in  the  days 
of  their  primal  vigor  devout  servants  of  the  beings,  unworthily 
of  course  regarded  as  gods,  and  their  splendor  faded  away  only 
when  this  piety  lost  its  hold  on  the  races,  and  they  strove  to 
forget  God.  Agnosticism  is  the  fatal  fruit  of  supine  ig- 
norance, of  unmanly  fear,  and  narrow  selfishness. 

The  savage  would  not  have  invariably  fallen  prostrate,  and 
called  on  the  Unknown,  unless  the  Unknown  were  made  fa- 
miliar to  him  by  the  promptings  of  nature,  an  unerring  guide 
on  occasions.  This  saving  lesson  of  nature  could  not  be  lost, 
but  through  the  long  night  of  savagery  it  grew  brighter  and 
stronger,  till  to-day  there  is  no  conviction  more  widespread, 
more  firmly  rooted.  The  undimmed  lustre  and  unfllagging 
strength  of  this  lesson  are  sufficiently  accounted  for  by  the  fact 
that,  though  dispositions,  and  customs,  and  prejudices,  and 
fears,  and  ignorance  can  all  undergo  changes,  man's  nature  and 
its  fundamental  teachings  are  immutable,  and  undergo  none  of 
the  vicissitudes  of  time.  The  savage's  heart  told  him,  more 
plainly  than  did  his  eyes  reveal  colors,  that  by  his  actions  he 
could  offend  and  displease  this  Unseen,  but  well  understood 
Being.  He  took  every  care  to  propitiate  God,  and  call  down 
God's  blessings.  To-day  our  patriotic  fellow-citizens  rear  en- 
during shafts  to  Lee,  Grant,  and  hosts  of  others,  who  deserved 
well  of  their  countrymen.  Even  so  the  savage,  untutored  save 
by  nature,  hewed  out  of  stone  or  wood  what  he  conceived  to  be 
an  image  of  this  unseen  being,  and  set  it  up  in  some  conspicu- 
ous place,  where  it  would  minister  unto  holy  thoughts.  If 
some  minds  among  them  were  gross  enough  to  confound  the 
deity  himself  with  these  images,  they  belonged  to  idolaters,  and 
fell  victims  to  an  ignorance  almost  as  excusable  as  that  which 
prompts  the  reiterated  nonsense  of  misguided  Protestants,  touch- 
ing Catholicity's  reverence  for  images,  relics  and  other  objects 
of  devotion. 

Integrity  of  life,  the  savage  felt,  was  a  bond  of  union  be- 
tween Heaven  and  earth,  and  the  virtuous  or  the  priests  had 
characteristics  that  endeared  them  to  God,  and  served  as  claims 
for  more  intimate  and  friendly  intercourse  with  the  Sovereign 
Lord  of  all.  Xowadays  impulse  teaches  the  most  cultured  and 
the   most   unsophisticated   alike,   that  a  favor  is   most  readily 


236  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

obtained  from  the  great  through  the  intercession  of  a  friend. 
The  god  represented  rudely  in  stone  did  not  answer  prayers 
and  protect  his  worshippers  of  old,  precisely  as  our  God  to-day 
seems  not  to  answer  prayers,  seems  not  to  protect  His  wor- 
shipers. The  prudent  mother  descends  not  to  the  silliness  of 
complying  with  her  hopeful's  every  request.  No  miracles  were 
ever  wrought  by  idols  of  stone,  but  miracles  of  the  Christian 
era  'are  plentiful  part  and  parcel  of  the  world's  history.  Some 
eyes  are  so  that,  let  their  owners  tiy  as  they  will,  they  can 
never  see  blue  otherwise  than  as  green;  some  heads  are  so  that 
an  abundant  crop  of  hair  nevermore  will  grace  them.  Asses, 
they  say,  can  be  made  enjoy  a  meal  of  shavings  by  adjusting 
spectacles  of  the  proper  hue.  Even  so,  Ingersoll's  mind  is  so 
that  it  is  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  substance  is  eternal,  that 
the  universe  was  without  beginning  and  will  be  without  end, 
that  the  substance  of  things  is  from  eternity  to  eternity.  Con- 
stellations will  of  a  surety  fade,  but  not  from  the  infinite 
spaces.  The  mind  capable  of  grasping  infinite  spaces,  should 
find  little  difficulty,  it  seems,  conceiving  an  infinite  being,  or 
God.  Yes,  the'  questions  of  origin  and  destiny  seem  to  be  be- 
yond the  powers  of  the  human  mind,  often  alas!  only  because 
the  owner  of  the  mind  is  too  lazy  and  too  dishonest  to  tax  the 
mind's  powers  to  their  fullest.  I  have  fallen  in  with  many  a 
dull  boy,  far  beyond  the  powers  of  whose  mind  the  open 
mysteries  of  algebra  seemed  to  be  placed. 

Love  of  parents  and  reverence  for  ancestors  are  motives  not 
to  be  spurned  in  choice  of  an  opinion  or  dogma.  But  they 
are  not  the  real  groundwork  of  a  philosopher 's  certainty  about 
the  existence  of  God.  The.  fact  that  they  persuade  or  urge  to 
the  belief  should  not  certainly  be  taken  for  proof  conclusive 
that  the  belief  itself  is  to  be  departed  from.  Li  fact  the  weight 
of  authority  is  on  its  side,  and  the  mother's  creed  should  not 
be  departed  from  until  satisfactorily  proved  false.  But  Ag- 
nostics and  Free-thinkers  are  assuming  a  large  contract,  when 
they  undertake  so  to  illumine  mankind  as  to  make  evident  the 
falseness  and  hollowness,  they  fancy  existing  in  our  certainty 
about  the  reality  of  God.  I  do  not  believe  in  the  existence  of 
God,  because  my  mother  and  father  believed  in  it  before  me; 
but  because  my  own  individual  reason  teaches  me  that  such 
belief  alone  is  pro])er  and  justified  by  events  about  and  around 


THESIS  I  237 

me.  There  can  be  in  religion  many  sorts  of  progress;  but  in 
point  of  dogma  there  can  be  no  progress.  The  one  religion  in 
Adam's  time  and  the  time  of  the  apostles,  was  dogmatically  as 
perfect  and  as  true  as  it  is  to-day,  and  as  it  will  be  at  the  end 
of  all  time.  The  one  true  religion  can  be  more  and  more  widely 
spread,  and  can  claim,  as  the  years  roll  on,  more  and  more 
subjects;  our  knowledge  of  its  dogmas  can  grow,  can  pass  from 
implicit  to  explicit;  but  it  was  at  the  very  origin  of  the  race 
as  pure  and  as  perfect  and  as  true  as  it  will  ever  be.  There 
may  be  progress  in  science,  there  may  be  progress  in  astronomy, 
geology,  philosophy;  but  in  religions  progress  as  such  is  im- 
possible. 

The  Christian  is  sure  that  Mahomet  was  an  impostor,  not 
simply  because  the  people  of  Mecca  declared  him  no  prophet, 
but  from  signs  also  that  to  any  student  of  history  are  far  more 
unerring  and  unmistakable.  Besides,  the  confession  of  the  peo- 
ple of  Mecca  with  regard  to  their  leader  and  prophet,  would 
have  more  weight  in  any  court  of  justice  than  the  denial  of 
Christ's  Messiahship  by  Israel,  whose  sceptre  and  sway  Christ 
came  to  abolish. 

The  seven  articles  taught  a  man  are  not  rolled  up  and 
crammed  down  his  throat;  but  they  are  proposed  to  his  con- 
sideration, and,  unless  reason  has  deserted  him,  he  accepts 
them;  and,  without  a  sigh  of  hesitancy,  though  they  entail  upon 
him  severe  sacrifices  and  trials,  he  makes  them  the  pole-star  of 
his  pilgrimage. 

If  the  average  man  seems  to  Ingersoll  to  merely  feel,  it  is 
because  the  truth  of  God's  existence  is  so  patent  and  so  im- 
bedded in  our  very  nature,  that  reason  accomplishes  its  work 
with  all  the  ease  and  facility  commonly  observed  in  operations 
of  the  feelings. 

There  are  unmistakable  signs,  by  which  the  average  man  can 
settle  for  himself  whether  his  God  is  the  true  God  or  not; 
whether  the  will  of  the  true  God  is  contained  in  his  version  of 
the  Holy  Scriptures  or  not;  whether  the  only  true  Church  is 
the  one  to  which  he  belongs  or  not.  There  is  no  reason  what- 
ever why  the  average  man  should  spend  a  single  day  in  un- 
certainty on  these  several  points.  Notice  what  a  falling  away 
from  his  first  position  is  evident  in  the  stand  here  taken  by 
the  Agnostic.     He  started  out  hymning  the  impossibility  we 


238  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

are  under  of  ever  arriving,'  at  certainty  about  God's  existence. 
The  question  is  now  not  about  God's  existence,  which  no  longer 
seems  to  be  disputed,  but  about  the  existence  and  elioice  of  the 
true  religion. 

Multiplicity  and  variety  of  religion  are  no  argument  against 
the  existence  of  God.  On  the  contrary,  they  are  a  weighty 
element  in  the  group  of  proofs  adduced  by  the  Theist  against 
the  Atheist.  If  the  average  Christian  had  been  born  in  Turkey, 
he  would  not  have  been  a  Mohammedan,  unless  he  willfully 
closed  his  eyes  to  the  light,  and  locked  his  mind  to  the  entrance 
of  all  thoughts  in  unison  with  reason.  To  escape  the  gross 
error  of  ^Mohammedanism,  he  would  not  have  had  to  read  con- 
troversial works,  or  peruse  tracts  spread  broadcast.  He  would 
have  had  simply  to  sit  down  and  seriously  think  the  matter 
over.  God  has  not  left  His  creatures  entirely  to  their  veriest 
whims  and  vagaries  in  choice  of  religion.  He  has  endowed 
reason  with  a  sort  of  instinct,  which,  unless  unduly  tampered 
with,  weakened  or  annihilated,  is  unexceptionably  sure  to  lead 
man  to  the  proper  knowledge  of  his  Creator,  and  of  the  service 
most  pleasing  to  Him.  If  the  average  man  believes  implicitly 
in  the  religion  of  his  country,  because  he  knows  nothing  of  any 
other,  and  -has  no  desire  to  know,  the  fact  is  no  necessity  im- 
posed upon  him  by  nature;  but  is  due  to  either  his  intellectual 
inactivity  or  incapability.  The  true  religion  courts  examina- 
tion, and  her  deepest  and  firmest  believers  are  those  who  have 
investigated  other  creeds,  -and  come  away  with  an  utter  disgust 
for  their  hollowness  and  wretchedness. 

It  is  unparliamentary  and  unkind  to  accuse  anybody,  no 
matter  how  misguided  he  may  be,  of  deliberately  telling  a  lie. 
But  misunderstanding  hardly  does  justice  to  tiie  wide  depar- 
ture from  the  truth,  evident  in  this  assertion  of  Ingersoll, 
"  Then  these  same  Christians  say  to  the  inhabitants  of  a  Chris- 
tian country.  You  must  not  examine,  you  must  not  investi- 
gate; but,  whether  you  examine  or  not,  you  must  believe,  or 
you  will  be  eternally  damned."  Christians  say.  If  the  result 
of  your  examination  is  refusal  to  believe,  and  you  live  up  .to  it, 
for  the  small  pains  taken  to  arrive  at  the  truth,  and  for  rejec- 
tion of  nature's  most  salutary  and  most  unequivocal  advice,  you 
will  be  eternally  damned.  The  right  to  examine  involves  the 
necessity  to  accept  and  reject,  not  to  accept  or  reject.     It  in- 


THESIS  I  239 

volves  the  necessity  to  accept  one  and  reject  every  other,  if  the 
examination  is  to  bear  any  fruit  at  all.  It  by  no  means  in- 
volves the  necessity  of  rejecting  all.  Else  it  would  be  a  futile 
endeavor  and  mere  waste  of  time  and  pains.  Christians  have 
examined,  and  their  search  has  not  been  without  result;  and 
they  have  freely  given  to  the  world  the  conclusions  attained  to. 
If  Christians  read  the  Koran  or  the  religious  writings  of  India 
and  China,  the  opinions  transmitted  to  them  by  their  ancestors, 
if  properly  transmitted,  would  undergo  no  change  whatever, 
except  perhaps  in  intensity  of  disgust  for  the  absurd  systems 
there  woven  together.  They  have  read  IngersoU  without  harm, 
and,  as  between  IngersoU  and  the  Koran,  the  Koran  has  fewer 
points  of  danger. 

Christians   are   more   rational   than   to  think   only   that   the 
true  religion,  which  succeeds  in  staying  volcanoes,  earthquakes, 
conflagrations.     God  has  designs  on  the  world,  with  which  He 
cannot,  as  it  were.  Himself  interfere,  and  the  will  of  vicious 
man  is  a  power  against  which  no  force  can  hold  its  own.     The 
real  God  looks  on  and  smiles  complacently  at  the  calamities 
that  befall  His  servants,  as  they  befell  Job,  because  He  knows 
what  a  weight  of  glory  the  sufferings  of  this  present  time  lay 
up  in  Heaven,  and  because  He  knows  full  well  that  the  pains 
of  this  life  are  as  nothing,  compared  with  the  joys  of  the  life 
to  come.     God   does  not  necessarily  favor  His   servants  here 
below,  because  eternity  is  the  more  proper  period  to  devote  to 
such  return  of  thanks.     This  is  rather  a  place  of  probation,  in 
which  the  patience,  and  love,  and  sacrifice  of  His  friends  are 
tested.     For  my  part,  I  never  feel  easy  when  the  current  of 
life  runs  smooth.     There  is  about  quiet  and  absence  of  trouble 
an  atmosphere  of  self-distrust,  of  dread  that  everything  is  not 
right,  and  that  God  has  perhaps  stricken  my  name  from  the 
roll  of  candidates  for  honor  and  conspicuous  service.     I  almost 
fancy  that  God  is  engaged  in  advancing  the  wages  of  past  ef- 
forts, and  making  payment  in  full  now  for  what  I  would  rather 
have  accumulate  interest  here,  and  be  handed  over  in  bulk  only 
in  Heaven.     The  prosperity  and  ill-luck  of  nations  alike  de- 
pend upon  the  providence  of  God;  but  neither  the  one  nor  the 
other  is  an  infallible  sign  of  His  pleasure  or  displeasure. 

Infidels  and  Agnostics  and  heretics  alone  have  neither  praise 
nor  blame  for  any  man,  no  matter  what  his  creed.     In  this 


240  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

point  at  least  they  are  true  to  themselves,  and  to  the  tenets 
they  adopt.  But  the  Catholic  who  has  truth,  and  who  is  con- 
scious that  he  alone  has  truth,  is  and  ever  will  be  at  war  with 
the  disseminators  of  false  and  pernicious  doctrines.  One  error 
can  live  at  peace  with  another  error,  it  can  crave  for  peace, 
when  truth  is  nigh.  But  trutli  can  never  lie  down  with  false- 
hood. Truth  is  essentially  pugnacious,  and  cannot,  without 
being  recreant  to  itself,  throw  do^vn  its  arms,  till  ever^-thing  is 
drawn  unto  it,  till  its  reign  is  absolutely  universal.  This  fact 
will  account  for  the  intolerance  of  Catholicity  and  the  dilly- 
dallyism  of  Protestantism.  This  fact  is  a  sufficient  reason  for 
Rome's  battle  cry  of,  iSTo  Compromise,  and  the  Pope's  refusal 
to  hear  of  half-measures  towards  reconciliation.  Truth  cannot 
be  reconciled  with  falsehood.  Sooner  will  the  earth  and  the 
sky  meet,  sooner  will  the  wolf  make  truce  with  the  lamb.  A 
creed  can  be  good,  no  matter  what  manner  of  man  professes 
it;  but  no  thoroughly  good  man  can  long  slave  to  an  essen- 
tially bad  creed.  "  The  brain  of  man  has  been  the  trysting- 
place  of  contradictions,"  but  truth  is  sure  to  always  win  before 
the  day  is  over.  "  Next  to  finding  truth,  the  greatest  honor 
must  be  won  in  honest  search  " ;  but  search  without  any  result 
but  falsehood  is  lamentable  indeed,  and  deserving  of  honor 
hardly  even  when  truth  is  impossible  as  a  result ;  when  such  re- 
sult is  impossible,  and  known  beforehand  to  be  impossible, 
search  is  pitiable  in  the  extreme,  as  waste  of  time  and  of  other- 
wise profitable  labor. 

Ingersoll  examined  the  religions  of  many  countries  and  the 
creeds  of  many  sects,  in  much  the  same  way  as  the  boy  who 
once  attempted  to  read  without  having  mastered  the  alpliabet. 
There  are  fundamental  ideas,  which  must  first  be  pondered  and 
appreciated,  before  an  examination  can  be  productive  of  proper 
conclusions.  One  of  these  fundamental  ideas,  to  which  he  is 
apparently  an  utter  stranger,  is  the  historical  fact  that  this 
earth  of  ours  is  accursed  of  God,  and  that  suffering  and  sorrow 
patiently  borne  are  the  coin,  with  which  the  Son  of  God  Him- 
self purchased  His  glorious  Resurrection,  with  which,  there- 
fore, we  Hi.s  brothers  by  adoption  are  to  purchase  Heaven. 
Ingersoll's  preference  for  Shakespeare  is  of  about  as  much 
value  with  men  of  sober  thought,  when  judgment  is  to  be 
passed  on  the  inspired  writers,  as  the  seven-year-old's  prefer- 


THESIS  I  241 

ence  for  Mother  Goose's  Melodies,  when  Judgmtnt  is  to  be 
passed  on  the  masterpieces  of  Homer,  Sophocles,  Demosthenes, 
Virgil,  Horace,  and  Cicero.  In  one  case  and  the  other  ig- 
norance accounts  for  the  perverseness  of  taste.  Humboldt, 
Darwin,  Laplace,  Huxley  and  Tyndall,  though  guilty  of  many 
gross  inaccuracies,  and  eaten  up  with  a  false  estimate  of  their 
abilities,  knew  more  about  science  than  any  knowledge  the 
writer  of  Genesis  betrays.  But  Moses  talked  and  wrote  to  be 
understood  by  the  men  of  his  time,  he  made  no  pretensions  to 
scientific  knowledge  of  a  later  date,  and,  in  communicating  his 
rude  notions  about  geology  and  astronomy,  is  nowise  worthy 
of  blame.  His  business  was  to  narrate  the  conduct  of  God 
with  His  people,  and,  in  knowledge  bearing  immediately  on  his 
subject,  he  was  incalculably  far  in  advance  of  the  modern 
thinkers,  who  out  of  inane  levity  laugh  at  him.  What  Moses 
intended  to  say  was  true.  In  matters  of  science  he  intended 
to  say  what  appeared  to  the  senses,  and  not  what  was  scienti- 
fically accurate.     We  ourselves  say  that  the  sun  rises  and  sets. 

"  We  believe  in  the  accumulation  of  intellectual  wealth," 
not  in  the  stowing  away  of  intellectual  garbage  and  trash.  We 
believe  in  the  intellectual  wealth,  which  has  the  true  ring  of 
genuine  gold,  which  has  truth  stamped  all  over  it,  which  frees 
men  from  fear,  and  makes  its  owners  light  and  buoyant  with 
the  spirit  of  the  liberty  of  the  children  of  God,  and  with  that 
exuberance  of  feeling  possible  to  only  a  deep,  and  solid,  and 
eternal  love  of  God.  Let  us  by  all  means  acknowledge  our 
ignorance,  when  the  subject  is  beyond  our  ken  or  the  sphere  of 
our  activity;  let  us  reverently  leave  to  God's  time  the  depths  of 
mysteries,  which  elude  our  weak  and  limited  reason.  But  let 
us  be  men  enough,  when  knowledge  entails  pain  and  sacrifice, 
that  can  be  shirked  by  a  profession  of  ignorance;  let  us  then, 
I  say,  be  men  enough  to  rise  up  and  say.  We  do  know. 


THESIS  II 

God  is  infinite,  altogether  simple,  and  essentially  one. 

Boedder,  pp.  85-109;  Jouin,  pp.  228-238. 

QUESTION 

In  our  first  thesis  we  proved  the  existence  of  God.  Unlike 
St.  Anselm,  we  kept  always  in  the  order  of  objective  reality. 
We  did  not  pass  from  an  abstract  notion  to  the  concrete  ex- 
istence of  a  being  represented  by  that  notion.  On  the  con- 
trary, we  began  with  the  concrete  realities  about  and  around 
us,  contingent  beings  in  the  universe,  and  deduced  from  these 
concrete  contingents  the  concrete  existence  of  a  concrete  cause, 
producing  them.  Himself  not  produced.  God  is,  therefore,  as 
real,  live  and  physical  a  being  as  His  effects.  He  is  no  mere 
notional  or  logical  reality,  or  abstraction  existent  in  the  mind 
alone,  with  no  claim  to  a  place  in  the  objective  order  of  things. 
He  is  the  First  Cause,  set  at  the  head  of  the  series,  terminating 
at  this  end  in  an  effect.  The  notion  effect  touches  Him  not. 
He  is  a  producer  merely,  the  cause  of  everything,  with  nobody 
and  nothing  outside  for  His  own  cause.  He  is  His  own  full 
explanation,  deriving  neither  His  being  nor  His  attributes  from 
aught  else.  He  is  the  one  being  a  se  in  the  universe.  Every- 
thing else  is  a  being  ab  alio.  These  expressions  a  se  and  ah 
alio,  interpreted,  mean  that,  whereas  God  is  the  absolutely  nec- 
essary being,  everything  else  is  contingent.  As  the  absolutely 
necessary  being,  actual  existence  attaches  to  His  person  in  much 
the  same  way  as  roundness  to  the  circle,  rationality  to  the  man. 
Actual  existence  is,  therefore,  of  His  very  essence,  it  is  as  im- 
possible to  think  God  non-existent  as  it  is  to  think  a  square 
circle.  It  is  quite  possible  to  think  everything  else  non-existent, 
because  actual  existence  is  a  favor  conferred  on  everything  else 
by  the  single  necessary  being,  God. 

We  come  now  to  the  attributes  of  God.     And  here  we  must 
remember  that  we  are  talking  after  the  manner  of  men.     At- 

242 


THESIS  II  243 

tributes  are  accidents,  and  in  strict  language  God  is  without 
accidents.  Accidents  connote  imperfection,  and  are  wholly  in- 
compatible with  necessary  being.  And  yet  the  imperfect  na- 
ture of  our  knowledge  constrains  us  to  hold  speech  of  God's 
attributes,  much  as  we  talk  of  His  eyes,  hands  and  ears.  God 
has  no  eyes,  hands  or  ears;  but  He  possesses  within  Himself 
whatever  perfection  these  several  organs  .secure  to  their  owners, 
without  the  limitations  attendant  on  sense-perception.  In  the 
same  way,  God  has  no  attributes,  and  yet  we  ascribe  to  Him 
whatever  perfection  attaches  to  simplicity,  unity,  immutability, 
eternity,  immensity,  wisdom,  justice,  pity  and  other  qualities. 
The  necessary  being  is  His  attributes.  Hence  in  exact  lan- 
guage God  is  wisdom,  is  justice,  and  mercy,  and  pity.  His  es- 
sence is  His  all,  and  everything  in  God  is  one.  Attributes  over- 
lap each  other  in  God.  Justice  and  mercy  are  one  and  the 
same  thing  in  God,  His  undivided  and  indivisible  essence, 
though  we  conceive  and  think  them  as  distinct  and  separate 
realities.  One  single  cause  can  be  the  root-principle  of  many 
different  effects,  and  God's  essence  can  display  itself  now  as 
wisdom,  now  as  justice,  now  as  mercy,  without  undergoing  any 
intrinsic  change  whatever.  Among  these  so-called  attributes  of 
God  we  reckon  some  fundamental,  others  accessory.  Their  re- 
spective importance  is  wholly  responsible  for  this  division.  The 
fundamentals  in  our  eyes  serve  as  basis  for  the  others,  and  the 
three  established  in  our  present  thesis  are  accounted  such.  To 
prove  whatever  other  attributes  of  God,  we  regularly  appeal  to 
His  infinity,  simplicity  and  oneness;  and  these  in  turn  are 
rooted  in  His  aseity  or  self-origination. 

TERMS 

God,  the  supreme  being  established  in  our  first  thesis;  the 
being  a  se,  with  self  for  single  origin ;  first  cause  of  everything ; 
creator  of  Heaven  and  earth;  infinitely  wise  and  holy,  and 
just;  the  artificer  of  creation;  the  rewarder  of  the  just,  and 
avenger  of  the  wicked;  man's  last  end;  the  universally  ac- 
knowledged Lord  and  Master  of  created  and  contingent  being. 
Infinite  wisdom,  holiness  and  justice  flow  as  corollaries  from 
our  first  thesis.  Here  we  intend  to  prove  God  infinite  in  every 
respect,  and  we  take  for  granted  only  what  we  already  proved. 


244  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

Infinite  —  This  word  can  prove  misleading,  because  of  the 
double  meaning  it  involves  in  Latin,  if  not  in  English.  In 
Latin  it  can  mean  unfinished,  incomplete,  a  thing  still  in  po- 
tency to  some  finish  or  perfection;  and  this  is  what  we  call 
infinite  in  privative  sense.  It  denotes  a  being  not  yet  in  posses- 
sion of  some  due  or  needed  perfection.  It  must  be  plain  that 
infinite  is  not  asserted  of  God  in  this  first  sense.  Infinity  of 
the  kind  is  imperfection,  and  imperfection  has  no  part  in  God. 
Infinite  can  likewise  mean  a  thing  that  has  no  end  or  limit; 
a  thing,  from  which  no  perfection  is  absent;  a  thing  so  perfect 
that  nothing  greater  can  be  conceived  or  thought;  and  this  is 
what  we  call  infinite  in  a  negative  sense,  or  in  positivo-nega- 
tive  sense.  God  is  infinite  after  this  second  manner.  His 
perfections  are  without  bound  and  limit.  He  is  so  great  that 
nothing  greater  can  be  conceived  or  thought. 

All-perfect  and  infinite  are  very  much  alike.  All-perfect, 
when  restricted  to  actually  existent  perfections,  falls  short  of 
the  infinite;  when  made  to  embrace  as  well  all  possible  perfec- 
tions, it  coincides  with  the  infinite.  Infinite  is  the  better  term, 
because  it  explicitly  removes  all  limits,  and  this  the  term,  all- 
perfect,  fails  to  do.  Infinite  is  part  negative,  part  positive. 
It  is  the  explicit  denial  of  all  limits,  all  imperfections,  and  the 
implicit  affirmation  of  all  actual  and  possible,  or  real  and  think- 
able perfections.  The  perfections  within  our  acquaintance  are 
of  many  different  kinds.  Of  these  some  are  simple  in  the  sense 
of  unmixed,  and  embody  in  ttheir  concept  no  suspicion  of  im- 
perfection ;  others  are  mixed,  and  involve  in  their  very  essence 
a  touch  of  imperfection.  Fair  examples  of  the  two  are  wisdom 
and  science,  or  knowledge  gotten  by  intuition  and  knowledge 
gotten  by  the  roundabout  and  laborious  process  of  reasoning. 
In  common  with  all  perfections  these  two  exist  in  God.  Sci- 
ence is  as  much  His  possession  as  wisdom.  And  yet  science  is 
an  imperfect  perfection;  and,  to  do  God  no  offense,  we  must 
maintain  that  science  exists  in  Him  quite  otherwise  than  as 
wisdom  exists  in  Him.  Other  examples  of  mixed  perfections 
are  quantity  and  courage.  Quantity  is  essentially  finite  and 
connotes  parts;  courage  postulates  an  element  of  danger  for  its 
owner. 

Simple  perfections  are  predicated  of  God  one  way;  mixed 
perfections,     another.     We    distinguish    three    possible     ways, 


THESIS  II  245 

formally,  eminently,  virtually.     A  perfection  is  formally  resi- 
dent in  a  being,  if  it  belongs  to  the  being  in  the  full  and  com- 
plete sense  of  its  definition  or  essence.     Whiteness  is  thus  a 
perfection  of  a  white  wall.     A  perfection  is  eminently  resident 
in  a  being,  when  present,  not  in  the  complete  and  full  sense 
of  its  definition  or  essence,  but  by  way  of  inclusion  in  some 
equivalent  perfection  of  a  higher  order.     Sense  is  thus  con- 
tained in  intellect;  and  angelic  knowledge  is  not  formally,  but 
eminently   sense-knowledge.     To   contain    a   mixed    perfection 
eminently,  is  more  in  God  than  to  contain  it  formally,  because 
it  is  to  contain  the  mixed  perfection  in  an  infinite,  not  a  finite 
way.     God   cannot  formally   contain   a  mixed   perfection,   He 
cannot  eminently  contain  a  simple  perfection.     A  perfection  is 
virtually  resident  in  a  being,  when  present  causally,  inasmuch 
as  the  being  is  equal  to  the  task  of  producing  the  perfection  in 
question.     All  the  perfections  of  an  apple  are  thus  contained 
in  the  parent  tree,  and  every  created  perfection  is  thus  con- 
tained in  God.     Mixed  perfections  have  no  formal  existence  in 
God,  but  only  eminent  or  virtual.     Created  simple  perfections 
exist  formally   in   God   as  simple   perfections,   eminently   and 
virtually  as  created;  formally,  because  they  exist  in  Him  in 
the  full  and  complete  sense  of  their  definition  or  essence,  which 
by  supposition  involves  no  imperfection;  virtually,  because  He 
produces  them;  eminently,  because  the  same  or  an  equivalent 
perfection  in  God  embraces  them  in  a  surpassing  way.     Thus, 
wisdom  in  God,  considered  as  His  essence,  or  the  resultant  of 
His  diiferent  perfections,  is  equivalent  to  perfections  specifically 
infinite,  and  to  an  infinite  number  of  perfections  in  each  spe- 
cies; and  this  is  the  same  as  saying  that  wisdom  in  God  is  in 
reality  every  other  conceivable  perfection,  infinite  in  point  of 
number  and  in  point  of  intensity.     This  is  not  true  of  created 
wisdom,  or  wisdom  in  man. 

In  the  ontological  order,  the  objective  order,  the  order  of 
things  as  they  are,  all  perfections  are  in  God  first,  principally, 
properly,  and  in  an  infinite  manner;  and  they  descend  from 
Him  to  creatures  by  the  method  of  participation,  secondarily, 
metaphorically,  by  grace  of  a  figure  of  speech.  In  the  logical 
order,  the  subjective  order,  the  order  of  thought,  or  of  things 
as  we  think  them,  all  this  is  reversed;  and  perfections  as  they 
exist  in   creatures  come  first  to  our  knowledge,   principally, 


246  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

properly,  and  in  a  finite  way;  and  from  them,  as  from  effects, 
we  rise  to  God  their  cause  by  affirmation  and  negation,  as- 
cribing to  God  what  is  perfect  in  them,  removing  from  God 
what  is  imperfect  in  them,  always  with  due  regard  to  the  ex- 
cess or  eminence  the  divine  nature  demands.  These  analogical 
or  metaphorical  notions  help  us  to  only  an  inadequate  or  in- 
complete knowledge  of  God's  essence;  and  therefore  our  knowl- 
edge of  God  at  its  best  is  essence-knowledge  in  only  a  wider 
sense,  inasmuch  as  we  become  aware  of  many  attributes  alto- 
gether absolute,  intrinsic  and  essential  to  God. 

In  spite  of  its  imperfection  our  knowledge  of  God  is  still 
true,  even  though  our  mode  of  knowing  the  infinite  is  different 
from  the  infinite's  mode  of  being ;  because,  while  attributing 
these  perfections  to  God,  we  strip  them  of  the  manner  of  ex- 
istence peculiar  to  them  in  creatures.  Thus,  in  a  confused  and 
obscure  way  we  arrive  at  their  mode  of  existence  in  God.  On 
this  account  we  know  in  a  measure,  and  in  a  measure  we  know 
not  what  God  is.  We  know  not  with  adequate,  complete  and 
literal  or  proper  knowledge;  we  know  inadequately,  incom- 
pletely, figuratively  and  by  analogy.  Life  in  man,  because 
created,  is  metaphorical  life  when  compared  with  life  in  God. 
Face,  for  instance,  is  said  univocally  of  a,  human  being,  ana- 
logically of  a  portrait.  Wihat  a  beautiful  face !  is  an  exclama- 
tion applicable  to  persons  and  pictures.  The  face  of  the  man 
is  even  less  superior  to  the  face  in  his  portrait  than  whatever 
perfection  in  God  is  to  the  same  perfection  in  His  creatures. 
In  the  objective  order  things  on  earth  are  the  analogues  of  God 
in  Heaven;  in  the  logical  order  God  is  the  analogue  of  things 
on  earth. 

Hence  we  are  far  from  classifying  God  with  creatures,  when 
we  attribute  to  Him  perfections  of  the  same  name  as  perfec- 
tions His  creatures  enjoy.  To  classify  two  or  more  beings 
under  the  same  species,  the  beings  in  question  must  be  exactly 
alike  under  at  least  one  aspect.  Thus,  we  are  justified  in 
classifying  men  under  one  species,  human,  because  individuals 
of  the  race,  no  matter  how  marked  and  numerous  their  differ- 
ences, are  exactly  alike  in  their  possession  of  reason.  But  God 
and  creatures  are  exactly  alike  under  no  single  aspect.  Even 
in  point  of  being,  the  most  general  notion  within  our  ac- 
quaintance, they  are  different.     God  is  being  a  se;  creatures  are 


THESIS  II  247 

beings  ab  alio.  And  this  difference  is  brought  out  in  the  ex- 
pression, God  is  wisdom,  while  man  merely  has  wisdom.  God 
is  whatever  is,  man  has  things  that  are. 

Locke  thinks  that  our  notion  of  infinite  is  gotten  from  the 
addition  of  finite  to  finite,  but  he  is  sadly  mistaken.  No  such 
addition  results  in  more  than  the  finite.  For  this  very  reason 
an  infinite  number  and  an  infinite  space  are  equally  absurd. 
Number  is  a  collection  of  units,  and  no  such  collection  is  so 
great  that  the  addition  of  another  unit  is  inconceivable.  If  it 
ever  became  infinite,  the  removal  of  one  unit  would  make  it 
finite,  and  its  infinity  would  be  made  up  of  the  remaining 
finite  number  and  the  removed  finite  unit.  Space  is  made  by 
the  dimensions  between  the  surfaces  of  a  body  or  bodies.  These 
dimensions  can  never  become  so  large  as  not  to  allow  of  a 
larger.  If  space  were  infinite,  a  part,  say  a  cubic  inch,  would 
be  contained  in  it  an  infinite  number  of  times,  and  infinite 
number  is  absurd.  No  less  so  is  infinite  space.  Number  and 
space  can  readily  be  conceived  as  indefinite,  so  great  that  every 
assignable  number  and  every  assignable  space  are  as  nothing  in 
comparison  with  them;  but  the  indefinite,  while  unlimited  in 
potency,  is  always  limited  or  finite  in  fact. 

Spinoza  in  his  pantheistic  way  writes,  God  is  not  infinite. 
He  is  nothing  but  the  energy  of  nature  scattered  in  creatures. 
Hobbes  teaches  that  the  infinite  means  nothing  more  than  our 
own  want  of  power,  as  who  should  say,  we  know  not  whether 
God  is  without  limit,  and  wherein  His  limitations  consist. 
Some  Traditionalists  and  Scholastics  maintain  that  reason  can- 
not prove  God  infinite;  but  in  the  main  the  position  they  take 
admits  of  explanation. 

Altogether  Simple  —  physically  and  metaphysically.  Simpli- 
city is  the  denial  of  composition.  A  compound  being  has  parts, 
a  simple  being  has  none.  These  parts  may  be  physical  or 
metaphysical.  Physical  parts  are  realities  quite  independent  of 
the  mind,  one  different  from  the  other,  uniting  to  form  a  com- 
plete being  called  the  whole.  Instances  are,  body  and  soul  in 
man;  head,  arms,  trunk,  limbs  in  body;  mind  and  its  thoughts 
in  soul;  hydrogen  and  oxygen  in  water;  matter  and  form  in 
body  and  water. 

Metaphysical  parts  are  concepts,  dependent  on  the  mind  for 
their  reality,  with  foundation  in  fact,  one  different  from  the 


248  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

other,  uniting  to  form  a  complete  being  called  the  whole.  In- 
stances are,  aniniality  and  rationality  in  man;  essence  and  ex- 
istence in  soul. 

Logical  parts  are  concepts  dependent  on  the  mind  for  their 
reality,  with  no  foundation  in  fact,  different  aspects  of  one  and 
the  same  thing,  uniting  to  form  a  complete  being  called  the 
whole.  Instances  are,  memory,  mind  and  will  in  the  soul; 
man  and  brute  in  animal.  The  soul  is  really  distinct  from  its 
faculties  with  an  inadequate  distinction.  This  is  far  from 
making  the  faculties  physical  or  metaphysical  parts  of  the  soul. 
They  are  different  views  of  one  and  the  same  soul.  The  soul 
is  each  of  its  faculties  and  more  besides.  Wholes  are  physical, 
metaphysical  or  logical,  according  as  the  parts  constituting  them 
are  physical,  metaphysical  or  logical.  A  thing  physically  sim- 
ple can  be  considered  a  metaphysical  or  logical  compound. 
The  soul  is  an  example.  A  physically  simple  substance  can  be 
considered  a  physical  compound  in  combination  with  its  acci- 
dents. The  soul  admits  of  this  composition,  and  it  is  far  from 
affecting  the  soul's  substantial  simplicity.  It  has  no  existence, 
when  the  soul  is  oonsidered  apart  from  its  accidents.  Logical 
composition  is  compatible  with  physical  and  metaphysical  sim- 
plicity. The  thing  in  question  is  simple  and  without  parts, 
logical  composition  results  from  viewing  this  simple  being  un- 
der different  aspects.  Man  and  brute  are  no  physical  or  meta- 
physical parts  of  animal,  because  man  is  animal,  and  brute  is 
animal.  Animality  and  rationality  are  metaphysical  parts  of 
man,  because  man  is  neither  animality  nor  rationality,  but  a 
combination  of  the  two.  They  are  not  physical  parts  of  man, 
because  they  are  mere  concepts,  and  never  exist  as  such  outside 
the  mind.  Memory,  mind  and  will  are  neither  physical  nor 
metaphysical  parts  of  the  soul,  because  memory  is  the  soul 
exercising  a  certain  function,  mind  is  the  soul  exercising  an- 
other function,  and  will  is  the  soul  exercising  a  third  function. 
Logical  composition  is  altogether  on  the  part  of  the  thinker, 
and  leaves  the  being's  simplicity  untouched.  It  can  therefore 
be  without  harm  recognized  in  God.  Metaphysical  composition 
offends  against  perfect  simplicity,  and  must  be  excluded  from 
God.  It  is  a  quality  native  to  everything  less  than  God,  be  it 
an  angel  or  a  soul.  Everything  less  than  God,  every  contingent 
being,  is  certainly  made  up  of  the  metaphysical  parts,  essence 


THESIS  II  249 

and  existence,  one  of  which  is  not  the  other,  the  two  uniting  to 
constitute  the  being  in  question,  whether  angel  or  soul.  Exist- 
ence is  of  tlie  essence  of  a  necessary  being,  one  is  the  other, 
and  there  can  be  no  union  or  composition  between  one  and  the 
same  thing.  Physical  composition  is  grosser  than  metaphysical, 
and  with  all  the  more  reason  has  no  place  in  God.  And  now 
to  resume.  Physical  composition  goes  into  these  classes,  matter 
and  form,  integral  parts,  substance  and  accident,  accident  and 
accident,  substance  and  substance.  Metaphysical  composition 
goes  into  essence  and  existence,  genus  and  difference.  Logical 
composition  goes  into  faculties  of  soul,  genus  and  species. 

Simplicity  means  more  than  unity.     One  means  undivided, 
simple  means  indivisible.     Unity  excludes  division,  while  it  is 
compatible  with  composition.     Man  is  an  example.     Simplicity 
excludes  composition  as  well  as  division.     The  soul  is  an  ex- 
ample.    Viewed    substantially    the    soul    is   physically    simple. 
Viewed  with  its  accidents  it  is  a  physical  compound;  but,  as 
before  remarked,  this  physical  composition  affects  not  the  soul 
itself,  but  the  soul  in  connection  with  its  accidents,  which  may 
be  present  or  absent  without  at  all  touching  the  soul's  sub- 
stance.    There  is  no  substantial  composition  in  God,  because  a 
physical  substantial  whole  is  made  up  of,  and  dependent  on, 
parts  different  from  itself,  and  God  can  be  dependent  on  noth- 
ing different  from  Himself.     There  is  no  accidental  composi- 
tion in  God,  because  an  accidental  physical  whole  results  in  part 
from  an  accident,  an  accident  is  an  added  perfection  or  modifi- 
cation, and  to  God  no  perfection  or  modification  can  be  added. 
There  is  no  metaphysical  composition  in  God,  because  its  founda- 
tion is  contingency,  as  is  evident  in  essence  and  existence;  and 
there  is  no  contingency  in  God,  the  one  necessary  being.     The 
metaphysical  composition  of  genus  and  difference  is  absent  from 
God,  because  He  can  be  classed  under  no  genus.     He  is  per- 
fectly similar  to  creatures  in  no  respect,  and  genus  is  constituted 
by  mutual  and  perfect  similarity  in   some  one  respect.     His 
justice,  on  account  of  its  independence,  is  not  perfectly  similar 
to  any  created  justice;  and  so  of  His  very  being  and  the  rest. 
Animal  in  man  is  perfectly  similar  to  animal  in  brute.     Each 
divine  attribute  coincides  with  the  divine  substance;  and  each 
implies  the  rest,  though  it  fails  to  express  them.     His  attributes 
are  absolutely  inseparable  in  their  application  to  objective  re- 


250  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

ality.  The}'  are  not  metaphysically  compounded,  though  meta- 
physically distinct.  Compounded  things  must  be  distinct,  but 
distinct  things  need  not  be  compounded.  The  Three  Divine 
Persons  are  really  distinct,  but  they  are  not  compounded  into 
one  Godliead,  because  they  are  really  identical  with  the  God- 
head. The  Three  Persons  are  virtually  distinct  from  the  God- 
head, but  they  are  not  virtually  compounded  into  the  Godhead, 
because  the  concept  of  each  Divine  Person  involves  the  concept 
of  the  Godhead.  Therefore,  the  mystery  of  the  Trinity  is  not 
opposed  to  the  physical  or  metaphysical  simplicity  of  God. 

Essentially  one.  Unity  is  the  denial  of  division,  and  pertains 
to  whatever  being  is  in  itself  undivided.  Units  or  ones  are  of 
as  many  different  kinds  as  there  are  degrees  of  unity.  The 
whole  world  in  spite  of  its  divisions  can  be  called  one  in  vir- 
tue of  logical  unity,  a  figment  of  the  mind  with  no  foundation 
in  fact.  The  world  is  no  more  a  real  one  than  two  separate 
loads  of  sand  are  one  load.  The  connecting  bond  between  its 
parts  is  wanting.  Other  units  are  real  ones,  in  virtue  of  a 
real  unity,  nowise  dependent  on  the  mind  for  its  reality,  and 
this  because  they  are  actually  undivided  or  indivisible  or,  though 
divided  and  divisible,  held  tight  together  by  a  connecting  bond. 
An  inch,  a  foot,  a  yard  is  called  a  mathematical  one  or  unit, 
inasmuch  as  it  is  a  basis  or  foundation  for  number  or  measure. 
Whatever  can  be  called  a  being  is  a  transcendental  one,  and  this 
again  goes  into  individual  and  formal  ones.  Peter  is  an  indi- 
vidual one,  inasmuch  as  he  is  not  only  undivided  in  himself, 
but  also  separated  from  everything  else;  and  whatever  exists 
in  the  world  of  realities  is  affected  by  this  individual  unity. 
Formal  unity  belongs  to  essences,  making  them  ones,  though 
they  are  compounded  of  different  notes.  Man  in  spite  of  ra- 
tionality and  animality  is  one  after  this  fashion.  Simple  be- 
ings vindicate  to  themselves  the  highest  hind  of  created  unity, 
called  that  of  indivisihility.  Tliey  are  one  in  such  a  way  that 
they  are  not  only  undivided  but  indivisible  in  themselves. 
Physically  considered,  the  soul  rejoices  in  this  supreme  degree 
of  unity.  ]\Ietaphysically  considered,  it  lacks  the  quality;  for 
GK>d  alone  is  both  metaphysically  and  physically  simple.  Unity 
of  composition  belongs  to  beings  resulting  from  union  of  two 
or  more  principles  intended  by  nature  to  form  them.  Tt  ren- 
ders a  thing  actually  ui>divided  without  removing  the  possibil- 


THESIS  II  251 

ity  of  division  or  separation;  and  man,  as  composed  of  body 
and  soul,  is  such  a  unit.  The  unity  of  art  belongs  to  works  of 
skill  or  mechanism,  which,  having  no  very  close  physical  con- 
nection between  their  parts,  preserve  throughout  a  sort  of  order 
and  relation.  A  house,  a  coat,  a  chair  are  ones  of  this  sort. 
Unity  of  aggregation  is  in  force  where  things  have  among  them- 
selves no  other  connection  than  that  of  nearness  of  position, 
as  may  be  seen  in  a  heap  of  stones,  a  pile  of  sand,  a  mound  of 
earth.  After  all,  these  different  varieties  of  unity,  because 
proper  to  creatures,  have  little  or  nothing  to  do  with  our 
thesis.  We  here  affirm  of  God  a  oneness  peculiar  to  Himself, 
and  altogether  outside  the  range  of  created  nature.  Essential 
unity  can  be  predicated  of  no  creature;  transcendental  unity 
in  some  or  other  degree  is  the  highest  of  which  it  is  capable. 
Essential  unity  makes  God  one  in  such  a  manner  that  He  is  not 
only  undivided  and  indivisible  in  Himself,  hut  He  is  the  only 
God,  the  only  one  of  a  kind,  and  a  class  hy  Himself.  God  is 
no  genus  like  animal.  He  is  no  species  like  man.  There  are 
many  men,  there  is  only  one  God.  Again,  the  Latins  had  two 
words  for  our  one :  unus  and  unicus.  God  is  more  than  unus  or 
one;  He  is  unicus,  and  we  have  no  English  equivalent,  except- 
ing perhaps  unique.  God  the  Father,  God  the  Son,  and  God 
the  Holy  Ghost,  are  not  like  man  A,  man  B,  and  man  C. 
The  Three  Divine  Persons  have  one  and  numerically  the  same 
individual  essence;  each  of  the  three  men  has  his  own  indi- 
vidual essence,  and  that  of  A  belongs  not  to  B  or  C.  As  St. 
Thomas  puts  it,  the  oneness  and  commonness  of  human  nature 
are  not  an  objective  reality,  but  a  subjective  consideration; 
while  the  actuality  signified  by  the  divine  essence  is  one  and 
common  as  an  objective  reality.  In  separate  human  natures 
we  have  not  real  identity,  but  only  similarity ;  and  in  the  Three 
Divine  Persons  we  have  real  identity  of  nature.  We  are  not 
concerned  with  the  Trinity,  that  question  belongs  to  dogmatic 
theology.     We  have  but  to  prove  God  one  in  essence. 

It  is  hard  to  comprehend  how  men  could  make  a  mistake  in 
this  matter  of  God's  oneness;  but  the  fact  stands,  whatever  its 
explanation;  and  while  God  in  modern  times  is  made  one  too 
few,  in  ancient  times  He  was  made  several  too  many.  Poly- 
theism is  opposed  to  Monotheism,  and  is  of  many  different 
kinds.     Some  contend  that  it  was  the  primitive  form  of  reli- 


252  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

gion,  and  that  by  successive  stages  of  evolution   it  grew,   as 
civilization   advanced,   to    Monotheism.     But    these    men    have 
small  or  no  regard  for  the  Bil)le.     Genesis  is  clear  evidence 
that  Adam  and  all  his  posterity  down  to  the  time  of  Abraham 
worshiped  one  God.     Idolatry  saw  the  beginning  of  polythe- 
ism, and  the  Chaldeans  would  seem  to  have  been  its  first  pro- 
moters.    The  stars  and  planets  were  divinities  in  their  eyes. 
From  them  the  mistake  passed  to  the  Egyptians  and  Phoeni- 
cians, the  Greeks  and  the  Romans.     Men  and  the  devil  were 
responsible   for   idolatry.     Men   got   themselves   ready   for   the 
abomination  in  a  threefold  way :     They  allowed  their  esteem 
for  relatives  and  heroes  to  usurp  the  place  of  God  in  their 
thoughts.     They   allowed    their    admiration   for   works   of    art 
to  exceed  due  bounds.     They  dulled   their   minds   by  grosser 
crimes,  and  fell  away  from  right  knowledge  of  God,  to  fasten 
their  hearts  on  creatures  of  surpassing  beauty  or  power.     The 
devil  finished  the  work  by  making  the  idols  his  oracles  and  in- 
struments in  the  performance  of  various  prodigies.     The  sin 
assumed   many   different  phases,    astrolatry,   demonolatry,   an- 
thropolatry  and  fetish-worship.     With  the  Greeks  no  mountain, 
hill,  river  or  spring,  no  tree  or  plant  was  without  its  divinity. 
Varro   counts   up   300   Jupiters   and   6,000   lesser   gods.     The 
Hindoos  had   33   million   gods;   some  say  300  millions.     The 
Japanese  maintain  pagodas  where  as  many  as  33,333  deities 
are  worshiped,  each  with  its  own  statue.     The  ancient  Mexi- 
cans honored  at  least  2,000  gods.     The  Egyptians  were  famous 
for  the  queer  beings  they  selected  as  objects  of  worship,  onions, 
garlic,  crocodiles,  snakes,  dogs,  cats,  hawks,  crows,  goats,  scor- 
pions, bats,  mice,  cows. 

Lamennais,  on  this  subject  of  idolatry,  makes  a  statement  not 
borne  out  by  history,  and  Protestants  employ  it  against 
Catholicity's  veneration  of  images.  He  maintains  that  pagans 
gave  their  idols  only  relative  worship,  of  the  same  nature  as 
that  accorded  images  by  Catholics.  But  pagans  themselves 
bear  opposite  witness,  and  they  ought  to  know  their  own  minds 
better  than  Lamennais.  They  testify  that  they  regarded  their 
idols  gods,  no  mere  representations,  and  paid  them  absolute 
worship.  In  cases  where  pagan  worship  was  merely  relative, 
the  gods  their  idols  represented  were  false  gods,  and  all  such 
worship  was  decidedly   wrong.     The  old   Greeks  and   Romans 


THESIS  II  253 

were  examples.  We  Catholics  render  absolute  worship  to  God 
alone  in  person,  relative  worship  to  His  images.  The  homage 
we  pay  the  Blessed  Virgin  Mary  and  the  saints,  as  well  per- 
sonally as  in  their  statues,  is  purely  relative.  In  person  they 
are  mere  creatures  like  ourselves,  though  closer  friends  to  God; 
and  their  statues  are  possessed  of  no  divinity,  but  persevere 
without  change  the  material  of  which  they  are  made.  A  piece 
of  marble  shaped  to  represent  Washington  gets  more  honor  at 
the  hands  of  Americans  than  the  same  piece  of  marble  ready 
for  work  in  the  sculptor's  studio;  and  Americans  are  no  idola- 
ters. 

DIVISION" 

Three  Parts,  I,  II,  III 
I,  Infinite;  II,  Simple;  III,  One 

PROOFS 

/.  Ood  is  infinite. 

1°.  The  absolutely  necessary  being,  God,  cannot  be  finite. 
Ergo,  God  is  infinite. 

With  regard  to  the  Antecedent: 

It  would  be  absolutely  necessary  inasmuch  as  it  is  infinite, 
or  inasmuch  as  it  is  finite  in  such  or  such  a  degree.  But 
neither  holds  true.  Not  the  first,  because  in  that  case  all 
finites  would  be  absolutely  necessary,  or  incapable  of  change; 
and  our  experience  is  other.  Not  the  second,  because  in  that 
case,  since  no  finite  is  so  great  that  greater  and  greater  cannot 
be  conceived,  there  would  be  an  endless  multitude  of  absolutely 
necessary  beings,  whereas  there  can  be  but  one  absolutely  nec- 
essary being.  If  there  were  two  absolutely  necessary  beings, 
they  would  have  different  essences.  If  one  had  actual  exist- 
ence for  essence,  the  other  could  have  only  possible  existence 
for  essence,  and  would  be  contingent.  It  would  therefore  be 
at  the  same  time  necessary  and  contingent,  a  square  circle,  a 
contradiction  in  terms. 

N.B.  When  we  say  that  a  thing  is  whiteness  itself,  that  a 
wicked   deed   is   baseness   itself,   that   an    orator    is   eloquence 


254  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

itself,  we  are  captive  to  the  notion  of  infinite  our  argument 
contains.  We  merely  contend  that  God  is  infinite,  because  He 
is  being  itself,  ipsum  esse.  As  whiteness,  baseness  and  elo- 
quence are  forms  conceived  in  the  mind  as  bases  of  certain 
specific  qualities  or  perfections,  so  being  is  the  form  conceived 
as  basis  of  every  quality  or  perfection  conceivable.  Being  is 
basis  of  whatever  perfection,  because  unless  it  is,  it  is  nothing. 
Therefore,  in  ascribing  being  to  (xod  as  His  essence,  we  are 
ascribing  to  God  every  conceivable  perfection  in  every  con- 
ceivable degree,  which  is  infinity. 

2°.  An  actual  being  is  infinite,  when  it  suggests  no  suffi- 
cient reason  for  limit.  But  God,  as  unproduced,  is  such  a  be- 
ing.    Ergo,  God  is  infinite. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor: 

In  case  of  a  produced  being  its  efficient  cause  suggests  limit. 
It  is  due  to,  this  particular  cause  and  no  other.  The  unpro- 
duced being  is  without  efficient  cause,  and  limit  can  accrue  to 
it  only  in  virtue  of  its  essence.  Its  essence,  however,  can  ex- 
clude no  simple  perfection  and  no  mixed  perfection,  when  rid 
of  its  imperfections.  Essence  excludes  only  what  conflicts  with 
essence,  only  what  in  combination  with  essence  would  provoke 
contradiction.  But  contradiction  is  out  of  the  question,  where, 
as  in  this  case,  everything  is  affirmation.  On  the  one  hand 
God  is  being  itself,  ipsum  esse;  on  the  other,  simple  perfection 
and  mixed  perfection,  when  rid  of  imperfections,  are  pure 
affirmations  without  a  trace  of  negation.  Contradiction  is  im- 
possible without  a  negation  or  denial.  A  square  circle  is  a 
square-not-square. 

3°.  God  is  the  actual  or  possible  maker  of  all  else,  actual 
and  possible.  But  the  maker  of  all  else  is  infinite.  Ergo, 
God  is  infinite. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor: 

The  maker  of  a  thing  gives  the  thing  its  perfections.  No- 
body gives  but  what  he  first  has.  Ergo  as  maker  of  all  else, 
actual  and  possible,  God  has  all  perfections,  actual  and  pos- 
sible, which  is  infinity. 

4°.  All  conceivable  perfections  are  either  unproduced  and 
necessary,    or   produced    and   contingent.     But    the    absolutely 


THESIS  II  255 

necessary  being  ought  to  possess  both  kinds,  and  therefore  be 
infinite.  Necessary  perfections  partake  of  the  necessary  being's 
nature,  and  cannot  exist  apart  from  it.  Contingent  perfec- 
tions exist  only  by  favor  of  the  necessary  being's  efficiency; 
and,  since  nobody  gives  but  what  he  first  has,  this  necessary 
being  possesses  all  the  actual  and  possible  perfections  resident 
in  His  effects,  actual  and  possible.  Possible  perfections  are 
producible,  and  get  their  producibility  from  God. 

5°.  Actual  creative  power  is  infinite.  Grod  is  creator.  Ergo, 
God  is  infinite. 

With  regard  to  the  Major: 

Actual  creative  power  is  infinite,  because  it  produces  some- 
thing from  nothing,  and  is  independent  of  every  outside  agency. 

PEINCIPLES 

A:  Infinity  is  perfection,  perfection  means  finish,  and  is  of 
two  kinds,  relative  and  absolute.  Perfection  makes  a  thing  per- 
fect, and  a  thing  can  be  perfect  in  two  ways,  simply  perfect 
and  perfect  after  a  manner,  or  perfect  privatively  and  perfect 
negatively.  That  is  perfect  after  a  manner,  which  has  every- 
thing its  nature  demands  for  wholeness  and  completeness;  and 
creatures  as  well  as  God  are  perfect  in  this  sense.  That  is 
simply  perfect,  which  has  every  perfection,  every  conceivable 
degree  of  being  and  reality,  and  every  perfection  is  its  due  in 
such  sense  that  no  perfection  at  all  can  be  absent  from  it  either 
privatively  or  negatively.  When  some  perfection  is  absent  from 
a  thing,  that  thing  is  called  imperfect.  A  perfection  is  pri- 
vatively absent  from  a  thing,  when  the  thing's  nature  demands 
its  presence  or  possession.  A  perfection  is  negatively  absent 
from  a  thing,  when  the  thing's  nature  makes  no  such  demand, 
when  the  thing's  nature  is  complete  and  whole  without  the 
absent  perfection.  Sight  is  privatively  absent  in  a  blind  man; 
negatively  absent  in  a  stone.  A  blind  man  is  privatively  im- 
perfect, a  blind  stone  is  negatively  imperfect,  and  a  negatively 
imperfect  thing  can  be  a  privatively  perfect  thing.  In  the 
case  of  God,  because  all  being  or  reality  is  His  due,  as  the 
ens  a  se,  the  absolute,  the  necessary,  to  be  negatively  imperfect 
would  amount  to  being  privatively  imperfect  too.     Sight  can 


256  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

be  absent  from  the  stone  without  rendering  it  truly  and  really 
imperfect,  nothing  can  be  absent  from  God  without  rendering 
Him  truly  and  really  imperfect ;  and  this  presence  of  every- 
thing in  God  constitutes  His  infinity. 

B:  God  is  the  greatest  conceivable  being.  ISTo  greater,  no 
better  being  than  God  can  be  conceived  or  thought,  because 
His  essence  is  being,  He  is  being  itself.  In  other  words,  He 
contains  within  Himself  the  plenitude  or  completeness  of  all 
being  and  the  reality  of  every  perfection. 

C:  God  is  first  principle.  But  first  principles  are  imper- 
fect, because  they  unite  to  form  something  complete  and  per- 
fect.    Ergo,  God  is  imperfect. 

Answer:  God  is  first  principle  in  the  sense  of  efficient  cause, 
I  grant;  in  the  sense  of  formal  or  material  cause,  I  deny. 

D:  That  is  perfect  which  is  finished,  completed,  totally 
made.     But  the  term  "  made  "  has  no  place  in  God.     Ergo. 

Answer:  Taken  radically  or  in  root,  perfect  means  made, 
I  grant;  taken  in  its  true  and  universally  received  sense,  I 
deny. 

St.  Gregory  explains.  As  best  we  can,  we  proclaim  in  a 
stammering  way  the  lofty  attributes  of  God.  Certainly,  what 
is  not  made  cannot  in  strict  language  be  called  completely  or 
totally  made,  or  perfect.  But,  because  a  thing  in  process  of 
making  passes  from  potency  to  act,  we  denominate  perfect  what- 
ever actually  exists,  whether  its  mode  of  existence  is  perfect 
or  imperfect. 

E:  Infinity  involves  a  multitude  of  perfections,  and  there- 
fore destroys  simplicity.     Ergo. 

Answer:  These  perfections  are  many  a  parte  rei,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  separate  realities  outside  of  the  mind,  I  deny; 
many  a  parte  mentis,  as  a  matter  of  thought  or  notional,  con- 
stituting one  physically  simple  reality  in  God,  I  grant.  St. 
Thomas  explains.  A  king's  power  in  much  the  same  way  con- 
tains all  the  scattered  particles  of  authority  resident  in  his 
officials. 

F:     God  is  all  being,  and  this  sounds  like  Pantlieism. 

Answer:  God  is  all  being  in  the  sense  that  He  is  the  formal 
being  of  everything  else,  in  the  sense  that  nothing  has  being 
but  God,  I  deny;  in  the  sense  that  no  grade  of  perfection,  no 
degree  of  being  can  possibly  or  actually  exist  without  in  some 


THESIS  II  257 

way  belonging  to  Grod,  I  grant.  This  illustration  may  serve  to 
elucidate  things.  The  fact  that  some  man  is  a  substance,  with 
a  body,  life,  sense  and  intellect,  is  far  from  eliminating  or 
annihilating  other  substances,  bodies,  life,  senses,  and  intellects. 
In  the  same  way  the  fact  that  God  is  all  being,  or  possesses 
within  Himself  the  plenitude  of  being,  is  far  from  denying  the 
existence  of  other  beings  and  other  realities  besides  God  and 
distinct  from  God.  If  God  is  creator,  there  must  be  other 
beings  proceeding  from  His  hands,  and  dependent  on  His  might 
for  existence. 

0:  To  be  is  God's  essence.  But  naked  being  says  nothing 
of  life,  or  knowledge,  or  freedom.     Ergo,  God  is  imperfect. 

Answer:  God's  essence  is  being  of  itself  subsistent,  I  grant; 
abstract  being,  which  bases  the  actuality  of  whatever  exists,  I 
deny.  The  being  we  affirm  of  God  is,  like  His  wisdom,  a  con- 
crete and  subsistent  reality.  The  being  we  affirm  of  creatures 
is  an  abstraction  of  the  mind,  with  no  concrete  substantial  re- 
ality in  fact.  Hence  being  embraces  in  God  every  possible  and 
actual  perfection.  Our  way  of  thinking  makes  these  perfec- 
tions different  formalities  from  God's  being,  but  in  reality  they 
are  one  and  the  same  with  His  being. 

H:  The  infinite  cannot  be  a  person,  because  a  person  is 
distinct  from  others,  and  distinction  means  limit.  So  the  Ger- 
man Transcendentalists  argue. 

Answer:  God  is  infinite  and  undetermined  negatively,  not 
privatively  —  Privatively  means  without  actuality,  unfinished, 
lacking  some  further  perfection.  Negatively  means  with  ac- 
tuality, and  without  limit;  lacking  no  perfection,  but  distinct 
from  everything  else. 

PEOOFS 

//.  Ood  is  absolutely  simple,  (a)  no  physical  composition  in 
God;  (h)  no  metaphysical  composition  in  God. 

(a)  The  physical  parts  in  God  would  be  beings  a  se  or  be- 
ings ab  alio.  Were  they  beings  a  se,  each  part  would  be  infinite 
and  God,  without  the  others.  "Were  they  beings  ab  alio,  a  col- 
lection of  contingent  beings  would  constitute  a  necessary  being, 
and  this  is  absurd. 

(b)  Every  metaphysical  compound  can  be  conceived  as  dif- 


258  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

ferent  from  what  it  in  reality  is.     But  this  is  impossible  in 
God,  the  necessary  being.     Ergo,  G^d  is  metaphysically  simple. 

With  regard  to  the  Major: 

Peter  is  a  metaphysical  compound  inasmuch  as  he  is  made 
up  of  possible  and  actual  existence.  He  can  be  stripped  of 
actual  existence,  and  conceived  as  a  mere  possible.  Animality 
and  rationality  in  the  man  admit  of  the  same  mental  separa- 
tion, and  one  can  be  conceived  without  the  other. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor: 

Because  God's  essence  is  actual  being,  He  can  be  conceived 
or  thought  only  as  He  actually  is,  and  to  think  Him  actually 
non-existent,  or  to  think  Him  in  some  different  state  or  con- 
dition, involves  intrinsic  contradiction. 

PRmCIPLES 

A:  One  simple  cause  produces  one  simple  effect.  Ergo, 
God  is  not  simple. 

Answer:  When  the  cause  is  a  necessary  agent,  I  grant; 
when  it  is  free,  I  again  distinguish,  if  it  is  one  and  simple  in 
fact  and  in  power,  I  grant;  if  it  is  one  and  simple  in  fact, 
manifold  in  power,  I  deny. 

B:  Compounds  are  better  than  simples.  Ergo,  God  not 
simple. 

Answer:  In  the  world  of  bodies,  I  grant;  in  the  world  of 
spirits,  I  deny.  Composition  perfects  bodies;  simplicity  per- 
fects spirits,  and  God  is  a  spirit. 

C :  If  simple,  God  could  be  completely  and  entirely  known, 
or  comprehended.     Ergo. 

Answer:  He  could  be  known  whole  and  wholly,  I  deny; 
He  could  be  known  wliole,  but  not  wholly,  I  grant.  Because 
He  cannot  be  known  wholly.  He  cannot  be  comprehended.  St. 
Thomas  explains.  The  measure  in  which  God  can  be  known 
is  infinite,  man's  mind  is  finite.  Ergo,  man  cannot  wholly 
know  God.  There  are  no  parts  in  God.  Ergo  man  must 
know  Him  whole,  or  not  know  Him  at  all.  Comprehension  is 
perfect  knowledge,  and  knows  its  object  in  every  conceivable 
detail. 


THESIS  II  259 

D:  Every  compound  can  be  reduced  to  its  simples;  and,  to 
avoid  infinite  series,  we  must  come  at  last  to  some  absolutely 
simple  thing.     Ergo,  God  is  not  the  only  absolute  simple. 

Answer:  Nothing  outside  of  God  escapes  metaphysical  com- 
position. 

E:     God  has  many  perfections.     Ergo,  God  is  not  simple. 

Answer:  Many  in  themselves,  I  deny;  many  in  our  mind, 
I  grant.     God's  essence  is  one,  and  equivalent  to  many. 

F:  In  God  there  is  something  common  and  something 
proper,  nature  and  personality.     Ergo. 

Answer:  The  common  and  proper  are  in  fact  one  and  the 
same  thing,  I  grant;  not  one  and  the  same  thing,  I  deny. 

0:  To  be  one  in  one  is  more  simple  than  to  be  one  in 
several.     God  is  one  in  several.     Ergo. 

Answer:  If  that  one  is  itself  in  the  several,  and  tlie  several 
are  constituted  by  personalities  and  relations,  I  deny;  if  that 
one  is  a  distinct  thing  in  the  several,  I  grant.  God  is  one  and 
three ;  but  the  three  are  one  in  essence. 

H:  The  Three  Persons  in  God  are  three  things,  according 
to  St.  Augustine.  But  three  things  give  composition.  Ergo, 
God  is  not  simple. 

Answer:  Three  things  have  composition,  when  united  among 
themselves,  I  grant;  when  not  united,  I  deny.  St.  Thomas 
explains.  The  Three  Persons  involve  no  composition.  The 
Three  Persons,  compared  with  God's  essence,  are  one  and  the 
same  with  it;  and  therefore  there  is  no  composition,  which 
demands  union. 

/;  Equality  and  inequality  are  in  God,  as  in  Trinity  and 
towards  creatures.  Likeness  is  in  God,  man  being  made  to  His 
image  and  likeness.  But  quantity  is  basis  of  equality  and  in- 
equality, quality  is  basis  of  likeness.  Ergo,  accidents  are  in 
God.     Ergo,  God  is  not  simple. 

Answer:  Accidents  are  in  God  as  they  are  in  creatures,  I 
deny;  virtually  in  God,  God's  substantial  perfection  is  equiva- 
lent to  the  perfection  contained  in  quantity,  quality  and  other 
accidents,  I  grant. 

J:  Wisdom,  justice  and  the  like  are  accidents  in  man. 
Ergo,  in  God,  and  He  is  compound. 

Answer:  Accidents  in  man  are  not  accidents  in  God,  be- 
cause nothing  is  predicated  univocally  of  God  and  creatures. 


260  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

K:  God  can  be  thought  without  goodness,  wisdom  and  the 
like.     Ergo,  they  are  accidents. 

Answer:  God  can  be  thought  incompletely  without  them, 
I  grant;  completely,  I  deny. 

L:  God  can  be  a  species  under  substance,  when  substance 
is  taken  to  mean  a  being  in  itself,  without  reference  to  the 
mode  of  its  origin.  One  species  would  be  a  being  in  itself, 
whose  essence  is  existence,  God;  the  other  species  would  be  a 
being  in  itself,  whose  essence  is  not  existence,  creatures. 

Answer:  Taking  substance  in  this  precise  sense,  being  in 
itself,  whose  essence  is  existence,  could  not  be  ranged  under  it 
as  under  a  genus,  just  as  an  animal,  that  would  be  by  its  es- 
sence a  rational  animal,  could  not  be  ranged  under  animal, 
prescinding  from  rationality  and  irrationality.  God  is  transcen- 
dental substance,  not  predicamental.  He  is  substance  and 
everything  in  transcendental  sense,  as  creatures  are  beings. 
Everything  is  being,  not  everything  is  substance. 

PROOFS 

III.  God  is  essentially  one. 

God  is  a  being  of  such  sort  that  no  greater  or  more  perfect 
can  be  conceived  or  thought.^ 

But  in  the  event  of  several  gods,  none  would  be  such.  Ergo, 
God  is  essentially  one. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor: 

Each  of  these  several  gods  would  be  equal.  But  he  who 
has  no  equal  is  greater  than  he  who  lias.  Ergo,  a  greater  can 
be  conceived.  If  one  of  the  several  could  hinder  the  others, 
the  others  would  not  be  omnipotent.  If  one  could  not  hinder 
the  others,  he  would  not  be  omnipotent. 

PRINCIPLES 

A :  There  are  two  kinds  of  unity,  transcendental  and  mathe- 
matical. The  first  is  constituted  by  absence  of  division;  and 
God  is  more  than  undivided.  He  is  because  of  His  simplicity 
absolutely  indivisible.  Ergo,  His  transcendental  unity  is  of 
the  highest.     He  is  besides   mathematically  one.     He   is   the 


THESIS  II  261 

only  one  of  a  kind,  possible  as  well  as  actual.  And  this  is 
what  we  mean  when  we  say  that  God  is  essentially  one. 

B:  These  several  gods  could  agree  to  always  do  and  wish  the 
same  thing.     Ergo,  no  conflict. 

Answer:  If  this  agreement  were  necessary',  they  would  not 
be  free,  and  that  would  be  an  imperfection.  If  the  agreement 
were  free,  their  condition  would  be  mutual  dependence,  dif- 
ferences and  displeasure  would  be  possible,  and  that  would  be 
imperfection. 

C :  The  Three  Persons  are  not  three  gods,  because  they  have 
numerically  one  and  the  same  nature.  Though  really  distinct 
among  themselves,  each  is  identical  with  the  one  divine  na- 
ture, each  is  infinite,  each  is  in  the  others,  each  formally  pos- 
sesses all  the  perfections  of  the  others,  because  God's  essence  is 
God's  perfections,  and  each  Person  is  identical  with  the  one 
divine  essence. 

D:  God,  as  the  most  perfect  being,  ought  to  be  able  to  pro- 
duce a  being  like  Himself.     Ergo,  several  gods. 

Answer:  The  axiom  is  true  of  beings,  whose  nature  can  be 
multiplied  in  different  individuals,  I  grant;  of  the  being  whose 
nature  cannot  be  so  multiplied,  I  deny. 

E :     God  would  not  be  omnipotent  or  supremely  good.     Ergo. 

Answer:  An  essentially  infinite  being  cannot  be  the  effect 
of  omnipotence,  because  a  produced  being  of  the  kind  is  an  in- 
trinsic contradiction.  Omnipotence  need  only  be  able  to  pro- 
duce greater  and  greater  effects,  without  ever  exhausting  its 
efficiency. 

F:  Solitude,  or  the  state  of  being  alone,  is  an  evil.  Ergo, 
several  gods. 

Answer:  In  a  being  sufficient  unto  itself,  I  deny;  in  a  being 
not  sufficient  unto  itself,  I  grant. 

G:  A  nature,  that  exists  in  several  really  distinct  persons, 
cannot  be  one.     Ergo,  God  is  not  one. 

Ansiver:  In  question  of  created  beings,  I  grant;  in  question 
of  God,  I  deny.     Faith  teaches  the  mystery, 

H:  The  common  consent  of  mankind  favors  polytheism  as 
much  as  monotheism.     Ergo, 

Answer:  Regarding  Polytheism,  the  consent  of  mankind 
was  never  universal,  enduring,  reasonable  or  a  matter  of  genu- 
ine tradition.     It  was  not  universal,  because  the  Hebrews  al- 


262  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

ways  worshiped  one  God,  and  wise  men  among  the  pagans, 
like  poets  and  philosophers,  acknowledged  one  supreme  ruler, 
usually  Jupiter.  It  was  not  enduring,  because  from  creation 
to  the  deluge  monotheism  was  universally  recognized,  and  long 
after  the  deluge  the  same  system  prevailed.  Since  the  dawn 
of  the  gospel,  the  better,  if  not  the  greater,  part  of  mankind 
professed  monotheism.  It  is  unreasonable,  because  several  gods 
are  an  open  contradiction,  and  the  gods  of  antiquity  were  char- 
acters of  the  lowest  type,  animals  of  the  most  repulsive  nature, 
plants  and  even  lifeless  objects.  The  demons'  perpetrated  seem- 
ing miracles  and  forged  sham  prophecies,  to  propagate  poly- 
theism. 

/.-  A  form  can  without  contradiction  be  multiplied,  when 
it  is  not  its  own  individuation.  But  God's  form.  His  essence, 
is  His  own  individuation.  St.  Thomas  explains.  That  in  vir- 
tue of  which  a  thing  is  this  particular  thing,  cannot  be  com- 
municated to  others.  That  in  virtue  of  which  Socrates  is  a 
man,  can  be  communicated  to  others ;  but  that  in  virtue  of 
which  Socrates  is  this  particular  man,  cannot  be  found  outside 
of  Socrates  himself.  If  therefore  in  virtue  of  one  and  the 
same  tiling  Socrates  were  a  man  and  this  particular  man,  sev- 
eral men  would  be  just  as  impossible  as  several  Socrates.  And 
this  is  what  happens  in  the  case  of  God.  God  is  His  nature; 
Socrates  is  not  his  nature.  In  virtue  of  one  and  the  same 
tiling,  His  essence,  God  is  God  and  this  particular  God.  God 
therefore  is  one.     S.T.  l.q.ll  a  3. 

J:  Every  created  thing  is  one  by  its  essence;  but,  since  it 
always  consists  of  potency  and  act,  it  involves  at  least  meta- 
physical composition. 

K:  Oneness  in  created  things  involves  denial  of  only  physi- 
cal, not  metaphysical  division ;  oneness  in  God  implies  denial 
of  metaphysical  division  as  well. 

L:  Finite  perfection  under  the  same  genus  can  be  manifold, 
not  infinite  perfection. 

M:  In  question  of  finite  natures,  plurality  removes  no  per- 
fection ;  in  question  of  an  infinite  nature  plurality  introduces 
imperfection. 


THESIS  III 

Ood  is  unchangeable,  as  well  physically  as  morally;  He  is 
besides  eternal  and  immense. 

Jouin,  pp.  338-238;  Boedder,  pp.  333-356. 

DIVISION 

Three  Parts,  I,  II,  III 
I,  Unchangeable;  II,  Eternal;  III,  Immense 

TEEMS 

Unchangeable.  Change  is  passage  from  one  state  or  condi- 
tion to  another.  Physical  change  affects  the  being's  nature; 
moral  change,  its  will.  Intrinsic  changes  have  place  inside  the 
changed  being,  and  are  absent  from  God;  extrinsic  changes  af- 
fect outside  beings,  and  are  compatible  with  divinity. 

PROOFS 

1.  (a),  Physically;  (b).  Morally. 

(a).  1°.  God  is  the  being  determined  by  sheer  force  of  es- 
sence to  actual  existence;  His  existence  is  His  essence.  Every- 
thing in  God  is  one.  But  determination  to  actual  existence 
involves  determination  to  an  actual  mode  of  existence.  Ergo, 
God  is  determined  to  an  actual  mode  of  existence. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  This  actual  mode  is  as  much 
part  of  His  essence  as  actual  existence  itself,  and  existence  in 
this  actual  mode,  because  it  belongs  to  God's  essence,  admits  of 
neither  removal  nor  change.  Ergo,  God  is  physically  unchange- 
able. 

Witli  regard  to  the  Minor.  An  actual  existence  cannot  be 
without  its  own  fixed  mode,  any  more  than  actual  motion  can 
be  without  its  own  fixed  direction  and  velocity. 

2°.  Physical  change  in  God  would  be  to  worse,  or  better,  or 

263 


264  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

an  equivalent.  Cliange  to  worse,  because  an  imperfection,  is 
out  of  question  in  the  infinite.  Change  to  better  is  no  less 
absurd  in  the  infinite.  Change  to  an  equivalent  presupposes 
the  possibility  of  two  infinites. 

(b).  Moral  change  is  eliange  of  will.  It  means  modification 
of  plan,  already  conceived,  or  a  halt  in  will-process,  implying 
that  now  at  last  Grod  begins  to  wis'h  or  not  wish  a  thing. 

1°.  Such  a  change  would  arise  from  some  physical  change  in 
*he  mind  of  God,  or  from  want  of  Jcnowledge,  or  from-  insta- 
bility of  purpose.  But  God  is  incapable  of  physical  change; 
and,  because  infinite,  He  is  a  stranger  to  ignorance  and  incon- 
stancy. 

2°.  Because  His  intellect  and  will  are  infinite,  God  as  a 
matter  of  fact  can  by  a  single  act  of  His  will  arrange  the  uni- 
verse and  its  every  minutest  detail.  Ergo,  He  must  be  sup- 
posed to  have  once  for  all  made  such  disposal  of  everything  by 
a  single  eternal  wish. 

With  regard  to  the  Consequent: 

Apart  from  the  reproach  of  inconstancy,  no  reason  can  be 
assigned  for  delay  on  God's  part  with  regard  to  any  single 
decree  of  His  providence.  He  had  to  make  no  experiment,  to 
become  aware  of  His  freedom.  That  would  derogate  from  His 
knowledge;  and  prudence  would  preclude  useless  trial.  Nor 
had  God  reason  to  fear  that  the  result  of  an  eternal  decree,  like 
a  sick  man's  cure  to  be  realized  in  the  course  of  time,  would 
fail  His  expectations.  The  omnipotence  of  His  will  centres 
in  the  circumstance  that  the  external  eft'ect  of  His  wish  begins 
to  exist,  not  at  the  precise  moment  when  He  wishes,  but  at 
whatever  remote  moment  of  time  He  chooses  and  decrees. 

PRINCIPLES 

A.  When  He  works,  God  moves  Himself  with  a  species  of 
motion  improperly  so  called.  He  works  without  passing  from 
potency  to  act.     He  is  always  in  action,  never  in  potency. 

B.  It  is  one  thing  to  change  one's  mind,  and  quite  another  to 
wish  a  change  in  things.  By  one  and  the  same  act  of  the  will 
a  person  can  wish  one  thing  and  another  to  happen  at  different 
times. 


THESIS  III  265 

C.  Freedom  implies  in  God  as  well  as  in  creatures  indiffer- 
ence with  regard  to  the  object;  but  this  kind  of  indiSerence  is 
extrinsic  to  the  agent.  Freedom  in  creatures  further  implies 
indifference  to  the  act  of  choice  itself,  and  this  indeed  is  in- 
trinsic to  the  agent,  and  involves  real  change.  But  the  latter 
species  of  indifference  is  absent  from  God,  because  the  act  of 
His  will  is  always  from  eternity. 

D.  To  wish,  viewed  actively,  touches  the  term  or  object  of 
the  wish;  viewed  passively,  it  touches  the  wish  itself,  inasmuch 
as  it  is  an  immanent  act.  To  pass  from  one  wish  to  another, 
viewing  the  wish  actively,  is  no  change;  but  to  pass  from  one 
wish  to  another,  viewing  the  wish  passively,  involves  change. 
God  is  always  in  act,  and  a  stranger  to  wishing,  viewed  pas- 
sively. 

E.  God  can  wish  and  not  wish  with  the  one  act,  because  all 
the  difference  is  in  the  outside  term,  not  in  the  act  itself. 

F.  The  use  of  freedom  in  itself  implies  no  change;  consid- 
ered in  its  term  or  effect,  it  implies  change  in  created  agents  on 
account  of  wishing  viewed  passively;  and  this  view  of  wishing 
is  not  verified  in  God. 

G.  Love  and  hate  in  God  are  one  and  the  same  act  in  point 
of  principle,  different  acts  in  point  of  term  or  object. 

H.  God  passes  from  the  condition  of  non-creator  to  that  of 
creator  by  an  act  eternal  in  point  of  principle,  temporal  in  point 
of  term  or  object,  not  by  an  act  temporal  in  point  of  principle. 

I.  In  God  there  is  in  reality  no  time  before,  no  time  after, 
but  only  according  to  our  way  of  thinking. 

J.  It  is  quite  correct  to  say  that  God  with  a  single  act  of  the 
will  wishes  this,  later  wishes  that  to  happen. 

K.  Freedom  means  power  to  change  one's  mind. 

Ansiver.  In  creatures,  I  grant;  in  God,  I  deny.  Freedom  in 
creatures  is  weighted  with  imperfection,  in  God  it  is  free  from 
same. 

L.  Prayer  changes  God's  mind. 

Answer.  Prayer  leaves  God's  mind  as  it  was  from  eternity. 
In  the  event  that  prayer  was  to  be  neglected,  God's  mind  would 
have  been  other  from  eternity. 

M.  To  pass  from  hate  to  love  is  change. 

Answer.  In  beings  capable  of  potency,  I  grant;  incapable, 
I  again  distinguish:  change  on  the  part  of  God,  intrinsic,  I 


266  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

deny;  change  on  the  part  of  the  term  or  object,  extrinsic,  I 
grant. 

N.  God  assumes  new  denominations  and  these  betoken  change. 

Answer.  New  relative  denominations,  I  grant;  absolute,  I 
deny.  A  white  wall,  without  any  change  on  its  part,  becomes 
like  another  wall  treated  to  a  coat  of  white  paint. 

0.  Incarnation  involves  change  'in  God. 

Answer.  Change  in  humanity  assumed,  I  grant;  in  God  as- 
suming humanity,  I  deny. 

II.     God  is  eternal. 

TERMS 

Eternal.  Eternity  formally  taken  is  duration  essentially 
without  beginning,  tvithout  end,  and  without  succession.  Dura- 
tion is  a  thing's  continuance  in  being,  or  the  period  a  thing 
lasts.  Time,  the  dwation  proper  to  creatures,  has  three  oppo- 
site characteristics :  it  embraces  a  beginning,  an  end  and  succes- 
sion. Causally,  eternity  tallies  with  the  definition  of  Boethius, 
"  Interminabilis  vitae  tota  simul  et  perfecta  possessio."  The 
perfect  possession  of  life  without  limit  and  all  at  once.  No  be- 
ginning, no  end;  no  past,  no  future;  indivisible  now  or  pres- 
ent ;  one  single  fixed  point,  admitting  of  no  division,  vested  with 
all  the  perfection  of  successive  duration.  Eternity  is  duration 
like  time  in  every  respect  save  succession  and  limit.  When 
we  talk  of  the  past  and  future  in  God,  we  are  consulting  our 
own  weak  and  imperfect  power  of  thought  and  speech.  Eter- 
nity must  not  be  conceived  as  time  infinite  from  front  and 
back.  That  indivisible  point,  described  as  eternity,  coexists  with 
all  real  happenings  in  the  course  of  time,  and  therefore  admits 
of  extrinsic  division.  Eternity  is  intrinsic  to  God,  and  there- 
fore a  necessary  attribute;  coexistence  with  things  created  is 
extrinsic  to  God,  and  necessary  only  in  the  hypothesis  of  crea- 
tion, properly  speaking  no  divine  attribute. 

PROOF 

He  is  eternal,  who  goes  on  existing  without  beginning,  with- 
out end,  and  without  succession. 

But  God  goes  on  existing  without  beginning,  without  end, 


THESIS  III  267 

and  without  succession,  because  He  is  the  absolutely  necessary 
and  infinite  being,  and  because  He  is  unchangeable. 
Ergo,  God  is  eternal. 

PRINCIPLES 

A.  The  eternity  essences  and  possibles  have  is  a  gift  they  en- 
joy at  God's  hands,  God's  eternity  is  His  own  by  favor  of  His 
essence.  They  are  eternal  by  participation;  He,  without  par- 
ticipation. 

B.  Inasmuch  as  eternity  coexists  with  this  precise  moment, 
it  does  not  coexist  with  any  set  moment  of  the  past  or  a  future 
year. 

C.  Eternity  becomes  no  larger  with  time,  just  as  the  soul  be- 
comes no  larger  with  the  growing  body.  Neither  soul  nor  eter- 
nity has  large  or  small,  because  both  are  simple,  indivisible  and 
without  quantity.  A  point  on  the  bank  of  a  stream  with  the 
water  flowing  past. 

D.  God  created  eternity  in  the  wide  sense,  not  in  the  strict 
sense ;  of  others,  not  His  own.     God  is  eternity. 

E.  Boethius,  Nunc  stans  makes  eternity,  not  in  reality,  but 
after  our  way  of  thinking.     God  is  eternity. 

F.  God  is  before  and  after  eternity,  in  aeternum  et  ultra, 
Exod.  15.18,  in  wide  sense,  not  in  strict. 

III.     God  is  immense. 

TERMS' 

Immense.  Formally  iaken,  immensity  is  infinite  filling  ex- 
istence, or  infinite  spiritual  occupancy,  or  infinite  capacity  to 
he  spiritually  present.  Considered  in  cause  or  principle,  it  is 
the  power  of  infinite  presence.  With  regard  to  body  space,  it 
is  an  intrinsic  and  essential  attribute  of  the  divine  nature,  in 
virtue  of  which  God  is  intimately  and  substantially  present  to 
every  conceivable  place  and  thing,  possible  as  well  as  actual. 

We  distinguish  three  kinds  of  existence :  circumscriptive, 
proper  to  bodies;  definitive,  proper  to  the  soul  and  angels;  and 
filling  or  all  pervading,  peculiar  and  proper  to  God.  Their  dif- 
ferences admit  of  easy  understanding.  Immensity  is  not  pre- 
cisely omnipresence.     The  whole   difference  between   the   two 


268  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

lies  in  the  reality  or  absence  of  creatures.  Immensity  is  tHe 
root  of  omnipresence,  and  independent  of  creatures;  omnipres- 
ence presupposes  their  existence,  and  is  therefore  hypotheticaJ, 
extrinsic  to  God,  and  an  attribute  only  when  confounded  with 
God's  immensity.  To  say  nothing  of  the  hypostatic  union  in 
Christ  and  the  union  of  grace  in  the  souls  of  the  just,  God  is 
in  creatures  after  a  threefold  manner: 

He  is  in  things  hy  His  essence  or  substance,  inasmuch  as  He 
substantially  exists  wherever  a  creature  exists  or  can  exist,  that 
is  everywhere,  even  in  imaginary  space.  This  is  the  presence 
of  which  our  thesis  speaks,  and  it  accrues  to  God  from  the  fact 
that  He  is  the  actual  or  possible  cause  of  all  things  actual  and 
possible,  and  the  impossibility  of  action  from  a  distance  ren- 
ders it  necessary.  A  body  is  after  this  manner  in  the  space 
it  fills,  and  the  soul's  presence  in  the  body  is  of  the  same 
nature. 

God  is  in  tilings  ty  His  power,  inasmuch  as  everything  in 
nature  is  subject  to  His  rule  and  authority,  inasmuch  as  He 
keeps  all  in  being  and  cooperates  with  all.  In  much  the  same 
way  the  king  is  in  all  his  kingdom.  He  is  in  all  things  hy 
His  presence,  inasmuch  as  all  things  come  under  His  notice  and 
knowledge.  After  this  fashion  a  man  can  be  said  to  be  in  a 
whole  room,  though  he  occupies  only  a  definite  portion  of  the 
same.  By  His  essence-presence  God  pervades  all  things;  by 
His  power-presence  He  preserves  all  things;  by  His  presential 
presence  He  comprehends  all  things.  Every  actual  being, 
whether  a  spirit  or  a  body,  has  two  locations  or  wheres,  one 
intrinsic  the  other  extrinsic.  A  thing's  intrinsic  location  is 
constituted  by  its  substance,  it  is  an  absolute  quality,  and  quite 
independent  of  surrounding  objects.  Extrinsic  location  is  the 
spatial  relation  a  thing  bears  with  some  neighboring  object, 
affecting  it,  when  a  body,  with  contact  of  mass  or  quantity; 
and,  when  a  spirit,  with  contact  of  influence.  A  body's  extrin- 
sic location  is  determined  by  the  outer  surface  of  some  enclos- 
ing medium ;  its  intrinsic  location  is  determined  by  its  own  outer 
surface.  The  enclosing  medium  can  be  changed,  removed,  or 
destroyed  without  at  all  influencing  the  thing's  intrinsic  loca- 
tion. Adsence  would  be  the  right  term  for  intrinsic  location, 
as  presence  is  for  extrinsic.  God's  intrinsic  location  is  His 
immensity.     It  is  without  bound  or  limit,  permeating  and  per- 


THESIS  III  269 

vading  everything,  as  much  an  actuality  in  imaginary  as  in 
real  space. 

PROOFS 

1°.  Immensity  is  a  simple  perfection,  infinite  in  the  case  of 
God,  and  actual.  But  no  perfection  of  the  kind  can  be  absent 
from  God.     Ergo,  God  is  immense. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  It  is  simple  because  it  involves 
no  imperfection.  Immensity  is  infinite  definitive  existence; 
and,  in  virtue  of  definitive  existence,  the  soul  after  its  own  meas- 
ure surpasses  whatever  material  atom  or  body.  Definitive  exist- 
ence, proper  to  the  soul,  is  a  closer  approach  to  immensity  than 
circumscriptive,  the  badge  of  bodies.  It  is  infinite  in  the  case 
of  God,  because  infinite  essence  calls  for  infinity  in  every  par- 
ticular, even  in  the  matter  of  coexistence  with  outside  objects. 
God's  coexistence  is  infinite  in  itself;  finite  by  accident,  because 
outside  objects  are  finite.  It  is  actual,  because  God  is  pure  act, 
with  no  suspicion  of  potency,  and  whatever  belongs  to  His  in- 
trinsic constitution  is  always  from  eternity  to  eternity. 

2°.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  our  world  actually  exists  in,  and  is 
enclosed  by,  imaginary  space.  God  ought  to  enjoy  the  same 
perfection.  Imaginary  space  is  not  altogether  nothing.  It  is 
emptiness  stretching  in  every  direction,  without  a  body  in  sight, 
but  fit  always  to  be  filled  with  bodies.  There  is  nothing  to 
prevent  God  from  creating  an  angel,  or  a  man,  or  anything 
else,  in  imaginary  space;  and,  in  the  event  of  such  a  creation, 
to  save  Him  from  change,  we  must  consider  Him  a  reality  in 
imaginary  space,  prior  to  the  production  of  the  angel  or  man. 
Eeal  space  is  the  world's  intrinsic  locus,  imaginary  space  is  its 
extrinsic  locus.     Both  are  equally  God's  intrinsic  locus. 

PRINCIPLES 

A.  Heaven  is  said  to  be  God's  special  and  proper  abode  only 
after  a  manner,  and  inasmuch  as  He  there  manifests  Himself 
by  way  of  reward  to  the  elect. 

B.  God  exists  in  foul  places,  without  at  all  contracting  harm. 
God  is  distinct  from  the  places  He  occupies,  and  no  physical 
union  intervenes.     The  sun  can  serve  for  illustration. 


270  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

C.  God  approaches  us  and  withdraws  from  us  only  in  a  meta- 
phorical and  figurative  sense. 

D.  In  imaginary  space  nothing  but  God  exists,  with  imag- 
inary space  for  intrinsic  locus;  and  nothing  but  God,  far  from 
being  pure  and  simple  nothing,  is  a  mighty  large  something. 

E.  The  terms  here  and  where  are  applicable  to  not  only  ac- 
tual but  also  possible  bodies. 

F.  Chrysostom  and  Augustine  say  that  God  is  nowhere,  be- 
cause He  cannot  exist  in  place.  That  kind  of  existence  is  char- 
acteristic of  bodies. 

Answer.  They  deny  circumscriptive  and  definitive  presence 
of  God,  not  filling  or  pervading  presence.  In  much  the  same 
way  they  contend  that  God  does  not  exist  in  time,  meaning 
that  His  existence  is  a  stranger  to  succession,  without  at  all 
questioning  His  coexistence  with  time. 

G.  God  is  indivisible,  and  cannot  be  in  two  places  or  times. 

Answer.  There  are  two  kinds  of  indivisibles,  one  of  quan- 
tity, the  other  outside  of  quantity.  A  point  and  a  moment  are 
instances  of  the  first  kind.  The  soul,  an  angel  and  God  are 
instances  of  the  second  kind.  A  point  or  a  moment  cannot 
exist  in  two  places  or  times ;  but  by  their  influence,  not  by  their 
mass  or  quantity, —  they  have  none  —  the  soul,  an  angel  and 
God  can  be  in  many  places  and  many  times. 

H.  What  exists  whole  and  entire  anywhere  cannot  exist  out- 
side of  that  place.     Ergo. 

Answer.  What  exists  whole  and  entire  by  wholeness  of  quan- 
tity, I  grant;  by  wholeness  of  essence,  I  deny.  A\Tiiteness  in 
whole  wall,  and  in  part  of  the  wall,  can  serve  for  illustration. 

/.  The  stronger  the  agent,  the  more  able  to  work  from  a 
distance.     Ergo,  God  need  not  be  present  to  His  effects. 

Answer.  Always  with  a  medium,  I  grant;  otherwise,  I  deny. 
Actio  in  distans,  is  a  contradiction. 


THESIS  IV 

God  knows  all  past,  present,  future,  possible  and  futurihle 
things. 

Jouin,  pp.  238-243.     Boedder,  pp.  255-290. 

TERMS 

God's  hnoivledge.  God,  because  infinite,  is  a  spirit  enjoying 
the  most  perfect  conceivable  kind  of  life.  Only  simple  perfec- 
tions are  formally  in  God,  mixed  perfections  exist  in  Him  vir- 
tually and  eminently.  Intellectual  life,  manifest  in  thought 
and  wish,  is  the  one  kind  of  life  free  from  every  admixture  of 
imperfection,  the  one  brand  of  life  deserving  the  title  simple 
perfection.  All  created  life,  intellectual  as  well  as  sensitive  and 
vegetative,  is  a  mixed  perfection  and  has  no  formal  being  in 
God.  Life  in  God  is  pure  act,  with  no  suspicion  or  trace  of 
mere  potency;  it  is  substance,  and  no  accident;  it  is  identical 
with  God's  own  essence;  infinite  and  wholly  devoid  of  parts. 
And  what  is  true  of  God's  life  is  true  of  His  knowledge.  God's 
knowledge  is  God's  life,  God's  substance,  God's  essence.  His 
knowledge  is  one  single  act,  not  made  up  like  ours  of  many 
different  acts.  In  God's  knowledge  all  the  multiplicity  is  in 
its  terms  or  objects;  in  our  knowledge  every  new  term  or  object 
calls  for  a  new  act,  and  acts  in  our  case  are  as  numerous  or  mul- 
tiplied as  the  terms  or  objects  of  our  knowledge.  There  is  no 
past  or  future  with  God,  everything  is  present.  God  with  one 
single  act  of  His  mind  reaches  whatever  is  capable  of  being 
known,  in  all  the  wide  range  of  its  knowability.  And  the  rea- 
son is  plain.  Otherwise  a  higher  and  better  intelligence  could 
be  conceived  or  thought,  and  God's  knowledge  would  fall  short 
of  being  infinite.  He  knows  all  things,  and  knows  them  ex- 
haustively or  comprehensively. 

The  determining  principle  of  God's  knowledge,  the  agency 
substituting  in  God  for  the  imprinted  intelligible  image  in  our 
knowledge,  the  actual  and  sufficient  reason  of  His  knowledge, 

271 


272  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

is  His  divine  essence.     His  essence  is  term-object  as  well  as 
motive-object  of  His  knowledge.     On  this  account  God's  essence 
is  the  one  primary  object  of  His  knowledge.     Everything  out- 
side of  God  is  a  mere  term-object,  a  secondary  object  of  His 
knowledge.     All  this,  to  preclude  difficulties,  and  free  God  from 
suspicion  of  dependence  for  His  knowledge  on  things  outside 
of  Himself.     In  addition  to  our  essence  we  have  need  of  the 
imprinted  intelligible  image  to  understand,  because  of  our  in- 
difference and  potency  to  actual  knowledge,  ignorant  now  and 
knowing  a  moment  later.     God  has  no  sucli  need.     His  essence 
is  enough  to  explain  all,  as  He  is  pure  act,  and  a  stranger  to 
mere  potency.     God's  essence  is  primary  object  of  His  knowl- 
edge, because  it  is  what  He  first  knows,  and  that  by  which  He 
knows  everything  else.     It  would  be  wrong  to  say  that  God  has 
many  ideas  in  the  same  sense  as  ourselves.     He  has  but  one 
idea,  and  this  single  idea  is  representative  of  whatever  is  know- 
able.     His  idea  is  one,  its  terms  are  without  number.     If  God 
knew  one  thing  after  another,  like  ourselves.  He  would  know 
an  infinite  numl)er.     But,  as  a  matter  of  fact.  He  knows  infinite 
things  all  at  once  and  by  the  same  single  act.     No  absurdity 
attaches  to  infinite  multitude,  but  to  infinite  number,  which  is 
multitude  measured  with  some  unit  for  standard.     God's  essence 
is  different  from  aught  else,  and  yet  it  is  the  means  God  em- 
ploys to  know  aught  else,  because  it  eminently  and  virtually 
contains  everything  else. 

Past,  present,  future,  possible  and  futnrihle  things.  God's 
knowledge  is  threefold:  1,  knowledge  of  vision,  2,  knowledge  of 
simple  intelligence,  3,  intermediate  knowledge;  with  actuals,  pos- 
sibles, and  futuribles  for  respective  objects.  In  Scholastic  lan- 
guage God's  knowledge  is :  scientia  visionis,  scientia  simplicis  in- 
telligentiae,  and  scientia  media.  We  repeat  that  there  is  no  past 
or  future  with  God,  everything  is  present.  Knowledge  in  God 
comprises  no  many  different  acts,  God's  knowledge  is  one  act,  and 
God's  knowledge  is  His  substance.  The  names  we  employ  are 
derived  from  the  process  human  knowledge  follows.  We  see  only 
actually  present  objects,  we  understand  essences  whether  pres- 
ent or  absent,  and  we  discourse  of  things  that  are  not,  but  would 
be  in  the  event  of  a  certain  condition's  fulfillment.  Therefore 
God's  knowledge  of  vinon  has  for  object  things  vested  with 
actual  existence,  whether  in  the  past,  the  present,  or  the  future. 


THESIS  IV  273 

His  knowledge  of  simple  intelligence  lias  for  object  pure  pos- 
sibles or  essences  never  vested  with  actual  existence.  His  in- 
termediate knowledge  has  for  object  futuribiles,  or  free  condi- 
tioned futures,  or  futures  dependent  on  a  double  condition,  the 
exercise  of  free  will  along  with  some  different  and  distinct  con- 
dition. Conditional  futures  are  not  the  same  as  futuribles. 
Conditional  futures  are  reducible  to  absolute  futures;  and,  as 
such,  form  part  of  God's  knowledge  of  vision.  Futuribles  are 
not  reducible  to  absolute  futures  or  mere  possibles,  and  so  con- 
stitute a  third  object  of  God's  knowledge,  distinct  from  objects 
embraced  by  God's  vision  and  simple  intelligence.  The  knowl- 
edge in  God  concerned  with  futuribles  is  called  intermediate, 
because  it  partakes  of  the  nature  of  both  vision  and  simple  in- 
telligence, without  being  identical  with  either.  Their  possibil- 
ity in  the  abstract  is  matter  for  simple  intelligence,  and  their 
impossibility  in  the  concrete  is  matter  for  vision;  and  the  di- 
vine knowledge  embracing  the  two  we  denominate  media  or 
intermediate.  Simple  intelligence  is  necessary  knowledge  in 
God,  and  precedes  every  free  decree,  not  in  the  order  of  time  or 
of  nature,  but  of  power  or  origin.  Vision  is  contingent  knowl- 
edge and  follows  a  free  decree,  not  in  time  but  in  nature.  In- 
termediate agrees  with  simple  intelligence,  inasmuch  as  it  pre- 
cedes every  free  decree;  it  differs  from  same,  inasmuch  as  it  is 
contingent  knowledge.  Intermediate  agrees  with  vision,  inas- 
much as  it  is  contingent  knowledge;  it  differs  from  same,  inas- 
much as  it  precedes  every  free  decree.  A  futurible  is  more 
than  a  possible  viewed  precisely  as  such,  and  therefore  it  is  out- 
side the  range  of  simple  intelligence.  It  is  a  possible  with  a 
bearing  on  actuality,  destined  in  default  of  a  condition  to  never 
materialize,  and  therefore  it  is  outside  the  range  of  vision. 

For  obvious  reasons  God's  essence  is  called  the  necessary  ob- 
ject of  His  knowledge.  Things  outside  of  God,  like  past,  pres- 
ent, future  and  futurible  things,  are  for  equally  obvious  reasons 
called  the  contingent  or  hypothetical  objects  of  God's  knowl- 
edge. The  past  is  what  once  was  and  is  no  more;  the  present 
is  what  now  is;  and  the  future  is  what  is  going  to  be,  though 
nothing  now.  A  necessary  future  depends  on  created  causes 
that  follow  necessary  law,  like  the  next  eclipse.  A  free  future 
depends  on  free  will,  whether  mediately  or  immediately.  An 
instance  would  be,  John  will  eat  to-morrow  at  nine.     A  future. 


274  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

whether  necessary  or  free,  is  said  to  be  absolute,  when  its  orig- 
inating cause  is  effective  and  prerequisite  conditions  are  veri- 
fied. It  is  said  to  be  conditioned,  when  its  cause  and  condi- 
tions never  materialize.  This  last  sort  of  future  is  known  as 
a  futurible,  and  is  what  would  happen  in  event  of  certain  con- 
ditions, but  never  will  happen  because  the  conditions  will  not 
be  verified.  An  instance  would  be.  Were  John  invited  to  the 
game,  and  he  never  will  be  invited,  he  would  excuse  himself  on 
the  plea  of  business.  Were  miracles  worked  in  Corozain,  and 
they  never  will  be  worked,  its  people  would  be  converted. 

About  God's  knowledge  of  past  and  present  there  can  be  no 
difficulty.     Such  knowledge  is  within  man's  reach,  and  it  would 
be  blasphemy  to  reckon  God  inferior  to  man.     About  futures 
and  futuribles  the  question  is  not  so  easy,  and  calls  for  proof 
as  well  as  explanation.     Past  and  future  say  a  relation  to  the 
present.     They  are  respectively  a  long  or  short  distance  behind 
or  in  front  of  the  present.     God  antedates  everything,  and  God 
always  exists.     When  events  are  taken  as  terms  of  God's  de- 
crees, God  antedates  them  in  time ;  when  they  are  taken  as  these 
decrees  themselves,  God  is  simultaneous  with  them  in  time,  prior 
to  them  in  nature.     In  our  case  the  future  often  becomes  a 
reality  only  after  we  cease  to  exist,  many  events  in  the  past  were 
actual  realities  before  we  began  to  be;  but  in  the  case  of  God 
nothing  of  the  kind  can  possibly  happen.     He  is  present  to 
whatever  future.  He  is  present  to  whatever  past;  and  all  this 
in  virtue  of  the  double  fact  that  past,  present  and  future  are 
bound  up  in  His  decrees  from  eternity,  and  that  He  always 
was,  always  is,  and  always  shall  be.     Time  works  no  change  in 
God,  it  works  changes  in  things  outside  of  God.     We  know  the 
present  because  it  is  an  actual  reality.     We  know  the  past  be- 
cause it  was  once  an  actual  reality.     We  can  guess  at  the  future 
without  precisely  knowing  it,  because  it  never  was  and  is  not 
now  an  actual  reality.     But  with  God,  in  virtue  of  His  eternal 
decrees,  the  future  is  as  mucli  an  actual  reality  as  the  past  and 
the  present.     All  things  are  futures  with  reference  to  God,  be- 
cause His  existence  precedes  them;   all  are  presents,  because 
actual  from  eternity  in  His  divine  decrees ;  all  are  pasts,  because 
He  outlives  them  all. 

Whatever  has  a  determined  being  has  a  determined  truth, 
and  determined  truth  is  the  one  requisite  for  knowledge  on  the 


THESIS  IV  275 

part  of  the  mind's  object.  Whatever  is,  is  knowable ;  and  every- 
thing knowable  is  necessarily  known  to  the  infinite  mind.  That 
past,  present,  future,  possible,  and  futurible  things  are,  is  plain 
from  their  several  definitions.  The  past  is  that  which  was ;  the 
present  is  that  which  is;  the  future  is  that  which  will  be;  the 
possible  is  that  which  can  be,  but  never  will  be;  the  futurible 
is  that  which  can  be  and  never  will  be,  but  would  be  under  cer- 
tain conditions  not  to  be  verified.  To  resume,  there  can  be  no 
difficulty  about  God's  knowledge  of  past  and  present  things  and 
of  necessary  futures.  Free  futures  are  of  two  kinds,  absolute 
and  contingent.  In  absolute  free  futures  the  consent  of  the 
will  is  the  one  requisite  condition  for  their  knowledge.  In 
contingent  free  futures,  or  futuribles  some  added  condition  at- 
taches to  consent  of  the  will.  To  the  mind  of  God  necessary 
futures  are  as  much  facts  as  the  past  or  the  present.  Absolute 
free  futures  are  as  much  facts  as  necessary  futures,  in  the  event 
that  God  knows  beforehand  how  the  will  is  going  to  choose. 
This  foreknowledge  must  in  no  way  interfere  with  human  free- 
dom; and  in  this  particular  we  clash  with  such  Thomists  as 
advocate  physical  predetermination.  Contingent  free  futures 
or  futuribles  are  as  much  facts  as  necessary  futures,  in  the  event 
that  God  knows  beforehand  how  the  will  would  choose,  were 
certain  conditions  verified.  In  futuribles  God  must  know  two 
things,  the  will's  choice  and  the  conditions  to  be  verified. 

About  absolute  free  futures  St.  Augustine  says :  "  As  your 
memory  of  past  events  never  forced  them  into  being,  so  God's 
foreknowledge  of  future  events  never  forced  them  into  being." 
Dante  beautifully  expkins  tlie  thing,  when  he  compares  the 
bearing  of  God's  foreknowledge  on  a  free  agent's  future  acts 
wdth  the  bearing  of  a  spectator's  knowledge  on  the  direction 
a  ship  takes  under  influence  of  wind  and  tide.  The  will  in 
course  of  time  never  chooses  this  or  that  because  God  foresaw 
the  choice,  but  God  foresees  the  choice  because  the  will  is  go- 
ing to  so  choose.  God's  foreknowledge  is  not  the  cause  of  our 
choice;  our  choice,  on  the  contrary,  is  the  cause  of  God's  fore- 
knowledge; not  indeed  the  determining  cause,  which  is  His 
essence  alone,  but  the  terminating  cause,  or  conditio  sine  qua 
non.  What  God  foreknows,  necessarily  happens;  but  we  recog- 
nize a  twofold  necessity,  antecedent  and  consequent.  Ante- 
cedent necessity  has   play   in  necessary  causes,   and  has   play 


276  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

prior  to  the  act;  consequent  has  place  in  free  causes,  and  is  sub- 
sequent to  the  act.  Antecedent  destroys  freedom;  consequent  is 
compatible  with  freedom.  Even  a  free  act  must  be,  when  it 
is  once  placed  or  put.  God's  knowledge  of  free  futures,  like 
man's  freedom  of  choice,  acknowledges  consequent  necessity,  it 
repudiates  antecedent  necessity.  God's  knowledge,  like  all 
knowledge,  presupposes  its  object;  but  this  precedence  of  object 
is  precedence  of  termination,  not  of  determination.  God's 
knowledge  in  point  of  determination  precedes  its  object  in  the 
order  of  time  as  well  as  of  nature,  when  there  is  question  of 
men's  free  acts  taken  as  realities.  In  much  the  same  way  God's 
knowledge  depends  on  our  freedom  terminatively,  not  determi- 
natively;  and  terminative  dependence  is  no  intrinsic  imperfec- 
tion in  God.  The  reality  of  a  futurible  is  not  absolute,  but 
only  hypothetical;  and  one  as  well  as  the  other  can  base  knowl- 
edge. 

DIVISION 

Three  Parts  — I,  II,  III 

7.  Past,  present,  and  possible  things.  II.  Necessary  futures 
and  absolute  free  futures.  III.  Contingent  free  futures,  or  fu- 
turibles. 

PROOFS 

I.  1°.  Knowledge  of  past,  present  and  possible  things  is  a 
simple  perfection.     Ergo,  it  exists  in  God. 

2°.  Man  enjoys  this  knowledge.  Ergo,  God  a  fortiori  enjoys 
the  same. 

II.  1°.  God  knows  whatever  is  vested  with  determined  or  set 
truth,  and  is  therefore  knowable.  But  necessary  futures  and 
absolute  free  futures  are  vested  with  determined  truth.     Ergo. 

WitJi  regard  to  the  Minor.  Whatever  event  as  a  matter  of 
fact  has  place  in  the  future  is  nothing  vague  or  undetermined, 
even  before  its  occurrence.  Before  its  occurrence  it  is  a  some- 
thing as  set  and  fixed  as  it  is  after  its  occurrence,  of  course  in 
the  logical  not  in  the  real  order. 

2°.  In  the  matter  of  actuality  the  future  is  no  worse  off  than 
the  past;  and  yet  nobody  hesitates  to  ascribe  knowledge  of  the 
past  to  man  himself. 


I 


THESIS  IV  277 

3°.  It  is  unworthy  God  to  suppose  that  He  learns  by  degrees, 
or  to  think  tliat  to  know  the  future  He  must  wait  till  it  happens 
in  the  real  order  of  things. 

4°.  Without  this  knowledge  of  necessary  futures  and  abso- 
lute free  futures  God  would  be  no  effective  ruler  of  the  universe. 
Such  knowledge  is  a  requisite  for  providence. 

///.  1°.  Every  statement  regarding  futuribles  contains  set 
or  fixed  truth,  and  therefore  futuribles  are  knowable  objects. 
But  God  knows  everything  knowable.  Ergo,  God  knows  fu- 
turibles. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  The  thing  is  plain  in  absolute 
free  futures.  Eegarding  Peter  in  fixed  conditions  one  of  two 
contradictories  must  necessarily  be  true.  Either  he  will  sin, 
or  he  will  not  sin.  He  cannot  do  the  two  things,  sin  and  at 
the  same  time  not  sin.  The  thing  ought  to  be  equally  plain  in 
contingent  free  futures  or  futuribles.  Eegarding  Peter  in  dif- 
ferent conditions  one  of  two  contradictories  must  necessarily  be 
true.  Either  he  would  sin,  or  he  would  not  sin.  He  could 
never  do  the  two  things,  sin  and  at  the  same  time  not  sin. 

2°.  Without  this  knowledge  of  futuribles  God,  desirous  of 
some  effect,  would  have  to  make  trial  of  several  different  means. 
But  every  such  need  is  derogatory  to  God's  dignity.  Ergo, 
God  knows  futuribles. 

3°.  Knowledge  of  futuribles  is  a  very  desirable  perfection. 
Ergo,  it  belongs  to  God. 

4°.  Knowledge  of  futuribles  is  a  requisite  for  providence. 
Ergo,  it  belongs  to  God. 

5°.  All  men  ascribe  this  knowledge  to  God.     Ergo. 

Scholion  I.     About  Absolute  Free  Futures. 

The  fact  that  God  knows  absolute  free  futures  and  futuribles 
is  easy  enough  of  comprehension,  but  the  process  by  which  He 
knows  them  is  somewliat  obscure.  And  first  with  regard  to 
absolute  free  futures.  Some  Thomists  maintain  that  God  knows 
them  in  predetermining  decrees.  These  decrees  are  wishes  on 
the  part  of  God,  ordaining  the  future  act  prior  to  all  foreknowl- 
edge of  the  agent's  behavior.  Therefore  the  last  reason  why 
G^d  knows  absolute  free  futures  is  because  He  formulates  a 
decree,  establishing  the  future  event  prior  to  all  foreknowledge 
of  the  future  event  itself.     To  bring  about  such  events  God 


278  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

therefore  employs  physical  predetermination,  He  energizes  the 
will  by  antecedent  pressure.  This  predetermination,  according 
to  Goudin,  a  good  Thomist,  is  a  quality  transient  in  nature, 
communicated  to  the  ivill,  and  binding  the  will,  without  a  chance 
of  escape,  to  a  fixed  act.  These  decrees  unduly  exalt  God's 
power,  to  insult  and  destroy  man's  feedom.  We  maintain, 
therefore,  that  they  are  superfluous  and  hurtful  to  human  free- 
dom. They  are  superfJuovs  for  four  main  reasons.  Physical 
predetermination  is  not  needed  to  explain  God's  quality  of 

a,  first  cause, 

b.  His  supreme  dominion, 

c.  His  foreknowledge,  or 

d,  the  will's  indifference. 

a.  These  four  facts  are  enough  to  constitute  God  first  cause 
of  man's  free  acts : 

1.  He  makes  the  will  and  its  energies. 

2.  He  predetermines  it  to  good  in  general,  the  summum 
bonum. 

3.  With  the  help  of  the  other  faculties  He  sets  the  will  in  mo- 
tion by  proposing  some  particular  and  finite  good. 

4.  He  contributes  to  the  act  by  simultaneous  cooperation  with 
the  will. 

b.  Dominion  is  twofold,  moral  and  physical.  God's  total 
dominion  is  manifest  in  His  bestowal  or  refusal  of  cooperation, 
and  in  His  arrangement  of  circumstances  with  a  view  to  this 
or  that  foreseen  act  of  the  will. 

c.  God's  foreknowledge  is  abundantly  explained  by  His  in- 
termediate knowledge,  in  conjunction  with  His  decree  to  co- 
operate with  the  will. 

d.  The  will's  indifference  is  active  as  well  as  passive,  and 
must  not  be  tampered  with  by  any  stress  brought  to  bear  on 
its  inner  nature.  Mere  passive  indifference  leaves  freedom  in- 
complete, active  gives  it  completion  and  finish.  T.his  active 
indifference  can  be  said  to  be  objectively  lifted  by  the  good  in 
question,  not  effectively.  It  is  formally  lifted  by  the  will  it- 
self engaged  in  actual  choice. 

Physical  predetermination  is  hurtful  to  human  freedom,  be- 
cause it  is  a  prerequisite  for  every  act  of  the  will;  and,  when 


THESIS  IV  279 

once  present,  the  will  is  no  longer  able  to  omit  the  act  or  put 
its  contrary.     But  freedom  is  on  all  sides  admitted  to  be  that 
capacity  of  the  will,  in  virtue  of  which,  with  every  prerequisite 
for  activity  present  and  verified,  the  will  is  still  able  to  omit 
the  act  or  put  its  contrary.     All   Thomists  consider  physical 
predetermination   a  simple   prerequisite.     Billuart  tries   to  get 
round  the  difficulty  with  the  help  of  a  time-honored  distinction, 
sensu  composite  and  sensu  diviso,  compound  sense  and  divided 
sense.     And  he  alleges   this   example.     A  man  seated  cannot 
walk.     True  in  compound  sense,  untrue  in  divided  sense.     In 
much  the  same  way,  the  will  with  physical  predetermination 
cannot  choose  in  compound  sense,  though  it  can  still  choose  in 
divided  sense.     No  parity.     Physical  predetermination  is  a  pre- 
requisite  for   willing;   sitting  is   no  prerequisite   for   walking. 
You  can  separate  sitting  from  walking,  you  cannot  separate 
physical    predetermination    from    willing.     Nobody    can    walk 
while  he  remains  seated,  and  nobody  can  choose  when  com- 
pelled by  physical  predetermination.     A  man  seated  can  change 
his  position,  a  man  willing  cannot  get  away  from  physical  pre- 
determination.    Were  sitting  a  prerequisite  for  walking,  no  man 
could  ever  walk;   and,  because  physical  predetermination  is  a 
prerequisite  for  willing,  no  man  can  ever  choose.     This  potency 
to  choose  in  divided  sense  is  no  potency  at  all;  because  the  one 
prerequisite  for  the  contrary  act,  namely  physical  predetermina- 
tion, is  forever  wanting.     Every  such  potency  is  metaphysically 
iiTeducible  to  act,  and  therefore  vain  and  empty,  a  mere  fig- 
ment of  the  mind,  and  of  no  practical  use  whatever.     Freedom 
of  the  sort  would  be  lame  and  halt,  altogether  incomplete,  be- 
cause forever  without  its  essential  prerequisite,   corresponding 
physical  predetermination.     It  would  be  freedom  to  put  one 
set  act,  and  tliat  is  no  freedom  at  all.     To  omit  the  act,  to  put 
its  contrary,  would  be  altogether  out  of  the  question,  because 
physical  predetermination  to  one  thing  or  the  other  would  never 
be  verified. 

Billuart  thinks  he  sees  a  resemblance  between  his  physical 
predetermination  and  the  foreknowledge  of  a  man's  free  act 
we  vindicate  to  God.  They  are  both  prerequisites,  but  there 
the  resemblance  ceases.  Predetermination  imposes  antecedent 
necessity  on  the  will;  foreknowledge  imposes  only  consequent 
necessity,  because  it  presupposes  man's  actual  exercise  of  his 


280  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

freedom.  Billuart  then  appeals  to  mystery,  saying  that  God  in 
some  strange  and  hidden  way  moves  the  will  in  a  manner  be- 
fitting its  nature.  But  mysteries  are  matter  of  revelation,  and 
God  is  their  author,  not  Billuart  or  the  Thomists.  Besides, 
mysteries  involve  no  contradiction,  and  free  will  physically  pre- 
determined is  a  square  circle.  We  admit  the  maxim,  omne 
movens  motum,  motion  on  the  part  of  a  mover  precedes  move- 
ment in  the  thing  moved.  But  God  is  mover  enough  without 
physical  predetermination.  He  moves  the  will  by  implanting 
in  it  a  natural  desire  for  happiness,  a  leaning  towards  good  in 
general,  the  summum  bonum ;  by  the  proposal  of  particular 
goods,  and  by  simultaneous  cooperation  with  the  will  in  all  its 
acts.  To  the  objection  that  God  in  our  system  would  be  unable 
to  get  from  man  whatever  act  He  wants,  we  answer  that  God 
is  still  supreme  Lord  of  animals,  plants  and  stones,  though  He 
cannot  squeeze  a  thought  from  them.  Besides,  grace,  coupled 
with  consent  and  foreknown  as  such,  can  enable  God  to  get  from 
man  whatever  act  He  wants. 

P.S.  God  and  the  will  together  choose,  or  determine  the 
man's  act;  but  God  must  not  on  this  account  be  called  its  de- 
termining cause.  God  and  the  eye  see  together,  vision  is  a  body- 
act,  accomplished  with  the  help  of  organs;  and  yet  God  must 
not  be  said  to  see  corporeally  or  employ  organs.  All  this  about 
absolute  free  futures  and  physical  predetermination,  according 
to  Thomists  their  single  explanation.  Therefore,  with  Thomists 
God  knows  absolute  free  futures  in  these  physically  predeter- 
mining decrees.  We  reject  all  such  decrees  in  the  matter  of 
absolute  free  futures;  and  must  otherwise  explain  God's  man- 
ner of  knowing  them.  God  of  course  knows  all  tilings,  past, 
present,  future  and  futurible  in  His  essence  as  in  formal  object. 
When  we  say  He  knows  things  in  anything  else,  we  mean  to 
introduce  no  new  formal  object,  but  merely  assign  the  root- 
reason  why  His  essence  represents  absolute  free  futures  and  fu- 
turibles  to  His  intellect.  We  maintain  that  God  knows  abso- 
lute free  futures  in  themselves  and  in  a  mutual  combination  of 
His  intermediate  knowledge  and  a  resultant  decree.  He  knows 
absolute  free  futures  in  themselves,  because  they  are  in  His 
essence  only  eminently,  and  He  must  know  them  formally;  be- 
cause they  must  influence  His  intellect  at  least  intentionally,  as 
the  sound  of  the  bell  when  one  has  vowed  to  say  a  Hail  Mary 


THESIS  IV  281 

when  the  bell  rings ;  because  they  are  the  root-basis  of  the  di- 
vine knowledge  touching  them.  He  knows  absolute  free  fu- 
tures in  a  mutual  combination  of  His  intermediate  knowledge 
and  a  resultant  decree,  because  this  is  the  process.  If  I  gave 
Peter  grace  A,  Peter  would  consent.  I  will  give  Peter  grace  A. 
Ergo,  Peter  will  consent.  The  Major  is  a  matter  of  interme- 
diate knowledge;  the  Minor  is  a  resultant  decree. 

PRINCIPLES 

A.  Opponents  object  and  say,  God  knows  things  inasmuch 
as  He  is  their  cause.  We  distinguish :  By  vision  for  actuals, 
by  intelligence  for  possibles,  by  intermediate  for  futuribles. 
Necessary  futures  belong  to  vision;  absolute  free  futures  and 
contingent  free  futures  or  futuribles,  to  intermediate.  For  ex- 
planation see  page  272.  The  medium  God  employs,  when  He 
knows  absolute  free  futures  in  themselves,  is  infallible,  because 
His  knowledge  is  posterior,  not  prior  to  act's  futurity.  Things 
would  stir  God  to  knowledge  in  sense  of  objective  conditions, 
not  in  sense  of  physically  determining  motives.  At  most,  things 
would  be  intentionally  determining  motives,  and  no  imperfec- 
tion or  dependence  attaches  to  that  kind  of  motive.  In  no  sense 
of  the  word  must  God  be  said  to  know  absolute  free  futures  in 
physically  predetermining  decrees,  because  man's  freedom  must 
be  kept  intact. 

B.  Regarding  God's  way  of  knowing  futuribles,  the  Thomists 
introduce  as  mediums  what  they  call  subjectively  absolute,  ob- 
jectively conditional  decrees,  decrees  actually  had  but  suspended 
in  effect  till  a  condition  is  verified.  We  deny  every  such  decree 
in  God,  while  ready  to  recognize  subjectively  conditional  decrees, 
not  what  is,  but  what  would  be.  God  knows  futuribles  not  in 
these  decrees  of  the  Thomists,  but  in  themselves,  inasmuch  as 
the  actual  existence  they  would  have  in  the  event  of  a  certain 
condition  is  the  ultimate  reason  and  basis  of  God's  knowledge 
touching  them.  Scripture  is  witness  to  God's  knowledge  of 
futuribles  in  St.  Matthew  11-21.  "Woe  to  thee,  Corozain,  woe 
to  thee,  Bethsaida;  for,  if  in  Tyre  and  Sidon  had  been  wrought 
the  miracles  that  have  been  wrought  in  you,  they  had  long  ago 
done  penance  in  sackcloth  and  ashes,"  Besides,  were  God  with- 
out this  knowledge,  He  would  be  held  to  the  unworthy  expe- 


282  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

dient  of  making  trial  or  experiment.  In  Matthew  Corozain 
and  Bethsaida  stand  for  the  Jews;  Tyre  and  Sidon,  for  the 
Gentiles.  Miracles  were  worked  for  the  Jews,  not  for  the  Gen- 
tiles. The  Jews  in  spite  of  miracles  failed  of  conversion;  the 
Gentiles  would  have  been  converted  in  the  event  of  the  same 
miracles.  And  Christ  reproaches  the  Jews  as  guilty  of  a  heav- 
ier condemnation  than  the  Gentiles.  Hence  we  argue.  Had 
God  foreknown  the  conversion  of  the  Gentiles  in  these  decrees 
of  the  Thomists,  the  Jews  could  have  objected  and  said  that  the 
Gentiles  would  -have  done  only  what  they  could  not  help  doing, 
and  would  have  deserved  no  credit  for  their  conversion.  Phys- 
ical predetermination  would  have  converted  the  Gentiles  in  the 
event  of  miracles.  The  reproach  made  the  Jews  would  be  un- 
reasonable, because  through  no  will  of  their  own  they  were  with- 
out physical  predetermination,  a  necessary  prerequisite  for  con- 
version, and  the  Gentiles  would  be  possessed  of  the  same.  Nor 
will  it  do  to  say  that  the  Jews  were  denied  physical  predeter- 
mination because  of  their  sins.  Successive  sins  would  then  re- 
sult from  successive  privations  of  physical  predetermination,  and 
progress  would  be  made  towards  an  infinite  series. 

Billuart  has  two  reasons  for  thinking  this  complaint  of  the 
Jews  without  foundation : 

1.  They  had  sufficient  grace;  they  had  the  power,  though 
that  power  was  of  no  avail  without  physical  predetermination. 
And  he  appeals  to  these  examples.  Fire  is  able  to  burn,  bread 
to  nourish,  mind  to  understand;  though  the  fire  must  be  ap- 
plied, the  bread  must  be  eaten,  and  the  mind  must  have  species 
or  images.  To  this  we  answer  that  sufficient  grace  of  this  kind 
confers  only  a  tied  up  power,  nowise  reducible  to  act.  It  is 
like  handing  a  man  a  sword,  binding  him  with  ropes,  and  then 
telling  him  to  defend  himself.  The  predetermination  is  a  pre- 
requisite. 

2.  The  hardness  of  heart  and  ingratitude  displayed  by  the 
Jews  account  for  their  privation  of  physical  predetermination. 
But  this  is  only  to  move  the  difficulty  back.  Predetermination 
is  refused  now,  because  it  was  refused  on  a  former  occasion. 

C.  This  passage  in  St.  Paul  would  seem  to  favor  Thomism: 
"  He  hath  mercy  on  whom  He  will,  and  whom  He  will  He  hard- 
eneth."  Rom.  9.18.  But  the  apostle  is  talking  of  a  call  to  the 
faitli,   not   of   predestination.     Men   called   to   the    faith   have 


THESIS  IV  283 

not  merited  the  favor,  men  not  called  to  the  faith  miss  the  favor 
because  of  their  sins.  Besides,  predestination  is  in  everybody's 
power;  physical  determination  was  not  in  the  power  of  the  Gen- 
tiles. Intermediate  knowledge  in  God  explains  the  problem  of 
free  will,  it  fails  to  explain  why  God  confers  merely  sufficient 
grace  on  one  man,  efficacious  grace  on  another;  and  this  is  the 
burden  of  St.  Paul's  lesson.     God's  will  is  the  explanation. 

SchoUon  II.     About  Futuribles. 

And  now  the  question  arises,  how  does  God  know  futuribles. 
We  just  proved  that  God  knows  absolute  free  futures  in  them- 
selves, and  in  that  combination  of  intermediate  knowledge  and 
decree  already  explained.  Here  we  maintain  that  God  knows 
futuribles  in  themselves,  inasmuch  as  the  actual  existence  they 
would  have  in  the  event  of  a  certain  condition  bases  as  root- 
reason  God's  knowledge  of  them.  God  is  said  to  know  things 
in  themselves  and  in  Himself;  and  the  two  sayings  must  be 
kept  apart.  There  can  be  no  difficulty  about  God's  knowledge 
of  all  things,  actual,  possible  and  futurible  in  Himself,  or  in 
His  essence.  His  essence  is  His  primary  object.  His  essence 
is  all  things.  His  essence  is  cause  of  all,  it  is  to  God  what 
species  or  image  is  to  us.  He  knows  His  essence,  and  in  it  all 
things  else.  To  know  a  cause  comprehensively,  is  to  know  all 
its  effects;  and  all  things  are  in  God's  essence  as  effects  are  in 
their  causes.  Ergo,  God  knows  all  things  in  Himself.  The 
contingent  reality  of  futuribles  is  in  God's  essence  as  well  as 
the  actual  reality  of  pasts,  presents  and  necessary  futures. 

All  the  difficulty  turns  on  God's  knowledge  of  things  actual, 
possible  and  futurible  in  themselves.  Actuals,  whether  past, 
present  or  future,  and  possibles  can  readily  be  known  in  them- 
selves, because  they  have  a  reality  of  their  own,  actual  or  pos- 
sible as  the  case  may  be.  Futuribles  are  different.  They  would 
seem  to  have  no  reality  of  their  own,  being  neither  actuals  sim- 
ply nor  possibles  simply.  Futures  are  of  two  kinds,  necessary 
and  contingent.  Xecessary  futures  are  reducible  to  actuals, 
and  therefore  belong  to  knowledge  of  vision.  Contingent  fu- 
tures are  of  two  kinds,  absolute  free  futures  dependent  on  choice 
as  single  condition,  and  contingent  free  futures  or  futuribles, 
dependent  on  a  double  condition,  choice  for  instance  and  mira- 
cles.    Matters  of  vision  and  intelligence  are  known  in  prede- 


284  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

temiining  decrees;  absolute  free  futures  and  futuribles  are 
known  prior  to  any  predetermining  decree.  Hence  the  need  of 
intermediate  knowledge  in  God.  Futuribles  are  like  possibles, 
inasmuch  as  they  will  never  be  reduced  to  act;  they  are  unlike 
possibles,  inasmuch  as  they  would  be  reduced  to  act  in  the  event 
of  a  certain  condition.  They  are  like  actuals,  inasmuch  as  they 
would  be  reduced  to  act,  having  contingent  actuality ;  they  differ 
from  actuals,  inasmuch  as  they  never  will  be  reduced  to  act. 
The  same  is  in  a  measure  true  of  absolute  free  futures;  and 
they  belong  to  neither  vision  nor  intelligence,  but  to  intemie- 
diate  knowledge.  Their  reality  in  God's  mind  precedes  every 
predetermining  decree,  unlike  actuals,  possibles,  and  necessary 
futures. 

Therefore,  absolute  free  futures  are  known  in  themselves  and 
in  the  combination  of  intermediate  knowledge  with  resulting 
decree,  which  is  by  no  means  predetermining.  In  themselves, 
because  God  must  know  their  formal  being,  not  merely  their 
eminent  being,  which  alone  exists  in  His  essence;  because  they 
must  themselves  as  formal  object  intentionally  stir  God's  knowl- 
edge; and  because  they  are  root  and  basic  condition  for  God's 
knowledge  of  them.  In  the  combination  of  intermediate  knowl- 
edge with  resulting  decree,  to  save  man's  freedom  from  harm  or 
diminution. 

Futuribles  are  known  in  themselves,  and  in  a  kindred  com- 
bination of  intermediate  knowledge  with  resulting  decree,  by  no 
means  predetermining.  In  themselves,  because  what  is  true  of 
the  absolute  reality  of  absolute  free  futures  is  true  of  the  con- 
tingent reality  of  futuribles.  In  the  combination  of  intenne- 
diates  knowledge  with  resulting  decree,  by  no  means  predeter- 
mining, to  save  man's  free  will  from  harm  or  loss.  The  decree 
in  this  latter  case  denies  for  instance  miracles,  and  posits  the 
consequent  non-occurrence  of  conversion.  The  decree  is  sub- 
jectively absolute  with  regard  to  miracles,  subjectively  condi- 
tional with  regard  to  conversion.  Tliomists  teach  the  contrary. 
When  we  say  that  futuribles  are  not  known  in  decrees,  we  mean 
Thomistic  decrees,  subjectively  absolute.  BcUarmine  and  Mo- 
lina talk  about  supercomprehension  of  the  will,  and  they  mean 
our  combination  of  intermediate  knowledge  and  resulting  de- 
cree. Futuribles  have  a  reality  all  their  own,  not  pliysical  of 
course  -and  absolute,  but  moral  and  contingent ;  and  that  suffices 


THESIS  IV  285 

to  base  their  truth  and  save  the  axiom,  omiie  veruin  est  ens. 
Their  reality  is  not  a  physical  reality  they  have,  but  a  moral 
reality  they  have  in  virtue  of  the  physical  reality  tliey  would 
have  in  event  of  a  certain  condition. 

PRINCIPLES 

A.  Three  kinds  of  knowledge  in  God,  necessary,  free,  and  in- 
termediate. Necessary  antedates  every  decree,  cannot  be  absent. 
Free  follows  a  decree,  can  be  absent ;  intermediate  antedates  every 
decree,  can  be  absent. 

B.  When  the  Fathers  say  that  men  are  lost  and  saved  because 
God  wills  it,  they  are  using  "  because  "  in  illative,  not  causative 
sense,  e.  g.  Antichrist  will  seduce  many  because  Christ  foretold 
it. 

C  Salvation  in  first  act  is  from  God ;  in  second  act,  from  God 
and  man.  Ergo,  in  full  and  complete  sense  from  the  two  to- 
gether. 

D.  Grace  given  to  Peter,  and  grace  given  to  Judas,  the  same 
intrinsically  and  physically,  not  extrinsically  and  morally. 
Grace  given  to  Peter  extrinsically  different,  because  foreseen  by 
intermediate  knowledge  in  conjunction  with  consent. 

E.  Man  saves  himself  not  as  cause,  but  as  putting  the  indis- 
pensable condition,  cooperation  with  grace.  God  gives  the 
grace  that  saves,  man  only  puts  the  condition.  Ergo,  God  saves 
rather  than  the  man. 

F.  Intermediate  knowledge  is  not  the  reason  why  grace  is 
given.  It  is  merely  directive  of  God,  and  God  can  allow  this. 
The  Pelagians  made  the  mistake  of  thinking  that  intermediate 
knowledge  is  the  reason  why  God  gives  grace. 

G.  To  reconcile  God's  foreknowledge  with  man's  freedom. 
God's  foreknowledge  is  eternal,  and  in  point  of  time  antedates 
our  free  acts.  Intentionally,  objectively,  and  terminatively  our 
acts  antedate  God's  foreknowledge,  and  they  shape  it.  Our 
acts  are  necessary  only  with  consequent  necessity.  Hence  it  is 
true  to  say,  God  foresees  that  Peter  will  consent,  and  Peter  can 
refuse  to  consent. 

B..  God's  knowledge  of  vision  is  neither  the  directive  nor  ef- 
fective cause  of  our  free  acts.  God's  wisdom  is  in  some  sense 
the  cause  of  tilings.     Ps.  103.24,  "  Thou  hast  made  all  things 


286  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

in  wisdom."  Directive  cause  is  intelligence  and  intermediate. 
Effective  is  will  in  a  decree,  no  Jvnowledge.  Proof :  Acts  would 
not  be  free,  because  God's  knowledge  of  vision  is  based  on  a 
predetermining  decree.  St.  Augustine  says,  (iod's  knowledge  is 
no  more  the  cause  of  free  acts  than  our  memory  is  the  cause 
of  past  events.  Damascene  says,  God's  knowledge  of  our  free 
acts  is  no  more  their  cause  than  the  doctor's  knowledge  of  a 
coming  disease  is  its  cause.  Our  conduct  precedes  God's  knowl- 
edge with  priority  of  causation  improperly  so  called,  it  is  de- 
terminative of  God's  knowledge  as  object  and  mentally,  not 
physically. 


THESIS  V 

God  has  a  will,  necessary  with  regard  to  Himself,  free  with 
regard  to  creatures. 

Jouin,  pp.  242-245.     Boedder,  pp.  290-325. 

TERMS 

Will.  That  God  has  a  will  hardly  needs  proof  after  proving 
that  He  has  an  intellect.  Scripture  is  plain  and  removes  all 
doubt  from  the  minds  of  believers.  "  Whatsoever  the  Lord 
pleased,  He  hath  done."  Ps.  134.6.  "  He  loves  justice,  and 
hates  iniquity."  Ps.  44.8;  and  these  acts  call  for  a  will.  To 
will  is  a  simple  perfection,  and  as  such  cannot  be  absent  from 
God.  Besides,  there  is  no  knowledge  without  desire,  and  God 
has  most  perfect  knowledge.  Even  dead  things  like  stones, 
and  live  things  without  knowledge  like  plants,  have  tendencies. 
Only  live  beings  with  knowledge  have  elicited  appetite.  Appe- 
tite has  good  for  object,  and  good  can  be  sensible  or  intellectual, 
material  or  spiritual.  The  will  tends  towards  good  and  away 
from  evil.  Tendency  towards  is  love,  tendency  away  from  is 
hate.  "Whatever  emotion  of  the  soul  is  free  from  imperfection 
can  be  attributed  in  strict  sense  to  God,  others  only  by  way  of 
figure.  Desire  with  respect  to  extrinsic  things  and  delight  are 
species  of  love  that  involve  no  imperfection.  Aversion  is  a 
kindred  species  of  hate.  Hope,  fear,  sadness,  remorse,  despair, 
anger,  are  absent  from  God,  and  are  ascribed  to  Him  only 
figuratively,  by  comparison  with  man.  Hope  and  despair  imply 
a  superior;  fear,  and  sadness,  and  anger  imply  harm  proper  to 
self;  remorse  means  change  of  heart.  Hatred  in  God  involves 
none  of  the  disturbances  it  involves  in  man. 

In  reality  and  formally  speaking,  God's  will  is  God's  essence; 
and  His  infinite  simplicity  is  the  reason.  And  yet  we  keep  them 
apart  in  our  mind.  God's  will  is  eutitatively  one  act,  termina- 
tively  many  acts;  by  nature  simple,  virtually  compound.     His 

287 


288  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

one  wish  equals  every  possible  wish,  and  touches  all  possible 
objects.  God  is  at  the  same  time  the  principle  of  His  wishes 
and  their  object,  though  with  our  minds  we  distinguish  between 
the  principle  of  God's  wishes  and  their  objects.  The  distinc- 
tion rests  in  the  fact,  that,  because  God  is  infinite,  His  one  wish 
equals  many,  and  because  the  act  of  wishing  one  thing  is  not, 
at  least  terminatively,  the  act  of  wishing  another.  Creation  is 
proof  that  God's  will  can  turn  on  things  outside  Himself.  Dif- 
ferences in  object  are  responsible  for  our  division  of  God's  will 
into  will  of  good  pleasure  and  will  in  symbol,  antecedent  will 
and  consequent,  conditional  and  absolute,  with  effect  and  with- 
out effect. 

A  word  about  each : 

Will  of  good  pleasure  turns  on  what  God  really  and  truly 
wants.  Will  in  symbol  resembles  the  written  legal  instrument 
among  men.  God's  will  is  seen  in  some  external  act.  At  times 
in  Scripture  God  makes  plain  by  the  turn  events  take  what 
He  wants,  the  opposite  of  what  He  might  be  supposed  to 
want.  Examples  are  the  sacrifice  of  Isaac  by  x\braham,  and 
the  silence  imposed  by  Christ  on  the  cured  leper.  St.  Matt. 
8.4. 

Antecedent  will  in  God  means  what  He  wishes  in  the  most  ab- 
solute manner,  without  regard  to  particular  circumstances. 
Consequent  will  means  what  He  wishes  with  an  eye  to  particu- 
lar circumstances.  With  antecedent  will  He  wishes  the  salva- 
tion of  all,  saint  and  sinner  alike.  With  consequent  will  He 
wishes  saints  saved  and  sinners  lost.  Hence  it  is  plain  that 
God  can  wish  with  consequent  will  what  He  previously  fought 
against  with  antecedent  will.  Their  theory  of  physical  prede- 
termination drives  the  Thomists  to  limit  the  particular  circum- 
stance in  question  of  consequent  will  to  the  beauty  of  the  uni- 
verse and  a  display  of  justice.  These  motives  had  all  to  do  with 
the  wickedness  of  Judas  and  the  holiness  of  Peter.  The  man's 
use  of  his  free  will  is  the  circumstance  on  which  we  insist. 
God's  antecedent  will  prescinds  from  man's  use  of  his  free  will, 
His  consequent  will  takes  this  circumstance  into  account.  Con- 
ditional will  in  God  means  a  wish  subject  to  a  condition,  and 
the  condition  hangs  on  man,  not  on  God.  Absolute  will  carries 
no  condition,  and  is  always  fulfilled.     Will  with  effect  and  will 


THESIS  V  289 

without  effect  explain  themselves.  No  absolute  will  of  God  is 
without  effect,  conditional  will  is  often  without  effect.  With 
the  same  antecedent  will  God  wishes  all  to  be  saved  and  wishes 
to  bestow  on  all  the  means  of  salvation.  In  one  case  His  ante- 
cedent will  is  conditional,  in  the  other  absolute.  Every  conse- 
quent wiU  of  God  is  absolute  and  with  effect.  Sometimes  will 
with  effect  is  not  consequent,  though  it  is  absolute  on  the  part 
of  God. 

Free.  The  formal  object  of  God's  will  is  His  own  goodness. 
It  is  what  first  and  of  itself  moves  His  wiU;  and,  being  alone 
infinite,  is  alone  in  proportion  with  His  faculty  of  wishing. 
The  primary  material  object  of  God's  will  is  God  Himself;  the 
secondary  material  object  is  every  being  outside  of  God,  because 
all  share  in  the  goodness  of  God.  When  God  Himself  is  ob- 
ject, God's  will  is  not  free;  when  creatures  are  object,  God  is 
free.  Freedom  is  immunity  from  necessity  or  from  restriction 
to  one  line  of  conduct. 

There  are  two  kinds  of  freedom,  because  there  are  two  kinds 
of  necessity,  physical  and  moral.  We  are  talking  about  phys- 
ical freedom,  not  moral.  Two  Icinds  of  physical  freedom,  be- 
cause there  are  two  kinds  of  physical  necessity,  extrinsic  and 
intrinsic.  Immunity  from  extrinsic  necessity  is  called  freedom 
of  spontaneity  or  freedom  from  violence.  Immunity  from  in- 
trinsic necessity  is  called  freedom  of  choice,  or  of  indifference, 
and  is  of  three  kinds,  contradiction,  contrariety  and  specifica- 
tion. 

With  regard  to  moral  evil  or  sin,  God  enjoys  no  freedom  of 
contrariety.  He  simply  must  hate  sin.  He  simply  must  love 
virtue.  Witli  regard  to  metaphysical  and  physical  evil  He  en- 
joys freedom  of  contrariety.  We  leave  God's  decrees  out  of  the 
question,  because  they  are  eternal  and  banish  suspension  of  will 
from  God.  Freedom  in  our  thesis  means  that  whatever  crea- 
tures God  wishes  to  come  into  being.  He  wishes  them  in  such 
a  way  that  He  could  have  not  wished  them.  No  imperfection 
must  attach  to  God's  freedom.  Therefore  it  must  be  conceived, 
not  as  indifference  on  the  part  of  a  potency  to  be  reduced  to 
act,  but  as  indifference  on  the  part  of  an  act,  put  from  eternity, 
to  touch  this  or  that  object,  as  indifference  to  whatsoever  term 
outside  of  God. 


290  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

Division  —  Two  Parts,  I,  11.    I,  Necessary;  U,  Free, 

PROOFS 

I.  1°.  Infinite  will  cannot  be  indifferent  to  infinite  good 
perfectly  known.     Ergo,  God  necessarily  loves  Himself. 

2°.  A  well  ordered  and  holy  will  cannot  but  love  a  being  in- 
finitely deserving  of  love.  Ergo  God  necessarily  loves  Him- 
self. 

//.  1°.  God's  will  is  free  with  regard  to  what  tilings  He 
knows  to  be  contingent.  But  God  knows  creatures  to  be  con- 
tingent.    Ergo,  God's  will  i«  free  with  regard  to  creatures. 

2°.  Creatures  are  particular  goods,  and  no  adequate  object 
for  even  a  finite  will.  We  ourselves  can  embrace  particular 
goods,  we  need  not  embrace  them.  They  are  no  adequate  good, 
and  not  necessarily  connected  with  God's  existence. 

3°.  Prayer  proves  free  will  in  God.  It  supposes  God  able  to 
grant  or  refuse  the  favor. 

4°.  Liberality  implies  same.  A  favor  is  a  gift  that  can  be 
withheld  without  wrong,  and  liberality  means  the  bestowal  of  a 
favor. 

PRINCIPLES 

A.  1°.  God  has  no  end  or  good  distinct  from  Himself.  He 
is  good  and  end  for  Himself  and  for  all  besides. 

2°.  A  perfectible  will  is  a  moved  mover,  not  a  divine  will. 

3°.  Will  of  God,  viewed  in  principle,  is  God's  being;  not 
when  viewed  in  term,  unless  His  essence  is  object. 

4°.  God's  will  is  not  stirred  by  creatures.  His  essence  stirs 
Him  to  wish  creatures,  always  as  secondary  object. 

5°.  God's  purpose,  when  He  seeks  outside  objects,  is  not  to 
perfect  Himself,  but  to  communicate  His  goodness  to  others. 

6°.  God's  wish  is  one  formally,  many  virtually. 

B.  \°.  God's  wish  is  eternal,  viewed  in  principle;  temporal, 
viewed  in  term;  its  necessity  is  consequent,  not  antecedent. 

2°.  God's  wish  regarding  outside  things  is  identical  with 
His  essence  after  the  manner  of  a  transient,  not  an  immanent 
act. 

3°.  God's  wish  would  be  contingent,  if  He  could  not  wish 
after  wishing;  not,  hmvever,  if  He  can  not  wish  before  wishing. 


THESIS  V  291 

The  first  implies  change,  and  therefore  contingency;  the  second 
implies  no  change. 

C.  1°.  The  necessity,  with  which  God  knows  things  outside, 
is  consequent  on  His  decree  to  create,  and  consequent  on  the 
free  acts  of  men. 

2°.  God  knows  only  the  possibility  of  things  with  antecedent 
necessity,  not  their  future  reality  or  futuribility.  He  knows 
the  latter  with  consequent  necessity,  dependent  on  free  will  and 
the  realization  of  conditions. 

D.  Freedom  in  creatures,  because  it  involves  potency,  is  a 
mixed  perfection;  not  in  God,  because  it  is  act,  and  no  potency. 

E.  We  conceive  God's  will  as  able  to  determine  itself;  in  it- 
self, and  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  determined  from  eternity; 
in  such  a  way,  howeve-r,  that  it  could  have  otherwise  determined 
itself. 

F.  The  act  by  which  God  loves  Himself  and  creatures  is  en- 
titatively  the  same,  not  terminatively.  It  is  necessary  entita- 
tively,  not  terminatively,  unless  His  essence  is  object. 

G.  1°.  Freedom  of  contrariety  regarding  moral  good  and 
evil  is  no  perfection,  and  is  absent  from  God. 

2°.  God  can  draw  good  from  evil;  and  with  God,  to  permit 
evil  is  good  and  no  harm. 

Scholion.     To  re'concile  God's  freedom  with  His  immutability. 

God's  freedom  must  not  prejudice  His  immutability.  New 
volitions  must  not  be  new  realities  in  God.  They  are  new  re- 
lations, but  non-mutual.  All  the  change  is  in  the  outside  term 
they  affect,  not  in  God  their  author.  The  relation  is  logical 
on  the  part  of  God.  God  is  really  the  same  before  and  after 
the  world  exists.  On  the  part  of  creatures  it  is  real.  Crea- 
tures are  different  before  and  after  God's  wish.  The  thing  in 
God  that  makes  Him  free,  that  makes  Him  now  wish  and  then 
not  wish  creatures,  is  God's  substantial  volition,  His  very  es- 
sence. There  are  no  accidents  in  God.  Wishes  in  us  are  acci- 
dents, in  God  they  are  a  substance,  they  are  Himself,  His  es- 
sence. 

In  God  freedom  stands  with  immutability,  because  it  rests  on 
the  surpassing  and  infinite  actuality  of  His  substantial  voli- 
tion. On  account  of  its  infinite  actuality  volition  in  God  can 
without  change,  increase,  diminution,  lean  or  not  lean  towards 


292  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

creatures  in  a  way  beyond  our  mental  grasp.  "When  He  leans 
towards  creatures,  He  wishes  them,  and  they  are  terms  of  His 
act.  When  He  leans  away  from  them,  they  are  no  terms  of 
His  act,  and  He  wishes  them  not.  The  mystery  of  God's  free- 
dom lies  in  this,  that  His  volition,  enduring  the  same  substance 
without  change,  views  outside  things  in  different  lights,  wishes 
some,  not  wishing  others.  The  act  of  volition  in  God  is  neces- 
sary and  eternal,  its  termination  is  free  and  in  time.  Hence 
term  or  object  is  the  important  factor  in  God's  freedom.  No 
free  act  entitatively  taken  can  be  absent  from  God,  a  free  act 
terminatively  taken  can  be  absent  from  God.  The  act  by 
which  God  loves  Himself  is  necessary,  the  act  by  which  He 
loves  creatures  is  free.  No  contradiction,  because  the  act  is 
necessary  and  free  under  different  respects,  entitatively  and 
terminatively. 

The  act  constituting  God  free  is  God  Himself,  and  this  act 
is  not  considered  in  itself,  but  inasmuch  as  it  connotes  terms 
or  objects.  The  infinite  nature  of  God  alone  explains  the 
wondrous  efficacy  of  this  act.  Finite  acts,  like  our  own  wishes, 
are  quite  other.  As  soon  as  my  free  act  exists,  it  becomes 
necessary.  It  is  called  free,  because  it  proceeds  from  an  in- 
different potency;  and,  at  the  very  instant  of  its  doing,  it  is 
done  in  such  a  way  that,  prior  by  nature  to  its  doing,  it  could 
have  been  left  undone.  Of  course,  when  once  done,  it  is  neces- 
sary, and  no  longer  free,  it  is  shackled  to  its  formal  object.  An 
act  in  God  is  free,  not  because  it  proceeds  from  an  indifferent 
potency.  There  is  no  potency  in  God,  He  is  all  act.  Act  in 
God  is  God  Himself,  and  therefore  of  no  act  in  God  can  it  be 
said  that,  prior  by  nature  to  its  doing,  it  could  have  been  left 
undone.  An  act  in  God  is  free,  because  in  virtue  of  its  infinite 
and  substantial  actuality  it  looks  effectively,  or  leans  with  life- 
giving  efficacy  towards  one  or  other  of  two  outside  objects. 
In  this  way  an  act,  necessary  and  immutable  in  itself  or  entita- 
tively, by  virtue  of  this  look  or  tendency  induces  change  in  an 
outside  object,  connotes  the  outside  object,  and  is  free  in  its 
causative  capacity. 

Another  explanation.  In  every  act  of  wishing,  a  created 
will  undergoes  an  intrinsic  change,  because  it  passes  from  po- 
tency to  act.  It  undergoes  no  additional  intrinsic  change  be- 
cause it  chooses,  or  wishes  with  freedom.     God  in  the  act  of 


THESIS  V  293 

wishing  undergoes  no  such  intrinsic  change,  because  passage 
from  potency  to  act  has  no  place  in  God.  He  is  act,  and  act 
alone.  And  therefore  no  intrinsic  change  attaches  to  God's 
will  when  it  chooses,  or  wishes  with  freedom.  Hence  God  can 
be  said  to  wish  or  not  wish  from  eternity,  because  no  intrinsic 
change,  no  passage  from  potency  to  act,  is  incurred  in  the 
double  process.  Creatures  cannot  be  said  to  at  any  fixed  mo- 
ment wish  and  no.t  wish,  because  the  double  process  in  their 
case  involves-  intrinsic  change,  passage  from  potency  to  act. 


THESIS  VI 

7.     Creatures,  to  continue  in  being,  need  positive  and  direct 
conservation  on  the  part  of  God. 

II.     Creatures,  to  act,  need  physical  and  immediate  coopera- 
tion on  the  part  of  God. 

Jouin,  pp.  250-253.     Boedder,  pp.  344-370. 

Division  —  Two  Parts,  I,  II.  I,  Conservation;  II,  Coopera- 
tion. 

QUESTION 

7.  There  is  nothing  in  the  nature  of  a  contingent  being  to 
make  its  continued  existence  necessary,  and  all  creatures  are 
contingent.  Only  the  necessary  being  enjoys  this  property,  and 
independence  in  the  matter  of  continued  existence  means  inde- 
pendence in  the  matter  of  origin.  Continuance  is  only  a  mode 
of  existence,  modes  follow  substance ;  and  contingents  are  as 
helpless  regarding  continuance  in  being  as  they  are  regarding 
original  existence.  As  nothing  in  their  nature  demands  first 
origin,  and  creation  alone  accounts  for  their  first  appearance 
in  the  universe  of  existences  or  realities;  so  nothing  in  their 
nature  demands  continuance  in  being,  and  conservatism  alone 
accounts  for  their  perseverance  in  the  universe  of  realities.  The 
quality  of  contingence  in  creatures  makes  conservation  as  much 
a  need  as  creation  ;  and,  as  all  contingents  are  necessarily  created, 
all  contingents  are  necessarily  conserved. 

TEEMS 

7.  Conservation  means  divine  activity  responsible  for  a  crea- 
ture's continuance  in  being.  It  can  be  negative  or  positive;  di- 
rect or  indirect.  Negative  conservation  is  simple  non-destruc- 
tion, policy  of  hands  off,  e.  g.  when  we  refrain  from  killing  a 
neighbor.  Positive  conservatism  implies  actual  influence  on  the 
thing  conserved,  e.  g.  food  sustains  life.     In  negative,  the  pre- 

294 


THESIS  VI  295 

server  does  nothing;  in  positive,  he  does  something.  Direct 
conservation  exei'ts  immediate  influence  on  object,  and  it  is  a 
species  of  continuous  production,  e.  g.  the  shape  of  a  vessel 
sustains  the  shape  of  the  liquid  it  contains.  Indirect  conser- 
vation wards  off  destructive  agencies,  e.  g.  salt  sprinkled  on  meat 
kills  germs. 

Sense  of  tliesis.  God  positively  and  directly  keeps  in  exist- 
ence every  contingent  being,  and  without  this  divine  activity 
no  contingent  being  could  continue  in  existence.  Deists  are  of 
opinion  that  God  after  creation  left  the  world  to  itself,  to  its 
own  native  forces,  physical  and  chemical,  and  to  unchanging 
laws. 

PROOFS 

I.  1°.  Unless  creatures  need  positive  and  direct  conserva- 
tion, God  cannot  annihilate  them.  But  God  can  annihilate 
creatures.     Ergo,  they  need  conservation. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  The  term  of  annihilation  is  noth- 
ing. A  positive  act  cannot  have  nothing  for  term.  Ergo,  an- 
nihilation can  be  accomplished  only  by  withdrawal  of  positive 
and  direct  conservation. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  God's  supreme  and  absolute  do- 
minion demands  it.  Creatures  can  exist  only  as  long  as  God 
wants  them  to  exist,  and  no  longer.  Even  man  can  destroy  the 
work  of  his  hands. 

N.B.  Immortality  of  the  soul  is  no  limitation  of  God's  power, 
because  God's  own  attributes  forbid  soul's  destruction,  and 
God's  attributes  are  God  Himself. 

2°.  St.  Thomas. 

What  depends  on  another  for  its  being,  as  opposed  to  its 
making  or  production,  depends  on  that  other  for  its  continuance 
in  being.  But  all  creatures  depend  on  God's  immediate  work 
for  their  being.  Ergo,  they  need  conservation  for  continuance 
in  being. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  Dependence  in  making  lasts 
while  making  continues,  and  then  ceases.  A  pari,  dependence 
in  being  ought  to  last  while  being  continues. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  Effects  depend  on  cause  for  their 
being,  when  they  can  be  produced  by  no  other  cause;  for  their 
making  only,   when   they   can   be  produced   by   another   cause. 


296  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

Every  effect  of  a  creature  can  be  made  by  another  cause,  e.  g. 
son,  house.  Nothing  can  be  made  without  God's  cooperation. 
Primal  matter,  angel,  soul  depend  on  God  for  both  being  and 
making.     They  must  be  created. 

3°.  Without  this  dependence,  God's  dominion  would  be  less 
perfect  than  it  is.    Ergo. 

PRINCIPLES 

A.  What  cannot  but  be,  needs  no  conservation.  But  actual 
creatures  cannot  but  be.     Ergo,  they  need  no  conservation. 

Answer.  Actual  creatures  cannot  but  be  in  hypothetical 
sense,  not  in  absolute  sense.  God  alone  cannot  but  be  in  abso- 
lute sense.  The  hypothesis  is  plain.  Actual  beings  cannot  but 
be  as  long  as  they  remain  actual.  They  can  not  be,  when  they 
cease  to  be  actual. 

B.  Nothing,  whether  a  house  or  a  wall  or  anything  else,  de- 
pends on  man  for  its  being.  Things  depend  on  God  for  their 
being  (esse);  on  man  for  their  making  (fieri).  For  this  rea- 
son a  house  can  endure  without  further  activity  on  the  part 
of  its  second  cause  or  man,  not  without  activity  on  the  part  of 
its  first  cause  or  God. 

C.  Things  tend  towards  nothing  negatively,  not  positively; 
and  this  tendency  is  no  argument  against  immortality.  The 
soul  has  no  need  of  indirect  conservation.     It  needs  direct. 

D.  The  soul's  immortality  is  indeed  natural,  but  not  abso- 
lute; and  its  self -conservation  is  indirect,  not  direct.  Its  spir- 
ituality and  simplicity  are  salt  preserving  it  from  the  destruc- 
tive and  corruptive  germs  of  materiality  and  composition.  God 
directly  conserves  the  soul. 

E.  Conservation  is  a  continuance  of  the  act  of  creation,  not 
a  renewal  of  the  act.  Everything  in  God  is  one.  Conservation 
and  creation  are  one  and  the  same  act,  the  terms  of  the  act  are 
different.  Creation  therefore  is  not  sufficient  to  explain  crea- 
tures, conservation  is  besides  needed. 

F.  A  substance  is  a  being  that  stands  in  itself,  exists  of  it- 
self, without  need  of  inherence  in  another  as  subject.  This 
circumstance  is  no  argument  against  conservation.  Substances 
depend  on  God  for  their  existence,  they  are  independent  of 
creatures.     Accidents  on  the  contrary  depend  on  creatures  for 


THESIS  VI  297 

their  existence,  they  cannot  naturally  exist  without  some  sub- 
stance for  subject  of  inhesion. 

G.  The  reason  why  a  house  can  continue  to  exist  without  its 
builder,  hot  water  without  fire,  is  because  they  do  not  depend 
for  their  being,  but  for  their  making  on  builder  and  fire.  They 
depend  on  God  for  being  and  cannot  continue  without  Him. 

H.  A  creature  able  to  continue  without  conservation  would 
reflect  more  credit  on  God's  omnipotence. 

Answer.  Square  circle.  Kecessary  and  contingent.  God 
could  not  annihilate. 

7.  Indirect  and  accidental  conservation  of  bodies  is  within 
the  province  of  creatures ;  e.  g.  salt  and  meat. 

a.  Positive  and  direct  self-conservation  belongs  immediately 
to  no  creature,  even  in  partial  sense,  because  creature  would  be 
ens  a  se. 

b.  God  immediately  conserves  all,  because  dominion  demands 
it. 

c.  Sometimes  He  conserves  by  Himself  alone,  e.  g.  primal 
matter,  angel,  soul. 

d.  At  other  times  with  the  help  of  creatures,  e.  g.  light  and 
sun,  image  and  object.     Their  esse  is  situated  in  their  fieri. 

J.  Things  cannot  conserve  themselves,  though  they  can  con- 
serve others.  They  cannot  produce  themselves,  though  they  can 
produce  others. 

K.  Annihilation  is  denial  of  conservation,  no  positive  act. 
God  alone  can  annihilate,  because  God  alone  can  conserve.  God 
never  annihilates.  Absolute  power  can,  ordered  power  cannot 
do  it.  Against  nature  of  spirit,  against  nature  of  primal  mat- 
ter, which  always  endures,  most  fit  to  exist,  made  and  destroyed 
by  God  alone.  God's  power  and  goodness  are  more  manifest 
in  conservation  than  in  annihilation.     Ergo,  by  miracle. 

L.  God  can  annihilate.  Finis  respondet  principio.  Like  be- 
ginning, like  end.  God  alone  in  the  beginning.  Ergo,  God 
alone  in  the  end. 

Ansiver.  Creation  declares  power,  annihilation  would  deny 
it.  Creatures  have  infinite  passive  potency,  enough  for  unend- 
ing duration,  not  infinite  active  potency  required  for  eternal 
duration.  Forms  and  accidents  are  destroyed,  but  not  annihi- 
lated, because  subjects  from  which  educed  and  substances  in 
which  they  inhere  remain. 


298  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

II.     Creatures,  to  act,  need  physical  and  immediate  coopera- 
tion on  the  part  of  God. 

TERMS 

Cooperation  with  second  causes  is  what  we  mean  by  God's 
concurrence  with  creatures,  Dei  concursus.  It  can  be  super- 
natural, natural;  immediate,  mediate;  physical,  moral.  Super- 
natural has  to  do  with  the  order  of  grace,  and  belongs  to  dog- 
matic theology.  Natural  has  to  do  with  deeds  in  the  natural 
order,  and  belongs  to  our  thesis.  Immediate  touches  or  influ- 
ences the  creature's  activity  in  such  a  way  that  the  whole  re- 
sult, act  and  effect  alike,  depends  of  itself  and  directly  on  God's 
conjoined  efficacy.  Mediate  reaches  the  cause  alone,  not  the 
cause's  effect.  Mediate  cooperation  begins  and  ends  with  the 
bestowal  of  energies  on  creatures.  Mediate  puts  the  sword  in 
a  man's  hand,  immediate  helps  wield  the  sword;  one  prepares 
the  cause,  the  other  works  in  conjunction  with  cause.  Physical 
is  here  opposed  to  moral.  Moral  influence  affects  the  agent's 
will,  and  through  it  the  effect  he  produces.  It  can  be  extrinsic 
by  advice,  or  intrinsic  by  predisposing,  and  God  alone  enjoys 
second  power.  It  is  always  mediate,  regarding  the  outward  act. 
Physical  influence  affects  the  agent's  outward  act.  It  is  im- 
mediate, and  contributes  to  the  agent's  outward  act  the  same 
kind  of  force  the  agent  himself  contributes. 

N.B.  God's  moral  cooperation  extends  to  only  good  acts. 
His  physical  to  good  and  bad  acts.  Other  meanings  of  moral 
and  physical.  Moral  activity  is  free  activity;  physical  is  de- 
termined or  necessary  activity.  A  man  acts  morally;  a  brute, 
physically.  In  matter  of  certainty,  moral,  physical  and  meta- 
physical have  their  own  meanings.  Physical  is  likewise  op- 
posed to  logical.  The  physical  exists  as  a  matter  of  fact  and 
is  independent  of  all  thought.  The  logical  is  dependent  on 
thought  for  existence,  and  as  a  matter  of  fact  exists  nowhere 
outside  of  thought,  e.g.  the  world  and  being  in  general,  par- 
ticulars and  universals,  this  man  and  man.  In  compounds, 
parts  are  physical,  metaphysical  and  logical;  or  really  distinct, 
virtually  distinct  with  foundation,  and  without  foundation  in 
fact.  In  our  thesis  physical  is  opposed  to  moral,  without  refer- 
ence to  other  meanings. 


THESIS  VI  299 


PROOFS 

II.  1".  A  thing's  activity  follows  the  nature  of  its  existence 
or  being.  But  creatures,  because  contingent  existences,  depend 
for  their  continued  existence  on  God's  physical  and  immediate 
conservation  or  preservation.  Ergo,  creatures,  because  contin- 
gent activities,  depend  for  their  activity  on  God's  physical  and 
immediate  cooperation. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  Agere  sequitur  esse  —  Sicut  res 
est,  sic  agit;  are  axioms  in  philosophy.  They  mean  activity 
follows  existence;  in  what  measure  a  thing  is,  in  that  measure 
it  acts. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor,  preceding  thesis. 

2°.  Whatever  is  a  being  by  participation  depends  on  God  for 
its  existence.  But  the  acts  of  creatures  are  accidents,  imperfect 
beings  by  participation.  Ergo,  they  depend  on  God  for  their 
existence  or  production,  and  God  is  part  cause  of  them,  co- 
operator. 

3°.  It  would  otherwise  be  hard  for  God  to  hinder  or  restrain 
the  activity  of  His  creatures,  and  that  would  destroy  supreme 
dominion.  To  prevent  a  certain  thought  or  wish,  God  would 
have  to  do  away  with  an  intellect  or  a  will,  and  immortality 
forbids. 

N.B.  God  as  first  cause  is  complete  in  His  own  order,  i.  e. 
no  other  first  cause  is  needed.  Creature  as  second  cause  is  com- 
plete in  its  own  order,  i.  e.  no  other  second  cause  is  needed. 
Nor  one  nor  other  is  superfluous,  e.  g.  writer  and  pen ;  phan- 
tasm and  working  intellect;  image  and  receiving  intellect.  Dif- 
ference between  God  and  examples:  No  dependence  in  God, 
all  the  dependence  is  in  creatures.  Ergo,  the  relation  is  non- 
mutual.  In  examples  the  dependence  is  mutual,  equally  af- 
fecting the  two  terms  of  the  relation.  God  alone  of  His  very 
essence  acts  without  dependence.  Creatures  essentially  act  with 
dependence,  because  they  exist  with  dependence. 

PEINCIPLES 

A:  If  God  were  single  cause  of  creature's  acts,  no  act  would 
be  immanent,  because  principle  would  be  outside  of  agent.     This 


300  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

is  not  the  case  when  God  acts  as  first  cause  only,  leaving  to 
creatures  all  the  activity  attaching  to  second  causes. 

B:  Free  will  remains  unharmed,  because  God's  cooperation 
is  simultaneous  with  wish,  not  prior  to  same. 

C:  One  and  the  same  act  can  immediately  and  wholly  pro- 
ceed from  two  agents  of  different  orders,  not  from  two  agents 
of  the  same  order.  God  and  creature  are  subordinates,  not 
coordinates. 

D:  God  permits  sin,  refrains  from  preventing  it;  and  this 
is  the  whole  extent  of  His  cooperation  with  sin.  Sin  is  not 
necessarily  mixed  up  with  God's  part  of  the  work,  it  lies  in 
abuse  of  will;  and  God  is  not  bound  to  physically  hinder  free 
exercise  of  the  will,  whether  it  be  use  or  abuse  of  the  faculty. 
God's  cooperation  is  indifferent  to  use  and  abuse,  man  makes  it 
one  or  the  other. 

E:  God  gives  to  every  nature  all  it  needs.  Ergo,  no  co- 
operation. Answer:  Always  in  accordance  with  quality  of 
nature.  To  contingent  natures  He  gives  contingent  or  de- 
pendent activity. 

F:  Creatures  are  by  themselves  sufficient.  Cause  is  often 
equal  or  superior  to  effect.  Ergo,  no  need  of  outside  help. 
Answer:  Cooperation  is  not  needed  because  effect  surpasses 
created  cause,  it  is  due  entirely  to  intrinsic  want  of  creature  as 
a  contingent  being.  Angel  cannot  create  another  angel  or  a 
fly;  father  alone  cannot  produce  a  son. 

G.  Creatures  are  superfluous,  because  God  can  produce  whole 
effect.     Ergo. 

Answer:  God  uses  creatures  not  because  He  needs  them,  but 
to  show  forth  His  goodness. 

H :  Creatures  are  God's  images.  Ergo,  they  act  like  God, 
with  independence. 

Answer:     Creatures  are  like  God,  they  are  not  equal  to  Him. 

I :  God  uses  creatures  as  instruments.  Ergo,  cooperation  is 
not  immediate. 

Answer:  Creatures  are  not  instruments  in  strict  sense;  and 
God's  immensity  makes  God  everywhere  present.  Like  and  un- 
like instruments.  Free  will  moves  itself.  Instrument  makes 
effect  like  principal.     Not  so  creatures. 

J:  God  ouglit  to  be  able  to  vest  a  created  cause  with  inde- 
pendent activity.     Ergo. 


THESIS  VI  301 

Answer:  Square  circle,  necessary  contingent,  could  not  hin- 
der. 

K:     Infinite  power  would  be  needed  for  every  effect.     Ergo. 

Answer:  On  part  of  first  cause,  not  on  part  of  second. 
Things  are  hard  and  easy  with  regard  to  second  causes,  not 
with  regard  to  first. 

L:  God  cooperates  with  matter  and  form  as  efficient  cause, 
not  as  matter  and  form. 


THESIS  VII 

God's  cooperation  with  man's  free  will  is  no  physical  pre- 
determination. 

Boedder,  pp.  370-381. 

QUESTION 

We  have  to  choose  between  physical  predetermination  of  the 
Thomists  and  simultaneous  cooperation  of  the  Jesuits. 

TEEMS 

Simultaneous  cooperation  means  that  God's  act  on  the  out- 
side is  simultaneous  with  creature's  act;  neither  before,  nor 
after,  but  along  with  it.  There  is  nothing  in  the  effect  but 
what  proceeds  from  the  creature,  nothing  but  what  proceeds 
from  God.  The  whole  effect  begins  with  both  and  depends  on 
both,  e.g.  pen,  penman  and  writing.  God's  intermediate 
knowledge  saves  free  will  from  harm. 

Physical  predetermination  is  actio  Dei  qua  voluntatem  bu- 
manam,  priusquam  ipsa  se  determinet,  ita  ad  actum  movet 
insuperabili  virtute,  ut  voluntas  nequeat  omissionem  sui  actus 
cum  ilia  praemotione  conjungere.  (Gonet.)  Gonet,  there- 
fore, and  he  is  a  representative  Thomist,  thus  describes  physi- 
cal predetermination:  Before  the  will  determines  itself,  God 
moves  it  to  act  with  such  irresistible  force  that  it  cannot  com- 
bine omission  of  the  act  with  God's  intervention.  Thomists  re- 
ject intermediate  knowledge  in  God,  and  make  no  provision  for 
free  will  beyond  a  mere  assertion.  All  Thomists  maintain  that 
God  predetermines  the  will  to  every  act  in  such  a  way,  that  the 
will,  too,  freely  determines  itself,  and  vote  the  whole  question 
of  free  will  an  insoluble  mystery.  Praedeterminatio  is  not 
praemotio  in  strict  sense,  though  Thomists  confound  the  two. 
One  means  predetermination  and  it  destroys  free  will,  makes 

302 


THESIS  VII  303 

it  a  necessary  agent;  the  other  means  antecedent  influence,  and 
it  influences  free  will  without  destroying  it,  secures  a  set  act 
put  with  entire  freedom  by  the  will.  Whatever  act  God  wants 
He  can  get  from  a  man,  and  get  it  without  danger  of  failure. 
Otherwise  men  would  be  outside  His  supreme  dominion.  He 
can  refuse  cooperation  to  every  wish  but  the  wish  He  wants. 
"With  the  help  of  indeliberate  acts,  provoked  in  the  man,  God 
can  morally  entice  and  physically  drive  the  will  to  good  acts 
prior  to  its  self-determination.  In  this  sense  God  can  physi- 
cally predispose  the  will,  exert  prior  influence  on  it,  but  He 
cannot  determine  or  predetermine  it. 

PROOF 

According  to  Thomists  themselves,  these  are  characteristic 
features  of  physical  predetermination.  It  is  concerned  with  a 
specific  and  individual  act ;  it  depends  on  God's  will  alone ;  it  is 
an  essential  prerequisite  for  the  act,  and  is  essentially  con- 
joined with  the  act. 

But  where  an  essential  prerequisite  for  the  act  is  not  in  the 
agent's  power,  where  a  condition  of  such  sort,  that  the  act 
cannot  be  omitted  in  the  event  of  its  fulfillment,  is  not  in  the 
agent's  power,  freedom  is  out  of  the  question,  and  beyond  un- 
derstanding. 

Ergo,  God's  cooperation  with  man's  free  acts  is  no  physical 
predetermination. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  Evident  from  the  very  concept 
or  idea  of  freedom.  Explanation  of  St.  Thomas :  Man  would 
have  no  free  will,  unless  it  rested  with  himself  to  determine  his 
act  in  such  a  way  that  he  chooses  this  or  that  according  to  his 
own  judgment.  Two  things  in  every  act,  substance  of  act  and 
determination  of  agent.  Act  is  in  agent's  power  only  when 
agent  determines  himself,  and  freedom  means  dominion  over 
act.  Unless  man  determines  himself,  he  is  not  free.  Instinct 
rules  brutes,  A  condition  which  makes  something  necessary 
never  destroys  freedom,  when  it  is  in  our  power.  A  condition 
which  makes  something  necessary  always  destroys  freedom,  when 
it  is  not  in  our  power,  e.  g.  if  you  run,  you  must  move.  If  God 
foresees  that  you  are  going  to  sin,  you  must  sin.  With  the 
Thomists  the  condition,  namely,  physical  predetermination,  is 


304  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

not  in  our  power,  it  is  altogether  dependent  on  the  will  of 
God.  In  the  event  of  such  or  such  predetermination,  such  or 
such  an  act  must  follow;  and,  whether  we  have  such  or  such  a 
predetermination,  depends  on  God,  not  on  ourselves. 

Here  is  another  sad  consequence.  In  physical  predetermina- 
tion God  would  not  merely  permit  sin,  He  would  determine  or 
compel  man  to  the  commission  of  sin.  According  to  the  Thom- 
ists  the  matter  of  sin,  the  physical  act,  is  willed  and  prede- 
termined by  God;  its  form  alone,  its  malice,  is  merely  per- 
mitted. But  in  willing  the  matter  of  sin,  God  necessarily  wills 
its  form,  since  matter  and  form  are  metaphysically  conjoined, 
and  therefore  inseparable  in  the  order  of  reality.  Man  himself 
never  wills  the  formal  malice  of  sin,  that  would  be  to  wish 
evil.  He  wishes  the  good  involved  in  the  sinful  act,  and  he 
incurs  blame  because  malice  is  inseparably  connected  with  the 
good  he  wishes.  God  would  therefore  be  as  much  in  the  wrong 
as  man,  and  therefore  unholy.  We  make  the  whole  sinful  act, 
matter  as  well  as  form,  substance  as  well  as  malice,  proceed 
from  God  by  the  single  way  of  permission  without  approval. 

SchoUon  —  How  God  moves  or  influences  the  will  in  its  free 
acts.  St.  Thomas:  God  implants  in  every  will  a  tendency  to- 
ward, a  natural  craving  for,  complete  happiness,  universal 
good,  the  summum  bonum,  Himself;  and  without  this  tendency 
man  can  desire  nothing.  In  this  single  respect  is  man's  will 
predetermined  by  God.  With  regard  to  particular  goods,  man 
determines  himself,  with  the  help  of  his  intellect,  to  wish  this 
good  or  that  good,  real  good  or  apparent  good.  1-2;  q.9;  a.6; 
ad.3. 

N.B.  A  real  good  is  good  in  itself,  good  as  a  matter  of 
fact ;  an  apparent  good  is  evil  in  itself,  good  in  the  mind,  e.  g. 
revenge.  Real  good  helps  to  last  end;  apparent  good  turns 
agent  aside  from  last  end.  Every  agent  under  man  seeks  real 
good,  because  nature  or  an  unerring  God  fixes  and  rules  its  ap- 
petite. Man  can  seek  real  or  apparent  good,  because  his  will 
or  appetite  is  fixed  and  ruled  by  a  reason  capable  of  error  and 
mistake.  God's  cooperation  with  man's  free  acts  has  a  parallel 
in  the  case  of  a  ship,  the  wind  and  its  pilot.  If  the  boat  goes 
wrong  and  breaks  on  the  rocks,  the  fault  is  not  with  the  wind, 
but  with  the  pilot  who  made  poor  use  of  the  wind.  The  wind 
is  man's  tendency  towards  universal  good,  implanted  in  him 


THESIS  VII  305 

by  his  creator,  the  pilot  is  free  will  in  its  selection  of  particular 
good.  With  the  Thomists  the  wind  would  be  God  and  free 
will  acting  in  concert,  or  the  wind  would  be  the  pilot. 

PRINCIPLES 

A:  God's  activity  is  simultaneous  with  man's  in  every  free 
act.  First  cause  is  prior  to  second  by  nature,  not  in  time. 
Priority  of  nature  means  simply  that  man's  wish  is  more  de- 
pendent on  God  than  on  man  himself,  because  man  gets  all 
his  activity  from  God. 

B:  God  and  man  are  partial  causes  of  man's  every  wish, 
from  the  viewpoint  of  cause  only.  From  the  viewpoint  of 
effect  they  are  total  causes,  one  subordinate  to  the  other,  like 
phantasm  and  working  intellect  with  regard  to  the  image;  like 
pen,  penman  and  writing.  God  produces  the  whole  effect,  man 
produces  the  whole  effect,  the  whole  wish,  but  under  different 
aspects;  God  under  universal  aspect,  man  under  particular 
aspect. 

C:  Man  cannot  wish  without  God,  but  God  need  not  pre- 
determine man. 

D :  The  indifference  we  ascribe  to  free  will  is  active,  not 
merely  passive.  Active  indifference  can  be  removed  by  the 
agent;  passive  must  be  removed  by  another. 

E:  Man's  will  is  in  potency  to  second  act,  not  to  first  act. 
Its  actuality  in  first  act  can  change  to  actuality  its  potency  to 
second  act. 


THESIS  VIII 

Ood  and  Evil 

Boedder,  pp.  393-412. 

QUESTION 
Cooperation  of  God  in  metaphysical,  physical  and  moral  evil. 

TERMS 

Evil  is  opposed  to  good.     Good  is  perfection,  whatever  con- 
tributes to  a  thing's  finish  or  completeness.     Evil  is  privatio 
boni  debiti;  it  is  absence  or  want  of  a  good  that  ought  to  be 
present,  e.  g.  blind  man.     Defect  is  absence  of  good  that  ought 
not  to  be  present,  it  is  limitation,  or  metaphysical  evil,  e.  g. 
blind  stone.     Every  creature  is  a  metaphysical  evil  because  of 
limitations  or  finite  nature.     Peccatum  means  slip  of  the  mind, 
mistake,  beside  agent's  end  or  purpose,  e.  g.   poor  scribe,  ig- 
norant doctor.     Culpa  is  slip  of  the  will,   fault,   sin,   blame- 
worthy, in  power  of  agent.     A  slip  of  the  tongue  is  no  fault 
of  the  heart.     Metaphysical  evil  is  defectus,  want,  limitation. 
Physical  evil  is  malum  or  peccatum,  or  absence  of  a  good  in 
the  physical  order,  that  ought  to  be  present.     Moral  evil  or  sin 
is  culpa,  act  of  will  opposed  to  rectitude  or  virtue.     Moral  evil 
has  to  do  with  the  man's  will;  physical,  with  any  other  faculty 
of  the  man,  e,  g.  blind,  deaf,  sick.     God  has  to  wish  metaphysi- 
cal evil  every  time  He  creates.     Limitation  is  of  the  essence  of 
a  creature.     God  can  wish  physical  evil  not  in  itself,  but  as  a 
means  to  some  moral  good  or  to  some  greater  physical  good. 
God  cannot  wish  moral  evil  as  an  end  or  as  a  means.     He  can 
however  permit  or  allow  it.     God's  permission  of  moral  evil  is 
always  physical,   never  moral.     We   distinguish   two   kinds   of 
such  physical  permission,  negative  and  positive.     Negative  is 
the  policy  of  doing  nothing,  leaving  things   alone,   letting  a 
thing  happen  without  at  all  desiring  it.     Positive  is  the  policy 

306 


THESIS  VIII  307 

of  doing  something  negative,  actively  leaving  things  alone,  let- 
ting a  thing  happen  with  bias  in  its  favor.  Negative  permis- 
sion is  extrinsic  to  the  permitting  agent,  positive  permission  is 
intrinsic  to  him.  To  be  negative  and  nowise  positive,  per- 
mission must  have  two  requisites.  1.  No  approval  of  the  thing 
permitted,  but  displeasure.  2.  The  thing  permitted  must  not 
necessarily  follow  from  what  the  agent  does.  If  it  necessarily 
follows,  the  agent  must  not  be  bound  to  refrain  from  doing 
what  he  does.  If  he  is  bound  to  refrain,  the  origin  of  the 
obligation  must  be  something  other  than  the  evil  that  follows. 
God's  permission  of  evil  is  purely  negative.  1.  God,  far  from 
approving  of  moral  evil  or  sin,  threatens  it  with  the  heaviest 
sanction  conceivable,  the  pains  of  hell.  2,  Sin  never  neces- 
sarily follows  from  what  God  does,  but  from  abuse  of  free  will, 
for  which  man  himself  is  alone  responsible.  God's  cooperation 
is  indifferent,  the  same  for  virtue  and  the  same  for  sin,  man's 
free  will  makes  the  difference.  God  is  not  bound  to  physically 
liinder  man's  abuse  of  his  free  will  from  a  motive  of  justice  to 
man,  because  man  of  himself  can  avoid  the  calamity.  His  own 
holiness  is  no  constraining  motive,  because,  far  from  approving 
the  sins  of  men,  God  detests  them;  and  the  sins  of  men  never 
prejudice  the  holiness  of  God.  God's  goodness  simply  holds 
Him  to  the  duty  of  sharing  His  gifts  with  free  agents  to  what- 
ever extent  these  free  agents  desire.  His  goodness  holds  Him 
to  good,  not  to  better  or  best.  His  wisdom  could  be  no  motive 
for  the  physical  prevention  of  sin,  because  He  can  derive  good 
from  even  moral  evil. 

Two  questions: 

I.  Can  God  wish  to  do  evil  Himself? 
II.  Can  God  wish  others  to  do  evil? 

PKOOFS 

I.  God  can  wish  neither  physical  nor  moral  evil  per  se,  be- 
cause they  are  opposed  to  good,  the  will's  object. 

God  can  wish  physical  evil  per  accidens,  because  it  is  not 
evil  simpliciter,  but  evil  conjoined  with  good,  greater  than  the 
good  the  evil  opposes. 

Physical  evil  sometimes  contributes  to  restoration  of  moral 


308  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

order,  to  establishment  of  Justice  and  preservation  of  order  in 
the  world.     Pain  leads  to  medicine  and  cure. 

God  can  wish  moral  evil  neither  per  se  nor  per  accidens.  He 
can  permit  it.  He  cannot  wish  to  sin  Himself,  He  cannot  wish 
others  to  sin ;  beause  against  His  holiness. 

Not  per  se,  because  otherwise  men  could  without  blame  wish 
sin.  Not  per  accidens,  because  no  conjoined  good  can  be  su- 
perior to  the  good  opposed  by  sin.  Divine  good  and  right 
order  are  opposed  by  sin,  and  no  good  can  be  greater.  And  yet 
sins  happen.  God  cannot  wish  them.  Ergo,  He  permits  them ; 
and  to  permit  sin  is  good,  not  evil. 
Four  good  tilings  in  permission  of  sin: 

1.  Good,  to  let  free  will  choose  between  good  and  evil,  while 
forbidding  evil  and  supplying  needed  means  for  its  avoidance. 

2.  Good,  to  refrain  from  means  and  helps  that  would  force 
free  agent  to  avoid  sin. 

3.  Good,  to  bestow  means  and  helps  that  God  foresees  will 
prove  inefficacious  because  of  man's  malice. 

4.  Good  to  afford  general  cooperation,  dependent  on  man's 
free  will  for  good  or  evil, 

PRINCIPLES 

A:  "The  Lord  hath  bid  Semei  curse  David."  II  Kings 
xvi,  10. 

Answer:  Bid  means  permit.  Other  meaning  absurd.  Bid 
and  permit  interchanged.  St.  Mark  x,  3.  Reason  enough  for 
permitting  is  the  fact  that  they  can  be  directed  to  higher  pur- 
poses of  providence.  Not  reason  enough  for  wishing  them. 
Same  true  of  martyrs  and  Passion  of  Christ.  Sin  is  not  on 
this  account  good,  because  capacity  for  direction  is  not  in  sin, 
but  outside. 

B :  Men  are  hardened  by  God,  blinded,  led  into  sin,  e.  g. 
Pharao.  Exodus  iv,  21;  People,  Isa.  vi,  10;  Egypt,  Isai.  xix, 
14;  hardeneth,  Rom.  ix,  18. 

Ansiver:  Permits,  allows,  denies  more  abundant  helps,  sends 
occasions  He  knows  men  will  abuse.  All  men  get  sufficient 
grace,  not  all  get  efficacious  grace. 

C :  One  sin  is  often  penalty  of  another.  God  can  wish 
penalty.     Ergo,  He  can  wish  sin. 


THESIS  VIII  309 

Answer:  Commission  of  sin  no  penalty,  but  the  denial  of 
more  abundant  graces  or  helps  that  could  impede  sin. 

D:  Sins  would  be  outside  the  order  of  providence,  beyond 
God's  power. 

Answer:  The  physical  act  needs  His  cooperation,  deformity 
is  in  human  will.  Besides,  God  permits  them  for  good  pur- 
poses. He  never  wishes  them.  To  wish  by  consequent  will  is 
to  permit. 

E:  God  causes  sin  by  cooperation.  What  He  causes.  He 
wishes.     Ergo. 

Answer:  He  causes  sin  in  the  sense  of  permitting,  not  in 
the  sense  of  loving  or  wishing. 

PROOFS 

II.  God  cannot  wish  others  to  do  evil.  God  cannot  wish  sin 
to  be  committed. 

1°.  No  difference  between  wishing  sin  and  wishing  sin  to  be 
committed.  Qui  facit  per  alium,  facit  per  se.  Men  would  do 
no  harm,  if  God  could  wish  them  to  commit  sin.  N"o  harm  to 
do  what  God  wants  done. 

2°.  God  forbids  sin.  Ergo,  He  cannot  wish  sin  to  be  com- 
mitted. 

PEINCIPLES 

A:  Either  God  wishes  sin  to  be  committed,  or  He  wishes 
sin  not  to  be  committed.  But  He  does  not  wish  sin  not  to  be 
committed.     Ergo,  He  wishes  sin  to  be  committed. 

Answer:  Enumeration  is  not  complete.  Datur  tertium. 
There  is  a  third  alternative.  He  permits  sin.  God's  will  re- 
garding the  non-existence  of  sin  is  not  absolute  and  efficacious. 
It  is  not  will  of  good  pleasure ;  but  antecedent  and  inefficacious, 
will  of  symbol.  His  will  to  permit  sin  is  absolute  and  effica- 
cious. 

B :  Commission  of  sin  and  non-commission  of  sin  are  con- 
tradictories.    Ergo. 

Answer:  To  wish  commission  of  sin,  and  to  wish  non-com- 
mission of  sin  are  not  contradictories.  Two  affirmations  can- 
not be  contradictories.  God  neither  wishes  sin  to  be  commit- 
ted, nor  does  He  wish  sin  not  to  be  committed.     He  wishes  to 


310  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

permit  sin  to  be  committed.  He  does  not  wish  sin  to  be  com- 
mitted, and  that  is  different  from  He  wishes  sin  not  to  be  com- 
mitted. 

C :  Sins  are  committed.  Ergo,  it  is  impossible  for  God  to 
wish  no  sin  to  be  committed.  Ergo,  He  wishes  sin  to  be  com- 
mitted. 

Answer:  With  consequent  and  efficacious  will,  I  grant;  with 
antecedent  and  inefficacious  will,  I  deny. 

The  commission  of  sin,  and  the  non-commission  of  sin  are 
contradictories.  To  wish  the  commission  of  sin,  and  to  wish 
the  non-commission  of  sin  are  not  contradictories. 

D:  St.  Aug.  Evil  is  not  good,  but  the  existence  of  evil 
is  good.  Enchir.  c.  96.  Ergo,  God  can  wish  sin  to  be  com- 
mitted. 

Answer:  To  permit  evil  to  exist  is  good.  Enchir.  c.  27. 
"  Nullo  modo  sineret  aliquid  mali  esse  in  operatione,  nisi,  etc." 
St.  Aug.  would  not  say  sineret  but  vellet;  because  God  can 
wish  good  and  not  merely  allow  it. 

E:  St.  Aug.  Sin  helps  to  order  and  beauty  in  the  world. 
Enchir.  c.  10.     Ergo. 

Answer:  Per  se,  no;  per  accidens,  yes.  Per  se,  sin  destroys 
order;  per  accidens,  it  is  an  occasion  for  higher  good.  0  felix 
culpa. 


THESIS  IX 

God's  cooperation,  viewed  as  something  outside  of  God,  is  the 
creature's  act,  proceeding  at  one  and  the  same  time  from  the 
creature  as  from  second  or  particular  cause,  and  from  God  as 
from  first  and  universal  cause. 

Boedder,  pp.  344-370. 

QUESTION 

God's  cooperation,  viewed  as  something  in  God,  is  His  eternal 
decree,  and  we  are  not  at  present  concerned  with  that.  We 
now  study  God's  cooperation  in  term  or  in  effect ;  and  we  main- 
tain that  it  is  the  creature's  act.  The  creature's  cooperation 
in  term  is  likewise  the  creature's  act.  In  other  words  the  crea- 
ture's act  is  the  whole  effect  of  God,  and  the  whole  effect  of  the 
creature.  The  whole  act  must  be  ascribed  to  God,  and  the 
whole  act  must  be  ascribed  to  the  creature,  not  a  part  of  the 
act  to  each,  e.  g.  pen  and  penman  in  writing.  Therefore  God's 
cooperation,  viewed  in  term,  connotes  nothing  distinct  from  the 
creature's  act,  and  the  physical  predetermination  of  Thomists 
is  ruled  out. 

PEOOF 

Really  and  truly  to  cooperate,  God  and  creature  must  com- 
bine to  produce  the  effect,  and  by  way  of  term  nothing  but  the 
creature's  act  need  result,  to  the  utter  exclusion  of  any  pre- 
determination or  extra  principle.  Ergo,  God's  cooperation  is 
the  creature's  act.  With  regard  to  antecedent:  This  view  of 
God's  cooperation  keeps  intact  the  creature's  essential  depend- 
ence on  God  for  its  causative  virtue,  the  creature's  dependence 
on  God  in  process  of  its  exercise  of  activity,  and  God's  owner- 
ship of  the  whole  act  or  effect.  The  creature  not  only  exists  in 
virtue  of  God's  conservation,  it  acts  in  virtue  of  God's  coopera- 
tion.    By  virtue  of  His  immensity  God  is  immediately  present 

311 


312  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

to  the  creature  at  three  different  periods,  before  the  act  begins, 
while  the  act  is  in  progress,  and  when  the  act  is  completed. 
Before  the  act  begins,  He  gives  the  creature  causative  virtue; 
while  the  act  is  in  progress,  He  gives  the  creature  help;  and 
when  the  act  is  done,  the  whole  thing  is  God's.  The  creature 
moves  and  applies  itself  to  the  act's  accomplishment  only  by  vir- 
tue of  help  borrowed  from  God.  God  performs  the  act,  as  first 
cause;  the  creature,  as  second  cause.  God  is  not  only  the  prin- 
ciple of  man's  causative  virtue.  He  is  also  the  principle  of 
man's  act. 

On  the  other  hand,  all  the  creature's  essential  dependence  on 
God  in  process  of  its  exercise  of  activity  is  kept  intact.  St. 
Thomas  in  different  places  describes  this  dependence  as  five- 
fold. God  cooperates  with  creatures,  (1)  hy  giving  them  their 
nature  and  its  forces;  (2)  hy  preserving  them  in  being;  (3) 
hy  applying  them  to  actual  work;  (^)  hy  vesting  them  with  the 
capacity  of  instruments;  (5)  hy  moving  them  in  quulity  of 
their  last  end.  This  fivefold  dependence  calls  for  no  physical 
predetermination. 

Besides,  these  three  axioms  need  explanation:  (a)  Second 
causes  never  act  without  motion  from  the  first  cause,  (b)  Sec- 
ond causes  must  be  applied  to  actual  work  by  the  first  cause, 
(c)  Second  causes  act  only  in  virtue  of  the  first  cause.  Ex- 
planation: (a)  No  motion  is  required  beyond  the  reception  of 
being  and  connatural  activity.  Creation  and  conservation  are 
themselves  motion.  Motion  is  a  metaplior  derived  from  artist's 
use  of  his  tools,  and  employed  to  express  creature's  dependence 
on  God.  The  real  and  proper  sense  is,  second  causes  never  act 
without  help  from  the  first  cause,  (b)  The  word  application 
is  as  much  a  metaphor  as  motion.  It  is  a  figure  used  to  portray 
the  superiority  of  the  first  cause,  which  directs  second  causes 
and  prescribes  their  appointed  ends,  (c)  The  power  attaching 
to  every  creature  is  God's  power,  because  He  preserves  all  and 
cooperates  with  all. 


THESIS  X 

Physical  predetermination  is  a,  useless  in  necessary  agents; 
6,  useless  in  free  agents,  and  destructive  of  free  will.  Simul- 
taneous cooperation  is  right. 

Boedder,  pp.  439-448. 

QUESTION 

Two  parts:  I.  Physical  predetermination.  II.  Simultane- 
ous cooperation. 

TERMS 

I.  Physical  Predetermination 

Thomists  teach  two  kinds  of  predetermination ;  one  eternal,  in 
God,  a  decree;  the  other  temporal,  in  creature,  motion  im- 
pressed on  creature;  and  this  is  physical  predetermination. 
Second  is  instrument  of  first,  and  is  likewise  called  antecedent 
influence.  Predetermination  and  antecedent  influence  are 
synonymous  with  Thomists,  not  in  themselves.  Predetermina- 
tion is  infallible,  influence  not.  Grace  is  influence,  not  prede- 
termination. Predetermination  is  different  from  influence  of 
object,  e.  g.  intellect  moves  will  objectively ;  different  from 
moral  influence,  e.  g.  invitation ;  different  from  simultaneous 
cooperation,  or  help.  Physical  predetermination  can  he  best 
described  as  (1)  a  true  push,  real  motion,  (2)  proceeding  from 
God  alone,  (3)  received  in  second  cause,  (^)  gotten  and  kept 
without  power  of  choice,  (5)  prior  to  act  and  cause  of  act,  (6) 
absolutely  necessary  to  every  act  of  every  creature,  (7)  brooTc- 
ing  no  denial  and  infallibly  connected  ivith  the  creature's  act, 
(8)  supplied  by  God,  not  to  make  the  creature  proximately  able 
to  ad,  but  to  make  it  actually  active;  to  put  it  not  in  first  or 
second  act,  but  between  the  two.  It  supposes  fire  equipped  with 
natural  power  to  burn   (remote  first  act),  and  with  all  condi- 

313 


314  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

tions  dependent  on  other  second  causes  (proximate  first  act), 
like  dry  wood  applied.  Over  end  above  all  this,  physical  pre- 
determination is  required,  to  save  God's  dominion  over  His 
creatures.  With  all  these  requisites  fulfilled,  creatures  cannot 
act  unless  they  are  applied,  excited,  moved,  actuated,  determined 
by  God.  Physical  predetermination  is  intrinsic  to  second 
cause.  Another  kind  is  extrinsic,  due  to  act  of  God's  will  and 
to  a  mysterious  sympathy  or  harmony  in  second  cause ;  and  wc 
are  not  concerned  w4th  this  extrinsic  kind.  Yet  -another  kind 
of  antecedent  influence  is  indifferent  to  will's  consent  and  dis- 
sent; and  we  are  not  dealing  with  this  kind  either.  We  all 
contend  for  physical  and  immediate  cooperation  on  the  part  of 
God,  not  content  with  mere  moral  cooperation.  Two  classes  of 
creatures,  necessary  and  free.     Hence  our  thesis. 

PROOFS 

(a)  1°.  God's  supreme  dominion  and  the  dependence  of 
creatures  are  secured  by  simultaneous  cooperation.  Three 
things  in  second  cause,  power,  exercise  of  power,  and  resulting 
effect.  All  three  depend  on  God  in  simultaneous  cooperation, 
because  of  creation,  conservation  and  cooperation.  No  act  is 
possible  without  physical  and  immediate  cooperation. 

2°.  Physical  predetermination  is  not  needed  to  apply,  to  move, 

to  excite,  determine  creature. 

Apply  means  to  unite.;  union  between  creature  and  God  se- 
cured by  immensity;  union  between  creature  and  effect  se- 
cured by  inclination  stamped  on  nature. 

Move  means  no  local  motion  needed,  like  cook  setting  meat  to 
fire. 

Excite  means  inclination  stamped  on  nature. 

Determine  in  specie  means  inclination  stamped  on  natiire. 
Creatures  rather  determine  God's  cooperation  e.  g.  Sun 
to  shine;  sun  to  produce  wheat,  pears,  roses. 

Determine  in  individuo  means  simultaneous  cooperation  and 
decree. 

(b)  Useless  in  free  agents.  1°.  Free  will  can  do  nothing 
without  simultaneous  cooperation.  God  can  refuse  it,  and  will 
becomes  helpless. 

2°.  Will  would  have  only  passive  and  negative  indifference, 


THESIS  X  315 

like  intellect:  freedom  demands  active  indifference.  Free  will 
means  dominion  over  act,  and  there  is  no  such  dominion  where 
will  must  wait  for  determination  by  another. 

Destroys  free  will.  1°.  Phj^sical  predetermination  is  not  in 
our  power.  With  it,  the  act  must  follow;  without  it,  the  act 
cannot  be  placed.  This  is  clear  from  qualities  of  physical  pre- 
determination enumerated  above.  We  cannot  fly  without  wings, 
read  without  light,  walk  when  chained.  Vain  distinctions  used 
by  Thomists,  originative  et  terminative;  sensu  diviso  et  sensu 
composito.  N.B.  Simultaneous  cooperation  goes  always  with 
foreknowledge,  and  never  affects  man's  freedom. 

2°.  No  violation  of  a  commandment  could  be  imputed  to 
man.     Ad  impossibile  nemo  tenetur  —  infinite  series. 

3°.  God  determines  the  will;  and,  to  be  free,  the  will  must 
determine  itself.  Necessary  agents  would  determine  themselves 
to  the  same  extent  as  man. 

4°.  God  would  be  the  author  of  sin.  Formal  wickedness  of 
act  is  inseparably  connected  with  material  entity  of  act.  It  is 
worse  to  physically  drive  a  man  to  sin  than  to  morally  incite 
him.  God  advises  against  sin,  and  cannot  drive  to  sin.  N.B. 
Simultaneous  cooperation  is  material,  not  formal.  It  is  giving 
necessary  help  according  to  agent's  nature.  Physical  prede- 
termination is  formal  cooperation.  It  is  giving  unnecessary 
help,  against  agent's  nature. 

PRINCIPLES 

A.  Second  causes  act  with  motion,  application,  virtue  of 
first.     Ergo. 

Answer:  Motion  of  first  is  creation  and  conservation  of  sec- 
ond cause  and  its  energies.  Application  of  first  is  union  with 
help  of  another  second  cause,  and  God  is  its  author.  God's 
eternal  decree  bearing  on  simultaneous  cooperation  moves  and 
applies  second  cause  from  eternity.  Aristotle  proves  God  from 
need  of  a  first  mover.  Virtue  of  first  is  creation  and  conserva- 
tion of  second  cause  and  its  energies,  along  with  simultaneous 
cooperation. 

B.  To  act,  a  thing  must  actually  exist.     Ergo. 

Answer:  Second  cause  actually  exists  and  has  natural  en- 
ergies.    Nothing  more  is  required.     First  act  is  not  a  mixture 


316  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

of  potency  and  act,  even  in  case  of  the  soul's  faculties.     Actu- 
ality is  present  before  exercise  of  faculty. 

C.  Second  causes  are  instruments  of  first,  and  must  be 
applied.     Ergo. 

Answer:  True  of  artist's  instruments,  not  of  others.  Crea- 
tures are  not  instruments  of  God  in  strict  sense.  Instrument 
contributes  to  likeness  with  principal  in  effect.  Creatures  con- 
tribute to  likeness  with  themselves,  not  with  God.  Instruments 
have  no  dominion  over  act,  men  have. 

D.  God  must   cause   the   creature's   act.     It   is   something. 

Answer:  He  causes  it  by  creation,  conservation,  and  co- 
operation. He  gives  the  creature  being  and  natural  energies, 
and  exerts  His  omnipotence. 

E.  Will  is  indifferent  and  needs  to  be  determined.     Ergo. 
Answer:     With   active   indifference.     It  determines   itself. 

F.  God  has  charge  of  the  universe,  and  must  direct  things. 
Ergo. 

Answer:  He  directs  men  as  general  directs  army.  He  gives 
soldiers  being  and  natural  energies,  encourages  them,  advises, 
promises  reward.     He  does  not  haul  them  around  physically. 

G.  God  must  arrange  things  without  danger  of  mistake. 
Ergo. 

Answer:  God  must  leave  men  free.  Simultaneous  cooper- 
ation with  the  help  of  intermediate  knowledge  secures  all  this. 
Consequent  and  extrinsic  necessity  needed,  not  antecedent  and 
intrinsic. 

H.  In  simultaneous  cooperation  God  is  first  cause,  first 
mover,  first  free,  first  to  determine,  first  cause  of  whole  thing, 
Lord  of  man  and  all  creation  besides.  Decree  exists  before 
second  cause.  Actual  cooperation  is  first  in  dignity,  necessity 
and  independence;  not  in  fact,  nature  or  causality.  Man's 
freedom  is  from  God,  and  determines  cooperation  in  decree. 
God  gives  everything  to  creature.  God  is  Lord  of  all;  nega- 
tively, by  refusing  cooperation ;  positively,  necessary  agents  act 
according  to  nature,  free  agents  can  be  led  with  the  help  of 
intermediate  knowledge.  And  so  simultaneous  cooperation,  the 
system  advocated  by  ]\Iolinistp,  neither  unduly  exalts  nor  unduly 
depresses  the  dominion  of  God  or  human  endeavor;  and  fur- 
nishes forth  a  rational  explanation  of  human  conduct  without 
detriment  to  the  majesty  of  God  or  the  liberty  of  man. 


THESIS  X  317 

II.  Simultaneous  Cooperation- 

TERMS 

Eight  doctrine  teaches  that  God's  act  on  the  outside  is  simul- 
taneous with  creature's  act,  neither  before  nor  after,  but  along 
with  it;  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  effect  but  what  proceeds 
from  the  creature,  nothing  but  what  proceeds  from  God ;  that 
the  whole  effect  begins  with  both  and  depends  on  both.  This 
is  cooperation  in  second  act.  Cooperation  in  first  act  is  God's 
act  on  the  inside,  it  is  God's  power  determined  by  an  eternal 
decree,  and  applied  to  cooperation  with  creature.  It  is  eternal 
and  not  simultaneous ;  precedes  the  creature's  act  in  time  and 
in  nature;  cause  of  act  destined  to  follow  in  course  of  time. 
Simultaneous  in  second  act  is  creature's  act  inasmuch  as  it  pro- 
ceeds from  God.  No  act  of  creature  but  it  proceeds,  without 
possibility  of  division,  from  simultaneous  cooperation  of  God 
and  creature.  In  second  act  it  is  prior  in  dignity,  universality, 
necessity,  and  consequence  to  creature's  act;  not  in  nature  or 
in  time.  Cooperation  in  first  act  is  a  decree  formulated  with 
help  of  intermediate  knowledge,  by  which  God  knows  what  the 
free  agent  will  do  in  the  event  of  divine  cooperation.  This  be- 
comes cooperation  in  second  act  without  more  ado,  as  soon  as 
the  creature  exerts  its  activity.  In  the  case  of  necessary  agents 
this  decree  is  absolute  and  necessarily  conjoined  with  a  fixed 
effect.  In  the  case  of  free  agents  it  is  efficacious  but  indifferent, 
neither  wholly  antecedent  nor  wholly  absolute,  but  virtually  and 
equivalently  conditional.  Efficacious,  because  it  will  secure  a 
fixed  effect  without  being  necessarily  conjoined  with  it.  In- 
different, because  the  will  in  second  act  remains  intrinsically 
indifferent  or  free. 

PEOOF 

The  decree  is  meant  to  constitute  the  will  in  nearest  first 
act  to  operation,  and  in  this  phase  the  will  must  be  free.  Not 
antecedent,  because  of  intermediate  knowledge;  virtually  con- 
ditional for  same  reason.  Of  course,  such  a  decree  leaves  free 
will  unharmed.  The  will  determines  itself  with  God's  co- 
operation.    God  and  will  are  cause  of  determination  in  such  a 


318  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

way  that  determination  is  left  to  the  will's  dominion  and 
choice.  Simultaneous  cooperation  in  first  act,  though  prior  to 
creature's  act,  is  not  physical  predetermination,  because  inter- 
mediate knowledge  shifts  the  creature's  act  from  time  to  eter- 
nity, and  in  this  way  the  eternal  decree  is  simultaneous  with 
the  creature's  act.  God  is  after  a  manner  determined  by  crea- 
tures, but  this  implies  no  imperfection.  It  is  objective  deter- 
mination and  extrinsic.  It  effects  nothing  in  God  physically 
or  morally.  It  arises  from  God's  wish  to  suit  Himself  to  the 
natures  of  things,  and  depends  altogether  on  His  own  free-will 
and  energy. 

About  God's  Cooperation  with  Sin 

Matter  of  sin  is  the  physical  act ;  form  of  sin  is  its  malice, 
deformity.  God  cooperates  with  sinner,  and  wishes  the  act; 
because  no  effect  of  creature  exists  without  God's  physical  and 
immediate  cooperation.  God  wishes  the  physical  act  permis- 
sively,  not  approvingly;  because  to  wish  it  otherwise  would  be 
to  contract  the  malice  of  sin.  In  a  lie  the  physical  act  is  iden- 
tical with  the  malice,  and  God  would  wish  a  man  to  commit 
sin.  He  would  wish  something  dishonorable.  God  is  not  the 
cause  per  se  of  sin,  but  only  its  cause  per  accidens.  Per  se 
means  with  full  intent  and  approval.  God  merely  permits,  dis- 
approves, detests,  threatens.  Examples  of  causes  per  accidens: 
musician  and  builder  with  regard  to  house;  builder  and  legal 
quarrel  over  house;  two  incendiaries;  against  wishes  and  be- 
yond expectations.  God  is  not  the  author  of  sin,  because  on 
no  score  can  it  be  imputed  to  Him.  Not  because  He  gave  man 
free  will.  He  gave  it  for  good  purpose,  strengthens  it  with 
grace,  rewards  its  right  use  with  Heaven.  Not  because  He  re- 
frains from  preventing  sin.  He  prevents  sin  in  a  way  suited 
to  free  nature;  not  held  to  prevent  it  every  possible  way.  Not 
because  He  produces  the  physical  act.  He  has  a  right  to  pro- 
duce it  as  universal  providence,  and  He  is  far  from  approving 
or  encouraging  it.  He  is  the  author  of  virtue,  because  He  co- 
operates approvingly  with  virtue. 

SCHOLION  —  ThOMISM    AND    MOLINISM    COMPARED 

According  to  the  Thomists,  who  reject  Molina's  middle  or 
intermediate  knowledge  in  God,  every  thing,  apart  from  His 


THESIS  X  319 

own  divine  essence  and  purely  possible  beings,  is  open  to  the 
eyes  of  God  in  His  decrees.  All  the  future  then  is  destined  to 
come  to  pass  because  God  has  so  decreed,  and  in  that  decree 
God  foresees  every  minute  detail  of  the  future.  In  this  state 
of  things  God  must  evidently  have  at  His  disposal  means  cal- 
culated without  fail  to  bring  about  these  future  events,  and  on 
the  other  hand  these  means  must  not  rob  man  of  liberty.  On 
this  difficulty  the  whole  question  hinges,  and  the  explanation 
offered  by  the  Thomists  is  necessarily  weak.  God  has  decreed, 
tliey  say,  that  somewhere  in  the  course  of  time  a  certain  free 
agent  is  to  acquit  himself  of  a  certain  act  and  no  other.  This 
divine  decree  is  sure  of  fulfillment,  because  it  proceeds  from 
omnipotence  and  includes  the  application  of  means,  that  simply 
render  any  other  course  of  action  utterly  impossible.  These 
means  are  gathered  up  in  the  one  word  physical  predetermina- 
tion. In  the  supernatural  order  this  physical  predetermination 
or  necessitating  bias  is  nothing  other  than  efficacious  grace. 
They  opine  that  in  any  other  hypothesis  God  would  not  be  the 
first,  primary  and  immediate  cause  of  human  activity,  and  that 
the  created  human  will  would  of  its  own  unaided  forces  pass 
from  a  state  of  rest  to  activity,  and  would  be  the  first,  primary 
and  immediate  cause  of  its  own  salvation.  The  Thomists  con- 
jure up  this  process  in  the  affairs  of  grace.  Man  has  these 
four  gifts  from  God,  1°,  existence;  2°,  sufficient  grace;  3°,  ef- 
ficacious grace  or  physical  predetermination;  4°,  simultaneous 
cooperation,  as  between  will  and  grace.  The  sureness  of  the 
future  event,  the  impossibility  of  its  failure,  assumes  a  threefold 
guise  as  considered  resident  in  the  act  itself,  in  the  will  of  God, 
and  in  God's  knowledge. 

These  three  guises  are  distinguished  by  the  titles,  objective, 
affective  and  intellective.  The  first,  in  the  Thomistic  system,  is 
derived  from  their  physical  predetermination,  or  bias  exerted  by 
God  on  the  will ;  the  second,  from  the  divine  decree  antedating 
foreknowledge  of  the  man's  consent,  and  ordaining  the  bestowal 
of  that  same  physical  predetermination ;  the  third,  from  the 
knowledge  God  has  of  the  said  decree.  In  God's  regard,  there- 
fore, the  connection  between  grace  and  the  act  elicited  under 
its  influence,  is  not  one  of  foreknowledge,  but  of  causality.  The 
sureness  of  the  act  leans  not  on  God's  foreknowledge  of  the 
man's  proffered  consent;  but  God's  foreknowledge  of  the  prof- 


320  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

fered  consent  is  wholly  founded  on  God's  omnipotence.     Hu- 
man   liberty,    the    Thomists    say,    emerges   unhurt    from    this 
forcing  process,  because  God  deals  throughout  with  the  will  in 
a  way  suited  to  its  inherent  freedom.     The  way  itself  is  strange, 
mysterious,  inexplicable.     To  make  the  will  appear  capable  still 
of  choice  under  pressure  from  physical  predetermination,  they 
employ  the  time-honored  distinction  turning  on  divided  or  sepa- 
rate and  united  or  conjoined  senses.     Under  its  protecting  fold, 
they  say  that  the  will,  though  unable  to  choose  in  a  united  or 
conjoined  sense,  is  still  able  to  choose  in  a  divided  or  separate 
sense;  and  human  liberty  remains  intact.     It  may  be  well  to 
set  down  here  what  some  eminent  Dominicans  have  said  of 
this  distinction.     Cajetan  says,  "  It  fails  to  satisfy  the  mind  " ; 
Aravius,  "  I  set  small  store  by  it " ;  Albertini,  "  When  it  comes 
to  answering  difficulties,  we  -abandon  the  system  with  as  much 
piety  as  wisdom " ;  Billuart,  "  My  answer  is,  that  it  is  a  mys- 
tery " ;    Bannez,    "  Ignorance    and    rashness.     We    believe    the 
Trinity,  though  we  do  not  understand."     N.B.     The  Trinity 
contains  no  element  which  renders  the  mystery  absurd  or  con- 
tradictory.    The  Trinity  is  revealed  doctrine.     The   Thomists 
can  appeal  to  no  revelation  for  their  physical  predetermination. 
Grace  borrows  none  of  its  strength  from  free  will.     Its  efficacy 
is  its  own  intrinsic  property.     Neither  is  its  bearing  on  the  will's 
free  consent  based  on  what  the  Thomists  style  God's  physical 
predetermination. 

Here  we  are  face  to  face  with  two  systems  of  theology,  that 
had  their  origin  in  attempts  to  reconcile  the  action  of  God's 
grace  with  human  liberty.  Like  the  Trinity,  the  question  is, 
and  must  forever  remain,  a  mystery.  But  nothing  prevents  us 
from  endeavoring  here,  as  we  endeavor  in  the  case  of  the  Trin- 
ity, to  show  that  the  mystery  involves  no  contradiction  and  vio- 
lates no  principle  of  reason.  Mysteries  are  superior,  not  hostile 
to  reason.  Faith  is  higher  homage  of  the  mind,  not  its  stultifi- 
cation. 

What  we  call  actual  grace  is  an  indispensably  necessary  help 
to  salvation.  This  actual  grace,  one  and  always  the  same  in 
itself,  sometimes  meets  with  resistance  in  the  soul,  sometimes 
with  welcome.  Men  at  times  under  stress  of  temptation  reject 
the  help  offered  by  Almighty  God,  and  walk  the  ways  of  the 
devil.     Men  at  other  times  in  spite  of  temptation  yield  to  the 


THESIS  X  321 

saving  influence  of  grace,  and  keep  the  straight  and  narrow  path. 
Theology  calls  resisted  grace  merely  sufficient,  it  calls  grace 
welcomed,  cherished,  put  to  good  account,  efficacious.  Man's 
unaided  will,  however,  is  far  from  raising  merely  sufficient  to 
the  dignity  of  efficacious  grace.  Man's  will  must  be  conceived 
as  under  the  influence  of  grace  even  before  the  act  of  consent  is 
placed,  and  grace  under  this  aspect  is  named  preventing.  No 
matter,  therefore,  what  part  human  activity  plays  in  its  accom- 
plishment, salvation  always  remains  the  free  and  gratuitous 
gift  of  God,  rooted  in  the  bestowal  of  this  preventing  grace. 
The  will  thus  elevated  makes  choice  of  virtue,  spurns  aside  sin, 
and  straightway  what  was  preventing  grace  becomes  assisting 
grace.  Therefore,  the  will  in  putting  a  salutary  act,  an  act 
tending  towards  salvation,  passes  not  from  complete  quiet  or 
rest  to  action,  but  from  an  indeliberate  to  a  deliberate  act.  On 
this  account  divine  grace  and  the  will  operate  together  in  the 
production  of  a  salutary  act,  when  that  act  is  considered  in  its 
formal  or  distinctively  last  stage;  when  it  is  considered  in  its 
totality  or  from  beginning  to  end,  grace  must  be  said  to  ante- 
date the  will.  In  other  words,  grace  is  first  merely  preventing 
grace,  to  become  later  on  assisting  grace. 

These  truths  well  in  mind,  to  answer  future  difficulties,  we 
can  now  draw  nearer  the  central  problem.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
God  has  determined  from  all  eternity  to  confer  on  certain  sin- 
ners and  on  all  His  elect  efficacious  graces,  helps  to  the  perform- 
ance of  virtue  they  shall  not,  yea  cannot,  even  though  free 
agents,  reject  or  fail  to  use.  It  is  the  province  of  theology  to 
save  God  from  the  reproach  of  doing  violence  to  human  liberty 
in  this  saving  process.  God's  omnipotence  must  not  be  exalted 
at  the  expense  of  His  creatures'  inalienable  prerogatives,  that 
would  be  to  insult  God's  wisdom;  nor  must  the  creature's  ac- 
tivity be  unduly  exaggerated  at  the  risk  of  belittling  God's 
supreme  dominion.  Salvation  must  be  so  explained  that  it  re- 
main at  one  and  the  same  time  the  free  and  gratuitous  gift  of 
God,  and  the  reward  due  in  justice  to  a  man's  hard  efforts. 
The  Thomists,  it  seems  to  us,  ascribe  too  much  to  God's  om- 
nipotence, and  leave  too  small  play  for  human  endeavor,  re- 
ducing free  will  to  something  dangerously  like  a  necessary 
agent,  without  choice,  and  consequently  without  merit.  We 
seem  to  them  to  emphasize  beyond  measure  the  energies  of  free 


322  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

will,  and  rele,a:ate  God's  omnipotence  to  too  obscure  a  corner  in 
the  scheme  of  salvation  and  sanctitication.     Whether  Thomists 
or  Molinists,  we  are  all  of  us  Catholics,  and  we  are  agreed  about 
such  defined  points  of  doctrine  as  the  gratuity  of  grace,  the 
nature  of  merit  and  the  continued  existence  of  liberty  alongside 
of  efficacious  grace.     Our  Church  is  a  unit  on  these  matters, 
and  leaves  no  room  for  doubt  or  discussion.     But  condescend- 
ing, as  it  were,  to  reason,  she  leaves  a  wide  field  for  argumenta- 
tion, when   methods   of   explanation   are   to   be   adopted.     She 
has  condemned  neither  Thomists  nor  Molinists,  and  even  en- 
courages  them    to    pursue   their   investigations    without   limit, 
provided  always  that  due  deference  be  paid  to  the  demands  of 
faith.     Hence   the   TJiomists,   though   they   seem   in    as   many 
words  to  deny  free  will  when  grace  exacts  consent,  are  never- 
theless careful  to  always  close  their  remarks  with  the  saving 
statement  that,  though  God  forces  or  determines  the  will.  He 
always  does  so  in  some  mysterious  way,  escaping  our  powers  of 
perception,  but  adapted  to  a  free  agent,  and  leaving  the  agent's 
liberty  inviolate  and  intact.     The  statement  saves  their  faith, 
and  puts  their  orthodoxy  beyond  suspicion;  but  it  is  far  from 
satisfying,  and  leaves  the  mystery  just  as  much  a  mystery  as 
ever.     The  Molinists  have  no  such   subterfuge  to  offer;  and, 
while  vindicating  to  free  will  all  its  vast  prerogative,  they  in  no 
whit  diminish  the  Creator's  supreme  and  universal  dominion. 
In  our  exposition  we  begin  with  the  system  of  the  Thomists, 
remarking  that,  though  they  profess  to  derive  their  doctrine 
from  passages  in  the  writings  of  St.  Thomas,  the  Molinists  are 
just  as  loud  in  declaring  that  the  Angelic  Doctor  is  autliority 
for  their  position.     Since,  however,  the  illustrious  St.  Thomas 
was  himself  a  Dominican,  the  Thomists,  belonging  to  the  same 
Order,  wear  his  proud  name  with  a  peculiar  grace,  and  nobody 
disputes  the  title  with  them.     We  are  ourselves  Molinists,  east- 
ing our  lot  with  tliat  leader  among  Jesuit  theologians  on  ques- 
tions of  grace.  Father  Molina  of  Spain.     God's  knowledge  of 
things  plays  an  important  part  in  the  two  systems;  and,  as 
explained  by  Thomists  and  Molinists,  presents  the  first  marked 
difference.     To  keep  God's  independence  of  created  things  safe, 
we  must  hold  that  God  knows  everything  in  His  own  essence, 
without  in  any  way  leaning  on  things  themselves  for  that  knowl- 
edge.    In  the  universe  of  things  we  distinguish  these  several 


THESIS  X  323 

categories,  1°,  Necessaiy  things,  things  such  of  their  very  na- 
ture that  they  cannot  not  be.     God  Himself  and  pure  possibles 
are   instances.     2°.  Contingent   things,    things   that   can    with 
equal  indifference  be  or  not  be.     Past,  present  and  future  oc- 
currences  are   instances.     Some   future   events   are   subject   to 
conditions,  tliey  are  dependent  for-  their  existence  in  time  on 
certain  circumstances.     If  these  circumstances  have  place,  then 
the  future  events  follow  as  a  matter  of  course;  if  the  circum- 
stances are  wanting,  the  future  events  likewise  fail  of  actual 
being.     Besides,  some  of  these  future  events  are  the  effects  of 
necessary  causes ;  others  are  the  effects  of  free  causes.     Events  of 
the  first  kind  present  no  difficulty,  and  fall  under  our  second 
category  or  contingents.     Events  of  the  second  kind  present  a 
difficulty,  and  constitute  a  third  class.     3°.  Futuribles,  or  fu- 
ture events  derivable  from  free  agents,  that  would  indeed  have 
place  under  certain  fixed  conditions,  but  never  as  a  matter  of 
fact  happen  because  these  conditions  are  never  fulfilled.     The 
conversion  of  the  Tyrians  as  described  by  Our  Lord  in   St. 
Matthew  xi,  21,  is  an  instance  in  point,  "Wo  to  thee,  Corozain; 
wo  to  thee,  Bethsaida;   for  if  in   Tyre  and   Sidon  had  been 
wrought  the  miracles  that  have  been  wrought  in  you,  they  had 
long  ago  done  penance  in  sackcloth  and  ashes."     The  conver- 
sion of  Tyre  and  Sidon  belongs  to  what  we  call  f uturible.  events. 
In  other  words,  it  never  happened,  but  would  certainly  have 
happened,  were  the  miracles  forthcoming.     We  distinguish,  like- 
wise, between  a  futurible  only  and  a  futurible  future.     The  for- 
mer never  happens,  the  latter  happens,  and  is  considered  fu- 
turible, only  under  the  aspect  of  complete  independence  from  its 
occurrence. 

To  embrace  these  different  objects  of  knowledge,  theologians 
agree  to  recognize  in  God  different  ways  of  apprehending  the 
truth.  Of  course,  this  agreement  is  a  matter  of  mere  con- 
venience. All  theologians  are  satisfied  that  everything  in  God 
is  absolute  unity,  and  they  speak  of  multiplicity  only  to  bring 
God  into  closer  range  with  our  feeble  intellects.  The  Thomists 
limit  God's  knowledge  to  two  kinds,  vision  or  seeing,  and  in- 
telligence or  understanding.  Every  object  in  the  field  of  knowl- 
edge, they  contend,  is  attainable  by  these  two  processes.  In- 
telligence grasps  things  possible,  and  future  events  dependent 
on  a  condition.    Vision  grasps  existences,  whether  necessary,  like 


324  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

tliat  of  God  Himself,  or  contingent,  like  that  of  aught  else  in 
the  universe  of  facts.  What  we  described  as  futuribles,  if  ad- 
mitted at  all  as  objects  of  God's  knowledge,  are  referred  partly 
to  intelligence,  partly  to  vision. 

The  Molinists,  admitting  intelligence  and  vision,  introduce 
a  third  kind  of  knowledge,  labeling  it  middle  or  intermediate. 
Thev  hold  it  necessary  for  the  understanding  of  events  styled 
futuribles,  and  derive  its  name  from  the  circumstance  that  it 
partakes  at  the  same  time  of  intelligence  and  vision.  The 
Thomists  are  up  in  arms  against  this  third  kind  of  divine  knowl- 
edge, branding  it  an  unnecessary  and  dangerous  innovation. 
That  it  is  a  necessary  feature  of  God's  knowledge,  may  be  easily 
seen  from  these  three  examples,  supposing  an  individual,  Peter, 
under  the  influence  of  efficacious  grace, 

1°.  Intelligence.     Peter,    looking    merely    at    the    essences    of 

things,  can  with  this  grace  be  converted. 
2°.  Vision.     Peter,  acting  as  a  necessary  agent,  shall  with  this 

grace  necessarily  be  converted ;  i.  e.  Peter  with  this  grace 

cannot  possibly  escape  conversion. 
3°.  Middle   or  Intermediate.     Peter,   acting   as   a   free   agent, 

shall  with  this  grace  be  converted ;  i.  e.  Peter  even  with 

this   grace   could  still   escape   conversion   and   embrace 

damnation. 

We,  therefore,  define  middle  or  intermediate  knowledge  as  the 
certain  and  infallible  knowledge  by  which  God  is  acquainted 
with  futuribles,  with  events  destined  to  happen  only  on  the  ful- 
filment of  a  condition,  that  has  a  bearing  indeed  on  their  oc- 
currence, but  no  necessary  connection  with  same.  This  knowl- 
edge in  God  has  accordingly  for  object  future  acts  springing 
from  free  agents,  in  the  event  of  a  certain  condition's  fulfil- 
ment. It  is  easy,  therefore,  to  see  that  it  has  for  object  acts 
in  a  double  sense  contingent.  They  are  contingent  on  the  con- 
dition, wliich  may  or  may  not  be  verified;  and,  even  after  the 
verification  of  the  condition,  they  are  contingent  on  the  choice 
made  by  the  free  will  of  the  free  agent.  To  illustrate,  we  take 
again  that  Scriptural  example  of  the  Tyrians,  "The  Tyrians 
would  be  converted,  if  given  the  grace  bestowed  on  the  people 
of  Corozain."     This  conversion  of  the  Tyrians  falls  into  the 


THESIS  X  325 

class  of  objects  known  by  Grod  with  that  knowledge  described 
as  middle  or  intermediate.  It  is  a  futurible,  and  in  only  a 
half-sense  of  the  word  a  mere  conditional  future.  Were  it  a 
mere  conditional  future,  the  Tyrians  on  the  acceptance  of  such 
grace  would  be  converted  in  spite  of  themselves,  and  would  be 
practically  deprived  of  freedom.  But  the  Tyrians  are  men, 
vested  with  free  will;  and,  therefore,  even  in  the  presence  of 
efficacious  grace,  they  are  at  liberty  to  choose  either  conversion 
or  damnation.  Their  conversion  becomes  a  necessary  fact  only 
after  they  have  rendered  full  and  free  consent  to  the  inspiration 
of  grace.  Grace,  therefore,  as  far  as  their  ultimate  conversion 
is  concerned,  is  a  condition  with  a  bearing,  indeed,  and  a  very 
vital  bearing,  on  their  conversion,  and  yet  not  necessarily  con- 
nected or  bound  up  with  it.  In  other  words,  grace  can  still 
be  present,  and  the  conversion  of  the  Tyrians  can  fail  of  effect. 
The  one  thing  in  the  whole  affair  that  caps  and  finishes  the 
business,  is  the  free  and  unconstrained  consent  of  the  Tyrians 
to  act  as  grace  prompts.  And  this  is  our  whole  reason  for  say- 
ing that  one  element  of  grace's  efficacy  is  derived  from  a  source 
outside  of  grace.  That  element  we  call  its  efficacy  of  connection. 
The  other  element,  called  its  efficacy  of  force  or  strength,  is 
intrinsic  and  wholly  native  to  grace  itself. 

That  God  has  knowledge  of  futuribles,  and  therefore  middle 
or  intermediate  knowledge,  is  evident  from  the  express  declara- 
tion of  Christ  concerning  the  Tyrians.  St.  Matthew,  xi,  21. 
Besides,  futuribles  are  capable  of  being  known,  and  God  knows 
everything  such.  God  knows  these  futuribles  neither  in  their 
proximate  cause,  nor  in  His  own  decrees;  but  in  themselves,  as 
they  exist  previous  to  any  divine  decree,  -formulated  in  their 
regard.  Knowledge  of  a  thing  always  presupposes  the  thing's 
existence.  We  are,  however,  far  from  maintaining  that  the 
futurible  is  the  cause  of  God's  knowledge.  It  is  a  mere  condi- 
tion, but  a  condition  indispensably  and  unqualifiedly  necessary. 
God,  therefore,  knows  a  futurible  beforehand,  because  it  is  in 
reality  going  to  happen.  The  futurible  is  going  to  happen,  not 
precisely  because  God  knows  it  is  going  to  happen.  Or,  as  St. 
Justin  says,  "  The  future  reality  of  a  futurible  does  not  follow 
after  God's  foreknowledge,  but  God's  foreknowledge  follows 
after  the  futurible's  future  reality." 
We  have  these  several  counts  against  the  system  of  the  Thotnists: 


326  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

1°.  The  divine  decrees,  in  which  according  to  this  system 
God  sees  futuribles,  are  described  as  subjectively  and  on  the 
part  of  God  absolute,  objectively  and  on  the  part  of  the  futur- 
ibles tliemselves  conditional.  Sucli  mixed  decrees  are  offenses 
against  common  sense.  God  cannot  absolutely  decree  a  thing 
diametrically  opposed  to  another  divine  wish.  This  would  be 
a  fair  instance  of  such  a  decree.  I  absolutely  and  without  con- 
dition decree  the  conversion  of  the  Tyrians,  and  I  at  the  same 
time  absolutely  withhold  from  the  Tyrians  the  grace  of  con- 
version or  efficacious  grace. 

Besides,  since  the  fulfillment  of  the  required  condition  is, 
according  to  the  Thomists,  entirely  independent  of  free  will, 
and  altogether  dependent  on  God,  these  decrees  could  be  with 
more  justice  called  even  subjectively  conditional,  or  conditional 
on  the  part  of  God.  This  grace,  they  say,  has  all  its  double 
efficacy  of  force  and  connection  from  within,  and  comes  in  its 
entirety  from  God.  It  may  be  here  remarked  that  some  Thom- 
ists venture  the  opinion  that  God  seriously  wishes  some  men 
to  be  sinners,  to  secure  variety  in  the  universe.  We  heartily 
disagree  with  the  sentiment. 

Again,  were  God  capable  of  having  the  decrees  postulated  by 
the  Thomists,  there  would  exist  in  God  a  decree  without  any 
corresponding  result  in  nature.  The  Thomists  are  fond  of 
quoting  these  as  parallel  examples,  "  I  intend  to  give  Lorenzo 
a  thousand  dollars,  if  he  marries  my  daughter."  "  I  intend  to 
make  a  present  of  a  horse  to  Egbert,  if  he  meets  me  to-morrow." 
These  are  not  parallel  examples,  because  in  these  two  cases 
the  condition  is  in  the  power  of  the  parties  on  whom  the  favor 
is  to  be  conferred,  in  the  power  of  Lorenzo  and  Egbert;  not 
altogether  in  the  power  of  the  man  who  pledges  himself  to 
confer  the  favors.  The  reverse  happens  in  the  case  of  efficacious 
grace.  God  decrees  the  favor,  and  the  condition,  too,  proceeds 
wholly  from  God,  being  put  outside  the  reach  of  the  human 
will,  when  constituted  by  God's  physical  predetermination.  To 
make  the  above  cases  parallel,  they  would  have  to  read  in  this 
absurd  way,  "  I  intend  to  give  Lorenzo  a  thousand  dollars,  if 
he  marries  my  daughter;  but  at  the  same  time  I  am  going  to 
take  efficacious  means  to  prevent  the  marriage."  "  I  intend  to 
make  a  present  of  a  horse  to  Egbert,  if  he  meets  me  to-morrow; 
but  I  am  at  the  same  time  going  to  take  efficacious  means  to 


THESIS  X  327 

prevent  his  meeting  me."  Surely,  this  is  not  the  way  God  of- 
fered the  grace  of  conversion  to  the  Tyrians,  this  is  not  the  way 
He  offers  grace  to  any  sinner. 

2°.  Human  liberty  is  done  to  death  by  the  Thomists.  It  is 
robbed  of  active  indifference.  In  other  words,  when  hard 
pressed  by  physical  predetermination,  it  no  longer  remains 
mistress  of  its  own  acts.  It  is  wholly  without  freedom  of 
choice,  because  it  is  forced  by  an  antecedent,  intrinsic  and  in- 
surmountable necessity,  i.  e.  physical  predetermination. 

3°.  There  would  be  no  such  thing  as  sufficient  grace  properly 
so-called,  because  witliout  this  physical  predetermination,  which 
at  once  constitutes  grace  efficacious,  the  grace  present  would  not 
proximately  equip  the  agent  for  action. 

Passing  now  to  the  Molinists,  it  is  easy  to  show  that  their 
system  is  free  from  every  reasonable  objection.  We  have  al- 
ready said  that  the  sureness  of  the  future  event,  the  impossi- 
bility of  its  failure,  assumes  a  threefold  guise,  as  considered 
resident  in  the  act  itself,  in  the  will  of  God,  and  in  God's 
knowledge.  The  corresponding  titles  are,  objective,  affective 
and  intellective.  With  the  Molinists,  the  first  is  derived  from 
the  free  act  of  the  will,  already  elevated  and  ennobled  by  pre- 
venting grace,  and  choosing  of  its  own  inherent  virtue;  the 
second,  from  an  absolute  decree  of  God,  elicited  under  the 
guidance  of  middle  or  intermediate  knowledge  antedating  the 
decree  itself;  the  third,  from  middle  or  intermediate  knowledge 
as  above  described.  The  objective  sureness,  therefore,  arises 
from  the  relation  of  fitness  in  force  between  the  grace  bestowed 
and  the  free  consent  of  the  will,  based  on  the  fact  that  the  will 
is  in  reality  of  its  own  free  choice  going  to  embrace  the  grace 
offered.  "  In  this  way,"  says  Suarez,  "  grace  will  infallibly 
meet  with  consent,  not  because  the  will  cannot  act  otherwise, 
even  when  confronted  with  this  grace,  but  because  the  will  as 
a  matter  of  fact  is  not  going  to  act  otherwise."  The  divine  de- 
cree constituting  affective  sureness  is  called  predefinition  or 
predestination,  though  predestination  is  more  properly  said  of 
glory  in  Heaven  than  of  any  single  grace.  The  ]\Iolinists  thus 
describe  predefinition,  "A  divine  decree  or  wish,  by  which  God 
prior  to  the  act  itself  decrees  from  all  eternity,  positively,  ab- 
solutely and  efficaciously  that  the  will  shall  in  time  acquit  itself 
of  a  certain  good  act."     This,  then,  according  to  Molinists,  is 


328  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

the  order  and  process  followed  in  the  conversion  of  an  indi- 
vidual, say  Peter: 

1°.  God  by  means  of  simple  intelligence  knows  all  possible  helps 
and  knows  the  possibility  of  Peter's  conversion. 

2°,  God  by  means  of  middle  or  intermediate  knowledge  fore- 
sees what  helps  Peter  will  freely  embrace  or  reject. 

3°.  Of  these  helps,  God  chooses,  e.  g.  A,  one  He  foresees  Peter 
will  freely  embrace  if  put  in  his  way. 

4°.  God  now  by  means  of  vision  knows  that  Peter's  conversion 
is  absolutely  going  to  happen  in  time. 

5°.  At  the  proper  moment  God  sends  Peter  the  help  A,  Peter 
embraces  it,  and  is  converted. 


GOD'S  PROVIDENCE,  HIS  GOVERNMENT  AND 

OWNERSHIP 

THESIS  XI 

Providence  belongs  to  God. 

Jouin,  pp.  253,  254;  Boedder,  pp.  381-393. 

TERMS 

Providence  is  from  providentia,  compounded  of  porro  and 
videre,  and  means  to  see  from  afar.  It  is  therefore  a  part  of 
prudence,  which  orders  things  to  their  ends,  and  has  to  do 
with  future  contingents,  not  with  pasts  or  presents.  It  can 
turn  on  one's  own  acts  or  on  another's.  In  the  matter  of  one's 
own  acts  providence  is  the  prudence  of  the  monk  or  solitary. 
In  the  matter  of  another's  acts,  it  can  be  domestic  or  family 
prudence;  political,  state  or  civil  prudence;  prudence  of  the 
king.  God's  prudence  or  providence  deals  with  the  acts  of 
others,  not  with  His  own.  He  is  His  own  last  end,  and  there 
can  be  no  question  of  ordering  His  own  acts.  His  end  and 
His  acts  are  God  Himself.  Providence  includes  knowledge  and 
will,  and  is  essentially  resident  in  knowledge,  practical  not 
merely  speculative.  Government  presupposes  providence. 
Providence  plans  order,  government  executes  the  plans  of  provi- 
dence, and  ownership  is  a  corollary  of  both.  Providence  is 
from  eternity,  government  is  a  matter  of  time,  and  presupposes 
creation.  Physical  providence  extends  to  all  creatures  without 
exception,  the  quick  and  dead.  Moral  embraces  only  men  and 
angels,  beings  with  free  wills.  Supernatural  touches  the  order 
of  grace;  natural,  the  order  of  nature.  Natural  or  physical 
providence  turns  on  creation,  conservation  and  cooperation, 
along  with  times  and  places  best  suited  to  the  accomplishment 
of  God's  designs  in  the  universe,  e.  g.  men  of  providence  in 
Church  history,  like  St.  Ignatius.     Moral  or  supernatural  turns 

329 


330  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

on  God's  laws  and  precepts,  promises,  threats,  rewards,  punish- 
ments, graces,  miracles,  gifts.  Briefly,  moral  has  to  do  with 
man's  elevation,  redemption,  justification,  decrees  regarding 
men's  virtuous  acts,  permission  of  sin,  grace's  helps.  Heaven, 
hell. 

Providence  means  a  plan  and  its  infallible  accomplishment, 
with  a  distinction.  God's  providence,  like  His  will,  is  twofold, 
antecedent,  conditional  and  inefficacious  as  well  as  consequent, 
absolute  and  efficacious.  Predestination  of  the  elect  is  a  mani- 
festation of  God's  consequent  providence,  while  the  loss  of  the 
damned  and  God's  wish  to  save  all  mankind  are  manifestations 
of  His  antecedent  providence.  Hence  the  distinction,  God's 
plans  are  infallibly  fulfilled,  I  distinguish.  Eegarding  su- 
preme end  of  everything,  God's  glory,  I  grant ;  regarding  other 
ends,  not  supreme  or  simply  last,  I  again  distinguish.  In 
question  of  consequent  and  absolute  providence,  I  grant;  in 
question  of  antecedent  and  conditional  providence,  I  deny. 
Whether  men  are  lost  or  saved,  God  gets  from  creation  the  very 
measure  of  glory  He  meant  to  have  from  the  beginning;  good- 
ness and  mercy  in  Heaven,  justice  in  hell.  Man's  salvation  de- 
pends on  his  own  free  will,  and  God's  providence  regarding  it 
is  antecedent  and  conditional,  not  consequent  or  absolute. 
God  is  held  to  supply  of  means  and  nothing  more. 

Three  opinions  about  divine  act  in  which  providence  formally 
resides,  in  intellect  and  will  both,  in  will  alone,  in  intellect 
alone.  In  second  opinion  will  wishes  end  and  chooses  means; 
in  third,  intellect  foreknows  creatures,  ends  and  means,  with 
the  decree  to  create  and  choose  set  means  for  measure  of  glory 
God  freely  purposes.  The  Thomists,  with  a  view  to  physical 
predetermination,  introduce  a  third  act  of  intellect  ordering  the 
accomplishment  of  preconceived  plans;  and  this  third  act  for- 
mally constitutes  providence.  Providence  connotes  two  things, 
foreknowledge  and  care;  first  belongs  to  intellect;  second,  to 
will;  and  from  the  very  term,  providence,  it  would  seem  to 
formally  reside  in  intellect.  There  must  be  no  suspicion  of 
physical  predetermination.  St.  Thomas  puts  it  in  intellect.  In- 
termediate knowledge  certainly  enters  providence.  The  Vati- 
can defined  providence  an  article  of  faith,  Denziger,  1933. 
Deists  and  Fatalists  deny,  with  Democritus,  Epicurus,  and  their 
chance-grouping   of    atoms.     Aristotle    and    Cicero   are    under 


THESIS  XI  331 

suspicion.     Ancients   separated   incorruptible   from   corruptible 
things  in  this  matter. 

PEOOFS 

1°.  Order  in  world  calls  for  government,  and  this  in  turn 
calls  for  providence.     Ergo. 

2°.  Providence  is  a  great  perfection  in  God.     Ergo. 

3°.  Nothing  in  providence  surpasses  God's  power  or  knowl- 
edge, nothing  conflicts  with  His  dignity.     Ergo. 

4°.  Providence  in  last  analysis  means  conservation  and  co- 
operation.    Ergo. 

PEINCIPLES 

A.  God  takes  counsel  without  doubt  or  -hesitation.  His 
knowledge  is  intuitive.  No  formal  study  of  means,  but  virtual. 
Our  study  without  its  imperfections. 

B.  Providence  is  eternal  with  regard  to  substance  of  act, 
temporal  with  regard  to  execution  or  outward  terms. 

C.  No  composition  in  God,  because  intellect  and  will  are 
one  thing  in  God,  His  substance. 


THESIS  XII 

God's  providence  a,  extends  to  everything  created,  and  b, 
touches  man  in  a  very  special  way. 

Boedder,  pp.  381-393. 

PEOOFS 

a,  1°.  God's  providence  is  coextensive  with  His  causality. 
Ergo. 

2°.  Every  agent  works  unto  an  end,  and  God  is  of  all  agents 
the  most  perfect.     Ergo. 

3°.  God's  providence  ought  to  be  the  most  perfect  conceiv- 
able.    Ergo. 

4°.  Birds  of  the  air,  lilies  of  the  field,  grass  in  the  meadow. 
St.  Matt,  vi,  36.     Hair  of  the  head.     St.  Matt,  x,  29. 

N.B.  Regarding  good,  God's  providence  is  approving;  re- 
garding evil,  permissive. 

PRINCIPLES 

A.  No  chance  in  the  world. 

Answer:     Respecting  God,  I  grant;  respecting  man,  I  deny. 
Chance  with  man  is  what  happens  ex  inopinato,  beyond  ex- 
pectation. 

B.  A   good   provider   excludes   evil.     Ergo,   no   providence. 

Answer:  A  particular  provider,  I  grant;  a  universal  pro- 
vider, I  deny.  Destruction  of  individuals  contributes  to  per- 
petuity of  species.  A  king  looks  to  the  community,  not  to 
individuals.     Evil  is  from  God,  as  darkness  is  from  the  sun. 

C.  Doth  God  take  care  for  oxen  ?     I  Cor.  ix,  9. 

Answer:  No  care  at  all,  I  deny;  no  special  care  as  for  men, 
I  grant.  St.  Jerome  says,  it  is  beneath  God's  majesty  to  care 
for  gnats,  bugs,  fleas,  flies.     Same  distinction  as  above. 

332 


THP:S1S  XII  333 

D.  God  left  man  in  the  hands  of  his  own  counsel. 
Answer:     No  determination,  I  grant;  no  providence,  I  deny. 

E.  God  does  no  evil.     Ergo. 

Answer:     Approvingly,  I  grant;  permissively,  I  deny. 

F.  A  prudent  man  permits  no  subject  to  commit  evil. 
Ergo. 

Answer:  To  obtain  greater  good,  I  deny;  othervrise,  I  grant. 
It  is  of  the  nature  of  free  agents  to  be  able  to  do  evil;  and 
providence  never  destroys,  it  respects  natures. 

G.  It  is  easier  to  get  good  from  good,  than  good  from  evil. 
Ergo. 

Answer:  Every  good  can  be  gotten  from  good,  I  deny; 
some  goods  can  be  gotten  from  evil  alone,  I  grant;  e.g.  pa- 
tience, repentance,  martyrdom. 

H.  Nobody  gets  evil  from  good.  Ergo,  nobody  ought  to  get 
good  from  evil. 

Answer:  Wrong  to  make  good  subserve  evil,  right  to  make 
evil  subserve  good. 

I.     Man  must  not  do  evil  to  procure  good.     Ergo,  nor  God. 

Answer:  Man  cannot  permit  evil,  when  it  is  in  his  power  to 
prevent,  and  prevention  is  a  duty,  without  approving  of  it  and 
therefore  doing  it.  God  can  permit  evil  without  approving 
of  it.     To  do  evil  and  to  permit  evil  are  two  different  things. 

J.     Man  is  able  to  take  care  of  himself. 

Answer:     Sufficiently,  I  deny;  insufficiently,  I  grant. 

K.     Men's  acts  are  oftener  crooked  than  brutes'.     Ergo. 

Answer:  Providence  is  to  blame,  I  deny;  free  will  is  to 
blame,  I  grant. 

L.     Sin  is  most  hateful.     Ergo,  God  cannot  permit. 

Answer.  Sins  are  greater  and  lesser.  He  can  without  ap- 
proval permit  a  lesser  sin  to  avoid  a  greater.  In  this  case  He 
chooses  not  between  good  and  evil,  but  between  two  goods.  He 
chooses  the  greater  good,  rejects  the  lesser,  because  absence  of 
the  greater  evil  is  a  good.  In  permitting  the  lesser  evil  He  is  re- 
jecting the  lesser's  absence.  Besides,  no  harm  attaches  to  the 
permission  of  evil,  when  approval  is  withheld  and  prevention  is 
no  duty.     God  threatens  sin,  and  He  made  men  free. 

M.     Providence  is  eternal.     Ergo,  predetermination. 

Answer.  It  antedates  man's  act  in  time,  I  grant;  in  nature 
and  causality,  I  again  distinguish,  foreknowledge  of  act  with 


334  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

help  of  intermediate  knowledge  presupposed,  I  grant;  otheririse, 
I  deny. 

N.  Miracles  are  departures  from  regular  order.  Ergo,  no 
providence. 

Answer.  Departures  with  a  just  cause,  I  grant;  without  a 
just  cause,  I  deny. 

PEOOFS 

b,  1°.  Special  providence  for  man,  because  highest  of  visible 
creatures,  and  closest  to  God,  and  a  good  provider  attends  to 
dignity  of  objects  he  manages. 

2°.  God  loves  man  in  a  special  way,  that  of  friendship,  and 
the  world  was  made  for  man. 

3°.  Man  needs  providence  more  than  other  creatures.  The 
others  are  ruled  and  determined,  they  cannot  go  astray.  Man 
is  free  and  can  disturb  order.  Hence  manifestation  of  provi- 
dence in  natural  law,  religion  and  worship,  instinct  for  good, 
stings  of  conscience,  society,  rewards,  punishments. 

4°.  History  is  witness.  Church  overcame  enemies  in  spite  of 
their  greater  strength.  Eoman  emperors,  heretical  countries 
never  prevailed.     Endurance  of  Church  is  a  lasting  miracle. 

PEINCIPLES 

A.  God  hath  equally  care  of  all. 
Answer.     Equally,  I  grant;  equal,  I  deny. 

B.  Man's  solicitude  would  be  idle.     Ergo. 

Answer.  Undue,  T  grant;  due,  I  deny.  God  gave  man  rea- 
son, to  use  it  and  look  out  for  himself.  His  industr}'  cooperates 
with  God's  providence.  Work  hard,  as  if  ever3'thing  depended 
on  yourself;  trust  in  God,  as  if  nothing  depended  on  you. 

C.  "We  would  have  cured  Babylon,  but  she  is  not  healed; 
let  us  forsake  her,"  Jer.  51.9.  Ergo,  God  has  no  care  for  sin- 
ners. 

Answer.  No  care  in  comparison  with  saints,  I  grant;  in 
comparison  with  lower  creation,  I  deny. 

D.  Greek  Fathers  deny  providence  in  evil  acts.     Ergo. 
Answer.     Deny  approving,  I  grant;  deny  permissive,  I  deny. 

E.  Good  suffer,  wicked  prosper.     Ergo. 


THESIS  XII  335 

Ansicer.  N'ot  always  the  case.  Good  must  atone  for  lesser 
faults.  In  many  things  we  all  offend,  St.  James  3.2.  Just 
man  shall  fall  seven  times,  Prov.  34.16.  If  we  say  that  we  have 
no  sin,  the  truth  is  not  in  us,  1.  St.  John  1.8.  Wicked  do  some 
good  and  deserve  a  reward.  None  in  next  life.  Ergo,  here. 
Providence  bears  on  last  end  or  next  life,  not  on  proximate  end 
or  this  life.  Adversity  tests  virtue;  perfects  justice,  fortitude, 
contempt  of  world,  meditation,  love  of  God.  Seneca,  and  the 
uses  of  adversity.  Jove,  and  the  spectacle  of  a  just  man  in  con- 
flict with  trouble.  Horace,  and  his  man  of  principle  face  to 
face  with  a  cracked  world.  Prosperity  ought  to  drag  wicked 
back  to  God's  feet,  He  is  an  indulgent  Father.  Horace's  peda- 
gogue and  cakes. 


THESIS  XIII 

X.  God's  providence  over  all  is  immediate  and  particular. 
Y.  God's  (a)  government  of  the  world  is  (h)  in  part  imme- 
diate, in  pari  mediate. 

Boedder,  pp.  381-393. 

QUESTION 

X.  Plato  teaches  three  kinds  of  providence.  God  cares  for 
spiritual  things,  genera,  species,  universal  causes.  Inferior 
deities  in  planets  care  for  matter,  things  that  are  bom  and 
things  that  die.  Demons,  midway  between  the  gods  and  our- 
selves, care  for  human  affairs.  Plato  is  wrong  when  he  removes 
planets  and  men  from  immediate  providence  of  God. 

PROOF 

God  provides  for  things  as  He  knows  them.  He  knows  them 
immediately  and  particularly.  Ergo.  Kings  fail  to  provide 
immediately  for  details  because  of  their  limited  ability.  God's 
ability  is  absolutely  unlimited. 

PRINCIPLES 

A.  St.  Augustine  says,  "  Better  not  to  know  things  than  to 
know  them."     Ergo. 

Answer.  True  of  men,  I  grant;  true  of  God,  I  deny.  Bet- 
ter for  men  not  to  know  vice  and  sin,  because  we  are  of  limited 
intellectual  capacity,  and  knowledge  of  evil  and  sin  crowds  out 
knowledge  of  better  things.  Besides,  knowledge  of  evil  drags 
down  the  will.  G^d  is  of  infinite  capacity,  and  God  is  above 
tempting. 

N.B.  God's  providence  imposes  necessity  on  necessary  agents, 
none  on  free  agents,  because  providence  respects  natures,  it  does 
not  destroy  them.  All  the  order  in  the  world,  with  respect  to 
necessary  agents,  is  such  by  virtue  of  providence  that  it  cannot 

336 


THESIS  XIII  337 

be  other;  with  respect  to  free  agents,  its  necessity  is  not  ante- 
cedent, but  consequent;  and  this  consequent  necessity  presup- 
poses God's  intermediate  knowledge  of  what  act  a  free  agent 
would  put,  and  put  freely,  in  such  and  such  circumstances,  if 
suited  help  and  cooperation  were  granted.  No  physical  pre- 
determination. The  order  of  providence  is  not  uncertain  or 
inefficacious,  because  God  gets  what  He  wants  from  all  crea- 
tures with  either  antecedent  or  consequent  necessity.  Conse- 
quent is  as  infallible  as  antecedent.  Creation  supposed,  provi- 
dence in  God  is  a  necessity;  because  creation  and  conservation 
without  providence  would  be  against  God's  goodness  and  wis- 
dom. St.  Ambrose  says,  "  Though  to  refrain  from  making  a 
thing  contains  no  wrong,  to  take  no  care  of  what  you  make  is 
the  height  of  unkindness  or  cruelty." 

Y.     (a)   God  governs  the  world. 

QUESTION" 

Government  is  execution  of  plans  which  constitute  providence. 
Boethius  says,  "  You  bind  the  elements  to  keep  cold  and  hot, 
dry  and  wet  together,  lest  subtle  fire  escape,  or  its  heavy  weight 
bury  the  earth  in  the  sea." 

PEOOFS 

(1)  Actual  order  in  the  world  proves  God's  government. 
Order  in  house  bespeaks  owner's  management. 

(2)  Government  touches  whatever  agents  tend  to  an  end. 
All  agents  work  unto  an  end.  Men  work  with  knowledge  of 
end  and  self-motion;  other  creatures,  without  knowledge  of 
end  and  with  motion  communicated  by  God,  or  instinct,  or  na- 
ture. God  governs  lower  creation  as  the  bowman  governs  the 
arrow.     The  arrow  is  ignorant,  but  the  bowman  knows. 

N.B.  One  God  governs  the  world,  not  many,  in  spite  of  op- 
posites ;  because  universal  and  last  end  harmonizes  particulars 
and  proximates.  Nothing  in  the  world  happens  out  of  accord 
with  God's  government,  because  nothing  can  escape  God's  knowl- 
edge or  purpose;  nothing  can  oppose  His  will  or  omnipotence, 
which  are  all  infinite. 


338  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 

PEINCIPLES 

A.  A  just  king  punishes  only  transgressors  of  his  law.  No- 
body transgresses  God's  law,  because  everything  happens  in  ac- 
cord with  His  government. 

Answer.  To  do  what  God  permits  without  approval  is  to 
transgress  God's  law. 

(b)   God  governs  some  things  immediately,  others  mediately. 

PROOFS 

1°.  God  governs  the  world  by  others  as  He  causes  by  second 
causes. 

2°.  Better  to  be  good  in  self  and  good  to  others  than  to  be 
merely  good  in  self. 

3°.  A  good  teacher  makes  not  only  wise  pupils,  but  able  teach- 
ers. 

4°.  God  uses  intellectual  beings  to  govern  lower  orders. 
Hierarchy  among  angels,  guardian  angels  for  men,  rulers  among 
men ;  minerals,  plants,  brutes,  men ;  hierarchy  of  universe. 

N.B.  God's  dominion  extends  to  ownership  and  jurisdic- 
tion; and  it  is  essential.  Man's  ownership  in  the  concrete  is 
accidental  and  from  diverse  titles,  occupancy,  purchase,  gift 
and  the  like.  God's  ownership  is  essential  because  rooted  in 
creation,  conservation  and  cooperation.  Lessius  says,  "  Subjec- 
tion or  dependence  is  measure.  Man's  ownership  of  internal 
acts  is  fuller  than  his  ownership  of  external  acts. '  First  are 
free  from  organs,  second  dependent  on  organs.  Man's  owner- 
ship of  senses  and  limbs  is  fuller  as  compared  with  fortune  and 
wealth.  First  are  intrinsic,  others  are  from  extrinsic  title,  like 
inheritance,  purchase,  occupancy."  Men  are  always  relative 
owners  with  regard  to  God.  In  disposing  of  their  property  as 
they  like,  they  can  offend  God  without  harming  their  neighbor. 
God's  ownership  is  basis  and  foundation  of  man's  ownership. 
Jurisdiction  likewise  belongs  to  God.  The  right  to  rule  and 
govern  men  belongs  to  their  maker.  "  King  of  kings,  Lord 
of  lords."  1  Tim"^  6.15.  "By  me  kings  reign."  Prov.  8.15. 
"  No  power  but  from  God."  Rom.  13.1.  "  All  power  in 
Heaven  and  in  earth."     St.  Matt.  28.18. 


INDEX 


Absolute  free  futures,  277,  278. 

Accident,  without  substance,  a 
miracle,  66;  in  God,  and  in  crea- 
tures, 259. 

Act,  in  which  providence  resides, 
330. 

Actual  simplicity  and  potential 
composition,  32. 

Actuality  of  past  and  future,  equal, 
276. 

Adam,  body  and  soul,  13;  and  lan- 
guage, 118,   119,   120. 

Aeneid,  and  type,  220,  221,  222. 

Aequale  cognoscitur  ab  aequali, 
129. 

Agere  sequitur  esse,  and  coopera- 
tion, 299. 

Aggregation,  and  snowball,   11. 

Agnostics,  inferior  to  pagans  on 
score  of  immortality,  90;  200; 
deny  intelligent  cause,  217;  and 
knowledge,  232. 

A  Lapide,  on   blood  and  soul,   77. 

Albertus  Magnus,  on  blood  and 
soul,   77;    on   sensu  diviso,   320. 

Anaesthetics,  and  hypnotism,   193. 

Analogical  knowledge  of  God,  true, 
240. 

Anaxagoras,  on  soul  in  brute  and 
man,   18. 

Anima  mundi,  and  James,  57. 

Annihilation  of  soul,  impossible 
to  God's  ordered  power,  93,  102; 
without  a  motive,  93;  demands 
conservation,   295,  297. 

Anselm,  St.,  on  God,  198,  199;  a 
priori  argument,  202;  his  syl- 
logism, a  fallacy,  203;  Descartes 
and  Leibnitz,  different,  216. 

Antecedent  and  consequent  will  in 
God,   288. 

Apollinaris,  and  two  souls,  64. 

Appetite,  rational  and  sensitive, 
149;  and  passions,  150,  151. 


Aravius,  on  sensu  diviso,  320. 

Aristotle,  4;  on  soul,  15;  on  plants 
and  animals  of  his  time,  27 ;  on 
faculties,  35,  46;  on  memory, 
42;  and  Dualism,  58;  on  blood 
and  soul,  77 ;  on  origin  of  ideas, 
115,  120;  and  nil  in  intellectu, 
123;  thing  known  assumes 
mind's  own  qualities,  129,  130; 
proves  two  functions  of  intellect, 
131,  132;  on  good,  144,  145;  on 
compulsion,  174;  on  theology, 
197;  on  God,  199;  and  primus 
motor,  220;  and  eternal  world, 
228,  229. 

Arminians,  and  Edwards,  154,  155. 

Asiatic  Fatalism,   181. 

Associationists,  47. 

Atheists,  and  Lucifer,  208;  prac- 
tical and  theoretical,  222. 

Atoms  in  molecule,  and  life,  27, 
28. 

Attention,  proves  free  will,  170. 

Attributes  of  God;  no  accidents  in 
God;  God  is  His  attributes; 
overlap  in  God;  His  essence  dis- 
plays itself  as  wisdom,  justice 
and  the  rest;  fundamental  and 
accessory,  243. 

Augustine,  St.,  man's  desire  of 
truth,  and  immortality,  98 ;  on 
the  three  tenses,  178;  and  Three 
Persons,  three  things,  259;  on 
absolute  free  futures,  275;  on 
God  and  memory  as  cause  of 
acts,  286;  on  sin,  310;  sin,  order, 
beauty,  103;  0  felix  culpa,  310; 
on  providence,  336. 


B 


Bacon,  on  philosophy  and  atheism, 

3;  on  God,  199,  214. 
Bain,    mind    is    material,    59;    and 

Parallelism,    60;    and   rules    for 


339 


340 


INDEX 


hahits,  153;  lies  about  free  will, 
171. 

Balmes,   against   Condillac,   48. 

Bannez,  on  sensu  diviso,  320. 

Because,    in    illative   sense,   285. 

Beclard,  on  life,  8. 

Benevolence,  never  without  fitness, 
147. 

Berkeley,  and  idealism,  40. 

Bernard,  on  science  and  last 
causes.  111. 

Bertlielot,  on  science  and  last 
causes,   111. 

Bieliat,  on  life,  8. 

Biedermann,  against  immortality, 
103. 

Billuart,  and  physical  predetermin- 
ation, 279,  280;  sensu  composite 
and  diviso,  279;  predetermina- 
tion, and  God's  foreknowledge, 
279,  280;  predetermination,  a 
mystery,  280;  and  complaint  of 
Jews,  282;  on  sensu  diviso,  320. 

Blood,  its  animation  by  the  soul, 
77,  78. 

Body,  knowledge  of,  53;  primary 
and  secondary  parts,  78';  sub- 
stance, no  accident,  81,  82. 

Boethius,  on  eternity,  266. 

Bonald,  on  God,  199. 

Bonaventure,  St.,  on  blood  and 
soul,  77. 

Bonnetty,   on   ideas,    118. 

Bowne,   on  God,   199. 

Braid  and  hypnotism,  184. 

Brain,  38 ;  St.  Thomas,  and  in- 
ternal senses,  39;  and  growth, 
40;  size  and  weight,  59,  60; 
St.  Thomas,  on,  70;  diseased, 
74;   and   consciousness,   107. 

Broderip's  dog,  and  reason,  30. 

Brutes,  and  life,  11;  have  senses, 
22 ;  have  no  intellect,  23 ;  artistic 
effects,  30;  three  operations,  ab- 
sent from  plants,  18;  soul  and 
qualities,  31. 

Buchner,  mind  and  engine,  59. 

Buckle,  statistics,  and  free  will, 
172,  173. 

Buddhists,  and  God,  222. 

Bull'8-eye  missed,  226,  227. 


Cabanis,  mind  and  secretion,  58. 


Cain  and  Abel,  and  Mill,  178. 

Cajetan,  on  blood  and  soul,  77 ; 
on  ideas,  136,  140;  on  sensu  di- 
viso, 320. 

Calvinists,  God  the  determining 
cause  of  choice,  154,  155,  156. 

Capreolus,  on  ideas,  140. 

Carpenter,  on  habits,  153. 

Cartesians,  and  life  in  plants,  11; 
deny  soul  in  brutes  and  plants, 
14;  on  objectivity  of  sensations, 
34,    40;    and    intelligence,    47. 

Caterpillar,    pupa,    butterfly,    102. 

Catholics,  will  the  determining 
cause  of  choice,  155,  156;  no  Fa- 
talists, 159,  160;  and  predestina- 
tion,  159. 

Causal  view,  and  condition  view, 
HI. 

Causes,  efficient,  partial  and  ade- 
quate, coordinate  and  subordi- 
nate, 125;  of  imprinted  image, 
phantasm  and  working  intellect, 
134;  of  developed  image,  im- 
printed image  and  receiving  in- 
tellect, 135;  proximate  and  ul- 
timate, 211;  have  their  causes, 
226. 

Change,  physical  and  moral,  in- 
trinsic and  extrinsic,  263 ;  of 
mind  and  in  things,  264;  and 
freedom  in  God,  265. 

Character,  habits  and  tempera- 
ment, 153;  in  Determinism, 
179. 

Children,    and    self-control,    153. 

Chinese,  on  future  life,  87. 

Choice,  supposes  conflict  of  desires, 
151 ;  four  types,  reasonable,  im- 
petuous, acquiescent,  anti-im- 
pulsive, 152;  selection  of  means, 
152 ;  manifestation  of  self-con- 
trol, 152;  its  cause,  and  Hobbes, 
176. 

Christian  and  Mahomet,  237;  and 
Koran,  239. 

Church,  condemns  neither  Molin- 
ism  nor  Thomism,  322;  and  hyp- 
notism,  194,   195. 

Cicero,  and  grouping  of  atoms,  24; 
on  future  life,  88,  89;  on  phys- 
ical order,  205,  206;  on  variety 
in  religions,  209;  on  Epicurus 
and  fear,  214. 

Circumscriptive  eiistence,  267. 


INDEX 


341 


Clarke,  S.  J.,  on  Catholic  philoso- 
phy, 4. 

Classification  of  God,  impossible, 
246. 

Clement  V,  Pope,  soul  form  of 
body,  80,  81. 

Clifford,  VV.,  and  mind-stuff,  60. 

Cognitum  est  in  cognoscente  ad 
modum  cognoscentis,  129,  130. 

Cognoscitive  act,  43;  strictly  and 
preparatively,    129. 

Color-blind,   45. 

Common  consent,  proves  immortal- 
ity, 100,  101 ;  proves  free  will, 
107;  proves  God,  208,  209,  213, 
214,  215;  objections,  222,  223; 
and  four   qualities,   215. 

Comte,  on  life,  8,  113;  and  Sens- 
ism,  116. 

Composition  of  man,  proved,  73, 
74. 

Conceptualism,  49,  51,  52. 

Condillac,  judgment,  47;  and  Sens- 
ism,  116. 

Conimbricenses,  on  ideas,  139. 

Conscience,  proves  God,  207,  212, 
213;    its  functions,  212,  213. 

Consciousness,  and  brain,  107 ; 
proves  free  will,  167;  and  De- 
terminism, 179. 

Conservation  of  creatures,  294- 
298;  as  much  a  need  as  creation, 
294;  definition  and  kinds,  294, 
295;  proofs,  295,  296;  objections, 
296,  297. 

Consultation,  and  free  will,  174. 

Contact,  of  mass  and  of  power,  76. 

Contingent,  and  necessary,  204; 
postulates  production  by  an- 
other, 204. 

Control,  physical  and  prudential, 
152;  deliberate  acts,   152. 

Conversion,  its  process  in  Molin- 
ism,   328. 

Cooperation,  with  free  will,  no 
physical  predetermination,  302- 
306;  proof,  303,  304;  objections, 
305;  with  sin,  318;  cooperation 
with  creatures,  298-302;  defini- 
tion and  kinds,  298;  moral  and 
physical,  and  other  meanings, 
298 ;  proofs,  299 ;  objections,  300, 
301;  objectively,  creature's  act; 
subjectivelv,  a  decree  of  God, 
311,  312. 


Corozain  and  Bcthsaida,  281,  282, 
323,    324,    325. 

Corruption,  essential  and  acci- 
dental, alien  to  the  soul,  94. 

Created  things,  contingent,  204; 
prove  God's  existence,  210,  211; 
objections,  217,  218,  219,  220. 

Creatianism  Exaggerated,  85. 

Creation,  of  soul  by  God,  86;  and 
cause,  233. 


D 


Damascene,  St.,  God  and  doctor, 
286. 

Dante's  boat,  and  free  will,  173. 

Darwin,  on  spontaneous  genera- 
tion, 13;  and  evolution,  23;  on 
God,  209;    against  God,  227. 

Darwinism,  Universal  Evolution, 
absurd,  23-28;  denies  God  and 
immortality,  postulates  spon- 
taneous generation  and  group- 
ing of  atoms,  destroys  morality, 
27. 

Darwinists,  mind  and  brute,  18. 

David  and  Semei,  308. 

Death,  a  penalty,  and  disagree- 
able, 102,  103. 

De  Bonald,  on  ideas,  118. 

Deception,   in  hypnotism,  186. 

Decision,  proves  free  will,  170. 

Definition,  1. 

Definitive  existence,  68,  267. 

Deism,   and  Ontologism,   118. 

Deliberation,  proves  free  will,  170. 

Delight  precedes  desire,   151. 

De  Lugo,  on  blood  and  soul,  77. 

Democritus,  on  soul  in  brute  and 
man,  18. 

Denial  of  immortality,  hypocrisy 
and  cowardice,  103. 

Dependence,  for  being  and  for  mak- 
ing, 295,  296,  297. 

Descartes,  on  God,  198,  199;  on 
brutes,  20;  on  union  of  faculty 
and  object,  34,  40;  on  soul's  lo- 
cation, 69;  and  innate  ideas,  117. 

Desire,  152;  triple  process,  151; 
volition  diflerent,  152. 

Determined  being  has  determined 
truth,  274,  275. 

Determinism,  158-165;  soft  and 
polite  Fatalism,  158,  160;  temp- 
tation and  consent  identical,  160, 


342 


INDEX 


161;    and    Fatalism,    178,    179; 

and  free  will,   170;   and  charac- 
ter,  179;    and   punishment,    180. 
Dilemma,  about  rain,  and  freedom, 

176,   177. 
Discere  est  reminisci,  with  Plato, 

85. 
Divisibility  of  souls,  32,  33,  70,  71, 

72. 
Division,   1;  of  Natural  Theology, 

198. 
Dominion,     demands     cooperation, 

299;    in  God   is   ownership   and 

jurisdiction,  338. 
Door,  window,  house,  217. 
Dualism,  mind  and  body,  two,  58; 

Ultra   and   Moderate,   58. 
Duration,  206;    infinite,  223. 
Dust  thou  art,  113. 


E 


Ear,  39. 

Edwards,  Jonathan,  and  Fatalism, 
153,  154,  155;  estimate  of  Cath- 
olic doctrine  on  free  will,  154, 
155. 

Ego,  empirical  and  transcendental, 
55. 

Egyptians,  and   deities,  252. 

Elicited  and  ordered  acts  of  will, 
148. 

Eliot,  Williams,  Indians,  and  God, 
209. 

Embryo,  and  soul,  13. 

Empirical  and  rational  psychology, 
5. 

Empiricists,  47 ;  soul,  a  succession 
of  transitory  feelings,  50. 

Epicureans,  on  soul  in  brute  and 
man,  IS. 

Epicurus,  and  chance,  200;  and 
fear  of  the  gods,  214. 

Eternal  punishment,  demands  im- 
mortality, 99,  100;  eternal  world 
and  Aristotle,  228,  229;  God 
proved  eternal,  206;  objections, 
207. 

Eternity,  266;  causally  and  form- 
ally, 266;  Boethius,  on,  266;  of 
essences,  and  of  God,  267 ;  no 
larger  with  time,  267. 

Ethical  arguments  for  free  will, 
169,    170,    171. 

Ethics  and  hypnotism,  193,  194. 


Euphorbus  in  Ovid,  90. 

Evil,  denial  of  good,  146;  and 
kinds,  306. 

Evolution,  resemblances  and  palae- 
ontology, 25 ;  Universal  and  Par- 
ticular, 25,  26;  and  Monism,  61; 
and  soul,  80. 

Evolutionists,  and  intelligence,  47. 

E.xamination,  and  right  to  accept 
and  reject,  238. 

Existence  of  God,  angels,  separated 
souls,  91,  92 ;  and  its  three  kinds, 
267. 

External  senses,  five,  35. 

Eye,  39. 


Facts  prove  free  will,  167. 

Faculties,  organic  and  inorganic; 
active  and  passive,  15,  35 ;  defi- 
nition, 40;  St.  Thomas  and  Aris- 
totle, on,   40. 

Faith,  and  science,  and  God,  225. 

Fatalism,  153-158;  173-183;  free- 
dom of  a  bird,  not  of  a  man,  155; 
consequences,  158;  Sophocles,  Oe- 
dipus and,  158,  159;  harsh  and 
gross,   158. 

Faye,  on  God,  199. 

Fear,  and  wisdom,  109;  and  God, 
213,  235. 

Felida,   of  James,   57. 

Fichte,  the  Ego,  and  pantheism, 
228. 

Filling,  or  all-pervading  existence, 
267. 

Finite  effect,  and  finite  cause,  221. 

First  Cause,  God;  second  causes, 
creatures,  312;  axioms  about, 
312. 

Fission,   12. 

Fixity  of  species,  26. 

Flame  in  candle,  and  life,  27,  28. 

Foeticide,  and  St.  Thomas,  87. 

Forces,  physical  and  chemical,  18; 
not  soul,  16. 

Forecasts,  and  free  will,  172. 

Form,  intrinsically  independent  of 
matter,  102. 

Formal  objects  of  senses,  36;  of 
intellect  and  sense,  51 ;  of  mind, 
essences  of  bodies,  121. 

Formally,  in  prescinding  and  ex- 
cluding sense,  79;  formally,  em- 
inently, virtually,  245. 


INDEX 


343 


Free  agent,  and  predetermination, 
314,  315. 

Freedom,  moral  and  physical,  165, 
166 ;  in  God,  289 ;  regarding  evil, 
289 ;  in  creatures,  a  mixed  jjer- 
fection;  in  God,  simjjle,  291;  and 
immutability  in  God,  291,  292, 
293. 

Free  will,  is  stronger  than  char- 
acter, environment,  IGl ;  freedom 
of  choice,  immunity  from  neces- 
sity, 164,  165;  St.  Paul,  and 
three  kinds,  164;  Lipps  on,  163; 
Fiske  on,  163,  164;  James  on, 
161,  162;  dishonest  estimates  of, 
163,  171;  proofs,  167-171;  and 
strongest  motive,  171,  181;  not 
liberty  to  desire  or  not  desire, 
171;  and  God's  foreknowledge, 
173,  181,  182;  and  Thomism, 
320,  322. 

Friedenthal,  man  and  monkey,  24. 

Future  life,  pagans  a  unit  on  fact, 
differ  in  explanation,  87 ;  Indi- 
ans and  Chinese,  87;  Virgil,  87, 
88;  Horace,  88,  89;  Cicero,  88, 
89;   Pythagoras,  89;  Ovid,  90. 

Futures,  free  futures,  and  futur- 
ibles,  273,  274,  275;  and  fixed 
truth,  277. 

Futuribles,  how  God  knows,  283, 
284,  323,  325. 


G 


Gaimilo,  and  St.  Anselm,  216. 

Gemmation,   12. 

Generation,  12;  spontaneous,  13. 

Gioberti,  and  Ontologism,  117;  on 
God,   198. 

God,  knowledge  of,  2,  53;  cannot 
a-nnihilate  soul,  96;  known  by 
deduction,  not  by  intuition,  117; 
triple  process  in  knowing,  119, 
120;  and  free  will,  157,  158; 
proved  a  posteriori,  not  a  priori, 
198;  exists,  200-241;  infinite, 
simple,  one,  242-262;  unchange- 
able, eternal,  immense,  263-270; 
knows  all  things,  271-286;  has 
a  will,  287-293;  cooperates  with 
and  conserves  creatures,  294- 
301 ;  no  physical  predetermina- 
tion, 302-305,  313-328;  attitude 
towards    evil,    306-310;     provi- 


dence, 329-338;  in  history,  213, 
214;  and  evil,  223,  231,  232,  239, 
306-311;  known  analogically, 
224;  as  real  and  physical  as  His 
effects,  242;  no  species,  260;  and 
sin,  300;  first  cause,  creatures 
second,  299 ;  causes  acts  of  crea- 
tures by  creation,  conservation, 
coujjeration,  314. 

Gonet,  on  physical  predetermina- 
tion, 302. 

Good,  one,  true,  144;  good  and 
kinds,  145,  151. 

Good  sufi'er,  wicked  prosper,  223, 
334,  335. 

Government  of  world  and  God, 
337 ;  immediate  and  mediate, 
338. 

Grace,  actual,  sufficient,  efficacious ; 
preventing,  assisting,  320,  321, 

Greeks,  and  deities,  252. 

Gregory,  St.,  and  incircumscriptum 
lumen,  192;  on  made,  in  God, 
256. 

Growth,' 12. 

Gunther,  and  two  souls,  64. 


H 


Habits  and  rules,  153. 

Haeckel,  on  spontaneous  genera- 
tion,  13;    and  evolution,  24. 

Hamilton  on  God,   199. 

Hearing  in  Iiypnotism,   187. 

Hedonism's  paradox,   151. 

Hegel  Idea  and  pantheism,  228. 

Hen,  and  scientist,  and  egg,  112. 

Heredity,  24,  26. 

Herschel,  on  God,  199. 

Hindus,  and  deities,  252. 

History,  and  God,  213,  214;  proves 
immortality,   101. 

Hobbes,  on  infinite,  247;  against 
free  will,   173-177. 

Hodgson,  conscious  states,  and 
nerves,  60. 

Hofl'ding,  on  energy  and  inertia, 
62 ;  and  Newton,  62. 

Horace,  on  future  life,  88,  89. 

Hume,  on  soul,  56;  against  free 
will,   177. 

Huxley,  on  soul,  59. 

Hypnotism,  183-196;  and  Mesmer, 
1S3;  and  Braid,  184;  definition, 
184;  senses  in,  186 j  and  intoxi- 


344 


INDEX 


cation,  185,  186;  phenomena,  and 
three  classes,  186;  deception  of 
senses,  186,  187;  hearing  wide 
awake,  other  senses  asleep,  187; 
obedience  in,  will  in,  188;  sleep 
In,  188,  189;  dreams,  and,  mo, 
191;  tricks  in,  spirits  in,  191, 
192;  preternatural  phenomena, 
193;  and  Ethics,  compared  with 
anaesthetics,  193,  194;  and 
Church,  194,  195. 


Idealism,  40,  41;  and  Monism,  58. 

Ideas,  their  origin,  115-143;  Aris- 
totle, St.  Tiiomas,  Scholastics, 
115,  120;  Materialists  and  Sens- 
ists,  116;  Plato,  Leibnitz,  Kant, 
Wolff,  Rosmini,  116,  117;  Ontol- 
ogists,  Traditionalists,  116,  117, 
118,  119,  120;  Descartes,  117;  of 
spiritual  things,  analogical,  123; 
external  senses,  remote  medium 
of;  imagination,  proximate  me- 
dium of,  127,  128;  particular 
and  proper,  general  and  com- 
mon;   and   precedence,    136. 

Identity  of  souls  in  brute,  31;  in 
man,  72,  73. 

Ignorance,  and  God,  214,  235. 

Illumination  of  phantasm,  radical 
and  formal,  138,  139. 

Illusions,  42. 

Images,  imprinted  intelligible, 
124;   developed,   124. 

Imagination,  42;  and  phantasms, 
121,   124. 

Immanence,  and  cooperation,  299; 
and  three  degrees,  10. 

Immanent  action,  9 ;  object  and 
eye,  28,  43,  44. 

Immense,  God  proved,  269;  objec- 
tions, 269,  270. 

Immensity  and  omnipresence,  268. 

Immortality  of  soul,  83-115;  its 
bearing  on  morality,  83 ;  of 
body,  from  faith ;  of  soul,  from 
reason  as  well,  83,  84;  absolute 
in  God,  natural  in  soul  and 
angel,  gratuitous  in  bodies,  84 ; 
proofs,  94-102;  objections,  102- 
115;  a  natural  desire,  98:  per- 
fect happiness  demands,  97,  98; 


man's  perfectibility  demands, 
98;  sanction  demands,  99,  100; 
justice  demands,  100;  common 
consent  demands,  100,  101;  in- 
corruptibility demands,  94;  not 
infinity,  103;  denial  is  hypocrisy, 
103;  Jews  and,  103;  Kant 
against,  104 ;  Verworm  against, 
10")-115;   and  conservation,  296. 

Immunity  from  necessity,  man's 
peculiar  possession,   165. 

Immutability,  and  freedom  in 
God,  291,  292,  293. 

Imprinted  image,  entitative  and 
representative  values,  130;  re- 
moves indifference  of  mind,  133. 

Incarnation,  and  change  in  God, 
266. 

Indefinite  series,  impossible  as  ac- 
tual, 211. 

Indians,  and  future  life,  87. 

Inert,   opposed  to  living,   18. 

Inferior  and  superior  psychology, 
5. 

Infinii  supremum  attingit  infimum 
supremi,  25. 

Infinite,  privative  sense,  and  neg- 
ativo-positive,  all  perfect,  244 ; 
with  Locke,  Spinoza,  llobbes, 
247;  God  proved  infinite,  253, 
254,  255;  objections,  255,  256, 
257;  will  and  infinite  good,  con- 
tingent good,  290;  infinite  series, 
absurd,  217,  218;  with  no  suffi- 
cient reason  for  limits,  254; 
maker  of  all  else,  254;  creative 
power,  255;  multitude,  and  in- 
finite number,  272. 

Infinity,  and  multitude  of  perfec- 
tions, in  God,  256;  and  perfec- 
tion, 255. 

Influence  of  intellect,  end  and  appe- 
tite on  will,  149. 

Ingersoll,  agnostic,  200;  and  God, 
209;  the  American  agnostic, 
231-242. 

Innate  ideas,  refuted,  116,  117. 

Intellect,  46-52;  and  sense,  20; 
differences,  30;  compared,  48; 
definition  of,  35;  and  three  op- 
erations, 36 ;  agens  and  possi- 
bilis,  working  and  receiving,  36, 
121,  122;  distinction  between, 
128,  129;  receiving,  possibilis, 
patibilis,  131,  132;  working,  and 


INDEX 


345 


its  triple  efficacy,  132;  Suarez 
on,   132;   counsels  will,   146. 

Intellectual  wealth  and  trash,  241. 

Intelligence  in  God,  for  possibles, 
273. 

Intermediate,  in  God,  for  futur- 
ibles,  273. 

Intoxication,  and  hypnotism,  185. 

Intussusception,   11. 

Ipsum  esse,  being  itself,  like  elo- 
quence itself,  253,  254. 


Jacobi,  on  God,  199. 

James,  of  Harvard,  on  soul,  56,  57 ; 
rules  for  habits,  153;  on  free 
will,  101,  162;  on  Determinism 
and  Fatalism,   162. 

Japanese,  and  deities,  252. 

Jews,  and  immortality,   103,   104. 

Job,  on  plants  and  animals  of  his 
time,  27. 

Jonson,  Ben,  and  memory,  43. 

Judas,  Peter,  and  Thomists,  288. 

Judgments,  prior  to  choice,  specu- 
lative and  practical,  166;  virtual 
and  formal,  44 ;  ratified  by  com- 
mon consent,  and  four  qualities, 
100,  101,  104. 

Justice,  demands  immortality,  100; 
proves  free  will,   170. 

Justin,  St.,  and  futiu-ibles,  325. 


Kant,  on  philosophy,  2;  on  soul, 
55;  on  noumena  and  phenomena, 
55;  against  immortality,  104; 
on  ideas,  116;  on  God,  198,  199; 
and  agnostics,  201;  against  God, 
220,  221,  224,  22i;. 

Kepler,  on  God,   199. 

Knowledge,  and  science,  and  wis- 
dom, 1,  2,  3;  not  a  physical  and 
chemical  process,  18;  its  instru- 
ments, 20;  defined,  44;  of  body, 
and  singulars,  and  God,  53 ;  has 
rise  in  senses,  123 ;  its  terms, 
intrinsic  and  extrinsic,  125,  126; 
resemblances,  and  three  kinds  of 
truth,  126;  in  God,  271-287;  is 
God's  essence,  271;  one  act, 
many  terms,  271;  pure  act,  no 
potency,   271;    divine  essence  is 


determining  principle,  271; 
threefold,  vision,  intelligence,  in- 
termediate, 272,  273,  274,  275, 
276;  proved,  276,  277. 


Laboratory  cannot  produce  life,  17. 

Lamennais,  on  God,  199;  on  idol- 
atry and  Catholics,  252. 

Lange,  against  God,  226. 

Language,  and  Traditionalists,  119, 
120. 

Last  causes  belong  to  philosophy, 
not  to  science.   111. 

Lateran  Council,  soul  form  of  body, 
81. 

Laws,  and  freedom,   173. 

Leibnitz,  on  union  of  faculty  and 
object,  34;  harmony  and  soul, 
65;  on  ideas,  116;  on  choice, 
157;  and  theodicy,  197;  on  God, 
198,   199. 

Lessius,  blood  and  soul,  77;  on 
dominion  in  man,   338. 

Liberality,  proves  free  will  in  God, 
290. 

Liberty,  defined  and  described,  156, 
157;  of  contradiction,  contrari- 
ety and  specification,   157. 

Liebig,  on  physical  and  chemical 
forces  in  a  cell,   112. 

Life,  6-34;  definition,  7,  8,  21;  sub- 
stantial and  accidental,  8,  92; 
in  God,  8,  9,  277;  in  creatures, 
9;  improvement,  motion,  action, 
9;  sun,  water,  rubber,  9,  10; 
three  principles,  quod,  quo  re- 
motum,  quo  proximum,  10;  three 
grades,  10;  in  plants,  brutes, 
men,  11;  and  first  origin,  13; 
laboratory  cannot  produce,  17; 
internal  and  external  factors, 
112. 

Lipps,  on  free  will,  two  masses  of 
ideas,   163. 

Location,  of  soul,  69 ;  of  different 
activities,  69;  extrinsic  and  in- 
trinsic, 268. 

Locke,  on  objectivity  of  sensations, 
34,  40;  on  judgment,  47;  on 
thought  and  matter,  59,  74 ;  on 
God,  199;  on  infinite,  247;  on 
ideas,  116. 


346 


INDEX 


Loss  in  extent  and  gain  in  inten- 
sity,   102. 

Lotze,  against  Condillac,  48. 

Love  and  hate  in  God,  one  act, 
265. 

Lullaby  and  hypnotism,   189. 

Luther  and  Bible,  62. 


M 


Macaulay,  and  memory,  43. 

Made,  no  part  in  God,  256. 

Malicr,  and  proofs  for  free  will, 
169,  170,  171,  172. 

Majorities  in  realm  of  thought, 
234. 

Malebranche,  on  universals,  50; 
Occasionalism,  and  soul,  65;  on 
ideas,  IKi;  on  God,  198;  and 
Ontologism,  201. 

Mallock,  against  God,  226,  227. 

Manicheans,  and  two  souls,  64. 

Mansel,  on  God,  199;  and  agnostics, 
201;  and  seven  difficulties,  229, 
230. 

Mastrius,  on  ideas,  139. 

Materialism,  6,  7,  03,  64 ;  and  man, 
14,  18;  and  intellect,  47;  on  sen- 
sations, 34,  37 ;  on  ideas,  37 ; 
and  Monism,  58,  59,  60. 

Matter,  and  form  from  life-action, 
17:  primary  and  secondary  qual- 
ities of  matter,  40. 

Maudslcy,  and  lies  about  free  will, 
171. 

Max  Muller,  on  Theos,  197. 

Media  vita  in  morte  sumus,  113. 

Memory,  sensile  and  intellectual, 
42. 

Men,  and  life,  11. 

Merit  proves  free  will,  169. 

Metaphysical,  argument  for  free 
will,  171;  parts,  none  in  God, 
258. 

Metempsychosis,  90. 

Mexicans,  and  their  deities,  252. 

Mezzofanti,   and   memory,   43. 

Mill,  on  soul,  56;  on  Determinism 
and  Fatalism,  158;  against  free 
will,  177,  178,  179,  180;  on  the 
god  of  Hobbes,  173;  on  Cain  and 
Abel,  178;  compares  Determin- 
ism and  Fatalism,  178,  179;  on 
character  in  Determinism,  179; 
on  consciousness  and   free   will, 


179;  a  Fatalist,  179,  180;  and 
lloundaljout  Fatalism,  181; 
against  God,  218,  225,  226. 

Million  guns  to  kill  one  hare,  221, 
222. 

Missing  link,  25. 

Mivart,  and  man's  body,  26. 

Moderate  Dualism,  58. 

Moleschott,  mind  and  phosphores- 
cence, 58. 

Molinism,  free  from  objections, 
327 ;  and  Thomism  compared, 
318-329. 

Molinists,  and  three  kinds  of 
knowledge,  323. 

Monism,  55-63;  and  natural  selec- 
tion, 24. 

Moral  evil,  and  God,  308. 

Morality,  in  will,  143. 

Moses,  and  science,  241. 

Motives,  and  their  elements,  152; 
two  better  than  one,  109. 

Mournful  faith,  immortality,  108, 
109. 

Muckermann,  and  skull-cap,  25. 

Multilocation,  and  quantity,  in 
case  of  soul,  32. 


N 


Natura  odit  saltus,  25. 

Natural  selection,  23,  26. 

Natural  theology,  and  revelation, 
197. 

Nature,  responsible  for  universal 
belief  in  (iod,  235. 

Neanderthal   skull-cap,  25. 

Necessary,  sin  in  hell,  174;  and 
contingent,  204 ;  cannot  be  finite, 
253;  agents,  and  predetermina- 
tion,  314. 

Necessity,  and  God's  foreknowl- 
edge, 275,  276. 

Negative  permission,  requisites, 
307;  of  sin,  good,  308. 

Nerves,  37,  38;   and  ends,  39. 

Newton,  on  God,  19!) ;  and  Holfding, 
62;  on  limitations  of  his  knowl- 
edge, and   immortality,  98. 

Nil  in  intellectu,  123;  and  hypno- 
tism,   188. 

Nil  volitum,  nisi  praecognitum, 
188. 

No  compromise  with  error,  240. 

Nominalism,   49,   51,   52. 


INDEX 


347 


Noumena     and     phenomena,     and 

Kant,  55. 
Xutrition,  11,  12. 


O 


Obedience,  in  hypnotism,   187. 

Objectivity   of   sensations,   41. 

Obligation  proves  free  will,  169. 

Occasionalism,  and  soul  and  body, 
65. 

0  felix  culpa,  310. 

Omnipotence,  absolute  and  relative, 
221. 

One  essentially,  and  God,  251; 
proof,  260;    objections,  201,  2G2. 

Ontological  argument  for  immor- 
tality, 94,  95. 

Ontologism,  and  God,  198. 

Ontologists,  201;  refuted,  215, 
210;  on  ideas,   110. 

Order,  205;  physical,  205,  206; 
proves  God,  212;  moral,  206, 
207;  proves  God,  212,  213;  ob- 
jections, 220,  221,  222. 

Organs,  definition,  35;  of  senses, 
external  and  internal,  36 ;  no 
cause  of  thought,  but  condition, 
64. 

Origin,  of  soul,  84,  85,  86;  Plato 
and  Pythagoras,  on,  84;  Tradu- 
cianism.  Material  and  Spiritual, 
on,  85,  86;  Exaggerated  Creati- 
anism,  on,  85,  8G ;  Rosmini,  on, 
85;  Evolutionists,  on,  86;  crea- 
tion by  God,  86,  87 ;  of  our  ideas, 
115-143. 

Ovid,  on  future  life,  90. 

Ovulation,   12. 

Owen,  on  life,  8. 

Ownership,  in  man,  relative  with 
regard  to  God,  338. 

Oxygen,  and  soul,   16. 


Paderewski,    and    battered    piano, 

114. 
Paley's  watch,   226. 
Pantheism,  227,  228;  and  God,  all 

being,  256;  and  Ontologism,  118. 
Parallelism,  Cliflord  and  Bain,  60. 
Paralysis,   and   consciousness,    108. 
Pascal,  and  memory,  43. 
Pasteur,  and  spontaneous  genera- 


tion, 13,  111;  on  science  and  last 
causes.  111. 

Paul,  St.,  on  three  kinds  of  free- 
dom, 164;  on  God  and  light,  197; 
and  Thomists,  282,  283;  harden- 
ing by  God,  308. 

Perfect  happiness,  demands  im- 
mortality, 97,  98;  perfect  love  of 
God,  ontological  and  motive  root, 
148. 

Perfectibility  demands  immortal- 
ity, 98. 

Perfection,  finish,  good,   145. 

Permission,  negative  and  positive, 
306,  307. 

Personality,  and  infinity,  257. 

Phantasm,  cannot  unite  with  mind, 
133;  and  its  illumination,  138; 
its  causality  in  ideas,  137. 

Phenomena,  and  noumena,  55;  in 
hypnotism,  three  classes,  186; 
preternatural,   192. 

Phenomenists,  and  intelligence,  47. 

Philosophy,  definition  and  division, 
1;  handmaid  to  theology,  198; 
and  God,  214. 

Phrenology,  and  soul,  69,  70. 

Physical  evil,  and  God,  307. 

Physical  predetermination,  accord- 
ing to  Goudin,  278;  explained, 
319;  according  to  Gonet,  302; 
superfluous  for  four  reasons, 
278;  hurts  human  freedom,  279; 
and  simultaneous  cooperation, 
compared,  308;  ruled  out,  311; 
useless,  and  destructive  of  free 
will,  313-317;  is  formal  coop- 
eration with  sin,  315;  makes 
God  author  of  sin,  315;  not  in 
our  power,  with  it  act  must  fol- 
low, without  it  act  cannot  be 
placed,  315;  leaves  will  only  pas- 
sive indifference,  314;  with 
Thomists,  315;  elements,  313. 

Physics,  and  free  will,   172. 

Physiologists,  and  soul,   18. 

Physiology,  and  free  will,  172. 

Piety,  and  freedom,  174. 

Pithecanthropus  erectus,   25. 

Pius  IX,  Pope,  and  Gunther,  64, 
G5. 

Plants,  and  life,  and  their  func- 
tions, 11  ;  differ  from  minerals 
in  nine  points,  16,  17 ;  from 
brutes   in   four   points,   19;   soul 


348 


INDEX 


esaentiallv  different  from  forces, 
21,  22,  2U\  organic  beings,  22. 

Plato,  4;  on  universals,  50,  52;  and 
three  souls,  04;  on  soul's  loca- 
tion, C9;  on  origin  of  soul,  84; 
discere  est  reminisci,  85;  and 
ideas,  116,  117;  like  knows  like, 
129;    and   primus  motor,   220. 

Plutarch,  and  God,  209. 

Polytheism,  and  monotheism,  209, 
210;  and  common  consent,  223, 
261,  202;  kinds,  252;  Chaldeans 
first,  252;  its  three  causes.  252; 
with  Greeks,  Romans,  Hindus, 
Japanese,  252. 

Positivists,  and  intelligence,  47. 

Practical  judgment,  free  will,  and 
Hobbes,  175. 

Praeambula   fidei,    198. 

Praedett'rmlnatio  and  praemotio, 
302,  303;  one  towards  summum 
bonum,  other  towards  created 
goods,  304. 

Praemotio  physica  of  Thomists, 
166,  167. 

Praise,  and  free  will,  174;  and 
blame  for  creed,  240. 

Prayer,  and  free  will,  174;  and 
God,  236 ;  and  change  in  God, 
265;   and  free  will  in  God,  290. 

Predestination,  with  Reformers 
and  Catholics,  159,  160. 

Predictions,  free  will,  and  Hume, 
177. 

Preestablished  harmony,  soul  and 
body,   65. 

Prejudice,  and  God,  214,  236. 

Prescience  of  God,  free  will,  and 
Hume,  177;  with  Mill,  177,  178. 

Presence  of  God  in  creatures,  three- 
fold, by  essence,  by  power,  by 
presence,   268. 

Previous  judgment  of  Thomists,  a 
lie,  166;  incompatible  with  free 
will,   168,   169. 

Procrress,  in  religion,  237. 

Providence  of  God,  329-338;  defi- 
nition, 329;  division,  329,  330; 
antecedent  and  consequent,  330; 
proved,  .j.il ;  objections,  331; 
defined  by  Vatican,  330;  extends 
to  all  creatures,  332,  333; 
touches  man  in  very  special  way, 
334;  immediate  and  particular 
over  all,  330;  and  consequent  ne- 


cessity,  in   case  of  free   agents, 

337;    St.    Augxistine    and    Plato, 

on,  336. 
Psychological    arguments   for    free 

will,   170. 
Psychology,  definition,  4;   rational 

and  experimental,  63. 
Pythagoras,    and    philosopher,    3; 

and  Transmigration,  18. 


Q 


Qui  facit  per  alium  facit  per  se, 
309. 

R 

Race,  26. 

Rationalism,  and  Ontologism,  118. 

Realism,  Exaggerated,  49,  52 ;  Mod- 
erate,  50,  52,   53. 

Realistic  Monism,  60,  61,  62. 

Relation  between  intellect  and  will 
proves  free  will,   168,  171. 

Remorse,  proves  free  will,  169;  and 
God,  223. 

Resemblances  between  parents  and 
children,   76. 

Resistance  to  temptation  proves 
free    will,    170. 

Responsibility  proves  free  will, 
169. 

Rickaby,  Free  Will,  and  Four  Eng- 
lish Philosophers,  173-182;  on 
choice  and  greater  complacency, 
180. 

Rinn  against  Mercer,  114. 

Rosmini,  on  origin  of  .soul,  85;  on 
ideas,  116;  on  God,  198. 

Roundabout  Fatalism,  181. 

Rudimentary   organs,  27. 


Sailors  and  cargo,  174. 

Salvation,  free  gift  of  God,  and  re- 
ward of  man's  efforts,  321. 

Sanction  demands  immortality,  99. 

Savages,  priests  and  God,  235. 

Scaliger,  and  memory,  43. 

Scholastics  on  ideas,  120;  on  free 
will,   163,    171. 

Scientific  judgment,  and  ethical, 
104. 

Scotus,  on  ideas,   140. 

Seated  man  cannot  walk,  279. 

Self-control  and  will,  153. 


INDEX 


349 


Sellishness,  and  God,  235. 

Self-motion,  8,  9 ;  motion  always 
from  another,  28 ;  motion  in  min- 
erals, 28. 

Sensation,  34-46;  what,  how  ac- 
complished, what  it  perceives, 
34 ;  with  Materialists,  34 ;  and 
Cartesians,  Descartes,  and  Locke, 
34 ;  three  stages,  3(5 ;  in  proper 
organ,  not  in  brain,  38;  two 
values,  cognitive  and  emotional, 
39;  in  objective  and  subjective 
phases,  40 ;  and  retention,  43 ; 
union  of  facultj'  and  object,  44; 
touch  and  sphere,  44;  material 
principle,  45. 

Sensationists,  and  intelligence,  47. 

Senses,  in  hypnotism,  185. 

Sensists,  and  soul,  18;  and  ideas, 
116;  and  Dualism,  58,  59. 

Sensu  diviso,   and   composito,   320. 

Several  gods,  a  contradiction,  260. 

Shakespeare  before  Scripture,  240. 

Ship,  wind,  pilot,  and  God's  co- 
operation, 304,   305. 

Sickness  affects  organs,  not  soul, 
75. 

Simplicity,  of  soul,  definition,  60; 
kinds,  67,  68 ;  brute  soul,  and  St. 
Thomas,  68;  and  location,  68, 
69;  proofs,  71,  72;  objections, 
76,  77,  78,  79;  form  without  mat- 
ter, 71;  no  quantity,  72. 

Simplicity,  of  God,  defined ;  phys- 
yical,  metaphysical,  logical,  247, 
248,  249;  no  physical  or  meta- 
physical composition  in  God, 
257,  258,  259,  260;  means  more 
than  unity,  249;  and  Three  Per- 
sons, 250;  God  proved  simple, 
257,  258;  objections,  258,  259, 
260;  and  complete  knowledge  of 
God,  258. 

Simultaneous  cooperation,  308 ; 
explained,  317;  is  right,  317, 
318,  319;  is  material  coopera- 
tion, 31.5. 

Sin,  infinite,  viewing  the  person 
offended,  94;  physical  act  and 
moral  malice  inseparable,  304; 
God  not  author  of,  318. 

Singulars,  knowledge   of,  52. 

Sleep,  hypnotic,   188,   189. 

Socrates,   4. 

Sophocles,  and  Fatalism,  158,  159. 


Soporific  talker,  and  hypnotism, 
189. 

Soul,  in  man,  what  it  is  not,  55- 
63;  what  it  is,  63-115;  its 
powers,  124 ;  in  plant  and  brute, 
material  and  non-subsistent;  in 
man,  spiritual  and  incompletely 
subsistent;  a  substance  and 
form,  14 ;  in  brute,  mortal,  made 
by  parents;  in  man,  immortal, 
created  by  God,  19;  and  chem- 
ical analysis,  29;  divisible  in 
plants  and  brutes  per  accidens; 
in  men,  indivisible  per  se  and 
per  accidens,  32,  33;  in  perfect 
brutes,  dies  in  part,  33 ;  and 
quantity,  32 ;  and  multilocation, 
32 ;  quality  in  brutes,  31 ;  in 
amputated  limb,  32;  a  real, 
abiding,  unitary,  simple,  spirit- 
ual, immortal  being,  56;  soul 
and  body  form  one  substance, 
73,  74;  objections,  80,  81,  82; 
coextensive  with  body,  79;  par- 
takes of  body's  material  being, 
81;  of  Christ  in  Sacred  Host, 
82;  origin  of  soul,  84,  85,  86; 
separated  from  body,  can  think 
and  wish,  95,  102;  soul,  and 
body,  and  imntortality,  106,  107. 

Species,  in  Evolution,  shape  and 
fertility,  26. 

Species,  id  quo,  non  id  quod;  in- 
tentionales;  sensiles  and  intel- 
ligibilcs;  impressa  and  expressa, 
40,  41;  body-essence  spiritual- 
ized, 121,  122;  substitute  for  it, 
122;  escapes  senses,  not  mind, 
45. 

Spencer,  on  life,  8;  on  soxil,  60, 
61;  on  free  will,  172;  on  God, 
199;  agnostic,  200;  against  God, 
218,  223,  224,  225. 

Spinal  cord,  38. 

Spinoza,  on  free  will,  170;  sub- 
stance and  pantheism,  228 ;  on 
infinite,   247. 

Spirits  in  hypnotism,  192;  evil, 
and  agents,  192. 

Spirituality,  of  soul;  different 
from  simplicity,  compatible  with 
extrinsic  dependence  on  matter, 
66;  definition,  66;  proofs,  70,  71; 
objections,  74,  75,  76 ;  intrinsic 
independence  of  organs,  71;  con- 


350 


INDEX 


cept  of,  abstractive  and  noga- 
tivo-positive,   75. 

Spiritiialization  of  outside  objects, 
129,  130. 

Spontaneous  generation,  13;  Pas- 
teur, Haeckel,  Scholastics,  13. 

Spontaneous  acts,  without  choice, 
152;  different  from  voluntary, 
164,  165. 

Stout,  and  lies  about  free  will,  171. 

Strauss,  on  immortal  and  infinite, 
103;  on  seed  never  matured,  98. 

Struggle  for  existence,  24,  26. 

Suarez,  on  blood  and  soul,  77; 
sweet  to  die,  110;  on  thought, 
140,  141;  on  working  intellect, 
132;  on  phantasm,  137;  on  Mo- 
linism,  327. 

Subjectivism,  and  Ingersoll,  232. 

Substance,  and  soul;  for  mind,  not 
for  senses,  66,  67 ;  complete  and 
incomplete,  67;  and  nature,  70; 
and  destruction,  234. 

Substantial  volition,  and  its  in- 
finite actuality  in  God,  292. 

Supremum  infimi  attingit  infimum 
supremi,   128. 


Temptation,  not  wrong,  but  con- 
sent to  it,   160,  161. 

Theistic  Ethical  argument  for  im- 
mortality,  99. 

Theistic  Ontological  argument  for 
immortality,  96,  97. 

Theistic  Teleological  argument  for 
immortality,  97. 

Theodicy,  justification  of  God,  197. 

Theology,  crown  and  consummation 
of  philosophy,  197;  natural  and 
dogmatic,   198. 

Thomas,  St.,  on  generation,  12;  on 
soul,  15;  on  faculties,  46;  on 
donkey  and  horse,  27 ;  on  brain 
and  internal  senses,  39,  70:  on 
objectivity  of  sensations,  41; 
simplicity  of  brute  soul,  (i8;  on 
angelic  power,  76;  on  matter  and 
form,  77 ;  blood,  part  of  body  in 
potency,  77 ;  on  time  of  soul's 
creation,  87 ;  and  foeticide,  87 ; 
four  arguments  for  immortality, 
96-101;  immortality,  a  natural 
desire,  97,  98;   answers  Strauss 


and  Biedermann,  103;  on  ideas, 
115,  136;  on  teacher  and  pupil, 
119;  on  sense  and  intellect,  123; 
on  phantasm  and  intellect,  138; 
on  causes  of  choice,  155,  156; 
and  a  posteriori  argument,  202; 
essence  and  individuation  in 
God,  and  in  Socrates,  262 ;  on 
conservation,  295;  on  predeter- 
mination, 303;  on  praemotio, 
304 ;  fourfold  dependence  of  crea- 
tures in  cooperation,  312;  au- 
thority for  Molinism,  322 ;  on 
providence,  330. 

Thomism,  and  Molinism,  compared, 
318-329;  wrong  on  three  counts, 
subjectively  absolute  and  ob- 
jectively conditional  decrees, 
death  to  liberty,  no  sufficient 
grace,   326,   327. 

Thomists,  and  previous  practical 
judgment,  166,  167,  168,  169; 
and  physical  predetermination, 
277,  278,  279,  280,  281,  282,  302, 
303;  and  grace's  process,  319; 
favor  God's  dominion  to  preju- 
dice of  human  endeavor ;  Mo- 
linists  favor  human  endeavor 
without  prejudice  to  God's  do- 
minion, 321,  322;  and  two  kinds 
of  knowledge  in  God,  323. 

Thomson,  on  God,   199. 

Thought,  and  its  process,  122; 
Suarez  on,  140,  141 ;  a  true  vital, 
cognoscitive  act,   126. 

Three  Persons,  not  three  gods,  261. 

Time,  266. 

Tongiorgi,  denies  soul  in  plants, 
14;   on  ideas,   123. 

Traditionalists,  201;  their  argu- 
ments, 225;  on  ideas,  116;  ab- 
surdities,   118,    119,    120. 

Traduciaiiism,    85,   86. 

Transmigralion  of  souls,   18,  90. 

Tricks  in  hypnoti.sm,  191. 

Trinitj',  and  physical  predetermin- 
ation, 320. 

Tyre  and  Sidon,  281,  282. 


U 


Ubaghs,  on  God,  198. 
Ultra  Dualism,  58. 
Unchangeable,    God    proved,    263, 
264;  objections,  264,  265,  266. 


INDEX 


351 


Unitary  being,  soul,   67. 

Unity,  of  soul,  67,  70;  proofs,  72, 
73;  objections,  79,  80;  of  indi- 
visibility, 70;  of  God,  defined, 
kinds,  250,  251 ;  transcendental 
and  essential,  251;  unus  and 
xuiicus,  251;  Three  Persons,  and, 
251;  St.  Tliomas  on  unity  in 
God,  251. 

Universals,  4U-55;  what,  and 
kinds,  40;  direct  and  retlex,  50; 
proved  from  common  and  collec- 
tive nouns,  51,  52;  fundamental- 
ly and  formally,  52  ;  ens  rationis, 
53. 


Variety  of  religions,  and  God,  238 ; 
in  Evolution,  20. 

Vaughau,  and  broken  down  har- 
monium, 70. 

Ventura,  on  ideas,  118. 

Verworm,  against  immortality, 
105-115;  twelve  arguments,  105, 
106;  soul  mortal  as  body,  106, 
107 ;  consciousness  depends  on 
brain,  107 ;  complex  phenomenon 
and  condition  cease  together, 
107 ;  paralysis  inhibits  conscious- 
ness, 108;  a  mournful  faith,  and 
fear,  108,  109,  110;  cowards  fear 
death,  110,  111;  causal  view  and 
condition  \iew,  111;  life-factors, 
internal  and  external,  112; 
Comte  on  life,  113;  monk  of  St. 
Gall,  113;  dependent  on  matter, 
113;  dust  thou  art,  113. 

Vibrations,  not  sensible  qualities, 
but  accompany  them,  45. 

Virchow,  on  bones  of  man  and  ape, 
25. 

Vision,  in  God,  for  actuals,  present, 
past,  conditional  and  absolute 
futures,  272,  273,  281. 


Vitalism,  strengthened  by  true  sci- 
ence, 111. 
Vital  acts,  six,  15. 
Voltaire,  on  thinking  matter,  74. 

W 

War  between  passion  and  will 
proves  one  soul,  79. 

\\  assmann,  on  Particular  Evolu- 
tion, 26. 

Waste  of  organisms,  and  God,  220. 

\Vater,  and  liberty,  and  Hobbes, 
175. 

Whipped  men,  and  necessary  being, 
218. 

Wholes,   and  their  kinds,  68. 

Will,  and  its  object,  143-150;  defi- 
nition, 143 ;  will  free,  appetite 
necessary,  143,  144;  mistress  of 
appetite,  144;  energy  measured 
by  intellect's,  all  good,  147; 
will's  freedom,  150-183;  nine 
emotions,  appetite  and  passions, 
150,  151;  in  hypnotism,  188,  190. 

Will  in  God,  necessary  regarding 
Himself,  free  regarding  crea- 
tures, 287-294;  in  God,  287; 
emotions  in  God,  287 ;  God's  es- 
sence, 287 ;  entitatively  one  act, 
terminatively  many,  288;  and 
its  kinds,  288;  of  good  pleasui'e 
and  in  symbol,  288;  antecedent 
and  consequent,  288;  absolute 
and  conditional,  288;  proofs, 
290. 

William  of  Champeaux,  and  uni- 
versals, 50. 

Wish,  viewed  actively  and  passive- 
ly, 265. 

Words  and  ideas,  119;  flexible 
phantasms,  120;  useless  without 
prior  ideas,  119,   120. 

Worship,  absolute  and  relative, 
253. 


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